

After Demosthenes

*The Politics of Early
Hellenistic Athens*

Andrew J. Bayliss

VISIT...

LANZAROTE
Caliente.COM

After Demosthenes

After Demosthenes

The Politics of Early Hellenistic Athens

Andrew J. Bayliss



To Vicky

Continuum International Publishing Group

The Tower Building 80 Maiden Lane
11 York Road Suite 704
London SE1 7NX New York NY 10038

www.continuumbooks.com

Copyright © Andrew J. Bayliss 2011

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission from the publishers.

First published 2011

British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data

A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

EISBN: 978-1-4411-0276-8

Typeset by Newgen Imaging Systems Pvt Ltd, Chennai, India
Printed and bound in Great Britain

Contents

<i>Preface</i>	vi
<i>Abbreviations and Conventions</i>	ix
Introduction	1
Chapter 1: The Reception of Hellenistic Athens: The Origins of a Negative Image	10
Chapter 2: Ideology in Hellenistic Athens	49
Chapter 3: The Enemy Within: Oligarchy in Hellenistic Athens	61
Chapter 4: Democracy in Hellenistic Athens	94
Chapter 5: Phocion: ‘The Good’ or ‘The Bad’?	129
Chapter 6: Stratocles of Diomeia: Audacious Buffoon or Shamelessly Bold?	152
Chapter 7: Callippus of Eleusis: Tin-Pot General, or Generalissimo?	187
Conclusion	211
<i>Notes</i>	215
<i>Select Bibliography</i>	254
<i>Index</i>	271

Preface

This book has been a very long time coming. It began life as a PhD dissertation at Macquarie University in Sydney more than ten years ago. That dissertation was completed three years later at the British School at Athens, and since then has been refined during a spell at the University of Nottingham and lately at the University of Birmingham. During the course of this epic journey (at least in terms of distance travelled) many individuals have helped transform the sometimes poorly written thoughts of a postgraduate student into what is now hopefully a thought-provoking and somewhat provocative monograph.

I must first thank Dr David Phillips, from the Department of Ancient History at Macquarie University, who first inspired me to take an interest in early Hellenistic Athens as an undergraduate. Hopefully David will recognize some of the sentiments expressed in this book. This academic year I had the pleasure of introducing twelve intrepid undergraduates to Hellenistic Athens in a module taught at the University of Birmingham, as David once did for me at Macquarie. Like this book, that experience would never have come about without David's encouragement over the years.

I would also like to thank Christian Habicht, Graham Shipley and Richard Billows for their helpful suggestions for the future publication of my work. The length of time it has taken to develop this monograph is in no way due to any deficiencies in the feedback they offered. I hope that I have done their suggestions some justice.

During my time at the British School at Athens, first as a visiting doctoral student, and later as the School Student, my knowledge and understanding of Hellenistic Athens, epigraphy, archaeology and scholarship in general was considerably expanded by conversation with Graham Oliver, Stephen Lambert, David Blackman, Graham Shipley, Ioanna Kralli, Alan Henry, Sean Byrne, Peter Thonemann, Peter Liddel, John Morgan, David Jordan, John Traill and Charles Crowther. Special thanks go to Stephen for showing me the ropes at the Epigraphical Museum in 1999.

During my time in Athens my endeavours were made considerably easier by the wonderful libraries (and librarians) at the British School and the

American School of Classical Studies. I would also like to thank the staff at the National Archaeological Museum, the Epigraphical Museum, and the Athenian Agora for their assistance, and their patience with my deficiencies in speaking Greek.

I would also like to thank my former colleagues at the Department of Classics at the University of Nottingham. Working with the incomparable Alan Sommerstein on the Leverhulme Trust-funded project ‘The Oath in Archaic and Classical Greece’ was an immensely rewarding experience. I am immensely grateful to Alan for his generous support during and after my time at Nottingham. I would also like to thank my other colleagues on the Oath Project: Isabelle Torrance, Kyriaki Konstantinidou, and Lynn Kozak. Thanks also go to Steve Hodgkinson for his guidance during and after my time at Nottingham. The benefits of my time working on Alan’s Oath Project can be seen throughout this volume, but the first chapter would not have come about if not for my former colleague (and tenant) Ian Macgregor Morris. Ian not only schooled me on the importance of the classical tradition, but also provided me with eighteenth-century tomes referred to in this monograph in lieu of rent! Many of the ideas in this book were forged in the fires of the now-infamous ‘coffee and complaining’ sessions we shared with Carsten Lange. I owe much to these two true gentlemen and scholars.

I would also like to thank my new colleagues at the Institute of Archaeology and Antiquity at the University of Birmingham. Collectively they have helped make the transition from postdoctoral researcher to lecturer much smoother than it could have been, which has allowed me finally to get around to finishing this book. I would especially like to thank Niall McKeown, Gareth Sears, Mary Harlow, Diana Spencer, Gideon Nisbet, Gillian Shepherd, John Carman, and Ken Dowden for their support. Very special thanks go to Niall for introducing me to my editor, and for reading a large chunk of this book when he really did not have the time to do so.

I must also thank my family for bearing with me while I have researched and written various parts of this book over the years. It has been a long time since my brother Peter suggested that I stop studying physics at high school and added a third unit of ancient history since I was enjoying the first two so much. My family supported me then, and have continued to support me despite my eccentric career choice, and my even more eccentric choice to swap Australian sun for British rain. I would never have even started the journey that led to this book without their love and support. I cannot thank them enough.

Thanks also go to my parents-in-law for their support since my move to the UK, not least for loaning me the laptop on which much of Chapter 1 was written!

Lastly, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude to my wife Vicky who has balanced the roles of sounding board, copy editor, devil's advocate, research assistant, thesaurus, cajoler, nurse, cook, friend and partner in all ways throughout the time that I have been writing this book. She has supported me in every possible way, and I cannot thank her enough. I really cannot express in words how much I owe Vicky; all I can say is that this book would never have been finished without her love and encouragement. It is dedicated to her, because without her it simply would not exist.

AJB
September 2010
Birmingham

Abbreviations and Conventions

<i>ABSA</i>	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>
<i>Agora 15</i>	Meritt, B. D. and J. S. Traill (1974), <i>Inscriptions: The Athenian Councillors</i> . The Athenian Agora XV. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
<i>Agora 16</i>	Woodhead, A. G. (1997), <i>Inscriptions: The Decrees</i> . The Athenian Agora XVI. Princeton: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
<i>AJPh</i>	<i>American Journal of Philology</i>
<i>AM</i>	<i>Mitteilungen des deutschen archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung</i>
<i>AncSoc</i>	<i>Ancient Society</i>
<i>AncW</i>	<i>Ancient World</i>
<i>ASNP</i>	<i>Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa, Classe di Lettere e Filosofia</i>
<i>BCH</i>	<i>Bulletin de correspondance Hellénique</i>
<i>CID</i>	<i>Corpus des inscriptions de Delphes</i> . Paris: École française d'Athènes.
<i>CQ</i>	<i>Classical Quarterly</i>
<i>FD</i>	<i>Fouilles de Delphes</i> . Paris: Boccard.
<i>FGrHist</i>	Jacoby, F. (1923–58), <i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> . Berlin: Weidmann.
<i>GHI</i>	Tod, M.N. (1948), <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions, ii. From 403 to 323 BC</i> . Oxford: Clarendon.
<i>GRBS</i>	<i>Greek, Roman, and Byzantine Studies</i>
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> . Berlin: de Gruyter.
<i>ISE</i>	Moretti, L. (1967), <i>Iscrizioni Storiche ellenistiche</i> . Florence: La nuova Italia.

<i>OCD</i> ⁸	Hornblower, S. and A. Spawforth (1996), <i>Oxford Classical Dictionary</i> , 3rd edn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
<i>OGIS</i>	Dittenberger, W. (1903–5), <i>Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae</i> . Leipzig: Hirzel.
<i>PdeP</i>	<i>La Parola del Passato</i>
<i>P.Oxy.</i>	<i>The Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i>
<i>REG</i>	<i>Revue des études grecques</i>
<i>SEG</i>	<i>Supplementum Epigraphicum Graecum</i> . Leiden: Gieben.
<i>Suda</i>	Adler, A. (1928–38) (ed.), <i>Suidae Lexicon</i> . 4 vols. Leipzig: Teubner.
<i>Syll</i> ⁸	Dittenberger, W. (1915–24), <i>Sylloge Inscriptionum Graecarum</i> , 3rd edn. Leipzig: Hirzel.
<i>TAPA</i>	<i>Transactions of the American Philological Association</i>
<i>ZPE</i>	<i>Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik</i>

Abbreviations of primary sources follow standard conventions, and are therefore not included in the abbreviations or the bibliography. All primary literary texts cited in this work are readily accessible to the non-specialist in both English and the original Greek or Latin in the Loeb Classical Library (Harvard University Press). All translations in this work are adapted from the Loeb translations.

All ancient dates in this book are BC unless otherwise stated.

Athenian archon dates 300/299–262/1 are based on Osborne, 2009.

There is no hard and fast rule for the spelling of Greek names. I was once very careful to transliterate Greek names rather than latinizing, or Anglicizing, but it seems pointlessly pedantic to spell Plutarch as Ploutarchos, or Aelian as Ailian. Even if one does transliterate carefully, inconsistencies are still a necessary evil, because no one outside of Greece would dream of spelling Athens as Athenai. In general I have tried to avoid the temptation to transliterate when writing this book. The result has been somewhat inconsistent and eccentric – I have opted for Aristides rather than Aristeides, but preferred Meidias to Midias. Athenian demes have been particularly tricky. I have chosen Phalerum, not Phaleron, Lamptrae instead of Lamptrai, but could not bear to use Sunium, and have instead chosen Sounion. Nonetheless, I trust that the reader will find the same names are always spelled the same (except when being quoted), and will not find the result too confusing.

Introduction

It is of no importance that the heart of Athens, her democratic system, continued fitfully to beat when her power to defend herself was largely paralysed.

Cawkwell, 'The End of Greek Liberty'

For George Cawkwell, Athens, once she has lost her liberty, is no longer worthy of study. His rejection of Athenian democracy when it no longer served the needs of an expansionist, imperialist state, is far from unusual. Most modern discussions of Athenian politics and Athenian democracy terminate in 322, or even 338.¹ Although there were democratic revivals in 318, 307, 288 and 229, in the modern discipline of classics these revivals are routinely overlooked, and the leading democratic politicians of later years are virtually unknown. When these democratic revivals have been noticed by modern scholars, the Athenians of the Hellenistic period have typically been seen as a shabby and shameful parody of their illustrious Classical predecessors, a people who lost their empire, their liberty, and their self-respect.

The lamentable place of Hellenistic Athens in modern scholarship is perhaps best illustrated by the fate of the Athenian general Phocion, one of the leading lights of the late fourth century. Phocion's career coincides with the early phases of the Hellenistic period, and his descent into obscurity mirrors that of his city. A student of Plato (Plut. *Phocion* 4.2, 14.7; *Moralia* 1126c), Phocion served as general on no less than forty-five occasions (Plut. *Phocion* 8.2). He was a friend of Alexander the Great, described by Demosthenes as 'the grater of my speeches', and the subject of no less than two ancient biographies.² Yet, when discussing Plutarch's *Phocion*, Robert Lamberton (2003, p. 8) observes:

The outstanding examples of . . . excellence expressed in lives circumscribed by history, lives well lived in spite of circumstances . . . are found in the pair *Phocion and Cato the Younger*. Cato is a figure familiar to anyone

with the slightest interest in the Greco-Roman world while Phocion is virtually unknown.

Lamberton goes on to claim that Phocion has only been ‘saved from oblivion’ thanks to Plutarch’s *Life*, yet at the same time relegates that particular work as ‘among the least read of the collection’.³ These are remarkable words indeed from one of the world’s foremost experts on Plutarch, for until quite recently, Phocion has been anything but ‘virtually unknown’, thanks almost entirely to Plutarch’s *Life*. Phocion was particularly well known in eighteenth-century France. Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, whom the French revolutionaries made a ‘father of the nation’ (Macgregor Morris, 2004, p. 343), chose Phocion as his mouthpiece for disseminating his personal political views to the wider world in his work *Entretiens de Phocion* (1763), which purported to be a new translation of an ancient dialogue featuring Phocion. François-Nicolas Delaistre (a student of Jacques-Louis David) was commissioned to produce a statue of Phocion for the chamber of the Sénat in the Palais du Luxembourg in Paris in 1804. The French compared Benjamin Franklin to Phocion when he was serving as an ambassador in Paris (Hill, 1869, p. 299), a comparison that was clearly intended to be an understandable compliment. Countless prominent Frenchmen, including no lesser figures than Robespierre and Brissot, consoled themselves on their way to the guillotine with the idea that their unjust deaths resembled that of Phocion at the hands of his countrymen. Phocion’s death was the subject of several influential paintings, including Joseph-Denis Odevare’s *Death of Phocion* that won the Prix de Rome in 1804, and two by Nicolas Poussin, which in turn inspired Fénelon to take the death of Phocion as a theme for one of his *Dialogues of the Dead* (Jamot, 1922, p. 158).

This was not just a French phenomenon – Phocion was a recognizable political figure elsewhere. Alexander Hamilton wrote two letters to the people of New York using the nom de plume Phocion;⁴ in 1766 Pitt received a ‘head of Phocion’ as a gift (Robbins, 1950, p. 428); and in 1821 the Greek revolutionaries wrote to Congress of the United States of America for aid, believing that, ‘the fellow-citizens of Penn, of Washington, and of Franklin will not refuse their aid to the descendants of Phocion, and Thrasybulus, of Aratus, and of Philopoemen’ (cited by Earle, 1927, p. 344). The fact that the fledgling Greek state chose Phocion over what we would think of as more obvious examples such as Miltiades, Themistocles, Leonidas, Pericles, or even Demosthenes, demonstrates how well known and admired Phocion was even in the nineteenth century.

Even a cursory survey of the writings of our predecessors in the field of Greek history will show that Phocion's demise, along with other key episodes of the history of Hellenistic Athens, holds a prominent place in many of the pioneering works of Greek history from the long eighteenth century, and indeed into the nineteenth century. This begs the question of how the discipline of ancient history has changed from one in which Phocion's death was central to Greek history, to one in which his very existence is almost entirely overlooked. How did the Athenians of the Hellenistic era fall so far, so fast?

There are obvious and understandable reasons for the scholarly neglect of Hellenistic Athens, some of which have been discussed in three recent discussions of the marginalization of Hellenistic history as a whole.⁵ The lack of a narrative source has not helped Hellenistic Athens. Fifth-century Athens has Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon. Hellenistic Athens has only Diodorus, and he runs out just as the Hellenistic period gets going. Had Philochorus' *Atthis*, which covered the period down to his death in 262, survived, Hellenistic Athens might appear more attractive to modern classicists. Hellenistic Athens might have more appeal if the openly political comedies of Alexis had been found in the Egyptian desert rather than the apolitical writings of Menander. The fact that the history of Hellenistic Athens has to be reconstructed from relatively inaccessible inscriptions has not helped Hellenistic Athens either. Nor has the long neglect of the Hellenistic period as a whole. Neither Greek nor Roman history, Hellenistic history has until recently sat on the margins of classical scholarship.

But while the current marginalization of Hellenistic Athens in modern scholarship can be partly attributed to the factors just discussed, it is the tendency towards negative comparison to Classical Athens that has proven crucial. The tendency of modern scholars to judge the Hellenistic Athenians largely in comparison to their Classical predecessors means that it is almost inevitable that their history will be seen as a period of decline, and therefore less appealing to scholars. By many standards of comparison the Hellenistic Athenians fail to measure up to their more glorious and well-known predecessors. For starters, Athens was no longer a maritime superpower in the Aegean: the Hellenistic Athenians lacked an empire; their fleet was destroyed by the Macedonians; and they were forced to endure the indignity of a Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus. Secondly, after almost two centuries of independent democratic rule, there were long periods of disruption to democracy and times when the Hellenistic Athenians owed their allegiance to foreign monarchs. Furthermore, fewer great works of art were produced, and the size of funerary monuments was severely curtailed. Compared to the

era of Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Plato and Thucydides, there are few surviving works of literature (Menander's works are preserved only in limited form, while Alexis, Philemon and Philippides of Cephale survive only in fragments), and there is a dearth of extant contemporary historical sources (Philochorus, Demochares of Leuconoe and Phylarchus survive only in fragments). Without a Thucydides, a Pheidias, or an Aristophanes to cast light on their actions and achievements, the Hellenistic Athenians are almost bound to be seen as inferior to their Classical counterparts.

But the problem goes beyond aesthetics. The crux of the matter appears to be the issue of freedom. The plight of the Greek cities in a world dominated by the Macedonians such as Antipater, Cassander, Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonos Gonatas is best summed up by a speech of Chlaeneas the Aetolian to the Spartans, recorded by Polybius (9.29):

As for the Successors of Alexander, need I tell you in detail how they treated the Greeks? For no one is so indifferent to facts as not to have heard how Antipater after his victory over the Greeks at Lamia treated the unhappy Athenians as well as the other Greeks in the harshest manner, going so far in his wanton and lawless violence as to appoint and send round to the different cities exile-hunters to catch those who had opposed or in any way offended the royal house of Macedon. Some forcibly driven out of temples and others dragged from the altars perished by torture, while those who escaped were expelled from the whole of Greece, having no single place of refuge except the territory of the Aetolian *ethnos*. And who is ignorant of the actions of Cassander, Demetrius, and Antigonos Gonatas, all so recent that the memory of them is quite vivid? Some of them by introducing garrisons to cities and others by planting tyrannies left no city with the right to call itself un-enslaved.

Chlaeneas' speech ought to arouse sympathy – or at least empathy. But the Athenians' loss of freedom has seen them become the object of modern contempt rather than sympathy. Modern commentators tend to focus on the interference of kings and see this as the end of Athenian sovereignty. Thus, Cynthia Schwenk (1985, p. 9) ends her corpus of fourth-century Athenian political documents at the Lamian War on the grounds that afterwards 'Athens no longer had the power of a sovereign state'. Cawkwell's claim that the existence of Athenian democracy after 322 'is of no importance' because Athens is not able to defend itself is a product of the same line of thought. So too is Robin Waterfield's (2004, pp. 267–8) observation in a recent popular history of Athens that whether Athens was a democracy

or oligarchy ‘made little difference . . . since the destiny of the city was no longer entirely in their hands’.

But why should it make little difference? Why is Athenian democracy no longer important once Athens is engaged in a struggle to maintain its freedom rather than attempting to trample on the freedom of others? Why is Athens seen to be no longer a sovereign state when the Athenian people are demonstrably in control of their own affairs? What is it that makes having their own destiny ‘in their hands’ so crucial? If such an argument were applied to the modern world we would be forced to see the internal politics of almost every nation in the world aside from the United States or China as unimportant. So how can such a line of thought be employed about Hellenistic Athens? The Athenians ought to be seen as having sovereignty whenever they have control of their own internal decision-making, and this can be argued to be the state of affairs for much of the period between 322 and 262, which is the focus of this book. Too often the lone voice in the wilderness of mainstream classics, Christian Habicht (1997, p. 2) observes:

The most lasting impression produced by a study of the inscriptions is that of a community regulating its affairs in exemplary fashion. Even if Athens was not always a sovereign power, and often had to follow the dictates of Macedonia, and later Rome, in foreign policy, the Athenians never relinquished control over their own internal affairs.

But this control of their own affairs is not recognized by the majority of scholars, who tend to apply a broad-brush approach to Hellenistic Athens. Outside specialist studies like those of Habicht, little attempt is made to distinguish between the different political regimes of Hellenistic Athens. The tendency to lump all of Athenian history in the Hellenistic period together means that the subtleties of Athenian politics are often overlooked. This approach sees Hellenistic democracy branded as ‘plutocratic’ or a ‘caricature’ of Classical democracy, regardless of clear evidence to the contrary. The biggest victim is perhaps the democratic regime from 288/7 to 262, which called itself ‘the democracy of all Athenians’, and laboured hard to revive Athens’ international reputation. This Athens was chosen to lead the allied Greek army at Thermopylae when the Celtic hordes descended on Greece in 279. Just over two hundred years after the famous last stand of Leonidas and his three hundred against Xerxes’ Persians, the Athenian general Callippus of Eleusis is said to have held the supreme command of all the Greek forces on the strength of Athens’ ‘ancient

reputation'. Our primary sources for this considered this to be one of Athens' greatest acts. But aside from experts in the field the event is almost unheard of. An illustration of this is the fact that there is no entry for Callippus in either the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* or *Der Neue Pauly*.

It is the Athens of Pericles, or that of Demosthenes, not that of Callippus, that ignites the imagination of modern scholars. Habicht (1997, p. 1) notes:

The interest of scholars has always been drawn first and foremost to the events of the fifth and fourth centuries BC, the period when Athenian power and civilization were at their height: the city's defense against Persian attack, the creation of the Athenian empire, competition with Sparta for hegemony over the rest of Greece, the blossoming of Athenian culture in the age of Pericles, and the rise of democracy.

When the Athenians are no longer an imperial sea power they seem to lose the esteem of mainstream scholarship. The oratory of Demosthenes can revive their interest, but once he is dead and buried and Athens has fallen before Macedonian might, that interest peters out. When once mighty states fall, the tendency to judge those who follow in their footsteps is almost inevitable. When this occurs, their successors are judged not by their own actions in the light of their own circumstances, but rather by the standards set by their predecessors. It seems to be the case that many modern scholars mean considerably more than the control of their own internal decision-making when they refer to Athenian sovereignty, and are, in fact, interpreting Athenian sovereignty as meaning that of fifth-century Athens – the imperialist state dominated by Pericles, the Athens for which 'sovereignty' meant not merely control of its own affairs, but also conquest, empire, and occasional acts of genocide.

This is unfortunate for Hellenistic Athens. The achievements of the Athenians of the Classical period have cast such an immense shadow that their Hellenistic descendants have not been able to escape from under it. Their lack of power, and their struggle to maintain their liberty renders them different and somehow shamefully inferior to their imperialist predecessors. Rather than being seen as labouring against superpowers more threatening than anything Pericles ever encountered, the Hellenistic Athenians are seen to have squandered the legacy provided by the victors at Marathon and Salamis. Having lost their liberty to the Successor kings, the Athenians of the Hellenistic period are often dismissed as shameless, servile flatterers of Macedonians. The comparison is not valid. Pericles never

kowtowed before a Macedonian king, but he never encountered one powerful enough to compel him to do so either.

This negative view of Hellenistic Athens has a long history itself. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century pioneers of the discipline of Greek history who were writing about the past in order to comment on their own political present condemned the Hellenistic Athenians because they offered no serviceable role model for the nations of their own day. But the long history of this line of thought does not make it right. Moral judgements about the Greeks of the Hellenistic world – especially the Athenians – are well and truly present in current scholarship. When commenting on modern attempts to understand Greek slavery, Moses Finley (1983, p. 9) wrote, '[m]oral condemnation, no matter how well-founded, is no substitute for historical or social analysis'. The same ought to apply to modern attempts to understand politics – especially in the case of Hellenistic Athens, where the 'politics' of modern scholars is undermining attempts to understand the politics of early Hellenistic Athens.

There is more to Athenian history than the fifth-century empire, and there is much about Hellenistic Athens that should attract the attention and hold the interest of modern classical scholars. After all, this is the Athens that was home to Theophrastus, Zeno, and Epicurus. Habicht (1997, p. 5) observes, '[t]hroughout the three centuries of the Hellenistic age the city retained its role as a leader in intellectual life and the arts'. This Athens also generated a truly remarkable output of public documents – enough to keep generations of classicists occupied. Athens' continued importance was underlined when Antigonos the One-Eyed declared the city to be 'the beacon-tower of the whole world' (Plut. *Demetrius* 8.2). He was not alone seeing the importance of Hellenistic Athens. Each of the most powerful of the Hellenistic monarchs courted Athens: Seleucus famously sent the Athenians a gift of a tiger (Alexis, frag. 204) or tigers (Philemon, frag. 47), and both he and his son Antiochus I were reputed to have returned the original statues of the Tyrannicides stolen by Xerxes (Valerius Maximus 2.10, ext; Pausanias 1.8.5) to curry Athenian favour.⁶ Antiochus the Great sent the Athenians a colossal golden head of Medusa, which Pausanias (1.21.3) saw on the south wall of the Acropolis, and Antiochus IV funded the resumption of work on the Temple of Zeus Olympius, begun by Peisistratus (Polybius 26.1.11; Livy 41.20.8; Strabo 9.39.6), and completed by Hadrian. The Ptolemies too paid considerable attention to Athens. Ptolemy Philadelphus made a formal alliance with the Athenians in 268/7 (*Syll.*³ 434/5), and his son Ptolemy Euergetes became 'almost the official protector of the neutrality of Athens' (Ferguson, 1932, p. 143). Even the

Romans courted Athens. In 228 the recently liberated Athenians (along with the Corinthians as the representatives of the powerful Achaean League) were the first port of call for the Roman envoy L. Postumius Albinus (Polybius 2.12.4–8), and by 200 the Athenians may have become one of the first Greek states to receive a formal treaty (*foedus*) with Rome (Habicht, 1997, p. 212).

But more importantly, Hellenistic Athens continued to strive to operate as a democracy for the best part of three centuries, going against the grain in what was a very monarchical world. This alone should make Hellenistic Athens worthy of scholarly attention. But this has not been the case. While in recent years there has been significantly more interest in the Hellenistic period, and indeed Hellenistic democracy – there have been detailed studies of Coan democracy (see for example Buraselis, 2004; Carlsson, 2004), and Hellenistic democracy in general (Grieb, 2008) – the same cannot really be said for Athens. Despite the prodigious scholarly output of Christian Habicht, the regular ground-breaking publications on Athenian epigraphy by Stephen Tracy, and the combined efforts of the editors of the forthcoming third edition of the Athenian volumes of *Inscriptiones Graecae*, Hellenistic Athens represents but a mere fraction of the scholarship on the Hellenistic period as a whole, or scholarship on Athens. Just as the Hellenistic period seems caught between Greek and Roman history, Hellenistic Athens seems trapped between Hellenistic history and Athenian history.

Whereas modern scholars tend to highlight the differences between democracy in Hellenistic Athens and Classical democracy as part of a negative comparison, this book will focus on the similarities. It will examine the key political institutions at Athens, and the actions of its leading politicians, in order to demonstrate that there is considerable continuity between the political practices of Classical and Hellenistic Athens. But it goes far beyond that. In many ways, this book is about the reception of Hellenistic Athens. The negative reception of Hellenistic Athens has long coloured accounts of Athenian politics of this period. This book is a reaction against the tendency to see Hellenistic Athens as the poor relation in the discipline of classics and ancient history.

Rather than judging the Hellenistic Athenians by comparing them to their more illustrious ancestors, it will serve our discipline better to try to analyse their actions in their own context. Rather than seeing the Hellenistic Athenians as a shadow of the Athenians who fought against the Persians at Marathon and Salamis, or the Athenians whom Pericles led to war against the Spartans, or even the Athenians Demosthenes urged to go to war against

Philip of Macedon, we should be viewing their actions against the backdrop of the world dominated by the Successors of Alexander the Great. That is, the Greek world described by Chlaeneas the Aetolian, in which the Athenians and the other city-states were subject to the whims of Cassander, Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonos Gonatas. A more balanced view will show that there is much more to politics in ancient Athens than the democracies led by Pericles and Demosthenes. Political life went on in Athens well after Demosthenes expired; our own politics should not prevent us from seeing that.

Chapter 1

The Reception of Hellenistic Athens: The Origins of a Negative Image

When I conceive an Athenian who survived the Lamian war of the battle of Chaeronea, I feel that life must have been unbearable for him.

B. G. Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient History

Delivered in a series of lectures in the 1820s, published posthumously in 1852, B. G. Niebuhr's judgement on the Athenians of the Hellenistic age would not seem out of place in mainstream scholarship today. It has become a commonplace that everything that was admirable and good at Athens ended either with her capitulation to the Antipater in 322, or when her hoplites gave way to Philip's Macedonian phalanx at Chaeronea in 338. That the Athenians stubbornly fought to regain their independence and maintain their democracy throughout the next century would probably come as a surprise to all but scholars with expertise in Hellenistic Athenian history. Yet they did. The Athenians laboured hard to regain their freedom and independence from the Macedonians, most notably in the Chremonidean War in the 260s, and the democratic institutions were revived in 318, 307, 288 and 229, and endured more or less intact down to Sulla's sacking of Athens in 86.

But why is the history of Athens in the Hellenistic age so little known? It is certainly not due to a dearth of evidence; roughly 80 per cent of the epigraphical evidence from Athens dates to the Hellenistic period, and Hellenistic Athens looms large in the well-read works of Plutarch and Polybius. It is not due to a dearth of culture. Athens remained an important centre of culture and learning deep into the Roman period, with the philosophers Theophrastus, Epicurus, Zeno and Diogenes, the playwrights Menander and Poseidippus, the historians Timaeus of Tauromenium, Eratosthenes of Cyrene and the mythographer Apollodorus all calling Athens home at one time or another during the Hellenistic period. Rather

than a dearth of sources, the cause of the neglect lies in the nature of the surviving source materials, and how modern historians of ancient Greece have used them, both within and without the modern discipline of classics. Of particular significance is the work of the pioneers of Greek history in the Enlightenment, for it was these writers and not classical scholars who were fundamental to the development of the modern discipline of ancient history.

Hellenistic Athens in the Athens–Sparta Debate

Much of the negative judgement of Hellenistic Athens can be traced back to the origins of the modern field of Greek history itself. Greek history as a discipline is a relatively new concept, being very much the product of Enlightenment writers.¹ The early works of Greek history, which laid the foundations for the field in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, were very much accounts of warfare and politics. Heavily influenced by their literary sources, the pioneering historians focused on the conflict between the Greeks and Persia (Herodotus), the fifth-century showdown between Athens and Sparta (Thucydides), the struggles for supremacy in Greece in the early fourth century (Xenophon), and the rise of Philip of Macedon (Demosthenes). Not surprisingly, Classical Athens looms large in their works as an independent imperial superpower. But things change dramatically with the Athenian defeat at the hands of the Macedonians in 322. Pioneering writers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries such as Charles Rollin, Temple Stanyan, John Gillies, and George Grote were seldom interested in the activities of the Athenians (and the other Greeks) when they were no longer totally free. Indeed, Rollin (1738, vol. 7, p. 37) considered Demosthenes and his party as ‘the last true Greeks’; Stanyan (1707–39) terminates his *Grecian History* at the Battle of Chaeronea in 338, while Gillies (1786) ends his *History of Greece* with the death of Alexander the Great in 323. Although Grote (1846–56, reprinted 1862) took his *History of Greece* down to the 270s, he finds the demise of free Athens particularly taxing. Grote’s heart was no longer in his work once it came to describing the events after 322, which he (1862, vol. 8, p. 525) describes as ‘marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world’.

In the long eighteenth century, Greek history was not being written with the sole objective of reconstructing or understanding the past.² Greek history was the realm of those who sought to comment on modern politics and thought through a study of antiquity during the so-called Battle of the

Books, which saw the best of the ancient world pitted against modern civilization in books, pamphlets and journals (Macgregor Morris, 2004, p. 342). When radicals and liberals turned to antiquity for political models as alternatives to the *ancien régime*, models were sought in the most powerful states, Athens, Sparta and Republican Rome in particular, with each serving as ammunition for those involved in the political debate (Roberts, 1994, p. 155). Classical Athens was sufficiently prominent in minds that the Dutch philosopher Cornelius de Pauw (1794, vol. 2, pp. 12–13) could write ‘one looks to Athens for laws to build a new state just as one looks to Sweden for wood to build a ship’. Inspired by the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau and Gabriel Bonnot de Mably, many French Revolutionaries hoped to revive Spartan ways in the fledgling republic, while Frederick the Great of Prussia actively sought to emulate Philip of Macedon and Alexander the Great.³ A fundamental part of this tradition was the so-called Athens–Sparta debate, a dispute over the model state that saw the modern commercial world pitted against the ancient agrarian world (Macgregor Morris, 2004, pp. 347–8). This debate raged with Laconophiles such as Rousseau, Adam Ferguson, Mably and Claude Helvétius on one side, and the Athenophiles such as Voltaire, David Hume, Adam Smith and de Pauw (to name just a few) on the other. This debate was crucial in shaping later views of Ancient Greece, and the later professional discipline of Greek history.

The importance of Athens and Sparta as potential political models rather than objects of purely intellectual curiosity is clear not only in the writings of commentators such as Jonathan Swift, Rousseau, Voltaire, Hume, Smith, de Pauw, and Mably, but also in the pioneering historical narratives in French and English by Charles Rollin, Claude Millot, Temple Stanyan, William Mitford, John Gillies and George Grote. This was perhaps partly due to the fact that many of the pioneering writers of ancient history were politically active amateurs rather than professional classical scholars: Mitford was the cousin of the First Duke of Northumberland and was elected the MP for Newport, Cornwall during the time that he was writing his *History of Greece*;⁴ Grote, a prominent Utilitarian, wrote his *History of Greece* after many years in Parliament as MP for the City of London.⁵ Even Gillies moved in powerful circles, having accompanied the sons of the Earl of Hopetoun to the Prussian court as their tutor.⁶ At that time professional classical scholars devoted themselves to classical texts, and the discipline of history as we would view it was not their concern.⁷ Indeed, even as late in the day as the publication of George Grote’s work, the response of the leading Cambridge classicist was to mount a (none too convincing) defence of Thucydides as the rightful historian of Greece.⁸

The Laconophiles were initially ascendant in the debate, with the advocates of Athens and its democracy on the back foot until the French Revolution. Although the Athenophiles saw Athens as representing the pinnacle of achievement – Voltaire could ask his readers whether Sparta ever produced ‘any Demostheneses, any Sophocleses, any Apelleses, or any Phidiases’ (Roberts, 1994, p. 168), seemingly confident that their answer would be in the negative – Athens’ democracy provided the Laconophiles with much ammunition. For the Laconophiles, the Athenian constitution was a negative example of the excesses of popular license as evidenced by events such as the execution of Socrates, the ostracism of Aristides the Just, or the condemnation of the Arginusae generals (Roberts, 1994, pp. 158–9). Athens was for them a centre of ill discipline, luxury and imperialism; Sparta represented a model for disciplined popular involvement in the organs of government, a city of liberty, austerity, and stability. Thus Claude Helvétius (1759, p. 223) asked his readers, ‘Did not frugal Lacedemon triumph over wealthy and commercial Athens?’, while Gillies contrasted the peaceful steadiness of Sparta’s constitution with the *stasis*-wracked Athenian democracy.⁹

Not surprisingly the Athenians of the Hellenistic age appealed to neither group as a model. For the Laconophiles, the Hellenistic Athenians were equally wild and excessive as their Classical counterparts. Phocion’s execution bore all the hallmarks of the horrors of the Arginusae trials and the condemnation of Socrates. Together with the spontaneous acclamation of Demetrius Poliorcetes as a god, Phocion’s trial was an indicator of the excesses and degenerate behaviour encouraged by democracy, and the dangers of placing too much power in the hands of the populace. For the Athenophiles, Hellenistic Athens represented a shameful parody of the great Classical city that was best swept under the carpet.¹⁰ Lacking freedom, the Hellenistic Athenian democracy could no longer serve as a positive political model; it could only stand as a warning, a moral lesson for future generations of how paradise could be lost.

But the debate changed in the wake of the French Revolution. When the likes of Robespierre and Saint-Just put the political ideas of Mably and Rousseau into practice, the appalling results began to tip the balance in favour of the Athenophiles. In the aftermath of the Reign of Terror, philosophers and historians began to focus on individual liberty. In 1819 Benjamin Constant upbraided Mably and Rousseau for mistaking authority at Sparta for liberty, and attacked Sparta for its lack of individual liberty. According to Constant (1988, p. 311) Sparta was so restrictive that ‘Therpandrus could not add a string to his lyre without causing offence to

the ephors'. Macaulay (1824, p. 293) likewise criticized Sparta for its 'perpetual interference with every part of the system of human life', and praised Athens where 'the laws did not constantly interfere with the tastes of the people'. So swift was this change that by 1824 Macaulay (1824, p. 291) could describe Mitford's preference for Sparta over Athens as 'eccentric'.

Arguably even more influential than Constant and Macaulay was George Grote. The publication of his *History of Greece* (1846–56) effectively ended the Athens–Sparta debate. Whereas Mitford had written from a Tory standpoint,¹¹ Grote's vision of Athens as the ideal liberal democracy 'carried English opinion to the opposite view' (Adams, 1927, p. 150). Such was Grote's influence that the nineteenth-century French historian Victor Duruy added a footnote to the second edition of his *Histoire Grecque* (1856) to the effect that whereas the first edition in 1851 had brought him censure from his college superiors due to his preference for Athens over Sparta, the publication of Grote's history had given his work legitimacy.¹² Under Grote's influence nineteenth-century writers came increasingly to identify themselves with Classical Athens. Classicists were already half way there; the Attic playwrights and prose writers, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Plato, Thucydides and Xenophon have long been fundamental works of study at school and tertiary level.¹³ But Grote's history taught the coming generations of lay readers and classical students that Athens was not only a city that produced magnificent works of literature, but a political model for the modern era. The identification with Athens is so strong that when nineteenth-century writers praise Athens, they are in fact praising not just Athenian society, but their own society as well.¹⁴ Thomas Arnold (1834, p. 241) was moved to write that Aristotle, Plato and Thucydides were 'virtually our own countrymen and contemporaries', while J. P. Mahaffy (1877, p. 2) argues that an educated man transported to Periclean Athens 'would find life and manners strangely like our own, strangely modern', and Edward A. Freeman (1863, vol. 1, p. 220) wrote:

We look at everything from an Athenian point of view; we identify ourselves throughout with that great Democracy which was the true mother of right and liberty, or art and wisdom. We trace her fortunes as if they were the fortunes of our own land; when we condemn her acts, we do it with that sort of reluctant feeling with which we acknowledge that our own country is in the wrong.

However, once writers identified themselves so closely with the Classical Athenians, there was to be no hope of rehabilitation for Hellenistic Athens.

Often unable to defend her own borders, regularly enduring foreign occupation, no longer a commercial hub, devoid of her empire and her once great fleet, Hellenistic Athens could never serve as a political model for British, French or Dutch writers at a time when each was still a maritime oriented imperial power. How could a Constant, a Macaulay or a Grote possibly identify with a Stratocles, an Olympiodorus, or a Phaedrus of Sphettus, each of whom was prepared to make sacrifices to foreign powers?

When it comes to understanding the place of Hellenistic Athens in modern scholarship we cannot forget that for the pioneering writers who shaped the field of Greek history the study of the activities of the Athenians, Spartans, Macedonians and Romans was not a matter of pure academic research, idle speculation or mere hobby. These pioneers were not merely writing about a subject that might make an interesting or thought-provoking book. They were not concerned with Graeco-Roman attitudes to sexuality or colour like many modern classicists. They were writing about Greek history because Athens and Sparta could serve as political models in a time of tremendous political changes in Western Europe, changes in which they are intimately involved.¹⁵ Greek history was, as Mitford wrote, 'a political institute for all nations'. The history of perpetually dependent *poleis* like Sicyon, or a failed imperial powers like Hellenistic Athens, or 'despotic' eastern monarchies like the Seleucids did not offer a viable alternative to the status quo. Independent, free, Classical Sparta appealed to Mably and Rousseau, but unfree Hellenistic Sparta did not, except when Agis and Cleomenes were attempting to revive the old Spartan way of life. Likewise, Voltaire, Constant, Macaulay and Grote sang the praises of Classical Athens, but saw nothing to emulate in Athens once it had lost its liberty.

A closer examination of the pioneering works of Mably, Mitford, Gillies, Grote and many others will demonstrate that the negative judgment of Hellenistic Athens that led its marginalization in the field of Greek history was not the result of the principles of what we would now see as fundamental to ancient history, but rather the need for models for the modern state. The prejudices of these early modern authors and their use and abuse of Hellenistic Athens needs to be analysed in more detail. So too does the legacy of Plutarch, whose negative portrayal of the Hellenistic Athenians is crucial in shaping modern views of post-Classical Athens.

The patterns that were set by the founders of the discipline have now become entrenched. The field of Greek history has evolved considerably in the last century, but the negative attitudes to Hellenistic history have lingered.¹⁶ There has been a recent push to change attitudes to Hellenistic

history as a whole, but the Hellenistic *polis* – particularly Athens – remains mired in the morass that was conceived long ago by writers who were preoccupied with the notion of liberty. One need look no further than the observation of a scholar of the eminence of Cawkwell (1996, p. 98) that the continuation of democracy after 322 ‘is of no importance’ due to Athens’ loss of ability to defend itself to see the legacy of the prejudices of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century writers.

There are several key factors, which overlap and combine to explain why the pioneers of Greek history shunned the Hellenistic Athenians, and thus why Hellenistic Athens still holds a marginal place in scholarship today:

- the nature of the available sources, especially Plutarch;
- early modern ideas of decline;
- modern (and ancient) views of race;
- modern (and ancient) attitudes to ‘liberty’.

An analysis of the pioneering works of Greek history, and more recent works on Athenian history, will demonstrate that much of modern scholarship is distorted by its intellectual inheritance, an inheritance that has brought about an unwarranted tendency to view the history of Hellenistic Athens in relation to the perceived perfection of Classical Athens.

Plutarch’s Negative Legacy

The judgemental attitude of modern historians towards Hellenistic Athenians within the context of the Athens–Sparta debate is very much the legacy of the ancient sources, particularly Plutarch. Partly because of a dearth of sources, and partly because of his popularity prior to and during the Enlightenment (one need look no further than Shakespeare’s *Julius Caesar* and *Antony and Cleopatra* to see the extent of Plutarch’s appeal), the pioneering works of Greek history and commentaries on Greece in the long eighteenth century rely heavily on Plutarch when it comes to describing what we now know as the Hellenistic period.¹⁷ Thus, Plutarch’s *Lives* of Demosthenes, Phocion and Demetrius Poliorcetes (and to a lesser extent Aratus) loom large in the eighteenth-century works of Rollin, John Gast, Gillies, Mably, William Robertson (a lesser light not to be confused with the famous homonymous Scottish historian), as well as the nineteenth-century works of Connop Thirlwall, Grote, Niebuhr and Duruy. This plays a crucial role in determining the place of Hellenistic Athens in the modern field of

Greek history, because Plutarch marked the Hellenistic Athenians out as a nation of servile flatterers who shamelessly squandered the legacy of their forebears; a nation of incompetents who almost wilfully failed to live up to the standards set by the victors at Marathon and Salamis. This was exacerbated by the fact that the other most prominent source for Hellenistic Athens – Polybius – is equally critical of the Athenians, in his case partly because what he perceived as their blind patriotism saw them refuse to support Philip V of Macedon against Rome, and partly because they failed to support his hero, Aratus of Sicyon. When the only extant source material was so critical of Hellenistic Athens, how could the pioneers who relied on Plutarch be anything other than critical themselves?

Plutarch enjoyed immense popularity during the eighteenth century,¹⁸ particularly in the first half, and provided useful ammunition against Athens for the Laconophiles in the Athens–Sparta debate.¹⁹ Plutarch singled Hellenistic Athens out for condemnation on three key occasions:

- Demosthenes' death in 322;
- Phocion's execution in 318;
- The deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes in 307.

Plutarch (*Demosthenes* 3.3) opens his *Life* of Demosthenes by equating Demosthenes' death with the end of Athenian liberty, and Cicero's death with the end of Roman freedom. He writes:

In my opinion two other orators could not be found who, from small and obscure beginnings, became great and powerful; who came into conflict with kings and tyrants; who lost each a daughter; who were banished from their native cities and returned with honour; and who, after taking to flight again and being captured by their enemies, ended their lives as soon as their countrymen ceased to be free.

Plutarch concludes his *Life* of Phocion (38) by describing Phocion's unconstitutional condemnation, and observes:

But Phocion's fate reminded the Greeks anew of that of Socrates; they felt that the sin and misfortune of Athens were alike in both cases.

The behaviour of the Athenians is crucial to Plutarch's *Life* of Demetrius, a work that was intended to serve as a warning to future generations. When describing the extraordinary divine honours voted for Demetrius Poliorcetes by the Athenians after his liberation of the city, Plutarch (*Demetrius* 10.2) states:

And now that Demetrius had shown himself great and splendid in his benefactions, the Athenians rendered him odious and obnoxious by the extravagance of the honours which they voted him.

For Plutarch, the history of Hellenistic Athens can be summed up by these three disasters. Having lost their liberty (largely by failing to carry out Demosthenes' vision), the Hellenistic Athenians go on to commit what is in Plutarch's eyes an atrocity akin to the execution of Socrates by executing Phocion. Not content with murdering a second Socrates, they follow it up by ruining the life and career of the most promising of princes through their shameless flattery. The end of Athenian liberty is followed only by excess and servility; the ungrateful masses condemn to death a man they elected as their general on no less than forty-five occasions in a trial reminiscent of the worst excesses of the mob in the Arginusae trial, and then proceed to cower and cringe before a man who ought to have been the best of kings but who, in fact, ultimately became the worst of tyrants as a result of their obsequious behaviour.

Plutarch's criticism of Hellenistic Athens (and Greece as a whole) struck a chord with the pioneers of the modern field of Greek history. His legacy can be seen clearly in the treatments of the death of Demosthenes, the execution of Phocion, and the deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes in almost all the pioneering works of Greek history, from Sir Walter Raleigh's *History of the World* in the seventeenth century, through to Grote's *History of Greece* in the nineteenth century. These writers who swallowed Plutarch's image of Hellenistic Athens and then regurgitated it back to the public were immensely influential, not just on the burgeoning discipline of ancient history, but also on the popular consciousness. Rollin's multi-volumed *Histoire Ancienne des Egyptiens, des Carthaginois, des Assyriens, des Babyloniens, des Mèdes, et des Perses, des Macédoniens, et des Grecs*, was immensely popular in France and Britain. His work was translated into English by 1730, and was said in 1739 to be 'in everybody's hands' (a ninth English edition was in circulation by 1800).²⁰ Claude-François-Xavier Millot's *Éléments d'histoire générale ancienne et moderne* (1772–83) which was first translated into English in 1778, was particularly popular in the newly independent United States.²¹ Despite being little more than a plagiarized translation of a French history by Pons Augustin Alletz,²² Robertson's *History of Greece* reached a ninth edition by 1829, while Goldsmith's Laconophile sentiments had a lingering effect through the popularity of his *Grecian History* as a school text throughout much of the nineteenth century.²³ Grote's influence was so strong that Momigliano (1966, p. 65)

argued, 'Grote's history set new standards and gave new impulse to the writing of Greek history. Under Grote's archonship a new era started'. Vlassopoulos (2007, p. 39) suggested recently that Grote's work 'provided the model for any subsequent narrative of Greek history'. The influence of these works meant that Plutarch's negative view of Hellenistic Athens had a profound impact on generations of students and teachers of ancient history.

Plutarch's legacy is perhaps best illustrated by Millot's *Elements of the General History* (1779), which devotes one entire chapter of his work (totalling seven pages out of only twenty-eight devoted to the Hellenistic period as a whole) to these three events of Athenian history. This chapter entitled 'Disturbances in Athens – Demosthenes and Phocion – Demetrius Phalereus' (1779, pp. 321–9) outlines the failures and crimes of the Hellenistic Athenians, and sets the tone for his account of the Hellenistic period as a time of 'crimes of ambition' and 'the horrors of war' (1779, p. 332). Albeit no admirer of Demosthenes, Millot (1779, p. 324) describes his death as coinciding with 'the ruin of that Republic', goes on (1779, p. 326) to call the execution of Phocion as 'a most enormous act of injustice', and expresses dismay (1779, pp. 328–9) at the injustice of Demetrius of Phalerum's fall from grace at Athens in the wake of the Athenian 'flattery' of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Millot places his account of these events at Athens before he recounts the wars of the Successors of Alexander the Great, and they take up a full quarter of his account of the century between the Lamian War and the Battle of Sellasia, despite comprising only one tenth of the years he covered. Plutarch's influence on Millot could not be clearer.²⁴

Shabby Sources: Plutarch's Other Legacy

But if Plutarch's influence was critical in the eighteenth-century denigration of Hellenistic Athens, it was his lack of influence in the nineteenth century that was pivotal in cementing the place of Hellenistic Athens at the bottom of the heap in more recent times. Whereas Rollin, Millot, Mably, Gast and Robertson had a deep admiration for Plutarch and drew heavily on his writings, there was a seismic shift in attitudes to literary sources in the nineteenth century. Thus, nineteenth-century historians and philologists writers in the mould of Grote, Macaulay and Niebuhr are highly critical of the standard of Plutarch and the other main literary sources for Hellenistic Athens, namely Diodorus and Justin. Their dismissal of such sources as

inferior made the study of Hellenistic Athens (and the Hellenistic period as a whole) less attractive to the scholars who followed them.

Given his previous prominence (if not primary role) as a source for Hellenistic Athens, Plutarch's fall from grace was disastrous for the field of study as a whole. Plutarch may have been critical of Hellenistic Athens, but at least he was considered as a useful source by the writers of the long eighteenth century. For the nineteenth-century writers, Plutarch is barely worth reading at all. Macaulay (1828, p. 352) was particularly critical:

the manner of Plutarch . . . reminds us of the cookery of those continental inns, the horror of English travellers, in which a certain nondescript broth is kept constantly boiling, and copiously poured, without distinction, over every dish as it comes up to a table.

Macaulay also took aim at his eighteenth-century predecessors in Greek history for their favourable opinions of Plutarch, Diodorus and Quintus Curtius. Thus, he argues (1824, pp. 287–8) that French and English authors,

have generally turned with contempt from the simple and natural narratives of Thucydides and Xenophon to the extravagant representations of Plutarch, Diodorus, Curtius, and other romancers of the same class.

Diodorus also incurred the wrath of nineteenth-century German scholars. In a recent critique of scholarship on Diodorus, Peter Green – an advocate of sorts for Hellenistic Athens – has recently (2006, p. 34) condemned the criticism of nineteenth-century positivists who themselves condemned Diodorus for his perceived lack of scholarly rigour:

Niebuhr set the fashion right from the beginning, damning Diodorus as 'naïve, unlearned, totally spiritless, without judgement, silly, incompetent even as an epitomiser' and one of the 'worst historians who has come down to us in either of the languages of antiquity from any period', a judgement repeated by numerous later scholars.

When the main narrative source for the best part of the first century of the Hellenistic period was held in such contempt, it is no wonder that the period itself fails to attract scholarly interest. The absence of a Thucydides or even a Herodotus to tell their story has condemned the Hellenistic Athenians to obscurity, not least because of the long-standing tendency of professional classicists to focus on a small range of standard texts.²⁵ The loss

of the *Atthis* of Philochorus – reputedly the most historically accurate of the Atthidographers – is to be much lamented. As a leading figure during the years between the Lamian and Chremonidean wars, his eyewitness account would have given us a rather different picture of this turbulent period. Had Philochorus' work survived to be incorporated into the canon of modern classics, the place of Hellenistic Athens in modern scholarship may have been very different.

Demosthenes and the Death of Greece

Early modern ideas regarding decline were also crucial in the process that led to Hellenistic Athens holding a marginal place in scholarship today. It was the fashion in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to see the rise and fall of ancient societies as mirroring the human life cycle, and for those looking for evidence of this in Athens, Plutarch provided it by equating Demosthenes' death with that of Athenian liberty. Thus Rollin (1738, vol. 7, p. 37) observes, Demosthenes and his party 'may be considered as the last true Greeks, and the defenders of expiring liberty'.

Plutarch's linking of the death of Demosthenes with the death of Greek liberty is picked up by the majority of the pioneers of Greek history within the context of the Athens–Sparta debate. This theme looms large in the writings of Rollin, Gast, Robertson, Gillies, and was later central to the works of Grote, Macaulay, Niebuhr and Duruy to name but a few. Demosthenes is the central figure in what must be considered to be the first modern work of Greek history, Jacques de Tournell's hundred-page 'Historical Preface' to his translation of Demosthenes' speeches. For de Tournell (1702, p. 134), Demosthenes is last of the Greeks to remain free and to make a stand against the attempts of the Macedonian kings to stamp out liberty:

His last attempt to restore the Liberty of *Greece*, has something more Noble in it than all the rest. 'Twas not then Philip, Conqueror of *Cheronæa*, before whom all *Athens* bowed, and to whom all *Greece* submitted, except the invincible Soul of *Demosthenes*; but 'was *Alexander*, and *Alexander* already Triumphant in *Asia*, whom this zealous Republican attempts to drive out of *Europe*: the man of whom the World stood in awe could not silence this Orator.

Even though they later honoured Demosthenes in the 270s, de Tournell (1702, p. 137) considers that the Athenians of the Hellenistic period should

be criticized for their failure to realize the genius of Demosthenes, and even for his very death:

Thus dy'd *Demosthenes* at 60 years of age, whose Memory the *Athenians* Honoured with a Statue, with Inscriptions, and divers Priviledges granted to his Posterity, and by a thousand other marks of a useless acknowledgement, little better than Ingratitude, for the more they express'd their Sorrow for losing him, the more they confess'd their fault in suffering him to be lost.

Despite his reputation as a staunch critic of Classical Athenian democracy, Gillies likewise laments the passing of Demosthenes. Gillies (1807, pp. 306–7) slams Antipater for his role in Demosthenes' death:

For in future ages, Antipater was forever to be branded as the murderer of Demosthenes, the blazing patriot, and incomparable orator. Such is the glory of his letters! that this single transaction, the punishment of an eloquent rebel, whose life could only have served again to embroil the affairs of Greece, excites more popular resentment against Antipater, than his appointment of such men as Antigonus and Polyperchon to govern the most distinguished portions of Asia and Europe; and thus subjecting numerous nations to unprincipled ambition and merciless cruelty.

Thus, for Gillies, so bright was Demosthenes' star as an advocate of liberty, that his execution brings more infamy for Antipater than his role in bringing about the chaos that reigned in the Graeco-Macedonian world at the end of the fourth century by failing to appoint a proper successor. Gillies echoes the work of Sir Walter Raleigh (1736, p. 492), who wrote of Antipater:

now all such, as either delighted with the orations of *Demosthenes*, or have surrender'd their judgments to authors justly admiring him, as the most eloquent of all that ever did speak and write, condemn him utterly, calling him a bloody tyrant.

Robertson's popular *History of Greece* also focused on the image of Antipater as a tyrant, comparing him to Demosthenes, whom he describes as 'the prince of orators'. For Robertson (1793, p. 486), the Athenians were fools who failed to appreciate the genius of Demosthenes, thus causing their own

ruin: 'Had the Athenians followed his advice, Philip would never have been able to arrive at the sovereignty of Greece'.

The idea that Demosthenes' death coincides with the death or decline of Athens and Greece is very much wrapped up with early modern theories of decline whereby writers drew comparisons between the rise and fall of societies and the cycle of human life. By this analogy, Classical Athens (particularly the fifth century) represents the 'mature adulthood' of the life of Athens, and what follows is a miserable decline into senility and death. Thus, de Tournell (1702, p. 4) observes:

A Famous Author has compar'd the duration of a People to the life of Man; according to which Notion we may assign the *Greece* four different Ages distinguish'd by as many remarkable *Epoques*. The first includes near 700 Years, from the foundation of her Petty Royalities to the Siege of *Troy*: the Second about 800 more from the *Trojan* War to the Battle of *Marathon*. The third something less than 200, from that Battle to the Death of *Alexander*. And the last, an equal portion of Years from the Death of that Conqueror (after which she began to decline) 'till at last she sunk under the Power of the *Romans*. The three first of these are what my present Design obliges me to consider; the last being of no use to it.

In de Tournell's eyes, Greece (and the Athens of Demosthenes, his central theme) falls into a decline akin to man's descent into old age after the death of Alexander the Great. Tournell (1702, p. 119) sees Greece as a body that was 'languishing', and describes Demosthenes as undertaking to 'reanimate' that body. Having Greece cast as a human body, de Tournell (1702, p. 110) gives Philip of Macedon the role of 'giving *Greece* the Fatal Blow', after which Athens is superfluous to his design.

Other eighteenth-century authors saw the Greek defeat in the Lamian War as a deathblow to Greece. Thus, Cornelius de Pauw (1794, vol. 1, p. 166) describes the Greeks as having been 'borne down by the scythe of the reaper'; Edward Wortley Montagu (1759, p. 143) writes, '[t]he Athenians were totally routed, and that fatal day put a period to the liberty and independence of Greece'; Lyttelton (1768, pp. 396–7) contrasts Athens which has lost its virtue, and cannot be restored to health with the youthful strength of Macedon. Goldsmith (1796, vol. 2, p. 231) described Demosthenes as 'the very life and soul of the foreign operations of the Athenians'.²⁶ Mably (1770, pp. 167–8) takes up the theme of political senility, describing the Athenians as needing to be awoken from their lethargy, restored, but ultimately hard of hearing:

Till then, that Orator [Demosthenes] alone had unveiled the projects of this ambitious Prince, and made every effort to open the eyes of the Multitude, and rouse them in their own defence. Had it been in the power of any man to awake the Athenians from their lethargy, to inspire the Grecians with their pristine valour, and restore them to a community of interests, Demosthenes would have accomplished it; he, who, by the fire of his orations, at this day still agitates and inflames the passions of his readers! But he spoke to the deaf.

The idea that Hellenistic Athens represents a terminal decline after the pinnacle of Greek achievement in the fifth century is cemented in the nineteenth century. This is particularly the case in Victorian England, due to what Jenkyns (1980, p. 73) describes as the ‘Victorian fondness for analogies drawn from the human lifespan’. Thus, it should come as no surprise to find Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 581) when comparing the Hellenistic Athenians to their Classical counterparts, writes, ‘an historian accustomed to the Grecian world as described by Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, feels that the life has departed from his subject, and with sadness and humiliation brings his narrative to a close’.

Grote emphatically equates the death of Demosthenes and the other Athenian orators after the Lamian War with the ‘death’ of Greek liberty as part of what Turner (1981, p. 232) describes as ‘an extended organic metaphor’. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 525) writes:

The violent death of these illustrious orators, the disfranchisement and deportation of the Athenian Demos, the suppression of the public Dikasteries, the occupation of Athens by a Macedonian garrison, and of Greece generally by the Macedonian Exile-Hunters are events belonging to one and the same calamitous tragedy, and marking the extinction of the autonomous Hellenic world.

Whereas the Hellenistic period represents a time when the life has departed from the Athenian *polis*, for Victorian writers such as John Symonds (1893, p. 4) the Classical period represents the ‘robust maturity’ of the life of Athens. In his inaugural lecture at Oxford in 1857, *On the Modern Element in Literature*, the poet Matthew Arnold (1960, p. 23) paints the fifth century as ‘the culminating age in the life of ancient Greece’. When the timeline of Athens is compared to the human lifespan, there is no chance of recovery from any period of decline that is perceived as equalling old age or death. Decline is inevitable, and everything that comes to pass after the postulated

descent into old age or death can only be perceived as inferior to what it follows. Thus, Arnold (1960, p. 30) claims:

The intellectual and spiritual life of Greece was left without an adequate material basis of political and practical life; and both began inevitably to decay. The opportunity for the ancient world was then lost, never to return; for neither the Macedonian nor the Roman world, which possessed an adequate material basis, possessed like the Athens of earlier times, an adequate intellectual soul to inform and inspire them.

In Macaulay's eyes the works of Demosthenes represent perfection that cannot be matched by subsequent writers. For Macaulay (1824, p. 297) Demosthenes was 'one of the greatest men that ever lived'. His speeches are so eloquent, so well written, that 'it would be impossible to alter a word, without altering it for the worse'. With such perfection on show, it is almost inevitable that everything that follows will be seen to be inferior.

This is clear in the writings of numerous nineteenth-century British commentators on Greek society, literature and art. In 1857 Arnold equated great societies with those that produce great literature and art. Thus, he sees the literature and society of Athens as commensurate with each other – great society produces great literary works. Thus Classical Athens produces Pindar [sic], Aeschylus, Sophocles and Aristophanes, whereas post-Classical Athens produces no writers of any note. Arnold (1960, p. 31) recognizes that Menander is a great writer, but argues that Athenian society had failed by Menander's day. For Arnold, fourth-century Athens is no longer worthy to have a writer as great as Menander – as if Hellenistic Athens produced Menander by accident, rather than through any inherent worth.²⁷

Arnold's views of Greek literature and history are in keeping with his contemporary John Ruskin's views on Greek art. For Ruskin (1886–7, p. 47) the post-Classical era represents 'the central tragedy of all the world, the suicide of Greece'. He sees a symmetrical decline of Greek art over the nine centuries before the death of Christ: archaic (9–7); best (6–4); corrupt (3–1); (Jenkyns 1980, pp. 75–6). Thus, Classical Greece is enshrined as the best society, whereas Hellenistic Greece is condemned as corrupt. The archaic period is also inferior to the Classical period, but at least it is a period of growth and improvement that will lead to the Classical. In the life-cycle view of Greek history there can be no recovery from the corruption of the Hellenistic period. The writer Symonds (1893, Chapter 1) divides Greek literature into five periods: superb adolescence, early manhood, magnificent maturity, robust old age, and senility (Jenkyns, 1980, p. 73).

Archaic Greece is equated with adolescence and early manhood, a period of growth; the fifth century is again equated with mature age, the prime of life, while the Hellenistic period is seen as on a par with senility. To sum up the Victorian view of Greek history, Jenkyns (1980, p. 74) writes, 'Frederick Temple could write casually, as though it were undisputed fact, "Greek history hardly begins before Solon, and it hardly continues after Alexander"'.

When Greek history and Greek liberty are viewed as entities that can grow, age, decline and die, the decline of Greece can only be seen as inevitable and unavoidable. The decline of Athens, Thebes and Sparta is accompanied by the rise of new powers such as the Aetolian and Achaean leagues, but their fall is equally inevitable. Thus the Aetolians, who initially prosper in what came to be known as the Hellenistic period while the greatness of the Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans had already been eclipsed, rise then because they are less evolved than their already fallen cousins. Rather than an exception to the rule of decline, the Aetolians are seen to be yet to decline. Macaulay (1827, p. 269) makes this clear: 'In the second century before Christ, Greece contained only one nation of warriors, the savage highlanders of Aetolia, who were some generations behind their countrymen in civilisation and intelligence'.

Backward and savage,²⁸ the Aetolians only manage in the Hellenistic period to achieve the level of sophistication previously attained by their southern Greek cousins. Briefly brilliant in the third century, the Aetolians are doomed to decline and die as the Athenians, Spartans, and Thebans had already done so before them.²⁹ Freeman (1863, vol. 1, p. 227) adopts the analogy of a living entity for describing Greek liberty by describing the rise of the Achaean and Aetolians leagues after 280 as 'the after-growth of Hellenic freedom'. Freeman (1863, vol. 1, p. 223) directly contrasts declining Greece in the Hellenistic period with the Greece of Thucydides, which 'enjoyed the freedom of youth'.

But the idea that Demosthenes' death led to the death of Athens and Greece is perhaps most marked in the work of the nineteenth-century German historian Niebuhr, who writes (1852, vol. 3, p. 45): 'The death of Demosthenes was the death of Athens; after him it only breathed'.

Niebuhr identified strongly with Demosthenes. In his translation of Demosthenes' *First Philippic* (1805), Niebuhr treated Demosthenes' struggle against Philip of Macedon as an example to the German people in their war against Napoleon (Adams, 1927, p. 148).³⁰ For Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, pp. 16–17), Demosthenes was such an ideal character that it is scarcely believable that his contemporaries dared to prosecute him in the Harpalus

case. That they did so can only be the result of their own character flaws rather than any flaws of the hero of Greece:

We also know the character of his accusers: Hyperides was a bottomless vessel, and a spendthrift who have might squandered all the treasures of the king of Persia. Stratocles, the principal speaker, who accused Demosthenes, is the same who afterwards, in the time of Demetrius Poliorcetes, appears as the most abject criminal and as the most cringing dog which that period, degenerate as it was, ever produced. If Demosthenes was guilty, then the others were innocent! but the purity of Demosthenes' character is well known, while his opponents are sufficiently notorious.

With Demosthenes canonized, and his death marking the death of Greece, what hope is there for the Athens of Stratocles? The origins of Cawkwell's metaphor (1996, p. 98) of Athens' heart beating 'fitfully' after her defeat at the hands of Philip of Macedon seem rather clear.

Phocion: Socrates Executed Anew?

The death of liberty (brought on by the death of Demosthenes) is seen to lead inevitably to degenerate behaviour at Athens in the Hellenistic period. As noted above, Plutarch cites both Phocion's death, and the deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes as evidence of the degeneration of Hellenistic Athens. With Plutarch casting Phocion in the role of a second Socrates, Phocion's death thus becomes a signal for the final decline and death of the Athenian state. For many writers of the long eighteenth century, Socrates' death was an emblem of all that was wrong with the Athenian state (Macgregor Morris, 2006, pp. 209–10). His death thus marked the beginning of decline of Greece. In one final brutal act of manic excess reminiscent of both Socrates' execution and the Arginusae trial, the degenerate Athenian masses slaughter a wise and gentle old man who had served them with honour for more than half a century. Phocion was popular figure with the Laconophiles;³¹ hardly surprising given that he was a known sympathizer of the Spartan way of life who sent his son to Sparta to be educated in the *agoge* and whose ascetic lifestyle had long been seen to resemble that of the Spartans (Plut. *Phocion* 20). Thus, an eighteenth-century re-publication of a work by Desiderius Erasmus (1753, pp. 260–1) records the fact that:

Phocion was by birth an Athenian: but his discourse was so grave, pithy, and full of useful remarks, with a sententious brevity, besides being so austere and upright in his morals, that he might in these respects be styl'd a Lacedemonian. He resembled Socrates in this in particular, that the constancy of his mind was such, as never to be seen either to laugh or weep.

Admired by the Laconophiles (and somewhat grudgingly by Athenophiles), Phocion's death becomes as a vital tool in the Athens–Sparta debate in the eighteenth century. The horror induced by Phocion's downfall is a key feature in almost every eighteenth-century account of Greek history from both sides of the Athens–Sparta divide. His execution provides a powerful example with which the Laconophiles can criticize the excesses of Athenian democracy and at the same time provides a clear signal for the Athenophiles that the Athenian *polis* is no longer worthy of their attention. On the 'Laconophile' side Rollin (1738, vol. 7, pp. 71–2) writes:

[I]t ought to be remembered, that the dregs of a vile populous, entirely void of honour, probity, and morals, predominated at that time in Athens. And there is sufficient foundation for the sentiments of Plato and Plutarch, who declare, that the people, when they are either destitute of guides, or no longer listen to their admonitions: and when they have thrown off the reins by which they once were checked, and are entirely abandoned to their impetuosity and caprice; ought to be considered as a blind, furious, intractable, and blood-thirsty monster, ready to launch in a moment into the most fatal and opposite extremes, and infinitely more formidable than the most inhuman tyrants. What can be expected from such a tribunal? When people resolve to be guided by nothing but mere passion; to have no regard to decorum, and to run headlong into an open violation of all laws; the best, the justest, and most innocent of mankind, will sink under an implacable and prevailing cabal. This Socrates experienced almost a hundred years before Phocion perished by the same fate.

For Rollin, there can be no justification for Phocion's death. It is an atrocity carried out by the Athenian masses who are 'a blind, furious, intractable, and blood-thirsty monster'.

Long suspicious of the Athenian mob, Gillies (1807, pp. 312–13) painted Phocion's execution as typical of the worst outrages of Athenian democracy:

That popular licence, which had so long been repressed through the authority of Macedon, broke out with an accumulated fury when fomented and inflamed by the same power which had formerly restrained its rage. Throughout most cities in Greece the individuals distinguished by rank or merit were banished, plundered, or put to death; the rabble under their malignant and long envious leaders tyrannising with unbridled rapine and sanguinary cruelty.

Like Gillies, Robertson (1793, p. 488) was outraged by Phocion's unjust death at the hands of the mob: 'Every person of sense and virtue was shocked at seeing the man, who, by way of distinction, used to be called *the honest man*, treated in so cruel and unworthy manner'.

Like Socrates, Phocion served as potent images in the Athens–Sparta debate. Both could be employed as models of excellence in spiritual and philosophical terms.³² Rollin (1738, vol. 4, p. 252) saw Socrates as 'the hero of the pagan world in regard to moral virtues'. When he follows Plutarch in linking Phocion's death with that of Socrates he joins his powerful image of Socrates to that of Phocion, describing the latter as 'one of the greatest men that Greece ever produced, in whose person every kind of merit was united', and a man who 'formed his manners upon the most perfect plan of Pagan virtue'. Millot (1779, p. 290) likewise saw Phocion as the most virtuous pagan: 'Phocion, a disciple of Plato, a true philosopher both in practice and principle, in whom every valuable talent and virtue were united, deserved to be ranked among the first of the Grecian heroes'.

For the Laconophiles, both Phocion and Socrates could be seen as victims of the turbulence and tyranny of the Athenian *dēmos*. Both could be used to demonstrate the fate of the virtuous man in a society of vice. Many writers pick up this theme in the long eighteenth century, e.g. Robert Filmer, Jonathan Swift, Adam Smith, Alexander Pope, and Richard Steele.³³ In these works Phocion is paired not only with Socrates, but also Cato, Scipio, Aristides, Miltiades, Themistocles, and even Job. Thus for Filmer (1680, pp. 59–60) Phocion is the most virtuous man of his time, unjustly destroyed by the fury of the masses:

If we will listen to the Judgment of those who should best know the Nature of Popular Government, we shall find no reason for good men to desire or choose it. *Zenophon* [sic] that brave Scholar and Souldier disallowed the *Athenian* Commonweal, for that they followed that Form of Government wherein the Wicked are always in greatest Credit, and Vertuous men kept under. They expelled *Aristides* the Just; *Themistocles* died in

Banishment; *Meltiades* [sic] in Prison; *Phocion* the most virtuous and just man of his Age, though he had been chosen forty five times to be their General, yet he was put to Death with all his Friends, Kindred and Servants, by the Fury of the People, without Sentence, Accusation, or any Cause at all.

Alexander Pope (1715, pp. 18–19) ranked Phocion with Socrates, Aristides, Cato and Brutus amongst the ‘wise and good’ who suffered in silence:

Here too the Wise and Good their Honours claim,
 Much-suff’ring Heroes, of less noisy Fame,
 Fair Virtue’s silent Train: Supreme of these
 Here ever shines the Godlike *Socrates*.
 Here triumphs He whom Athens did expel,
 In all things Just, but when he sign’d the Shell.
 Here his Abode the martyr’d *Phocion* claims,
 With *Agis*, not the last of *Spartan* Names:
 Unconquer’d *Cato* shows the Wound he tore,
 And *Brutus* his ill genius meets no more.

For Jonathan Swift Phocion’s downfall could be seen to be a direct result of too much power lying in the hands of the masses. When Swift (1701, p. 21) attacked the impeachment of the Whig ministers Edward Russell, John Summers, Charles Montagu and William Bentinck, he cast them in the roles of Miltiades, Themistocles, Aristides, Pericles and Phocion. Swift closely follows the account of Plutarch’s *Phocion* rather than that in *Alexander* or *Demosthenes* (Arrian 1.10; Diod. 17.15; Plut. *Demosthenes* 23), whereby Phocion personally diverts Alexander from his plan to execute the leading Athenian orators despite having spoken in favour of handing the orators over to Alexander before his unjust fall at the hands of a plot between the Macedonian regent Polyperchon and the Athenian people: ‘But Polyperchon, in hatred to Phocion, having by Order of the young King . . . restored those whom Phocion had banished; the Plot succeeded, Phocion was accused by Popular Orators, and put to death’.

Swift (1701, p. 43) later adds that Phocion was impeached despite being ‘guilty of no other Crime but negotiating a Treaty for the Peace and Security of his Country’. Drake (1702, p. 118) countered on the grounds that Themistocles was ambitious; Pericles pandered to the people; and Phocion ‘went over to Philip of Macedon, Alexander and Antipater’. Drake was

alone in this view, and it would be considerably more than a century before the Athenians' ideological motives for eliminating Phocion were so well understood. Gast (1793, vol. 2, p. 136) casts Phocion as innocent – guilty only of having 'been in favour with Cassander and his father'. The expanded history by Goldsmith (1798, p. 290) also paints Phocion as the innocent victim of the malice of the Athenian masses. Thus, Phocion is 'virtuous', accused of a 'pretended crime', and 'fell a sacrifice to . . . prejudices', because Polyperchon duped the Athenians into believing false promises of liberty.

Given his philo-Laconian sentiments, and his destruction at the hands of the people while acting in what he saw as their interests, it should come as no surprise that Phocion proved to be a potent image in Revolutionary France, particularly with the leading Girondists. His popularity at the time can be seen not only in the fact that many adopted his name as a pseudonym,³⁴ or named their children after him (Roberts, 1994, p. 195), but also in the fact that many revelled in emulating his political martyrdom. Thus, Robespierre, Marat, Brissot and Buzot among others either sought comparison to Phocion or received such comparison from others. Brissot, who according to Madame Roland had been filled from the earliest youth with a desire to emulate Phocion (Roberts, 1994, p. 194), rejoiced in sharing his fate. Brissot wrote in his memoirs prior to his execution:

I judged that my enemies would make me mount the scaffold. The images of Sidney and of Russel presented themselves to my mind, I recalled the fate of Phocion, and in my misfortune, I congratulated myself on sharing the destiny of these great men (quoted by Parker, 1937, p. 176).

Buzot continued the metaphor, writing of Brissot in his memoirs, 'You died like Phocion and Sidney, for the liberty of your country; like them, you will live in the memory of honest men' (Parker, 1937, p. 176; Roberts, 1994, p. 196). Gensonné looked forward to the French people regretting his fate, as the Athenians did when they conferred posthumous honours on Phocion. He wrote in his prison memoir: 'Socrates and Phocion drank the hemlock; Sidney perished on a scaffold, and the same people who had applauded their death accorded to their memory the justice which, during their lives, they had refused to their virtue' (Parker, 1937, p. 176). On hearing his fate, Lasource (mis)quoted Phocion's famous retort to Demosthenes: 'I die when the people have lost their reason; you will perish when they recover it' (Parker, 1937, p. 176; Roberts, 1994, p. 196). Robespierre cast himself as an unappreciated statesman like Phocion or Aristides

(Roberts, 1994, p. 196), yet Dufriche-Valazé had earlier attacked Robespierre by comparing himself to Phocion: 'Robespierre, you who can only figure as Anytus and Agnonides did in the famous trials of Socrates and Phocion' (Parker, 1937, p. 176).

Phocion's popularity amongst the Revolutionary leaders was no doubt increased by that fact that Phocion was a powerful figure in the writings of Mably whose writings had much influence on the Jacobins.³⁵ One of Mably's most famous and influential works was his *Entretiens de Phocion* (1763),³⁶ which purported to be a translation of a dialogue between Phocion and a young aristocrat, Aristias, recorded by his friend Nicocles and recently discovered at Monte Cassino, but in reality represented Mably's political thoughts using Phocion as a mouthpiece. Mably's Phocion sees that the time for the 'healthy violence' of a Lycurgan coup at Athens had passed, and advocates a policy of submission to Macedonian overlordship, which will nonetheless bring about the end of the horrors of mob rule. In the course of the dialogue Mably (1769, p. 66) makes Phocion prefigure his own calm acceptance of his death at the hands of the Athenian mob by criticizing the Athenians for their treatment of Socrates, condemning Socrates' death as an 'eternal stain' while adding that it 'did not ruffle his tranquillity'. Phocion's fall is even more prominent in the English translation by William MacBean who adds a translation of Plutarch's *Life* of Phocion to Mably's dialogue. When discussing Plutarch's execution MacBean (Mably, 1769, pp. ciii–civ) observes:

The sentence passed against Phocion resembles that of Socrates in every circumstance, only that in the case of Socrates, they had a juster regard to the festival called Theoria, than they had to Jupiter in the case of Phocion. It was fourscore and two years from Socrates's death to Phocion's. When the Athenians had committed so great an error, after they had been sensible of it and what is more after they had been visibly punished for it, one would think they never could have been guilty of the like again. But such is the nature of the populace, after the commission of one crime, they are seldom long before they commit another. They will run head-long into an error in the morning, be sorry for it at noon, and as soon as they have dined, be guilty of just such another.

Phocion also looms large in Mably's *Observations sur l'histoire de la Grèce*. Mably (1770, pp. 172–3) admires Phocion as a selfless politician who advised the Athenians against ruinous warfare even though going to war would

place him in a position of authority:

I am seized with admiration at the rare good sense with which Phocion spoke on the same occasion to the same Athenians. That man was as great a General, as Demosthenes was a bad soldier: he entered into the situation of his Fellow-citizens, and advised them to preserve peace, although the war might place him at the head of the affairs of the Republick.

Mably (1770, pp. 173–4) saw Phocion as Athens' last hope, but felt that even with Phocion Athens' decline and death was inevitable. Without him it was swifter and less dignified:

That great man considered his Republick as labouring under a disease impossible to be eradicated; and, like a skilful physician, far from thinking of restoring her immediately to a perfect health, he expected by a wise and circumspect management, to prolong her life. Enfeebled, in effect, by a long series of evils, violent remedies would have necessarily hastened her dissolution. Phocion would have suffered a virtuous People to abandon themselves to despair, because virtuous People have a right to expect everything from despair; but he knew that it is rashness for a corrupted Republick even to dare what is only difficult. He apprehended the ruin of Greece inevitable; and was sensible at that same time, that resistance would hasten the blow, and that to parry it a while, was all that human prudence could accomplish.

The key to understanding the potency of Phocion's death as a political symbol is the perception of his innocence *and* later vindication. Erasmus, Swift, Lyttelton,³⁷ Alexander Hamilton,³⁸ the Girondists and Robespierre all stress that the Athenians subsequently regretted their actions, and that Phocion was posthumously restored to a place of honour. Phocion is to be admired not only for his unjust death, but also for the fact that he was proved to be right. Thus, when Brissot, Buzot, Dufriche-Valazé and their like are on their way to the guillotine, they can not only console themselves with the idea that they are being put to death unjustly like Phocion, but also hope (if not assume) that they will be remembered and honoured as martyrs for a just cause after their deaths. It would take an ardent supporter of Athenian democracy and its actions like Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 550) to notice that the Athenian change of heart took place under the auspices of a new oligarchy backed by a Macedonian garrison!³⁹ Just as Swift was able to ignore the fact that Phocion had spoken in favour of handing the leading

orators over to Alexander, those who wish to see Phocion's death mirroring their own do not let the facts get in the way of a good martyrdom.

Phocion's downfall is problematic for many of the Athenophiles. His 'martyrdom' proved an uncomfortable image for Hume (1751, p. 147) who lamented the execution of 'the modest, the gentle *Phocion*' by his fellow citizens, and for Adam Smith (1790, p. 243) who observed:

Theramines, Socrates, and Phocion, who certainly did not want courage, suffered themselves to be sent to prison, and submitted patiently to that death to which the injustice of their fellow-citizens had condemned them.

But with the victory of the Athenophiles in the Athens–Sparta debate in the nineteenth century, the portrayal of Phocion changes. With Athenian democracy freed from the bonds imposed by the Laconophiles Phocion need no longer be seen to be an innocent victim of the monstrous masses. Instead, it can be brushed aside as an aberration rather than a sign of any flaws in the Athenian system. The same can be said for the execution of Socrates and the Arginusae generals. Each act is lamentable, but there are mitigating circumstances. In the cases of Socrates and the Arginusae generals, religious scruples are to blame. In the case of Phocion, rather than a leader who rightly criticizes the excesses of democracy, he is a traitor who betrays Athens to the Macedonians. Furthermore, both Phocion and Socrates can be seen to have brought about their own deaths.⁴⁰ Thus, while Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 7, p. 256) sees the trial as 'renewing the foulest iniquity of the proceedings which followed the battle of Arginusæ', he makes it clear that Phocion was to blame for his own death, betraying Athens by losing faith in the ability of his fellow citizens to maintain their liberty at a time of crisis:

Had he lived in an earlier period, he might have served his country, like Nicias, with unsullied honour. In a later age he might have passed his life in peaceful obscurity. His lot fell on dark and troubled times, when it was difficult to act with dignity, and the best patriot might be inclined to despair. But he despaired not merely of his country, which any man may innocently do: but also for her, which no man has a right to do.

According to Thirlwall, Phocion's loss of faith for Athens leads him to refuse to assist patriots in restoring freedom, to act as 'the tool of his country's enemies, as the servant of a foreign master', and ultimately to be 'constant

only in his opposition to whatever bore this aspect of freedom'. Likewise, Thirlwall absolves the Athenians of any guilt for the execution of Socrates. He argues that Socrates was guilty by having been present in Athens during the reign of the Thirty, and probably could have avoided his fate had he conducted his defence in the usual manner. Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 4, p. 279) expresses surprise not that Socrates was found guilty, but rather that the verdict was so close. Such sentiments would have been unthinkable only a few decades earlier.

Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 547) is even more emphatic in defending Athenian democracy against the charge of condemning innocent men. He argues that while Phocion was not personally responsible for the changes in government imposed by Antipater, he and his co-accused were 'agents in carrying them out'. Thus, they were liable to suffer the consequences of violating the oath of Demophantus (Andocides 1.96–8), which stipulated taking action against anyone who should hold office after the democratic government was subverted. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 548) notes – most unusually for the time – that many of the Athenians who voted to condemn Phocion must have thought their actions were 'not merely legitimate, but patriotic'. Like Thirlwall, Grote (1862, vol. 6, p. 182) blames Socrates for his own downfall:

Whoever has read the account of the trial and defence of Sokratês, will see that he himself contributed quite as much to the result as all the three accusers united.

For Grote, Socrates could have been acquitted had he chosen to defend himself properly, and not used an offensive tone in his dealings with jurors. The change in scholarly reactions to the circumstances of the deaths of Phocion and Socrates was so profound, and so enduring, that Tritle (1988, p. 3) not so long ago argued that the parallels between the two are 'perhaps of primary importance' with regard to neglect of Phocion in modern scholarship, seemingly without realizing that attitudes towards Phocion's death had ever been different.

Whereas Classical Athenian democracy could gain the favour of thinkers in spite of the death of Socrates, Hellenistic democracy would not enjoy the same fate despite being absolved of guilt for the death of Phocion. Athens could be seen to undergo a revival after Socrates' death under the guidance of Demosthenes, but with the Phocion's death almost coinciding with that of Demosthenes there can be no recovery for Athens this time. Their nearly simultaneous deaths coincide with the end of Greek liberty,

and Athens will never produce their like again. They might have prevailed had they listened to Phocion, but they did not. Thus, de Tournelle (1702, pp. 117–18) argues:

One might at that time have look'd on *Agesilaus* as the last General of *Sparta*; and *Epaminondas* of *Thebes*. But *Athens* was not even then unprovided of good Captains. In *Phocion* she might have had her *Miltiades*, and her *Themistocles*, if her Cabals had not excluded him from the Command, and preferr'd those before him that hardly deserv'd the honour to obey him.

Lyttelton (1768, pp. 390–3) in his dialogue between Aristides, Phocion and Demosthenes has the fifth-century statesman ask his fourth-century successors how they failed against Macedon when they were both at the helm of Athens. The answer ultimately provided is that they failed because they did not unite behind the same cause. For Aristides it seems obvious that Demosthenes ought to have placed Phocion in charge of the Athenian forces at Chaeronea, and that Phocion ought to have consistently opposed Philip of Macedon in his 'great plan of Conquest and Dominion'. Like Mably, Lyttelton (1768, p. 387) sees Phocion as desperately trying to prolong the inevitable collapse of the Athenians, rather than allowing them to go out in a blaze of glory. Thus Phocion pre-empt's Aristides' attack with the argument that:

I saw no Wisdom in accelerating the Downfall of my Country by a rash activity in provoking the Resentment of any Enemy, whose Arms, I foretold, would in the Issue prove superior, not only to our own, but to those of any Confederacy we were able to form.

Lyttelton echoes Montagu in portraying Demosthenes and Phocion together at the helm at the time of Athens' collapse. Like Mably and Lyttelton, Montagu saw that the failure was inevitable. For Montagu (1759, p. 154) the failure of the policies of both Demosthenes and Phocion is an indicator that the *polis* had already failed: 'Phocion and Demosthenes failed, because corruption had extinguished publick virtue, and luxury had changed the spirit of liberty into licentiousness and servility'.

With their failure, only shame and degeneracy follows.⁴¹ Plutarch and the Enlightenment commentators who relied upon him did not have to look far for signs of that degeneracy.

Athens and Demetrius Poliorcetes: Degenerate Flatterers

Modern commentators find the ultimate proof of the death of their ideal *polis* in 307 with the deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Condemned by critics of Athenian democracy as an indicator of the excesses of democracy, the Athenians are roundly criticized for honouring a foreigner, which is seen to be synonymous with their loss of liberty. Their behaviour is almost always seen as excessive, irrational, shameful, or downright deranged.

Eighteenth-century historians either condemn the Athenians for their extreme ingratitude to Demetrius of Phalerum (e.g. Millot, Robertson), or excessive flattery towards Demetrius Poliorcetes (Gast, Gillies, Robertson, William Young). The influential Rollin (1738, vol. 7, p. 132) covers both views, criticizing the Athenians for their behaviour toward both Demetriuses: 'The extreme ingratitude the Athenians discovered towards Demetrius Phalereus, was no less criminal and extravagant than the immoderate acknowledgement they had just shown to their new master'.

So too does Robertson (1793, p. 490) who not only condemns the Athenians for overthrowing Demetrius of Phalerum, whom he ranks 'among the greatest men that Athens every produced', but proceeds (1793, p. 494) to castigate the Athenians for the degeneracy of the 'democratical form of government' and their servility to their new conqueror:

The Athenians, with a view of making court to the conqueror . . . heaped the most extravagant honours on Demetrius Poliorcetes and his father Antigonus, calling them their kings and tutelary gods, and carrying their pictures in the procession at the feast of Minerva. What a worthless, unaccountable, and degenerated people!

Modern writers from the beginning of the eighteenth century to the present day have been remarkably consistent in their terminology when criticizing the honours for Demetrius – the honours are typically described as 'extravagant,' or 'excessive', or even both.⁴² The much less common 'extraordinary' seems a much more appropriate (and far less derogatory) term to employ.⁴³ Early modern commentators make no attempt to put the honours in context of similar honours, which is unsurprising given that they were mostly writing prior to the discovery of much of the relevant epigraphical material, an excuse that later commentators cannot employ. Thus, the Athenians' actions are seldom seen as anything other than a serious error of judgement. Viewed through the distorted lens of Classical Athens, their behaviour is always perceived as something that they and the

reader should be ashamed about, because the Classical Athenians would not have honoured a foreigner in that way. Thus Rollin (1738, vol. 7, p. 284) observes:

We shall see Athens, once so jealous of her liberty, and so formidable to the most powerful kings, running headlong into slavery, and as she changes her masters, successfully paying them the homage of the basest and most abject adulation.

The submission of the Athenians to the Macedonians, particularly to Demetrius, is seen to be synonymous with the degeneracy of the Athenian state. One often gets the sense that the Hellenistic Athenians are being judged by a different set of standards than the rest of the Greeks, and this is expressed explicitly by numerous authors. Thus, Gast (1793, vol. 2, p. 212) compares their behaviour towards Demetrius with that of the fifth-century Athenians towards Miltiades:

The extravagant adulation with which the Athenians expressed their gratitude shews what a change had taken place in the character of that once-illustrious people. In their days of glory, an olive-wreath was the only reward Miltiades laid claim to; and even in this he met with opposition. Now the most distinguished honours, such as Athens was wont to pay only to her gods, were prostituted to sooth the vanity of a young adventurer, whom they scarcely knew; who had served them, merely because it served his own interests; and who, they could not but be sensible, owed the power, of which he was possessed, to perfidy and usurpation.

The eighteenth-century commentators attribute these crimes of the Hellenistic Athenians to the masses. It is the nature of the Athenian state itself that is responsible for the ‘extravagant’ honours that turned Demetrius from a genial benefactor into a monstrous tyrant. The last Athenian leaders deemed worthy of the honour of mention by name are Demosthenes, Phocion and Demetrius of Phalerum. This is nowhere more evident than in the eighteenth-century accounts of the deification of Demetrius. The praise for the ousted Demetrius of Phalerum stands in strong contrast to the silence of these authors regarding the author of the decrees deifying Demetrius and his father Antigonus – Stratoles of Diomeia. Not one of Rollin, Gast, Robertson, Millot, Mably, de Pauw, Young, or Gillies can bear to refer to Stratoles by name.⁴⁴ The anonymity heightens the censure of the Athenians collectively. In contrast, the nineteenth-century authors

single Stratocles out for severe censure, thus deflecting blame from Athenian society as a whole onto one individual. For Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 7, p. 332) ‘Stratocles . . . tasked his ingenuity to exhibit the utmost extent of servile impudence’, and brought the cause of liberty into contempt. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 566) cannot refrain from reminding us that Stratocles had taken part in the prosecution of Demosthenes fifteen years earlier: ‘Stratocles (who has already been before us as one of the accusers of Demosthenes in the Harpalian affair) with others exhausted their invention in devising new varieties of compliment and adulation’.

All this despite the fact that this is actually Grote’s first proper reference to Stratocles!⁴⁵ It is clear that an Athens dominated by an enemy of Demosthenes could never appeal to Grote. The same is true for Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, pp. 94–5) who follows Plutarch in comparing Stratocles to Cleon (Plut. *Demetrius* 11.2), and adds comparisons to Hyperbolus and Demades to the condemnation of his political style. For Niebuhr, Stratocles’ crime in deifying Demetrius is almost equalled by his crime in prosecuting Demosthenes:

The manner in which this was done, and in which they flattered him as long as they were favourable to him, is the worst and most indelible stain in the history of the Athenians. We must suppose that they were intoxicated with joy, and that thus they were led into indecencies, which, however, we can never forgive them. There was at that time no want of intellect, intelligence, and wit at Athens; Athenaeus has preserved a song which they sang of him, and which is worthy of the age of Aristophanes; but among the leading men of the republic, Demochares was the only noble-minded person, who tried to make use of Demetrius only for the purpose of delivering his country, and recovering for it that independence which existed in his imagination. He therefore was no favourite of Demetrius, who gave his confidence to Stratocles, a man combining the impudence of Cleon and Hyperbolus, with the servility, the frivolity, and villany of Demades; and had been the principle accuser of Demosthenes in the affair of Harpalus. He seemed to have taken Demades for his pattern, and to become wealthy was the object of his *πολιτεία*. To this man belongs the shame and disgrace of having devised those flatteries, for it was he who induced the Athenians to decree the most extravagant and indecent honours to Demetrius.

Thus, Stratocles attacks the icon of Classical Athenian liberty in 322, and reveals the absence of liberty in Hellenistic Athens by proposing the

deification of a foreigner a few years later. His actions are an ‘indelible stain’ on Athens.

Cringing Before Barbarians

There is more than a hint of racial prejudice in much of the criticism of the Athenians. For Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, p. 95) it is not so much the case that Greeks should not have deified a mortal man, but more that European Greeks (rather than those in Asia) should not have done so:

At first Antigonos and Demetrius were saluted with the title of kings – this might pass uncensored, but they were literally declared gods. They were worshipped as θεοὶ σωτῆρες, altars were erected to them, sacrifices were instituted in honor of them, and their portraits were to be woven in the peplos by the side of the images of the gods and heroes. This was an Asiatic idea: in Asia such things were not uncommon; and in Egypt, too, Ptolemy already enjoyed divine honours as σωτῆρ; but it was disgraceful for the Athenians to do the same – the countrymen of Thucydides and Demosthenes ought to have left that to the Asiatics.

Not only is this an ‘Asiatic’ idea, the fact that the Athenians are deifying a non-Greek Macedonian seems to heighten the crime. A tendency to take the views of Demosthenes who stresses the otherness of Philip of Macedon at face value has coloured modern scholarly views of the Macedonians, and the Greeks who submitted to them, no more so than in the nineteenth century.⁴⁶ Whereas eighteenth-century writers such as Gillies, Mitford, Gast and Robertson saw Philip II, Alexander the Great and even Philip V as admirable and talented statesmen who were very much part of the Greek world, their nineteenth-century counterparts such as Thirlwall, Macaulay, Grote and Rawlinson saw the same Macedonian kings as ill educated, culturally inferior barbarians.⁴⁷

The majority of eighteenth-century commentators explicitly describe the kingdom of Macedon as a part of Greece. Mitford (1784–1818, vol. 5, p. 195) observes,

in the heat of party contest among the republics, the foul language of democratical debate would sometimes stigmatise the Macedonians with the name of barbarians. But this is not found from any others. Among the Greek historians their Grecian blood has been universally acknowledged.

Their speech was certainly Grecian, their manners were Grecian, their religion was Grecian; with differences, as far as they are reported to us, not greater than existed among the different republics.

Eighteenth-century writers even allow the Seleucids and Ptolemies Greek status. Robertson (1793, p. 36) justifies extending his Greek history to the Roman conquest by claiming that for other writers, 'the end of the history of Greece is . . . extended to the period of the extinction of the government of the Seleucidae in Asia by Pompey the Great . . . and, by some authors . . . to the time that the race of the Lagidae failed in Egypt'. Gillies (1807) includes the Antigonids, Seleucids and Ptolemies among the Greeks, referring to the Hellenistic monarchies as 'the Greek kingdoms in Asia and Africa'.

But in nineteenth-century histories we see a sharp contrast, with authors not only critical of Macedonians and their behaviour, but also distinguishing them from Greeks. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 246) sees Macedonians as ignorant barbarians who could barely communicate with the outside world:

Alexander . . . like his father Philip, was not a Greek, but a Macedonian and Epirot, partially imbued with Grecian sentiment and intelligence . . . The basis of Philip's character was Macedonian, not Greek: it was the self-will of a barbarian prince, not *ingenium civile*, or sense of reciprocal obligation and right in society with others, which marked more or less even the most powerful members of a Grecian city, whether oligarchical or democratical. If this was true of Philip, it was still more true of Alexander, who inherited the violent temperament and headstrong will of his furious Epirotic mother Olympias.

Grote was highly critical of the work of J. G. Droysen who effectively 'invented' the concept of the Hellenistic period with his (1836–43) *Geschichte des Hellenismus* (reprinted in 1878) and *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen* (1833), which emphasized the role of the Macedonians in spreading Greek culture throughout Alexander's conquests.⁴⁸ Grote (1862, vol. 8, pp. 273, 288, 305, 472) preferred to compare the Macedonian king to Xerxes, Napoleon and even Attila the Hun.

The idea that Macedonians are barbarians is present in the works of other nineteenth-century writers. Niebuhr (1852, vol. 2, pp. 255–6) argues that although Philip 'spoke Greek from his infancy . . . he did not acquire the sentiments of a Greek', describes (1852, vol. 3, pp. 43–4) Antipater 'as rude

and cruel as a Turk or an Algerian', and (1852, vol. 3, p. 13) suggests that handing over a prisoner to the Macedonians would be the same as 'to deliver up a person to the Turks'. George Rawlinson clearly distinguished between Hellenic, Macedonian and Asiatic peoples in his *Manual of Ancient History*. For Rawlinson, Macedonians are clearly inferior to Greeks. When discussing Alexander's plan to bring about a 'racial fusion' between the European and Asiatic peoples of his empire, Rawlinson (1869, p. 209) argues that 'the integration of races would have improved the lower types of humanity', but that the new race 'would have fallen far below the Hellenic, *perhaps even the Macedonian type*' [italics added]. Interestingly (and not that surprisingly), Rawlinson regularly cites the work of Niebuhr in the Macedonian section of his history.⁴⁹ George Finlay and Mahaffy, who both devoted volumes to post-Classical Greece, likewise saw Macedonians as distinct from Greeks. For Finlay (1877, p. 23) 'neither the people of Macedonia, nor the chief part of the army . . . was Greek either in language or feeling'. Mahaffy (1896, p. 20) sees Macedonians as 'semi-barbarous'. Duruy (1892, vol. 4, p. 5) saw the Macedonians as 'a blending of the Greek race with those Barbarians who formed the population of Illyria and Epeiros'. For Duruy (1892, vol. 4, pp. 127, 222) because Alexander the Great was not a Greek, but 'a Macedonian; the oriental policy which counts human life so unimportant prevailed in his country', and the Greeks were inflicted with a master who was 'not a Greek king, but an Eastern despot'.

Nineteenth-century writers seem embarrassed by the fact that the Greeks (particularly the Athenians) fall under the sway of the Macedonians. The Greeks themselves are dismissed as degenerates who inevitably squander the glorious achievements of their ancestors and grovel at the feet of their barbarous Macedonian masters. The racially charged view of relations between Greeks and Macedonians taints not only Stratocles' deification of Demetrius, but any form of connection with Macedon or Macedonians, and has coloured modern attempts to treat relationships between Athenian political leaders and Macedonians. Friendship with a 'Macedonian' is almost uniformly condemned. Whereas eighteenth-century authors such as Mitford had admired Aeschines for his attempts to reconcile Athens and Philip of Macedon, nineteenth-century authors condemn his 'Macedonizing'. Thus the terms 'Macedonizer' and 'pro-Macedonian' are levelled regularly against Aeschines, whose policy of appeasing Macedon is typically seen as a crime equivalent to his opposition to Demosthenes. In the context of the political struggle within Athenian politics Grote (1862, vol. 8, pp. 232, 269, 552) equates 'Macedonizing' (by Aeschines and Phocion) with 'anti-Hellenic' and 'anti-Athenian'.⁵⁰ Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 7, p. 133) likewise

sees 'Macedonizing' as a crime against Athens, and (1835–44, vol. 7, p. 258) takes issue with Polybius for his 'unjust' criticism of Demosthenes, blaming the historian's 'Macedonizing' for his failure to perceive that Demosthenes was trying to stop a 'foreign power'. Rawlinson (1869, p. 253) also praises the 'anti-Macedonian' party at Athens and can hardly bear to mention the pro-Macedonian behaviour that so offended Grote and Thirlwall. This simplistic view sees Athens become the site of a struggle between patriotic 'anti-Macedonians' and treacherous 'Macedonizers' or 'pro-Macedonians'. This in turn affects how modern scholars cast Stratocles' deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes. When Macedonians were Greek, this act was a symptom of the perils of democracy. But when Macedonians have become foreign oppressors, Stratocles' act is transformed into shamefully undemocratic and unpatriotic 'Macedonizing'. The struggle between Stratocles and Demochares thus becomes Aeschines vs. Demosthenes version 2.0, with Stratocles stepping into Aeschines' shoes as the flatterer of the barbarian king, and Demochares inheriting his uncle's position as the archetypal 'anti-Macedonian'. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 569) portrays Stratocles as the arch-flatterer, and Demochares as 'the last known spokesman of free Athenian citizenship'. His vision has been shared by generations of modern commentators, with Demochares and Philippides of Cephale uniformly tagged as 'anti-Macedonian' and their reputed opponents such as Stratocles and Phaedrus of Sphettus, stigmatized as 'pro-Macedonian'.⁵¹

In the twentieth century this developed into an unhelpful tendency to equate this 'pro-Macedonian' behaviour with 'collaboration'. Partly because the Germans had identified so readily with Macedon in the eighteenth century, British and American historians were quick to draw parallels between Germany and Macedon in the context of the rise of Nazism.⁵² A prime example is Robinson's comment of Philip of Macedon (1948, pp. 150–1): 'Hitler keeps to the eye'. Unhelpful World War II analogies abound in accounts of Hellenistic Athens, with Ste. Croix (1983, p. 609 n. 2) comparing Phocion to Pétain, Tracy (2000b, p. 339) defending Demetrius of Phalerum against imagined charges of being a 'Quisling', Dreyer (1999, p. 270) calling Olympiodorus 'the collaborator', and Green (1990, p. 129) describing Demochares as 'an intransigent Gaullist . . . among the more pliable men of Vichy'. But Olympiodorus was no more a collaborator than Demochares was an intransigent Gaullist. Olympiodorus' greatest achievement was expelling Demetrius Poliorcetes' Macedonian garrison from the city of Athens with a ragtag army of old men and boys, and Demochares' willingness to beg for money from Macedonians caused Grote to despair of Hellenistic Athens. Recently scholars have begun to

question the idea that Classical Athens was split between pro-Macedonians and anti-Macedonians,⁵³ but little progress has been made when it comes to our understanding of Stratocles and Demochares.

But while this view has dominated nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship, there is an inherent lack of logic to these labels. Although Demochares of Leuconoe and Philippides of Cephale are regularly labelled as ‘anti-Macedonian’, they were content to be ranked amongst the *philoi* of the Macedonian Lysimachus, the former bodyguard of Alexander the Great. The case of Callias of Sphettus is even more odd, since he abandoned Athens altogether for many years to serve another Macedonian, Ptolemy, who seems to somehow lose his Macedonian ethnicity by relocating to Egypt! The case of Ptolemy is particularly illustrative of the manner in which modern scholars perceive the divine honours accorded to Hellenistic monarchs. Whereas the new Athenian tribes that were created in honour of Demetrius Poliorcetes and his father Antigonus (Antigonis and Demetrias) are regularly referred to disparagingly as the ‘Macedonian tribes’,⁵⁴ the later tribe named after Ptolemy III (Ptolemais) is very seldom designated the ‘Egyptian’ tribe.⁵⁵ But perhaps the greatest example of the inconsistency of modern scholarship is Demosthenes’ status as the ‘anti-Macedonian’ par excellence despite the fact that he counted Hephaestion, the close friend of Alexander the Great, among his friends. When even Demosthenes’ friendship with a Macedonian must be swept under the carpet, what hope is there for Athens once Stratocles and the so-called pro-Macedonians hold sway?

Modern (and Ancient) Attitudes to ‘Liberty’: Athens as the Paragon of Liberty

Demosthenes: I shall not shame Athens by voluntarily choosing slavery and giving up the tomb’s finest ornament which is liberty.

Pseudo-Lucian, In Praise of Demosthenes

Plutarch was not alone in antiquity in seeing Demosthenes as the ideal advocate of Greek liberty. Demosthenes’ death was as potent a literary motif in antiquity as it would become in the nineteenth century, as the above quotation illustrates. Heavily influenced by Plutarch’s *Demosthenes*, Pseudo-Lucian’s work depicts Demosthenes refusing to join Callimedon, Pytheas and Demades on the Macedonian side, despite the prospect of sharing in

‘good fortune’ because to do so would have meant compromising his own freedom. Pseudo-Lucian’s Demosthenes goes happily to his death, safe in the knowledge that he has not shamed his homeland by choosing slavery to the Macedonians. The influence of Plutarch’s stance towards Demosthenes and liberty can also be seen clearly in modern works such as those of Macaulay, Grote, Niebuhr and Duruy. All things considered, so much of the negative attitude towards Hellenistic Athens can be traced to the issue of liberty. Liberty was decisive in framing Plutarch’s portrayal of Demosthenes and the behaviour of the Athenians with regard to Demetrius Poliorcetes. Liberty was crucial in framing modern responses to Plutarch’s work. Liberty was pivotal to both sides of the Athens–Sparta debate, and was the crux of the victory of the Athenophiles in that scholarly quarrel. The central role of liberty in the framing of historical enquiry can be seen in Adolf Holm’s Introduction (1894–1911, vol. 1, p. 5) to his late-nineteenth-century *History of Greece*.

What then are the chronological and geographical limits of Greek history? Into what epochs must it be divided? We should close with the battle of Chaeronea, if Greek liberty ceased with it. But that was not the case. Greece lost, it is true, her position in the politics of the world, but still retained some of her internal independence . . . We must therefore go as far as the destruction of Corinth.

Holm argues that Greek history should end when Greek liberty ends. No doubt de Turreil, Stanyan and Grote would have agreed, and there is little reason to doubt that Gillies, Mitford, Robertson, de Pauw or Mably would have seen anything wrong with the principle. Where Holm differs from his predecessors (and crucially many who followed) is in how he defines liberty. Holm does not follow Plutarch or his Enlightenment disciples in equating Demosthenes’ death with the death of Greek liberty. He recognizes that liberty of a kind exists in Greece until the final Roman conquest in 146. Very few of Holm’s predecessors, contemporaries or successors have viewed the parameters of Greek history in the same way.

Grote’s victory in the Athens–Sparta debate set the pattern for Greek history. Athens was no longer a potential political model; it was *the* political model.⁵⁶ But it was not just any Athens that became the political ideal; it was the Athens that most appealed to Grote – the democratic Athens of Pericles and Demosthenes. The Athens that was free, independent, imperialistic and a thorn in the side of the Persians, the Spartans and the Macedonians was the city that Grote advocated as a model. That ideal *polis* died with

Demosthenes and could never return once freedom had been lost. The Athens of Stratocles – Demosthenes' enemy – was an anathema to Grote and those who followed his vision of Greek history. Democracy without liberty is no democracy at all. Nineteenth-century Britain could learn nothing from the Athens of Stratocles. It was Classical Athens they should heed.

But Classical Athens' position as role model is problematic for modern scholarship, for this Athens is in many ways anomalous. The much-vaunted liberty of the Classical Greeks had never been much more than a façade for most of the *poleis* except for Athens, Sparta, Thebes, Argos and (to an extent) Corinth.⁵⁷ Even the Thebans twice lost their independence in the fifth and fourth centuries. When Athens loses her liberty at the end of the fourth century, she is merely dropping to a similar status to that of *poleis* such as Tegea in the Peloponnesian League or Samos in Athens' own fifth-century empire. The problem is how that loss of liberty and status has been perceived. With modern commentators today identifying themselves so strongly with the Classical Athenians there is too much at stake. When the Athenians lose their status as an independent power, that loss of status has been felt too keenly by generations of commentators who have seen their own states mirrored by the Athens of Pericles and Demosthenes. As demonstrated above, with the death of Demosthenes portrayed as the end of Greek liberty, the deification of Demetrius naturally comes to be seen as symptom of this lack of liberty. By this way of thinking, if the Athenians had been free they would never have deified a Macedonian – just think how Demosthenes would have felt about it! By the time Macaulay describes Demosthenes as 'one of the greatest men that ever lived', the die is cast for Hellenistic Athens. The Athenians who follow Demosthenes, and fail to continue his policy of outright opposition to the Macedonian foreigners can only be seen as inferior to the great champion of Greek and Athenian liberty. Their speeches must also have been less eloquent, their policies less admirable, their actions less glorious.

But we should not forget that during much of the Hellenistic period the Athenians could still claim to have freedom, autonomy, their venerated democratic institutions and even some foreign possessions. The decline is a matter of imagination as much as reality. Tritle (1997, p. 3) has argued that the perception of the fourth century as a period of decline can be 'recognized as a result of the underlying historiographic and philosophic concepts of the Enlightenment', and that 'historians today are more inclined to study a period without raising the spectre of "decline" and to attempt an understanding of that era from within. As a result, the fourth century is

seen neither as decadent nor as declining, but rather as both changing and yet remaining the same in many ways'. Unfortunately, the same cannot yet be said for the Hellenistic period. As a sub-discipline within the fields of classics and ancient history, Hellenistic studies is only now on the verge of coming of age. The very ideas of race that have excluded Hellenistic history from the mainstream have started to place it on the agenda. The modern emphasis on the 'other' has seen the histories of the Greek dominion over Egypt and the East emerge from the shadows. Grote's very reason for rejecting Droysen's vision of the Hellenistic period – the interaction between Greeks and non-Greeks in Asia – is now at centre stage, even if Droysen's conclusions regarding the extent to which Greek culture was adopted by non-Greeks have been refuted. But the fashionable focus on the 'other' cannot help bring Hellenistic Greece to the fore. For Athens the old tendencies remain, and Hellenistic Athens' status as a failed state remains unchallenged. Too often historians are eager to condemn the actions of the Hellenistic Athenians rather than attempt to understand them. Waterfield's recent popular history of Athens demonstrates that the negative view based on liberty has clearly penetrated the popular consciousness. When describing the events of 322, Waterfield (2004, pp. 267–8) observes:

This was the end of the world's earliest great democratic experiment; it had lasted a little less than 200 years, from the time of Kleisthenes' reforms. It was also the end of Athenian power: from now on it made little difference whether the nominal ruler of Athens was the assembled people, or an oligarchy, or a single individual, since the destiny of the city was no longer entirely in their hands.

But not having complete control of one's destiny is a charge that could be levelled against almost every modern nation state. Many a modern nation has lost its former glory, and lost its empire. Yet when it comes to Classical Athens there is an air of greater significance to it. It seems that in the eyes of modern commentators it is more momentous, more significant, and more lamentable, and somehow less understandable for the Athenians to have lost their liberty. The 'philhellene' George Finlay (1877, Preface) justified writing a Greek history covering the period between the Roman conquest and the regaining of freedom from the Ottoman Turks in the 1820s on the grounds that 'The history of the Greek nation, even as a subject people, cannot be destitute of interest and instruction'. That is certainly the case. We can learn as much from the Athenians after their loss of liberty as we can from the way they trampled over the liberty of others when they

dominated the Aegean world. In the late nineteenth century, Freeman (1863, vol. 1, p. 224) argued that much could be learned from the affairs of Greece recorded by Polybius, describing the '[t]he age of Polybios' as 'the age which connects the Greece of Mr. Grote with the Greece of Mr. Finlay'.⁵⁸ Freeman thus emphasizes the chasm that existed in the field of Greek history by the second half of the nineteenth century. That chasm is still present in our discipline. The preoccupation with liberty continues to cloud scholarly views of Greek history as it did in the eighteenth century when William Young (1804, p. 463) concluded his history of Athens as follows:

It may be asked, 'Did not Demetrius Poliorcetes expel the Phalerean from his government, and restore liberty to Athens?' Liberty, I answer, it was then incapable of receiving: for the truth of this mark, recur to the lives of Plutarch.

Plutarch's legacy could not be any more clear in Young's work. Unfortunately, when one considers the views of classicists like Cawkwell and popular historians like Waterfield, it is just as clear today.

Chapter 2

Ideology in Hellenistic Athens

[F]rom now on it made little difference whether the nominal ruler of Athens was the assembled people, or an oligarchy, or a single individual, since the destiny of the city was no longer entirely in their hands. Great powers were always hovering, to dictate the city's future . . . In return for their fealty, cities like Athens received benefactions from the king himself, or from indigenous plutocrats . . . Local politics became increasingly meaningless: there was little point in currying the favour of the Assembly when the Assembly had no real power

Waterfield, Athens: A History, from Ancient Ideal to Modern City

Waterfield's summation of Hellenistic Athens in a recent popular history succinctly illustrates the modern 'reception' of this phase of Athenian history. For Grote and those who follow his vision of Athenian life after Demosthenes, the politics of Hellenistic Athens is a sorry affair dominated by shameless flatterers of Macedonian kings and greedy plutocrats. Modern discussions of democracy or Athenian political institutions almost uniformly end in 322, and it is typical for modern scholars to portray the Hellenistic Athenians as shallow or hollow versions of their ideologically inspired predecessors. Whereas Athenian politics in the Classical period is seen as a bitter struggle for supremacy between factions or parties of democrats and oligarchs, the political arena in Hellenistic Athens is seen as an ideological vacuum dominated by like-minded plutocrats whose interest in participating in politics is purely financial gain. Athenian politicians like Stratocles, Phaedrus of Sphettus or Glaucon of Aethalidae who claim to be supporters of democracy cannot be viewed as real 'democrats' like Pericles, Demosthenes, or even the likes of Cleon and Hyperbolus because they are unfree, servile flatterers of foreign kings, whose primary motive for entering the political arena is lining their pockets. Because of the modern preoccupation with liberty, and the vision of Demosthenes as emblematic of Athenian

life, Hellenistic Athens has come to be portrayed as ideologically different from Classical Athens.

Modern Perceptions of Ideology in Hellenistic Athens

The modern distinction between the ideology of Classical and Hellenistic Athens would have come as a surprise to many Enlightenment thinkers. In the context of the Athens–Sparta debate the Laconophiles saw little or no difference between what we know as Classical and Hellenistic Athens. Such thinkers saw the execution of Phocion, the rejection of Demetrius of Phalerum and the deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes as typical examples of the perils of Athenian democracy. There was no difference between these ‘crimes’ and the trial of Miltiades, the ostracism of Aristides, the trial of the Arginusae generals, and the execution of Socrates. In terms of political ideology the Laconophiles saw little difference between the excesses of the masses when egged on by Cleon in the fifth century or by Stratocles at the end of the fourth century.

But when the Athenophiles effectively won the Athens–Sparta debate in the nineteenth century, Classical Athenian democracy and Athenian democratic ideology were elevated to role model status. Nothing could be clearer to Grote, Macaulay or Niebuhr than Demosthenes’ devotion to both liberty and democracy. His death thus becomes for them not only the death of Athenian liberty, but also the death of any genuine commitment to the cause of democracy in Athens. In their eyes the Hellenistic Athenians who prostrated themselves before the Macedonians were not only failing to live up to Demosthenes’ ideals of freedom, autonomy and empire but also his commitment to the principles of democracy. A democracy dominated by a man such as Stratocles who would stoop so low as to prosecute Demosthenes and deify a Macedonian could never be a real democracy!

Their dismissal of democracy after Demosthenes as failing to live up to the standards set by the Classical Athenians is apparent as an intellectual legacy in many twentieth-century works. Actions like the deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes have been typically seen not merely as evidence of a lack of freedom at Athens, but also a deficit of the kind of moral fibre that ‘democrats’ ought to show. Thus, Stratocles cannot be seen as a true democrat, and regimes where the participants declare themselves to be a democracy cannot be seen to be real (i.e. ‘radical’) democracy. Thus Claude Mossé (1973, p. 108) observed:

The philosophical tyranny of Demetrios of Phaleron had been only a brief halt in the irremediable decadence of the *polis*. The democracy restored by Demetrios Poliorketes was a mere caricature of the regime which had constituted the greatness of Athens.

Mossé's condemnation of Hellenistic democracy as a 'caricature' of the Classical democracy is certainly extreme, but she is by no means alone in distancing Hellenistic Athenian democracy from its Classical ancestor. Most modern academic studies have sought to distance the later Hellenistic democracies from the democracies of the Classical period. There is a general perception that the Athenians of the fifth and fourth centuries would not recognize the democratic *politeia* of the Hellenistic period as real or genuine democracies and would see them as a 'watered down' version of pure democracy. This can be seen well beyond scholarship on Athenian politics. Thus, in her study of the family in ancient Greece, Cynthia Patterson (1998, p. 188) speaks of the 'hollowness of the late-fourth-century democratic restoration in comparison to that of the fifth century'. In a similar vein Michael Scott's recent popular history of fourth-century Athens (2010) concludes with the deification of Demetrius Poliorketes in order demonstrate a fundamental difference between Classical and Hellenistic Athens. Thus Scott writes:

As the tumultuous century came to a close, Athens, the birthplace of democracy, had begun openly to worship a living man as a god, and had willingly given him the title of king. The dawn of the new world was complete.

But this tendency towards negative comparison is perhaps nowhere more evident than in James O'Neil's monograph on ancient Greek democracy (1995), which explicitly differentiates the Hellenistic democracies from the Aristotelian 'final' form of democracy that developed in the fifth and fourth centuries at Athens, Corcyra and Syracuse. O'Neil (1995, pp. 107–9) sees later democracies as 'evolving away' from those of the fifth and fourth centuries, and dismisses them as qualitatively inferior to these 'true' democracies. But such an approach is arguably a red herring. Besides the oddity of employing the ideas of a firm critic of democracy to condemn regimes that Aristotle himself would certainly have considered to be democratic, Aristotle did not use the term 'final' (*teleutaios*) to indicate a superior or more highly evolved form of democracy.¹ Aristotle merely uses the term 'final' to indicate the 'last in order' at the time he was writing.² Moreover,

Aristotle never even mentions Corcyra or Syracuse in his discussion of 'final' democracy. Aristotle actually characterizes 'final' democracy as a negative example of deviation away from the rule of law, whereby all citizens are allowed to hold office, 'but the multitude is sovereign and not the law; and this comes about when the decrees of the assembly override the law'. For Aristotle (*Politics* 1292a) this type of democracy is more akin to tyranny. This is hardly an appropriate rod with which to beat Hellenistic democracy. But when Aristotle is wearing his less critical hat he describes 'final' democracy as a constitution whereby 'all to meet in council about all matters, and for the magistracies to decide about nothing but to make preliminary decisions' (Aristotle, *Politics* 1298a). The Hellenistic revivals can be seen to meet these requirements easily enough.³ The negative comparison needs more to prove the case that late fourth- and early third-century democracy is a 'caricature' or regression from fifth-century democracy.

Another red herring is O'Neil's contention (1995, p. 105) that the domination of political affairs by the wealthy serves as evidence of the different nature of Hellenistic democracy. He observes,

[Hellenistic] democracies retreated from the more radical measures of the fifth and fourth centuries and increasingly allowed their leading citizens to play prominent roles in public life, making the idea of democracy more acceptable to many members of the upper class who might otherwise have favoured oligarchy.

According to this line of thought, once democracy is watered down sufficiently to make it palatable to the rich, oligarchy loses its appeal. The Hellenistic *polis* thus becomes the province of the wealthy who engage in politics for self-aggrandizement and financial profit. Green (1990, pp. 40, 50) likewise sees Hellenistic Athens as dominated by 'plutocrats'. This image has proved persuasive as the quotation from Waterfield that began this chapter clearly demonstrates. Yet one might ask what period of Athenian politics was not dominated by the wealthy? Athens had always been a plutocracy. Shipley (2000, p. 129) argues, 'élite leadership was traditional; the élite were predominant even in the radical democracy of fifth-century Athens', while Hansen (1987, p. 67) observes, '[w]hen the Athenian political leaders balanced accounts they added up talents and minas, whereas the ordinary citizens had only drachmas and obols to count'.⁴ This aspect of Athenian politics never changed: Pericles, Cleon, Nicias, Alcibiades, Conon, Thrasybulus, Eubulus, Lycurgus, Aeschines, Demosthenes all possessed fortunes and property on a scale that would have made most of their fellow

citizens green with envy. In this regard the leaders of Hellenistic Athens – Stratocles of Diomeia, Demochares of Leuconoe, Callippus of Eleusis and Glaucon of Aethalidae – were no different from their fifth- and fourth-century predecessors.

A consequence of this modern perception of Athens after Demosthenes as a city dominated by self-interested ‘plutocrats’ is that ideology is generally perceived as irrelevant to studies of Hellenistic Athens. This is partly because of a dangerous tendency to provide a generalized view of political ideology whereby the Hellenistic and Roman periods are lumped together as if they were exactly the same. This line of thought sees Athens dismissed as a university town dominated by a political elite who had no real ideological agenda at all. It is not merely the case that commitment to democracy is underplayed. The idea that some Athenians may have been ideologically opposed to democracy, let alone committed to an oligarchic cause is equally underestimated. The distance between the two ideological viewpoints is typically so underappreciated that any regime where the assembly still functions and the Athenians do not do something extravagant, like deify a Macedonian, the regime is democratic enough to be accepted as an inferior ‘Hellenistic democracy’. This approach leads some modern scholars to accept Demetrius of Phalerum’s claims that he ‘improved’ democracy despite the fact that he introduced a limited franchise based on wealth and severely curtailed key democratic institutions, and at the same time dismiss the democratic credentials of the regime that overturned his restrictive policies because of its close connections to Demetrius Poliorcetes. When democracy can be dismissed as a ‘caricature’ of ‘real’ democracy, the boundaries between democracy and oligarchy can be blurred to the point where ideology no longer exists.

But the evidence that we possess clearly demonstrates that Athens was no ideological vacuum. Rather, there existed at Athens a group or groups of political leaders committed to the idea that all Athenians should be able to participate in the governing of Athens, and prepared to use the terminology of democracy to describe themselves and their regime. There is evidence that these leaders perceived that there was a group or groups of Athenians opposed to the idea of popular participation and opposed to their interpretation of the terminology of democracy. Thus we have changes in *politeia* from democracy to oligarchy or tyranny (both with limited franchises), and back again in 322 (oligarchy), 319/8 (democracy), 317/6 (tyranny), 307/6 (democracy), ca. 300 (tyranny), 296/5 (oligarchy), 288/7 (democracy), 263/2 (oligarchy), and again in 229 (democracy). But even where there is clear evidence that the Athenians were motivated by ideology,

their motives are disregarded. Despite the fact that the Athenians described their government as a democracy during the third century, Ste. Croix (1983, p. 322) has dismissed their claims, arguing ‘during the third and second centuries BC *demokratia* increasingly came to signify no more than an internally self-governing republic.’ Hedrick Jr. (1999, p. 403) has followed Ste. Croix in arguing that ‘regimes that an Athenian of the fourth or fifth century would have characterized as “oligarchic” took upon themselves the name of “democracy”’. Patterson (1998, p. 188) even minimizes the ideological motivation behind Phocion’s trial, arguing that it is ‘an indication of the extent to which Athenian politics were now driven by the issues and alliances created by the Macedonian domination’, despite the fact that the jurors were heard to cry ‘stone the oligarchs and the haters of the *dēmos*’ during Phocion’s trial. It has reached the point that to suggest that Athenians in this period had any genuine commitment to democracy is almost heresy.

Even when a modern scholar does see commitment to democracy, Athens is still cast as devoid of ideological diversity. Gabbert (1986, pp. 29–30) has suggested that ‘belief in democracy was a “given” in Athenian politics,’ even during the Hellenistic period. But because she sees democracy as a ‘given’ at Athens, any disputes within the political leadership at Athens cannot be considered to be disputes on ideological grounds. Instead, they are merely disputes between democrats about which of the Hellenistic kings would be most permissive of democracy. Thus Gabbert essentially employs the same arguments that O’Neil used to demonstrate that the Hellenistic democracies were not ‘true’ democracies to demonstrate that Athens was entirely democratic. Unfortunately Gabbert’s suggestion that there was a general ideological consensus at this time implies that there was no real diversity of opinion or ideology at Athens in the early Hellenistic period, which means that she has essentially arrived at the same result as Ste. Croix et al.

Nonetheless, her argument that a term like ‘oligarch’ was thrown about as one might use the terms ‘fascist’ or ‘Nazi’ in modern times as ‘buzzwords to describe the opposition’ does hint at the truth – there was, in fact, an *opposition*. Time and again in the period between 322 and 262 we have examples of disputes amongst the political leaders of Athens based on ideological grounds, rather than merely about which king to support, or personality clashes. Aside from the bloodbath in 319/8, we have evidence of a similar purge in 322/1, the exile of the ‘oligarchs’ in 307/6 and their recall in 292, *stasis* and a military junta in the years following the Battle of Ipsus and the usual array of feuding and

squabbling we would expect to find within the Athenian political leadership. Dreyer (1999, p. 68) is probably much closer to the truth than Gabbert in suggesting the *majority* of the people were '*eindeutig demokratisch*', thus at least implying that there were those in Athens who were not 'democratic'.

Green (1990, p. 40) attempted to demonstrate the degeneracy of the Athenian politicians who came to the fore after 322 by highlighting the 'spectrum of conservatism, pragmatic opportunism, hysteria, subservience and cynical *Realpolitik*' that they represented. But one must wonder if such attitudes make these politicians any different from their predecessors. The history of Athenian politics is a history of diversity. Ferguson (1911a, p. 3) argued long ago that there was 'sedition within Greek cities from time immemorial.' He specifically contrasted Athens in the *later* Hellenistic period with this axiom, comparing Athens to a graveyard after this sedition stopped. When it comes to the scholarly reception of democracy in Hellenistic Athens, the backdrop to the squabbling in Athens is crucial. While the Athenians are haggling about how to maintain their maritime empire they maintain scholarly interest and regard. When they lose their freedom their squabbles tend to be seen as hysterical or ludicrous. Such is the focus on Athenian liberty and imperialism that, had the Spartans possessed sufficient financial and manpower resources in 404 BC to enable them to permanently break the maritime power base of the Athenians as the Macedonians did in 322 BC, prominent fourth-century Athenians such as Demosthenes, Aeschines and Isocrates would almost certainly be as little regarded by classicists today as their Hellenistic counterparts.

The relationships between Athens and the Hellenistic kings were also more complex than Gabbert would have us believe. The Athenians chose their potential benefactors carefully, particularly if one king, such as Antigonos the One-Eyed, might seem a likely champion of democracy. But the Athenians did not follow the kings blindly. If one follows Gabbert's line of thought, Athenian political leaders such as Phaedrus of Sphettus and Olympiodorus constantly acted out of personal loyalty to Demetrius Poliorcetes. But the evidence shows that they did not. Certainly both flourished when Demetrius held sway over Athens. Olympiodorus was particularly prominent in the democracy of 307–1, and was even willing to serve as archon twice during the increasingly oligarchic regime imposed by Demetrius in the 290s. Yet he later led the old men and boys in a daring raid that captured the Museum hill from Demetrius' garrison (Pausanias 1.26.1). Phaedrus likewise prospered in the 290s under

Demetrius, but at the same time that Olympiodorus was expelling Demetrius' garrison from the Museum, Phaedrus led the Athenian hoplites against Demetrius' forces in the Attic countryside (*IG* II² 682, 35). Olympiodorus and Phaedrus supported Demetrius when it suited them, but they were both ready to oppose him when to do so better served their political interests.

Defining Ideology in Democratic Athens

Ideology is one of the most problematic issues in the study of Athenian politics. Traditionally studies of Athenian politics broke things down into a struggle between two political 'parties', with the 'democrats' on one side and the 'oligarchs' on the other. We now agree that Athenian democracy was far more complicated than this, but this has not helped to develop a consensus with regard to labelling Athenian politicians, especially for the early Hellenistic period. A good example of the difficulties involved in employing labels is the late-fourth-century orator Demades who appears in modern accounts as a 'moderate' (Williams 1989, p. 24), 'a propertied democrat' (Ferguson 1911a, p. 27), and even a 'populist', (Green 1990, p. 41), yet has also often been cast as the ringleader of the oligarchy of 322/1 (Williams 1985, pp. 97–168).⁵ Despite their incompatibility, each of these labels could be considered appropriate to describe the ideological background of Demades, depending upon the circumstances in which he was operating, and upon how one evaluates the evidence regarding his career.

Understanding Athenian political ideology is made even more problematic by the fact that Athens had long been a democracy. All the political leaders worked within that framework, and any opponents of the system had to contend with the fact that democracy had significant mainstream support. Opponents were in the minority, and as such, outsiders. An indication of this is the fact that the Athenians referred to the prominent orator Callimedon of Collytus as the 'hater of the people' (*misodēmos*), which served to distinguish him from all other politicians (Deinarchus 1.94).

Because democracy was the norm in the Classical period, definitions of Athenian political ideology tend to focus on the mainstream view. Josiah Ober (1998, p. 33) has defined the central tenets of Athenian 'popular political ideology of the late fifth and fourth centuries' as:

1. A belief in the autochthonous nature of the Athenians, their innate intellectual superiority vis-à-vis all other peoples, and the necessity of maintaining the exclusivity of the citizenry;
2. An assumption that the ideal of political equality could be achieved and maintained in the face of existing social and intellectual inequalities among citizens;
3. A conviction that both consensus and freedom of public speech were desirable;
4. A belief in the superior wisdom of decisions made collectively by large bodies of citizens;
5. A presumption that elite citizens were simultaneously a danger to democracy and indispensable to the political decision-making process.

This definition is based upon Ober's contention (1989, p. 39) that Athenian social and political decisions, actions and judgements were the products of ideology and discourse functioning within the environment of the democratic political order and in response to external events.

Few would dispute Ober's definition. But there is a problem in that this definition effectively ignores the views of the opponents of democracy. They were present in democratic Athens, and we cannot ignore them. Any study of Athenian political ideology must endeavour to determine what motivated *all* the Athenian political leaders whether they were 'democrats' or 'oligarchs' or something else entirely. This is especially true of the early Hellenistic period when there were several periods in which those opposed to democracy held sway.

The crucial features of Classical Athenian democracy were the lot (sortition), and popular participation in the council, assembly and law courts.⁶ Each of these features ensured that participation was possible for *all* Athenians. The council, assembly and law courts depended upon large-scale participation by all Athenian citizens regardless of their qualifications. But critics of democracy believed the poorest citizens (and therefore the least educated) should not be allowed to play a role in the governing of the state.⁷ When oligarchs were able to seize control of Athenian affairs towards the end of the fifth century, citizenship was limited to only a few thousand, and a narrow ruling clique ruled in the place of large citizen decision-making bodies. The same happened when the Macedonians imposed oligarchies on Athens in the early Hellenistic period.

Essentially the issue at hand is how Athenians themselves believed Athens should best be governed. Should all the citizens including the poor and

'incompetent' be allowed to play a role? Or should the governing of Athens be left to a smaller group of more 'qualified' citizens?⁸ Bearing all this in mind, it seems to me that the crucial tenets in Ober's definition of Athenian political ideology are:

- A conviction that both consensus and freedom of public speech were desirable;
- A belief in the superior wisdom of decisions made collectively by large bodies of citizens.

These two ideas must be retained in order to produce a definition of Athenian political ideology that takes full account of the critics of democracy. Borrowing heavily from these two tenets and Moses Finley's definition of ideology (1982, p. 17) as 'the combination of beliefs and attitudes, often unformulated or subconscious and certainly neither coherent nor necessarily consistent, which . . . underlay . . . thinking and . . . behaviour',⁹ for the purposes of this study I am defining Athenian 'political ideology' as:

an individual's set of beliefs, values and attitudes concerning who should be allowed to participate in the governing of Athens, and how their participation should be facilitated.

Following this line of thought we are likely to find two basic groups at Athens:

- Those who believed that all the citizens should be allowed to participate in the governing of Athens, at all (or most) levels. These are the so-called democrats;¹⁰
- Those who believed in limiting political participation to a smaller group. This group could include those who favoured various forms of limited participation, even tyranny. These are the so-called oligarchs.

That is not to say that all those who supported the principle all the citizens should be allowed to participate in the governing of Athens would have agreed on all issues; nor would all those who favoured limiting political participation to a smaller group. There would always be significant differences in the outlooks and attitudes amongst the various 'members' of these broadly defined ideological groups. As we would expect from a city with a population of 30,000 citizens, political diversity was the rule. Some citizens whom we could style 'democrats' would have been more 'democratic' than

others, whereas some of those we could categorize 'oligarchs' would have been more restrictive in their outlook than others. Many of those opposed to democracy on principle would have been happy to work within the system. This was as true in the fifth century as it was in the Hellenistic period. Alcibiades argued that although he thought democracy was 'absurd', because democracy was the form of government at Athens, it was necessary to conform to the conditions that prevailed (Thucydides 6.89).

We also need to consider the fact that after the Lamian War, the Athenians had to face up to the fact that they were no longer entirely masters of their own domain. No matter what their ideological outlook, all the Athenians were obliged to compromise with the Successors of Alexander for their freedom and autonomy. Each and every Athenian who embarked on a political career had to decide how far he was willing to go to follow his principles. Following principles could get political leaders into serious trouble – Demochares was driven into exile after one too many snide comments about King Demetrius' interference in Athenian affairs – so each individual had to decide what he should do if he could not achieve his goals. Put simply, each had to ask himself whether to compromise or not. There is clear evidence that this issue could cause significant divisions at Athens.

However, we cannot overlook the fact that the majority of Athenian citizens had a genuine commitment to democracy in one form or another. This is clear from the fact that the Athenians resurrected democracy each time it was put down. The oligarchic regimes of the Four Hundred and the Thirty were quickly overthrown at the end of the fifth century, and the situation was no different in the early Hellenistic period: the oligarchy imposed on Athens by Antipater in 322/1 was overthrown after a bloody coup in 319/8; democracy surged back after Demetrius Poliorcetes ousted Demetrius of Phalerum's oligarchy in 307; and the restricted regime imposed on Athens by Demetrius Poliorcetes in the 290s was overthrown by force in favour of a democratic regime that lasted for a quarter of a century. But this is not to say that all Athenians were committed to democracy. There was a significant minority of wealthier Athenians who would have preferred a more restricted government (preferably involving them). Although they were a minority, they represented a very real threat to Athenian democracy, a threat which Antipater, Cassander and Demetrius Poliorcetes were able to exploit to their advantage. But the threat they posed is often underappreciated by modern commentators. The tendency to underestimate the commitment of Hellenistic Athenians to democracy is crucial here, because it has been mirrored by a similar tendency to underestimate the extent to

which the opponents of democracy were motivated by ideology. The blurring of the lines between democratic and oligarchic ideology has created an environment that has allowed some modern scholars to deny the extent to which the two fourth-century regimes imposed by Antipater and Cassander were oligarchic. In order to properly analyse and understand Hellenistic Athenian democratic ideology it is necessary to first examine the Athenian opponents of democracy, particularly in the light of recent attempts by several modern apologists to rebrand the fourth-century oligarchies as democracies. Ideology did not end at Athens in 322. The supports of democracy and oligarchy were very real, as the following chapters will demonstrate.

Chapter 3

The Enemy Within: Oligarchy in Hellenistic Athens

The oligarch is the sort who, when the people are debating which people to choose to assist the chief magistrate with the procession, takes the podium and says they need to have absolute power; if other speakers propose ten of them, he says 'One is plenty – but he has to be a real man!' He remembers only one line of Homer – he doesn't know a single thing about the rest: 'More than one leader is bad; let one alone be our ruler'

Theophrastus, Characters

Written in the last quarter of the fourth century – the very period that modern scholars typically see as the end point of genuine ideological commitment at Athens – Theophrastus' character sketch entitled *Oligarchia* provides us with a satirical view of the opponents of democracy. Theophrastus defines oligarchy as the desire for office for the sake of power and profit and proceeds to ridicule those who held such political beliefs through his portrayal of an oligarch whose political leanings are so extreme that he would be better described as advocating tyranny rather than oligarchy. This cranky and unpleasant fellow goes about grumbling about demagogues, sycophants in the law courts, the mob, the agora, and having to pay for liturgies. He is embarrassed when scrawny unwashed types sit next to him in the assembly, and blames Theseus for all of Athens' troubles because he broke up the monarchy by uniting the twelve cities of Attica. He would much prefer to govern Athens himself with his associates, but would settle for rule by one man, provided he is a real man, with the strong implication that he would like to be that man. His views are encapsulated in one final rant, 'either they must run the city, or us'.

Oligarchs and ‘Haters of the People’

Although this is intended to be a humorous caricature, Theophrastus is nonetheless reflecting contemporary attitudes and concerns. One need look no further than the fact that in the immediate aftermath of the defeat at Chaeronea the Athenians felt the need to pass a law against tyranny to see that the Athenians perceived a threat to democracy from within. This law legitimizes the killing of ‘anyone [who] revolts against the *dēmos* for the purpose of establishing a tyranny or joins in setting up a tyranny, or overthrows the *dēmos* of Athens or the democracy at Athens’, and threatens to take away the citizen rights of anyone who participates in such a regime, even for as little as sitting together in the council and deliberating about anything (*SEG* 12.87, 7–22). This law was clearly targeted at behaviour attributed to Theophrastus’ oligarch who praises rule by a single man, and advocates getting together to deliberate without reference to the common people. His loathing of the masses is reminiscent of the attitudes attributed to the prominent late-fourth-century orator Callimedon of Collytus who was known as ‘*dēmos*-hater’ because of his extreme political views.¹ Given his nickname, it is not surprising that Callimedon would later play a prominent role in the oligarchy Antipater imposed on Athens in 322/1.

During the Hellenistic period Athenian politicians were often accused of ‘overthrowing the *dēmos*’ or of being ‘oligarchs’. Yet in spite of the clear evidence, modern scholars typically deny the existence of genuine democratic or anti-democratic ideology in Hellenistic Athens. Athenian democracy clearly had numerous critics both at home and abroad, including intellectuals, active Athenian politicians, and even foreign statesmen such as Antipater (Diod. 18.18.4–5). Generally speaking, critics of democracy believed in limiting political participation to a small group of wealthy, property-owning citizens, a criticism of Athenian democracy that would have much influence on the Athens–Sparta debate in the Enlightenment. The exclusion of the poorest citizens (i.e. those who did not own any land or those who lacked significant wealth) is a clear indicator of oligarchy. When the oligarchs seized control of Athenian affairs in 411 and 404, a small ruling clique did the actual governing, and citizenship was limited to only a few thousand. The Thirty even called in the assistance of a Spartan garrison to prop up their unpopular regime. Circumstances were little different when Antipater and Cassander imposed oligarchy on Athens (322/1 and 317/6) with citizenship limited to as few as 9,000, and a Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus to ensure that the Athenian populace did not misbehave.

Much as we today find such regimes unappetizing, our distaste should not blind us to the fact that there was a small minority of Athenians who favoured limiting citizenship to the wealthy elite. A case in point is the notorious Callimedon of Collytus. In spite of his unsavoury reputation, Callimedon was able to rise to political prominence as an orator in the time of Demosthenes (Athenaeus 3.100c). Modern scholars are right to point out that Callimedon's ideas were abhorrent to the majority of Athenians. But we would do well to avoid going too far in downplaying the importance of their opposition.² Our sources make it clear that here were thousands of Athenians like Callimedon who were willing to play some sort of political role in each of the fifth- and fourth-century oligarchies.

A Case of Denial: Rebranding Oligarchy as Democracy

The fact that the political views expressed by Callimedon and those who moved in the same circles are repellent to current mainstream political thought has doubtless played a significant part in the fact that regimes that were seen as oligarchic in antiquity have been rebranded as democratic by modern apologists. The most notable cases are Lawrence Tritle's apologist view of Phocion's role in the oligarchy Antipater imposed (Tritle 1988, pp. 123–40), and Steven Tracy's defence of Demetrius of Phalerum's regime (Tracy 2000b). It appears that the very notion of oligarchy is so unpalatable that Tritle's Phocion must preside over a 'moderate democracy' rather than an oligarchy, while Tracy's Demetrius must be more democratic than the 'democracy' dominated by Stratocles of Diomeia that followed him.

Tritle and Tracy are by no means the only scholars to downplay the significance of anti-democratic sentiment, or the extent to which these Hellenistic regimes were restricted. Indeed, Tracy's view of Demetrius of Phalerum's regime has clearly impacted on mainstream or popular thought, since Waterfield (2004, p. 276) recently wrote, '[Demetrius] used not just his famous eloquence, but democratic offices to maintain his power and authority, like a fifth-century statesman'. Moreover both lines of thought have reappeared in recent academic works: Peter Liddel (2007, pp. 90–4) has defended Antipater's oligarchy, and Lara O'Sullivan (2009b) has recently replicated much of Tracy's vision of Demetrius of Phalerum.³ Scholars who defend either regime typically employ the same types of arguments to support their views, and it is not unusual for commentators defending the Antipatrid oligarchy as democratic to cast Demetrius' regime as oligarchic and vice versa. Thus, Liddel condemns Demetrius of Phalerum's

regime as oligarchic, while O'Sullivan casts Antipater's regime as oligarchic. In a similar vein Tracy (2003, pp. 11–12) insists that the regime led by Phocion in 322/1 must be regarded as oligarchic due to the number of citizens who were excluded from the organs of government, yet refuses to accept that Demetrius' regime ought to be seen as oligarchic due to its similar restrictions. Because of this tendency, this study will reconsider the two oligarchic regimes together. This is not to suggest that the two oligarchic regimes are the same or closely related to each other⁴ – rather, it is my intention to demonstrate that the two regimes share recognizably oligarchic traits.

Lachares' Tyranny and the Pro-Demetrian Oligarchy

While the Antipatrid oligarchy and Demetrius' regimes have their apologists, two Athenian regimes from the early Hellenistic period are almost uniformly recognized as oligarchic or restricted – Lachares' tyranny (early 290s) and the regime that Demetrius Poliorcetes put in place after ousting Lachares (296/5–288/7). These regimes bear many of the hallmarks of oligarchy: ruling cliques, repression of opposition with the threat of military force, and the interruption of democratic procedures. According to Pausanias (1.25.7) Lachares had been a popular leader but was encouraged by Cassander to seize power after the Athenians had broken with Demetrius Poliorcetes, their erstwhile benefactor. Lachares duly did so ca. 300, exploiting his position as ὁ τῶν ξένων ἡγούμενος to take control. Lachares put down a military junta led by Charias, the hoplite general, with the assistance of an elusive group of troops known as the Peiraikoi soldiers (*P. Oxy.* 17.2082 = *FGrHist* 257a).⁵ Lachares' spell in power began with a bloodletting, with Charias and three others led before the assembly and condemned on a single vote, just as Phocion and his friends had been in 318 and the Arginusae generals in 406. After taking control, Lachares swiftly developed a cruel reputation. The Peiraikoi soldiers broke with Lachares and seized Mounychia without his knowledge, and the Piraeus seceded from the city. Demetrius Poliorcetes took advantage of the confusion at Athens, making an alliance with the Piraeus residents and besieging the city. Demetrius swiftly expelled Lachares, but not before he had looted the acropolis to pay his mercenaries – including the stripping of the statue of Athena of its gold, an act which confirms Pausanias' sensational claim that 'we know no tyrant who proved so cruel to man and so impious to the gods'. No modern commentator would seriously suggest that Lachares was

anything other than a tyrant. The regime that Demetrius imposed in Lachares' place was openly oligarchic, and was kept in place with two garrisons, one in the Museum, and one in the Piraeus.⁶ In a clear violation of sortition, Olympiodorus held the archonship for two consecutive years between 294/3 and 293/2 (DH, *Deinarchus* 9.2; *IG* II² 378; *IG* II² 649; *IG* II² 389; *Agora* 16.167), elections were clearly interrupted,⁷ the annual secretary was replaced by the *anagrapheus* on public documents (*IG* II² 649 + Dinsmoor, 1931, p. 7; *Agora* 16.167), and Demetrius himself ordered the return of oligarchic exiles to Athens in 292/1 (DH, *Deinarchus* 9).

Yet both of these restricted regimes had certain democratic features. Neither regime placed restrictions on citizenship. The assembly continued to meet, decisions were published on stone, and officials were still elected by the *dēmos*. Lachares allowed tribal cycles to continue, and although the same cannot be said for the pro-Demetrian oligarchy, a fragment of Philochorus (*FGrHist* 328 F167 = DH, *Deinarchus* 2–3) suggests that the system was still recognizably democratic to contemporary Athenians. According to Philochorus, at the beginning of the year following Demetrius' restoration of democracy (307) a portent occurred on the acropolis which Philochorus and his fellow seers interpreted as indicating that the oligarchic exiles would return 'under the existing *politeia*; and it came about that this interpretation was fulfilled'. Given that Philochorus was no rabid pro-Antigonid, his claim should be trusted.⁸ But no modern commentator would seriously suggest that either regime was a genuine democracy. Indeed, Habicht (1997, pp. 90–1) compares this 'democracy' to recent communist states in Europe calling themselves 'democratic republics' or 'people's republics'. Yet compared to these restricted regimes, the oligarchies imposed by Antipater and Cassander should be seen as more oligarchic in nature.

Oligarchic Traits

In attempting to defend Demetrius of Phalerum's regime, Tracy (2000b, p. 339) has himself actually hinted at such oligarchic traits. Tracy suggests,

One might well object 'What was Demetrius' precise role and is it not a sham to claim that the democratic institutions were functioning if in the end they had no real power, if in fact that power was invested in Demetrius?' Or it could be argued that of course he maintained the outward show of democracy but in fact like some modern 'peoples' democratic republics'

his regime was very repressive. Was Demetrius, in short, a Quisling, a stooge of the Macedonians, who kept his fellow citizens subservient to the controlling power?

The answer to each of these questions is, 'yes'. Demetrius' claims to have improved democracy are a sham. His regime was repressive; the democratic institutions had no real power; and his position of power in Athens was based on his relationship with a foreign conqueror. The same can also be said of the oligarchy Antipater imposed, and to a lesser extent the pro-Demetrian oligarchy of the 290s. Both fourth-century regimes bear many similarities to the two fifth-century oligarchies, Lachares' regime, and the pro-Demetrian oligarchy:

- Both regimes began with a purge of the leading democrats, as did the Thirty and Lachares' tyranny;
- Both limited citizenship to the wealthy as the Four Hundred and Thirty had done;
- Like the Four Hundred, the Thirty and the pro-Demetrian oligarchy, both fourth-century regimes can be seen to have impeded the regular functions of the council and assembly by crucial changes to the democratic institutions and procedures;
- As in the case of the fifth-century regimes, new posts were created to enforce their rule;
- Where a Spartan garrison on the acropolis had propped up the Thirty, and Demetrius Poliorcetes' garrisons in the Museum and the Piraeus had ensured compliance with his views in the 290s, a Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus backed up both fourth-century regimes.

Each of these oligarchic features will be discussed in detail below, starting with limited franchises enforced by both fourth-century regimes.

Bloody Purges

No one who has read the sources can fail to appreciate the violence that surrounded the two fifth-century oligarchic regimes at Athens. From the ousting of the old democratic council by the new council of Four Hundred armed with daggers to the murder of the ostracized demagogue Hyperbolus in Samos, terror and violence mark Thucydides' account of the oligarchic coup in 411. The Thirty made the Four Hundred look like amateurs when

it came to violence, embarking on a reign of terror in which around 1,500 citizens and resident aliens were slaughtered as perceived opponents of their regime. Lachares' reign as tyrant was also marked by a bloody purge, with at least four prominent opponents executed after a somewhat dubious trial. Violence and oligarchic coups go together hand-in-glove in Classical and Hellenistic Athens.

The Antipatrid oligarchy began with the execution of the leading democratic orators, including Demosthenes, Hypereides, Eucrates, Aristonicus of Marathon and Himeraeus of Phalerum. Although our sources make it clear that the order for their execution originated with the Macedonian regent Antipater, we should not fool ourselves into thinking that the new leaders of the oligarchic regime were unhappy with this. Plutarch provides no indication that any of the Athenian envoys to Antipater objected to his demands, with the possible exception of Demetrius of Phalerum.⁹ Demades was clearly more than willing to go along with this decision, proposing the assembly decree ordering their deaths. Plutarch (*Demosthenes* 28) vividly describes how Hypereides, Aristonicus and Himeraeus who had sought refuge in the temple of Aeacus on Aegina were dragged out of their sanctuary by Antipater's bounty hunter Archias. Antipater duly dispatched them all, even cutting out Hypereides' tongue in the process. Antipater was denied his victim in Demosthenes who took his own life. Many other democratic leaders were driven into exile, although Phocion intervened to ensure that Hagnonides of Pergase and some others were not forced to leave Greece altogether (Plut. *Phocion* 28.3). The stability of the new oligarchy was enhanced by the removal of these potential troublemakers. Antipater's friends who would rule Athens on his behalf did not need to stage a bloody coup, as did the Thirty or Lachares – Antipater had done the dirty work for them.

Demetrius of Phalerum's regime began with a similar purge of democratic leaders. Plutarch (*Phocion* 38.1) tells us that the *dēmos* condemned and put to death the prominent democratic orator Hagnonides, while two other prominent leaders – Epicurus and Demophilus of Acharnae – fled Athens and were hunted down and killed by Phocion's son Phocus. O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 41, 113) has argued that Demetrius' accession to power was not accompanied by an official suppression of dissidents on the grounds that Cassander required the death of Hagnonides, and Phocus' slaying of Epicurus and Demophilus was an unofficial act of vengeance against the prosecutors of his father. But the execution of three of the four most prominent leaders of the democracy at the start of Demetrius' reign is surely not coincidence, given their bloody removal was in the interests of

the new oligarchy's leader, and the fact that Demetrius had already been complicit in the execution of the democratic leaders in 322/1. The fact that someone else got his hands dirty does not make the purge any less of a reality.

Limited Franchises

Aside from the purging of democratic opposition, the imposition of limited franchises is the most obvious manifestation of anti-democratic attitudes. Aristotle (*Politics* 1292a–b) explicitly associated restricting citizenship by wealth with oligarchy. This view is entirely in keeping with the fact that both fifth-century Athenian oligarchies severely limited the number of citizens eligible to participate in Athenian politics: the Four Hundred in 411 limited the franchise to 5,000 of those 'able to serve the state in person or with their wealth' (*Ath. Pol.* 29.5); while the Thirty planned to draw up a list of only 3,000 Athenians for citizenship, but never quite got around to doing so (*Ath. Pol.* 36.1–2). The exclusion of the poorer elements of society is clearly what Theophrastus' 'oligarch' is thinking when he rants, 'either they must run the city, or us'. Given that Antipater wished to prevent the 'troublesome' and 'warlike' Athenian rabble from causing him problems after the Lamian War (Diod. 18.18.4), it should come as no surprise to find that the first act of the new regime that he imposed was to restrict citizenship to those possessing property worth 2,000 drachmas. Only 9,000 met the requirement in 322/1, and up to 22,000 Athenians were deprived of their citizen rights (Diod. 18.18.4).¹⁰

The 2,000 Drachmas Franchise

The 9,000 Athenians who met the property qualification of 2,000 drachmas were designated 'masters of the city and countryside'. According to Plutarch, Phocion wanted to create a polity that was more harmonious and uniform as in the times of Pericles, Aristides and Solon (Plut. *Phocion* 7.5). Antipater told the Athenians they could be his allies if they reverted to their ancestral constitution (*patrios politeia*) 'based on wealth' (Plut. *Phocion* 27.5). Some even called the new regime a 'Solonian *politeia*' (Diod. 18.18.5). But such claims to restoring the ancestral or Solonian constitution should not fool us into believing that the regime was democratic. The fact that the Thirty, who limited citizenship to a mere 3,000, called their regime a 'Solonian' constitution ought to prevent us from seeing this as anything other than

oligarchy. Diodorus is probably reflecting views of the poorer citizens at the time when he writes that Antipater 'overthrew the *dēmos*' and 'changed the form of government from a democracy'.

Nonetheless, a minority of modern scholars have sought to minimize the significance of the limited franchise. Tritle (1988, p. 133) has argued that because 9,000 citizens still possessed full rights the regime ought to be seen as a 'moderate form of democracy'. But Tritle's argument depends upon his contention that nine thousand citizens possessing full rights equates to 'a wider form of government than oligarchy'. This contention seems more in keeping with Antipater's view that the regime was the 'ancestral constitution' but with the poorest left out, than with realities of the property qualification, which disenfranchised between 12,000 and 22,000 citizens. In one fell swoop between 60 and 70 per cent of the population of Attica suddenly ceased to be citizens. Given that Aristotle argued that any form of limited franchise was typical of oligarchy we must view a regime that excluded 60 per cent of the population as very much oligarchic. Indeed, Tritle emphasizes the similarity of this regime to the fifth-century oligarchies by repeatedly referring to it as the Nine Thousand.

Tritle's claim (1988, p. 134) that 'exclusion of the *thētes* [from holding office] would not necessarily be an oligarchical or radical act' is also unconvincing. Besides the fact that there is nothing in either Diodorus or Plutarch to support this conclusion, Tritle's argument relies on the fact that, under the democracy, treasurers of Athena were appointed from the highest census class (the *pentakosiomedimnoi*), and the fact that the *thētes* were officially excluded from serving as archons. But Tritle overlooks the fact that this latter rule was effectively invalid by the time the *Ath. Pol.* was written. Tritle's argument also obscures the fundamental issue at hand. To an extent it is irrelevant whether *thētes* were excluded from holding office under the old democracy; what is relevant, is the fact that they were also excluded from attending the assembly under the new regime Antipater imposed. Hitherto all Athenian citizens had been entitled to serve in the council, attend the assembly, and act as jurors in the courts. They were even paid for the privilege. If they so chose they could even address these bodies. Under the new regime, between 12,000 and 22,000 Athenians were suddenly deprived of these long-held rights, draining the assembly and the law courts.¹¹ For the poorest Athenians, this was certainly a 'radical act'. We ought not overlook the fact that Plutarch speaks of the 'shame' and humiliation the Athenians felt, and the 'cruelty' they endured (Plut. *Phocion* 28.4). If the disenfranchised were relatively unaffected by the changes, they would hardly have felt such shame. Moreover, Antipater offered land to the

disfranchised in Thrace, and a large number seem to have taken him up on the offer. If the poorest citizens were not excluded from political participation, why would they accept such an offer, particularly when they felt that they were being treated 'like men from a captured city'. Besides, if the poorest Athenians were not excluded there would be no point to any of Antipater's actions apart from the installation of the garrison; in fact, their exclusion would actually help to explain the intention of the garrison.¹² Plutarch refers to the presence of 'foreigners' (*xenoi*), 'slaves' (*douloi*), and 'disfranchised citizens' (*atimoi*) at the trial of Phocion (Plut. *Phocion* 34.2). These terms should not be taken literally;¹³ 'foreigners' surely indicates the presence of those who had been exiled in 322/1 and had taken up in Thrace, whereas 'slaves' and 'atimoi' surely indicates those who had been disfranchised, but chose to remain in Attica.¹⁴

Liddel also argues that the regime was democratic. While his approach is different from that of Tritle, it likewise rests on the premise that the changes did not radically alter the governing of Athens.¹⁵ Thus, Liddel (2007, p. 91) states,

In short, other than the number of citizens able to participate in the democracy, the abolition of certain minor offices, and the ascendancy of the secretary (*anagrapheus*), there was a considerable element of continuity in the *polis* – institutions. The functioning of institutions that would have allowed the performance and negotiation of civic obligation was probably unaffected by the restriction of the franchise.

Certainly there is no indication that the fundamental organs of government were limited as they were under the Four Hundred or the Thirty. But Liddel's 'other thans' are too significant to be dismissed so lightly. We have already seen that the number of citizens able to participate in the governing of Athens was more than halved; the powers of the *anagrapheus* were almost certainly completely incompatible with the principles of democracy; and the abolition of the 'minor offices' included the deliberate reorganization of policing of the politically sensitive Piraeus region whence opposition to the Thirty came, and which was now home to a Macedonian garrison.¹⁶ By focusing on the continued existence of certain institutions rather than on the impact on them of a limited franchise, Liddel drastically underestimates the radical reshaping of Athenian society and government under the oligarchy. This is not a new scenario. Eighteenth-century writers were by and large unconcerned by the impact of the limited franchise,¹⁷ and nineteenth-century writers were seldom any more sympathetic. Thirlwall

(1835–44, vol. 7, p. 192), for example, could not fathom how so few Athenians could meet such an insignificant sum.¹⁸ This trend has continued into the twentieth century. By concentrating on the effect of the limitation of participation on the upper strata of society, even modern scholars who recognize the regime as oligarchic often underplay the impact the changes had on the nature of politics at Athens and on Athenian society as a whole. The failure of modern scholars to fully comprehend the impact of the limited franchise on the majority of the Athenian population is perhaps best illustrated by the recent claims of Grieb (2008, p. 52) that the disenfranchised were able to enjoy their citizen status except for their exclusion from the decision making process. One can only wonder how the poorest 60–70 per cent of citizens of most modern democratic states would react to being told that although they were no longer able to run for office or vote, they would still retain their citizen status!

The tendency to underplay the significance of the limited franchise is exacerbated by the tendency to see the property qualification as either representing the marker between the old Solonian class of landless *thētes* and the landowning hoplite class (*zeugitai*),¹⁹ or a contemporary assessment of the poverty line. Thus, Casson (1976, p. 30) argues that 2,000 drachmas was considered to be the ‘poverty line’ at the time, while Williams (1985, p. 118) argues that the figure represented the line between the so-called most excellent (*bellistoi*) and the worthless (*ponēroi*).²⁰ But such distinctions treat the property qualification as if it were a figure determined by a reasoned analysis of statistics by a government body in a modern nation state rather than a figure imposed by a foreign conqueror and his entourage of Athenian yes men. Consequently, modern scholars often understate how significant the effect would have been. For examples, Lehmann (1995, p. 139) describes this oligarchy as a ‘three-quarter-society’ (*Drei-Viertel-Gesellschaft*), a tag that drastically understates the extent of the exclusion. Considering 60–70 per cent of Athenians were debarred from citizenship, it would be more appropriate to call the new regime a ‘one-quarter society’.

It is clear that many of the disenfranchised were by no means poor. According to Plutarch (*Phocion* 29.4), Phocion kept the ‘troublemakers and revolutionaries’ out of office, and taught them to be fond of home and to delight in farming. This suggests that when the new rules of citizenship were enforced it was not only landless urban poor who were excluded, but also landowners who had hitherto been eligible to hold office. It is possible to speculate just how many landowners would have been disenfranchised. According to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*On Lysias* 32), when Phormisius

proposed limiting political rights to those who owned land in 403, some 5,000 Athenians would have been disenfranchised. Given that either 12,000 or 22,000 Athenians were disenfranchised in 322, this suggests that as many as 7,000 to 17,000 landowners could have been victims of the new property qualification.²¹

This belies Casson's hypothesis that 2,000 drachmas represented the 'poverty line' at the time. Jones' suggestion (1957, p. 31) that a figure of 2,000 drachmas was equivalent to 'roughly five acres and a cow' is probably more accurate, but perhaps runs the risk of still understating matters. To put the property qualification in perspective it might help to demonstrate what the figure of 2,000 drachmas represents in terms of movable goods.²² Two thousand drachmas is roughly equivalent to 666 *medimnoi* of barley, sufficient grain to feed a family of four for 14.5 or 24 years respectively,²³ and significantly more than the annual income of the richest strata of Athenian society the so-called *pentakosiomedimnoi*. It is also equivalent in value to 20 minimum-value warhorses in the fourth and third centuries,²⁴ or 400 head of oxen or 2,000 sheep of sacrificial quality in the time of Solon as cited by no less a source than Demetrius of Phalerum (Plut. *Solon* 23.3). 2,000 drachmas was clearly a substantial sum in anyone's terms – which must be the reason why it was chosen in the first place.

Rather than representing an actual 'poverty line' as we would understand it today, it seems more likely that 2,000 drachmas represented what the wealthiest Athenians considered to be the line that separated the 'most excellent' (i.e. themselves) from the 'worthless' (i.e. everyone else). This would be effectively the 'poverty line' for those who had little or no understanding of what poverty actually entailed. This vision of 'poverty' is perhaps akin to that expressed in Menander's *Dyscolus* where Cnemon is described as 'poor' (*ponēros*) by Chaereas, the gofer of the extremely wealthy Sostratus (l. 130) despite owning property 'worth maybe two talents' (l. 327). Cnemon's stepson Gorgias, also a small landholder, calls himself 'poor' but again this is in comparison to Sostratus (l. 769). The comparison to Sostratus is made even clearer when his slave Daos tells Sostratus that he must dupe Cnemon into thinking that he is a 'a working farmer, by your way of life a poor man.' (ll. 369–70). The true extent of the 'poverty' of Cnemon and Gorgias is illuminated by the fact that Sostratus' father Callippides can provide his daughter with a dowry of three talents (l. 844), but the supposedly impoverished Gorgias can claim to have a talent to spare as a dowry for his half-sister (ll. 844–5). There would have been a place for these sorts of 'poor' in the oligarchy, but many smaller landholders would not have been as fortunate. It is particularly apt to consider the sentiments expressed in

Menander's work, because the *Dyscolus* was written and produced in 317 BC, the year in which Demetrius of Phalerum became tyrant of Athens and imposed his own property qualification for citizenship at Athens.

The 1,000 Drachmas Franchise

Demetrius of Phalerum set the property qualification for citizenship during his spell in charge of Athenian affairs at 1,000 drachmas (Diod. 18.74.3), and enforced it with a census (Athenaeus 6.272b). Modern scholars often fail to take into account the harshness of this franchise because they concentrate on the fact that it was exactly half that imposed under Antipater.²⁵ Thus Tracy (2000b, p. 338) argues that Demetrius 'expanded the citizen pool and opened up the process to more people, at least two to three times as many as the oligarchic regime which preceded him', while O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 41) sees the franchise as being 'relaxed to ten *minae*'. But such claims ignore the fact that the regime that preceded Demetrius' was a democracy with full participation – so rather than expanding the citizen body Demetrius was actually significantly diminishing it. Given the number of citizens who still would have been disenfranchised would have been at the very least the 5,000 or so who did not own land,²⁶ it would be more accurate to describe the regime headed by Demetrius as less oppressive than the earlier oligarchy, rather than more relaxed.

That is not to deny that the limited franchise was milder than that under the oligarchy imposed by Antipater. But the fact that it was milder does not mean that it was compatible with democracy. Aristotle rejected the notion that democracy was the same as rule by the majority of citizens, and even went so far as to argue that no one would call a government a democracy even if the whole number were 1,300 and the thousand richest did not give the three hundred poorest a share in government although they were free-born (Aristotle, *Politics* 1290a). For Athenians accustomed to full participation and full freedom, the limited franchise could only mean an oligarchy. Indeed, even a recent critic of the notion that this regime was oligarchic suggests that the limited franchise is 'one sense in which the regime of 317–301 could unquestionably be deemed oligarchic' (O'Sullivan 2009b, p. 108).²⁷

By setting the limit at 1,000 drachmas Demetrius and Cassander were probably attempting to avoid the resentment of the disfranchised that brought about the rapid downfall of the Antipatrid oligarchy rather than seeking to achieve a more democratic citizen body. One cannot forget that

Demetrius was a leading figure in that oligarchic regime, and he must have been anxious to avoid the kind of revolution that had toppled him and the rest of 'Antipater's friends' from power in 319/8. By allowing many more poor citizens to retain their rights Demetrius was certainly going some way towards minimizing the resentment. He was also conforming to the views of Aristotle (*Politics* 1295a25–1296a21, 1297b1–7) who argued that social stability could only be achieved if those with political rights outnumbered those without (Wilson 2000, p. 270). But the fact that so many Athenians joined Ophellas in his doomed expedition against Carthage in 310/9 should be seen as a sign of strong discontent in Athens at the time. With the promise of a rich, new land to inhabit, Ophellas was able to recruit a large number of Athenians, especially those who had lost their political rights in 317 (Habicht 1997, p. 65). If Demetrius' reforms had not adversely affected the disenfranchised there would have been less incentive for them to join in such an arduous campaign.²⁸ It is worth bearing in mind that the property qualification of 1,000 drachmas still represents a significant degree of wealth.²⁹ The 'poor' of the ilk of Cnemon in Menander's *Dyscolus* may have been included in Demetrius' new Athens, but there were clearly many Athenians whose poverty was real and who were left on the margins of his 'improved' democracy.

Ruling Cliques and Tyrants

Athenians associated oligarchy with ruling cliques and cabals. The oligarchic regime of 411 was dominated by the so-called Four Hundred who ruled without consulting the 5,000 citizens, while the Spartan-backed oligarchy of 404 was led by the Thirty who never truly drew up the list of 3,000 Athenians eligible for citizenship. Both regimes were infamous – especially the Thirty – and the Athenians thereafter feared the influence of small groups of opponents of democracy. In Athenian eyes oligarchy went hand in glove with tyranny (Brock 1989, pp. 160–1). Xenophon (*Hellenica* 2.4.1) referred to the Thirty as 'tyrannizing' the Athenians. While both the oath of Demophantus from 410 (Andocides 1.96), and the 337/6 law against tyranny (*SEG* 12.87, 7–22), treat 'tyranny', 'oligarchy' (literally small groups getting together outside the assembly), and 'overthrowing the *dēmos*' as the same thing.³⁰ Theophrastus' 'oligarch' hints at this side to anti-democratic sentiment when he declares, 'One man is sufficient, but he has to be a real man!' This aspect of oligarchy can be seen in both the oligarchic regimes of the late fourth century – despite modern scholarly claims to the contrary.

Antipater's Friends

Tritle (1988, p. 137) rejects Jones' claim (1957, p. 42) that a 'small extremist clique' ruled Athens after 322/1, arguing that there is no evidence for cabals of ruling oligarchs like the Four Hundred or the Thirty. He even accepts the claims of the oligarchs that they were governing according to the laws of Solon. But such a line of thought runs contrary to the fact that most modern scholars attribute particularly prominent roles to Phocion and Demades,³¹ thus at least implying that there is a ruling cabal of sorts. Dreyer (1999, p. 159) even goes so far as to refer to the oligarchy as *das Phokion-regime*. Yet the fact that the same modern scholars who have assigned Phocion and Demades leading roles in the oligarchy seldom provide clear evidence justify their claims, might at first seem to support Tritle's argument.

But if we look carefully at the evidence that we possess, we can see that there was, in fact, a small group of Athenians that dominated Athenian affairs during the oligarchy, a group that Polybius calls 'the friends (*philoî*) of Antipater' (Polybius 12.13.1–8). Antipater was the de facto overlord of Athens, and almost every individual who played a leading role in the new regime can be counted among his friends:

- Phocion is portrayed by Plutarch as 'managing' (ἐπιμελόμενος) Athenian affairs on Antipater's behalf (Plut. *Phocion* 29.4), while Diodorus describes him as holding 'the supreme authority under Antipater' (Diod. 18.65.6). Demades is known to have proposed at least six decrees in the oligarchic assembly (*IG* II² 372, 380, 383a, 399, 400, *Agora* 16.100) and acted as an ambassador on behalf of the regime (Diod. 18.48.3; Plut. *Demosthenes* 31.4; Plut. *Phocion* 30.5–6). Both Phocion and Demades were known to be *philoî* of Antipater – the Macedonian regent himself referred to them as such. According to Plutarch, Antipater remarked that he had 'two friends (*philoî*) at Athens, Phocion and Demades; one he could never persuade to accept anything, the other he could never satisfy with his gifts' (Plut. *Phocion* 30.2).³² This anecdote gives us a good idea of just how much power and influence Phocion and Demades had as a result of their friendship with Antipater;
- Diodorus indicates that Phocion and his associates (οἱ περὶ Φωκξωνά) played such a prominent role in Athenian affairs during the oligarchy that they feared for their lives when their regime was overthrown and full democracy was restored (Diod. 18.65.4). This belies Plutarch's suggestion that Phocion's friends were condemned to death merely due to

their connection to him (Plut. *Phocion* 34.5), and it would be naïve to read too much into it.³³ Hegemon for instance is executed having only just accompanied Phocion as an ambassador to the Macedonian regent. He was a prominent orator in his own right,³⁴ so when he claims that Polyperchon will be able to attest to his goodwill to the Athenian people he is surely speaking in terms of a recent political role. Given that Polyperchon had spent the last few years at Antipater's court, the fact that Hegemon claims to know Polyperchon well suggests that he too could be counted among 'Antipater's friends'.³⁵ It seems unlikely that men of the stature of Thudippus of Araphen and Pythocles of Cedoe had not played an active role in the oligarchy;³⁶

- Callimedon of Collytus, the notorious *misodēmos*, can also be linked with 'Antipater's friends', given that his first move after the outbreak of the Lamian War was to flee to Antipater's court (Plut. *Demosthenes* 27);
- Polybius provides us with crucial information that Archedicus of Lamprae, who held the very prominent office of *anagrapheus* in 319/8, was one of 'Antipater's friends'. He mentions that Timaeus of Tauromenium cited claims made by Archedicus, the comic playwright, as evidence that Demochares of Leuconoe (the nephew of Demosthenes) was unfit to blow the sacrificial flame because of indecent conduct. Polybius finds these allegations offensive, and dismisses them on the grounds that they come from a poet of no repute. Polybius argues that Demochares – a noted democrat – had many enemies among 'Antipater's friends', and that he had said much to annoy Antipater, his successors and friends;
- Demetrius of Phalerum was another prominent figure who can be plausibly linked with Antipater. The fact that he made a beeline for Antipater's grandson Nicanor in the Piraeus when the people overthrew the oligarchy and was counted among 'the many political enemies' (*antipoliteuomenoi*) of Demochares along with Archedicus of Lamprae (Polybius 12.13.1–8) should suffice on that front. But if there are some doubts about Polybius' evidence,³⁷ his later connections with Antipater's son Cassander should be seen as decisive.

When the democratic revolution started, 'Antipater's friends' were forced to flee Athens. Phocion and Hegemon went as ambassadors to Antipater's old friend Polyperchon; Demetrius of Phalerum fled to Antipater's grandson Nicanor; and Callimedon and Phocion's son-in-law Charicles fled to places unknown. Those who were holding offices, namely, the 'magistrates' (*archai*), were deposed, and were replaced by new ones 'from among the democrats' (Diod. 18.65.6). Some, such as the *anagrapheus*

Eucadmus of Anacaea, survived. Collectively those who had held office during this period were reviled as oligarchs (*IG* II² 448, 61), but their connections to Antipater were still noteworthy when Polybius was writing more than a century later.

Modern apologists probably make too much of divisions between the leaders of the oligarchy. The fact that Demades attempted to convince Antipater to remove the garrison when Phocion had refused to use his influence with the Macedonian regent need not be seen as a sign that we are dealing with anything other than an oligarchic clique.³⁸ Demades' fatal mission to the Macedonian court, which ended in his trial and condemnation by his fellow ambassadors,³⁹ is in fact quite reminiscent of Theramenes' miserable fate at the hands of his fellow members of the Thirty. Demades may have found himself in a similar position to that in which Theramenes found himself in 404 – sympathetic to the oligarchic cause in principle, but rather dissatisfied with the current arrangements. Like Demades, whose trial reeks of a set-up⁴⁰ and had little legal basis,⁴¹ Theramenes was put on trial by his erstwhile colleagues and summarily put to death (Xenophon, *Hellenica*, 2.3.15–56; Diod. 14.4.5–5.4). Both paid the ultimate price for refusing to toe the line.

Demetrius of Phalerum, the 'Tyrant' of Athens

Where a clique of Antipater's friends had led the earlier oligarchy, when Antipater's son Cassander took control of Athens, he installed just one man, Demetrius of Phalerum, as an official governor of Athens or 'manager' (*epimelētēs*) of the *polis* (Diod. 18.74.3). Tracy rejects the notion that Demetrius was a quisling figure or a 'foreign stooge'. O'Sullivan likewise refuses to see Demetrius' Athens dancing solely to the beat of Cassander's drum. But their view not only ignores the fact that Demetrius had 'form', so to speak, having played a leading role in the Antipatrid oligarchy,⁴² it also ignores the fact that despite holding the official title of *epimelētēs*,⁴³ Demetrius was effectively a tyrant. Indeed, Pausanias (1.25.6) specifically describes Demetrius as a *tyrannos*, which is a view shared by most modern scholars.⁴⁴ Plutarch argued that the regime was an 'oligarchy' in name, but actually a monarchy because of the 'power' (*dynamis*) Demetrius held (Plut. *Demetrius* 10.2). Cicero described Demetrius as 'the leader' (*princeps*) of Athens (Cicero, *De Finibus* 5.19.54), which probably reflects his understanding of the Greek sources and is entirely consistent with the picture Plutarch and Pausanias provide. The position was also quite similar to that which

Deinarchus of Corinth (not the Athenian resident speech-writer, but the homonymous Corinthian potentate) and Solon of Plataea had held under Cassander's father, or indeed that of Phocion in the Antipatrid oligarchy. Such a post was clearly incompatible with democracy.

Given his father's preference for oligarchy and de facto tyranny, it is not at all surprising that Cassander employed Demetrius of Phalerum as 'manager' of Athens. Cassander would later encourage Lachares to seize power as tyrant at Athens after the Battle of Ipsus. Demetrius' prior involvement in the Antipatrid oligarchy must have recommended him to Cassander. The fact that Aristotle had schooled both may have also assisted Demetrius' case with Athens' new master, but it would have been his credentials as a leading light in the Antipatrid oligarchy that would have surely convinced Cassander. In fleeing to Cassander's nephew Nicanor in the Piraeus when the people overthrew the oligarchy, Demetrius clearly made a better choice than Phocion, whose choice to argue his case before Polyperchon proved fatal. Cassander did not give Demetrius reason to regret his choice. Indeed, Athenaeus (12.542e) states that after Demetrius fled to Nicanor, he acquired much power when he became Cassander's *philos*. In a similar vein, Pausanias (1.25.6) states that Cassander 'made' Demetrius tyrant at Athens.

Tracy (1995; 2000b, p. 337) has attempted to get around the incompatibility of Demetrius' position with democracy by arguing that the Athenians chose him willingly.⁴⁵ Diodorus states 'whatever man should seem right to Cassander' would be *epimelētēs*, and that Demetrius of Phalerum 'was chosen' (ἤρξαθη) (Diod. 18.74.3), but does not state explicitly who did the choosing. Tracy exploits the slight ambiguity to argue that the Athenians were permitted to do the choosing. But it seems more likely that Cassander chose Demetrius himself,⁴⁶ particularly given their recent meetings in the Piraeus and Pausanias' statement that Cassander 'made' Demetrius tyrant at Athens. It is difficult to imagine that Cassander would have trusted the Athenians with a free choice, or bothered to allow them the pretence of a rigged 'election'. Cassander was probably only as mild towards the Athenians as he was because he needed to get back to Macedon in a hurry.⁴⁷

The only evidence to hint that the Athenians elected Demetrius as *epimelētēs* comes from a deme decree from Aexone (*IG* II² 1201, 11–12) which states that Demetrius 'was elected by the *dēmos* of the Athenians' to a particular office that was nine letters in length. On the strength of Diodorus 18.74.3, Tracy has argued in favour of restoring *epimelētēs* (ten letters). But there are obvious flaws in this argument. For starters, one must assume crowding.⁴⁸ Moreover, it seems unlikely that an Athenian decree would have

described Demetrius as being ‘elected’ by the *dēmos* to such an extraordinary post, despite the claims of Stork et al (2000, p. 49. n. 4) that *epimelētēs* was an elected Athenian office.⁴⁹ The title *epimelētēs* clearly refers to Demetrius’ position vis-à-vis Cassander, not Athens, As Cassander’s official nominee, Demetrius role was to ensure the Athenians obeyed their Macedonian overlord.⁵⁰

It is far more likely that the term *nomothetēs* should be restored here as several modern scholars have done.⁵¹ It is the correct number of letters (nine), so there is no need to assume a scribal irregularity as one needs to if restoring *epimelētēs*. It also tallies perfectly with ‘he made laws’ in line 12. Thus the decree would read: ‘and having been elected *nomothetēs* by the people of Athens he made laws (*nomoi*) fine and beneficial to the city’. It makes far more sense that the document would record that Demetrius would have made laws after being appointed *nomothetēs* rather than *epimelētēs*, particularly given that Demetrius is elsewhere described as having ‘made laws at Athens’ in 317/16 (Marmor Parium, B, 15–16), and Georgius Syncellus (*Chronological Abstract*, p. 521) referred to Demetrius as the third Athenian *nomothetēs*. Demetrius himself wrote a work entitled, ‘Concerning the *nomothesia* at Athens’, a work in which he must have referred to his own duties as *nomothetēs*, and is known to have used the term *nomothetēs* when referring to his lawgiving (Plut. *Aristides* 27.3).

There is thus no evidence to suggest that anyone other than Cassander chose Demetrius. Tracy (2000b, p. 332) argues that Demetrius came to his position of power as a result of an ‘agreement’ between Athens and Cassander, thus implying free choice on the part of the Athenians. He notes that it was Demetrius’ ‘singular misfortune that his regime was the second one imposed by the Macedonians in the space of less than five years’. The clear implication is that if Antipater had not imposed an oligarchy on Athens five years earlier, no one would have complained about Demetrius’ regime. But the critical factor is Tracy’s own word *imposed*. This so-called agreement was not made between equal partners; Cassander imposed it on Athens. The Athenians had no free choice, and immediately afterwards several thousand citizens were no longer able to participate in the governing of Athens. O’Sullivan (2009b, pp. 127–8, 131, 161, 228) tries to defend Demetrius on the grounds that his position was akin to that of Pericles in the fifth century. O’Sullivan is perhaps correct in suggesting that Plutarch’s statement (*Demetrius* 10.2) that Demetrius’ rule was nominally oligarchy but in reality monarchy echoes Thucydides’ claim (2.65.9) that Periclean Athens was in name a democracy but in reality rule by the foremost

individual. She is also right to point out that Cratinus styled Pericles a 'tyrant' as Pausanias did Demetrius, and that both patronized the arts. But this does not make Demetrius' regime a democracy. Pericles achieved his pre-eminence through a combination of talent and adroit political manoeuvring. Demetrius, on the other hand, achieved his power through the backing of Cassander and his Macedonian garrison. It was a restrictive regime, and the ancient sources make that clear.

Disruption of Council and Assembly

Both fifth-century oligarchies disrupted the normal functioning of the council and assembly. Tritle (1988, p. 137) cites the continued activity of the council and assembly as evidence that no ruling cabal under the Antipatrid oligarchy. In particular he focuses on the fact that the assembly 'continued to legislate'. In a similar vein, Tracy (2000b, pp. 337–8) and O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 117–26) both maintain that Demetrius of Phalerum allowed the council and assembly to function as normal. But these arguments have fundamental flaws.

First, both the assemblies in question excluded thousands of Athenians who had once been eligible to participate in the decision-making process. As discussed earlier, in the case of the Antipatrid oligarchy, this was an assembly that excluded more than half of the Athenian populace. It was also an assembly that lacked power within the framework of the oligarchic regime. Phocion showed that he was willing – and able – to ignore decisions made by the assembly of the Nine Thousand. According to Plutarch the assembly repeatedly called upon Phocion to travel to Macedon as an ambassador to persuade Antipater to remove the garrison, but 'he refused to act many times' (Plut. *Phocion* 30.4–5). When they grew tired of his refusals, the Athenians turned to Demades. Williams (1989, p. 28) argued that the fact that the people chose Demades to treat with Antipater indicates that the assembly was 'free of Macedonian control and was not completely controlled by the oligarchs'. But Phocion's ability to shrug off decisions made in the assembly – Demades' main theatre of operations⁵² – highlights the impotence of the assembly, especially when one considers that when Demades did travel to Macedon to carry out its orders he was betrayed by his fellow ambassadors in what reeks of a set-up.

Furthermore, the extant decisions of the assembly reflect the new power structures of the oligarchies. Tribal cycles were allowed to continue, but the decrees the Antipatrid oligarchy published are dominated by the new

authority of the *anagrapheus*, an official whose duties were greatly expanded at the same time as the duties of the secretary were diminished. The brief oligarchy in the 290s employed this official at the expense of the secretary altogether. The few decrees published by Demetrius' regime clearly reflect a new power structure in that they bear no mention of secretaries at all. After the ouster of Demetrius, the secretary returns to his usual place in decrees of the council and the assembly, which suggests that the absence of the secretary is indeed significant. There is also clearly some sort of disruption to the secretarial cycle, because the newly restored democracy does not start off where we would expect in the sequence.⁵³ O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 123) counters the suggestion that the absence of the secretary is abnormal with the assertion that the secretary is sometimes omitted post 307 (albeit without providing examples).⁵⁴ But the occasional omission (perhaps by scribal error) after 307 cannot be equated with the complete omission during the years of Demetrius' rule.

We ought also be suspicious of the fact that the majority of the surviving decrees from the Antipatrid oligarchy were sponsored by one of Antipater's friends, Demades – a man whose reputation is fatally tarnished by his willingness to propose the measure condemning Demosthenes, Hypereides, Himeraeus of Phalerum and Aristonicus of Marathon to death. The assembly may have continued to legislate, but it was probably little more than a rubber stamp for 'Antipater's friends'. Furthermore, the proposers of the only securely dated inscriptions from Demetrius' ten-year regime (*IG* II² 450; 453 + *SEG* 32.100) – Thrasycles of Thria (314/3) and Telocles of Alopece (310/09) – are both known to have been politically active in the Antipatrid oligarchy. Thrasycles held the office of *anagrapheus* in the first full year of the Antipatrid oligarchy, and Telocles proposed a decree in the assembly in early 318 (*Agora* 16.102). Together, Thrasycles' willingness to hold an important office during the earlier oligarchy, and Telocles' activity in the oligarchic assembly is hardly a ringing endorsement of the democratic credentials of Demetrius' regime. O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 129) makes much of the fact that Telocles also proposed *Agora* 16.102, but this is because she incorrectly dates this measure to the period of democracy.⁵⁵ Even if this were the case, the fact that Archedicus of Lamptrae, the *anagrapheus* of 320/19 actually did propose a decree in the democratic assembly in 318/7 (*Agora* 16.104) clearly demonstrates that some oligarchs – even one of Antipater's friends – survived the return to democracy unscathed.⁵⁶ But the fact that they did so does not mean that they were not active members of that regime, nor does it preclude the possibility of Demetrius' regime bearing the hallmarks of oligarchy.

Rather, it demonstrates the tolerance of Athenian democracy. The Athenians were clearly able to forgive and forget past crimes – the amnesty after the overthrow of the Thirty is a clear indication of that if ever we needed it – and it may be the case that the holders of certain offices under the oligarchy were not totally contaminated by their active role in the oligarchy. The Athenians had been willing to overlook the active political participation during the period of the Thirty by Rhinon of Paeania and Phayllus of Acherdous due to their obvious change of heart and key role in the negotiations that led to the reconciliation of the oligarchs and democrats. All was forgiven once Rhinon and Phayllus had rendered up their accounts to the new democratic regime (*Ath. Pol.* 39.3–4). It may be the case that Archedicus and Telocles (and perhaps also Eucadmus of Anacaea the incumbent *anagrapheus*) were quick to jump ship once the writing was on the wall for the Antipatrid oligarchy, and so escaped punishment.⁵⁷

The paucity of published decrees from Demetrius' regime is also significant. Tracy argues that the two extant decrees 'reveal no unusual irregularities'. But the fact that only two Athenian decrees survived from the ten years that Demetrius was in power is a clear irregularity in itself.⁵⁸ The Athenians wrote their democratic decisions down on stone 'for all to see', so any change from this practice would have inevitably been seen to be restrictive, and therefore oligarchic. Significantly more published documents have survived from the short-lived democracy that preceded Demetrius' regime, and these documents also bear the typical hallmarks of democracy – especially the primacy of the secretary. That there is no mention of payment for the stele in Thrasycles' decree also points to its irregularity, and may suggest that during Demetrius' spell in charge of Athens decrees were inscribed at private expense (Lambert 2000, p. 488). This might also be one reason why so few decrees from this period are extant. But any switch from regular publishing of assembly decisions is a marked change from democratic practice.⁵⁹ The fact that the only decree to survive more or less intact from Demetrius' regime honours a Macedonian friend of Athens' Macedonian overlord Cassander – Asander, the satrap of Caria – and was proposed by a known oligarch cannot be insignificant.

Somewhat surprisingly this dearth of decrees is often under-appreciated, and not only by those who attempt to defend Demetrius' regime as democratic. Hedrick Jr. (2000a, p. 328) sees the regime as oligarchic because of the limited franchise, but when discussing the inscriptional output of the democratic regime that followed Demetrius' tyranny maintains that 'the

traditional forms of the democratic government were largely preserved in this period'. Hedrick suggests four possible solutions to the question of why there are so few extant decrees from this period:

- The dearth of decrees is 'the consequence of a general administrative furtiveness and hostility to the sharing of information';
- Little money was spent on the publishing of decrees because of the frugality of the regime;⁶⁰
- Decrees declined numerically 'while Demetrius exercised oversight of them';
- The Athenians destroyed the inscriptions from the oligarchic regime after the restoration of democracy, just as they destroyed the statues of Demetrius.

Unfortunately, each of Hedrick's suggestions flies in the face of his own contention that Demetrius' regime was in any way compatible with democracy. If the dearth can be attributed to hostility to sharing information, limited expenditure, or Demetrius' oversight, then the regime can only really be seen as restrictive. If the Athenians destroyed the inscriptions from Demetrius' reign after his ouster, it would be to all intents and purposes a *damnatio memoriae*. If so, Demetrius' regime cannot be seen as compatible with democracy. It is worth considering the possibility that the assembly met less frequently under Demetrius than it previously had done under democratic rules. Fewer meetings – or at the very least fewer meetings of the type that would generate the type of decisions that were recorded on stone – would certainly help to explain the dearth of published documents from the ten years of Demetrius' rule.⁶¹ Whatever the solution, the absence of published assembly decrees from Demetrius' regime does not speak well for Tracy's assertion of the retention of the 'democratic machinery'.⁶²

Tracy (1995, p. 158; 2000b, p. 339) also argues that Demetrius' regime was essentially democratic on the grounds that the *dēmos* was not completely docile and maintained some control over internal affairs, and supplied the fact that the *dēmos* compelled Demetrius to negotiate with Antigonus in 313 as evidence of that the Athenians could control their own destiny.⁶³ O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 137) adopts the same approach and even speaks of the 'anti-Cassandran elements' gaining power in the assembly, as if they were an official opposition waiting in the wings. But this event should be seen as an isolated case in a time of serious crisis for Demetrius and Cassander that is akin to the state of affairs in 319/8,

when Polyperchon's decree awarding freedom to the Greeks eventually brought about a democratic revolution against the oligarchy. On that occasion an invasion by Polyperchon's son, Alexander, prompted the Athenians to oppose Phocion and side with Alexander in the hope of expelling the garrison from the Piraeus. That the Athenians resolved to revolt in 319 has not prompted modern scholars to think that the regime was anything other than an oligarchy, and there is no reason to think that the secret decision to negotiate with Polemaeus in 313 should either.

Diodorus (19.78.3–5) makes it clear that the Athenians first 'secretly' (λῆθρα) sent messages to Antigonus the One-Eyed asking him to free the city. The need for secret correspondence with Antigonus makes it clear that we are dealing with a conspiracy against Demetrius rather than the normal course of democratic government at Athens.⁶⁴ It was only after Polemaeus appeared in Attica that the Athenians took courage and 'forced' (ἠνέγκασαν) Demetrius to make a truce and send envoys to Antigonus. The Athenian decision to negotiate with Polemaeus was clearly made without consulting Dionysius the commander of the Macedonian garrison, and would not have been possible if Polemaeus had not been so near with a large army. The fact that the commander of Cassander's garrison was not able to compel either the Athenians or Demetrius to remain loyal to Cassander indicates the gravity of the crisis caused by Polemaeus' invasion. In such a crisis, the Macedonian garrison would have been powerless to stop the Athenians without marching against the city, a task he would not have been likely to undertake with Polemaeus' army poised to strike.⁶⁵ Certainly there was 'a current of discontent' at Athens (Gottschalk 2000, p. 372) but there is no need to assume that these dissenting voices had any real power under normal circumstances. It was simply an abortive democratic revolution.⁶⁶ The next time an Antigonid force entered Athenian territory Demetrius was not so fortunate.

New Offices

Both the Antipatrid oligarchy and Demetrius of Phalerum introduced new offices or altered existing ones in ways that overturned the democratic processes. These changes can be seen as in the same vein of changes imposed by the fifth-century oligarchies, especially the Thirty who set up a new council, a board of Ten to govern the Piraeus and backed up their new body of Eleven with a force of 300 whip-bearers (*Ath. Pol.* 35.1). None of the

new measures of the fourth-century regimes were quite as extreme, but they were clearly designed to be restrictive.

The Office of Anagrapheus

Any attempt to defend the Antipatrid oligarchy must take into account the expansion of the duties of the office of *anagrapheus*. The evidence suggests that the powers of the *anagrapheus* were expanded in such a way as to be incompatible with democracy. This previously insignificant office, which was overlooked by the author of the *Ath.Pol.*, is almost unheard of until 321/20.⁶⁷ But under the oligarchy, the role of the *anagrapheus* was greatly expanded at the expense of the *grammateus kata prytaneian* who had previously been responsible for the publishing of decrees of the council and the assembly. Under the oligarchy the secretaries lost their annual status and served for only one prytany, and they lost the duty of arranging for the engraving of decrees to the *anagrapheis* (as the name implies, coming from the verb 'to inscribe'). Modern scholars often underplay the significance of this change,⁶⁸ but O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 31 n. 57) has recently suggested that the sinister title recalls the language used at the time of the Four Hundred when the drafting of the new constitution was the responsibility of one hundred who did the 'inscribing' (*Ath.Pol.* 30.1).⁶⁹

This does not seem to be stretching the point too far, because the *anagrapheus* has a position of unparalleled prominence in the decrees of the Antipatrid oligarchy. In both the surviving state decrees from 321/0, the name of the *anagrapheus*, Thrasycles of Thria, appears in the pre-script before that of Archippus, the eponymous archon (*IG II² 546*; *SEG 21.303*). In six out of the eight decrees from 320/19, the name of the *anagrapheus* Archedicus of Lamptrae appears before that of the archon Neaechmus, usually in the nominative case, and once even before the gods in a 'superscript' (*IG II² 380*; *383b*; *381*; *382*; *383*; *384*). It was not until the sixth prytany of the year that Neaechmus' name appeared before that of Archedicus (*SEG 21.306*). In the last year of the oligarchy, the name of the *anagrapheus*, Eucadmus of Anacaea, precedes the archon Apollodorus, once in the fourth prytany – the first extant decree from that year (*IG II² 390 + SEG 21.315*). In three decrees from the sixth to tenth prytanies, Apollodorus' name appears before Eucadmus (*IG II² 386*; *388*; *SEG 21.312*). This suggests that the *anagrapheus* attained a position of 'equality with, or even superiority to, that given the eponymous archon' (Williams, 1985, p. 124).⁷⁰ After the democratic

restoration, the name of the *grammateus* Aphobetus of Cothocidae appears before Eucadmus (*IG* II² 387).

Williams (1985, p. 124) has speculated that the *anagrapheus* became 'the custodian of Athens' archives, supervisor of all clerks, and, perhaps, technical adviser on administration and constitutional law to both the assembly and council', and that the *anagrapheus* might have had the power to block illegal or 'inconvenient' legislation (as the *nomophylakes* could during Demetrius' regime). Oliver (2003a, p. 46) sees the prominence of the *anagrapheus* as 'a major and symbolic move away from the *auctoritas* of the council. The *anagrapheis* were perhaps responsible for the cancellation of decisions made by the old democracy such as the grant of citizenship to Euphron of Sicyon, since the decree from 318/7 reaffirming this grant states that 'those holding office in the oligarchy took away the gift and destroyed the stele' (*IG* II² 448, 62–3).⁷¹ If the *anagrapheis* were effectively supervising legislation, the powers of the office would have been so extensive that it would have been unlikely that the powers that be would have entrusted such powers to someone appointed by lot. Indeed, the powers of the old secretary had been such that the office had traditionally been elected until the development of democracy at Athens (*Ath. Pol.* 54.3).

Nomophylakes

Whereas the Antipatrid oligarchy altered the powers of the *anagrapheus* in order to oversee the activity of the council and assembly, Demetrius of Phalerum introduced a board of *nomophylakes* or 'guardians of the law' to keep Athens under firm control. The 'illegal' trial of Phocion and his friends in 318, where the will of the *dēmos* overrode the laws, must have profoundly affected Demetrius of Phalerum, and his institution of a body to oversee Athenian political activity makes sense in this context. According to Philochorus (*FGrHist.* 328 F64) the *nomophylakes* wore white headbands, sat in the theatre opposite the nine archons, conducted the procession to Pallas Athena, compelled the magistrates to abide by the laws, and sat in the council and the assembly with the *proedroi* in order to prevent the enactment of measures disadvantageous to the *polis*. Pollux (8.102) claims that Demetrius of Phalerum changed the name of the Eleven to *nomophylakes*, and that these officials took care of those in prison, arrested thieves and slave dealers, and put them to death if they admitted their crimes. Such was their connection with death that the door to their office was known as the 'door of Charon'.

While the Philochorus fragment does not explicitly state that the *nomophylakes* in question are a fourth-century phenomenon,⁷² the fact that Philochorus discusses the office in the seventh book of his *Atthis* – the book in which he covers Demetrius of Phalerum – suggests that these should be seen as the same office.⁷³ The prominence of the *nomophylakes* at meetings of the council and the assembly meant that the freedom of the Athenians and what passed for the Athenian *dēmos* was compromised, a fact that has not been lost on modern scholars.⁷⁴ This reform must be seen as inconsistent with the principles of democracy. Aristotle (*Politics* 1323a7) regarded the very concept of a board of *nomophylakes* as aristocratic, and therefore not in keeping with democracy.⁷⁵ If the *nomophylakes* did police the assembly, their duties would have been tantamount to the abolition of the *graphē paranomōn* (Hansen 1974, p. 55), which Demosthenes once claimed would mean the abolition of democracy (Demosthenes 58.34).⁷⁶ Furthermore, their duties in overseeing officials were in fact a reversal of the democratic reforms of Ephialtes who entrusted the supervision of magistrates to the council (*Ath. Pol.* 25.2). Because these officials were on hand to ensure that no ‘illegal’ motions were carried, the assembly must have effectively become the rubber stamp for whatever Demetrius and his cronies wanted. The fact the only two known assembly decrees from Demetrius’ decade long reign were proposed by orators with oligarchic pedigree cannot be insignificant.

Gynaikonomoi

The *nomophylakes* were not the only new officials Demetrius introduced to regulate Athenian affairs. Another new board of officials – the *gynaikonomoi* or ‘regulators of women’ – regulated Demetrius’ sumptuary legislation limiting the size and scale of both weddings and funerals. According to Philochorus, the *gynaikonomoi* ensured that the number of guests at weddings and other religious occasions was limited to thirty (Philochorus, *FGrHist* 328 F65 = Athenaeus 6.245a). Philochorus tells us that the *gynaikonomoi* acted in conjunction with the Areopagus in watching all the gatherings in private houses. In *The Headdress*, Menander portrays the *gynaikonomoi* drawing up a list of all the caterers to help ensure that no one violated the law (Athenaeus 6.245b). The *gynaikonomoi* also policed Demetrius’ ban on elaborate grave monuments, and required that funerals take place before dawn (Cicero, *On the Laws*, 2.25).

The *gynaikonomoi* clearly had the capacity to interfere in the daily lives of ordinary Athenians, particularly in controlling the behaviour of women (which presumably the average Athenian would have considered his own duty). Their powers are thus incompatible with democracy (Hansen, 1991, p. 243; Williams, 1997, p. 335).⁷⁷ Demetrius' new regulators, who kept an eye on the citizens, were very much in keeping with his teachers' views: Theophrastus believed in simple sacrifices and simple funerals (*Peri Eusebeias* in Porph. *Abst.* 2.11–12; D.L. 5.36, 39), while Aristotle, Isocrates and Plato each criticized Athenian democracy for the license of the citizens.

The sumptuary laws were not aimed at the poorer elements of Athenian society, but rather the wealthy who were denied the opportunity to publicly flaunt their wealth. But this did little to improve the lot of Athens' poor. Indeed, Demetrius managed to cause resentment across the political spectrum. Timocles criticized the intrusive powers of the *gynaikonomoi* in one of his comedies by showing a party on stage where one of the guests suggests that the doors should be opened so that a *gynaikonomos* can count the number of guests. Another guest responds, 'It would be better if he made a list of the houses of the dinnerless' (Timocles frag. 32 = Athenaeus 6.46). Clearly Timocles felt that Demetrius was more interested in keeping a lid on the extravagance of the rich than in helping the poor. Demetrius may have been trying to keep the poorer elements of society quiet by restricting their social superiors (Green, 1990, p. 47; Wiles, 1984, p. 172).

Disruption of Sortition

The reduction in available manpower due to the limited franchise would have had a profound effect on the continuity of the traditional organs of government at Athens. The underlying principle of the lot was that as many citizens as possible would be able to participate in the governing of Athens. Each of those who put their name forward for the ballot had an equal chance of being chosen, and each was paid to take part. To ensure that everybody had an equal chance, it was illegal to serve for two consecutive years, or for more than two terms overall (with the board of generals being the obvious exception to this rule). But the oligarchy imposed by Antipater had a property-based census, which limited the right to participate to only 9,000 of the wealthiest citizens. If payment for holding office was abolished, and there is no good reason for

thinking that payment would have been maintained because the exclusion of the poorest citizens would have made payment unnecessary,⁷⁸ the number of citizens able to regularly participate in the governing of Athens would have been further reduced. Furthermore, for a foreign-backed oligarchy, the number of politically reliable citizens must be even smaller.

The lot (sortition) was a cornerstone of Athenian democracy,⁷⁹ and rotation of the magistracies was ensured by yearly terms of office, and a ban on repeated tenure of office (*Ath. Pol.* 62.3). Aristotle explicitly describes these principles as democratic (Aristotle, *Politics* 1317b19–25), so one must assume that their violation would be construed as a sign of oligarchy. It certainly would be incompatible with the principles of what I have defined as ‘democratic ideology’, with its emphasis on full participation for all citizens. Even with a large citizen pool it would have been difficult to obtain the 250 new councillors and the hundreds of other magistrates that were required each year,⁸⁰ because the number of men reaching their thirtieth year (the year of eligibility) every year would be less than six hundred.⁸¹ But if it was difficult with a citizen base of over 20,000 men, with only 9,000 citizens available ‘the problem was insoluble’ (Ferguson 1911a, p. 26). Such a limited pool meant that there were too many jobs and not enough citizens. The only realistic solution was to double up offices,⁸² abolish others, and to allow repeated tenure of the council and other offices.

The prominence of the office of *anagrapheus* has clear implications here. Given that we know quite a considerable amount about two of the three holders of this office,⁸³ it seems particularly unlikely that they were selected by lot.⁸⁴ The first *anagrapheus* was Thrasycles of Thria, a prominent orator who was sufficiently well known to appear on a curse tablet from the 320s (*CIA App.* P. 7, a, 4). Thrasycles is known to have proposed the decree honouring Asander, the satrap of Caria, in 314/13 during the tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum (*IG II²* 450, 9–10). All the indications are that Thrasycles came from a wealthy and prominent family. His brother Agasicles is named on a votive dedication from Carystus (*IG XII* (9) 1242, 4), and another brother, Nausias, was named on the same curse tablet as Thrasycles (*CIA App.* p7, a, 3). Given his prominence, Thrasycles’ appointment as *anagrapheus* cannot be coincidental. The second *anagrapheus* was Archedicus of Lamprae, whom Habicht (1993, pp. 253–6) has identified as the comic poet who launched a venomous attack on Demochares (Polybius 12.13). Archedicus’ career is relatively well known. He is known to have proposed a decree honouring Antipater and other royal officials in either 338/7 or 322/1 (*IG II²* 402),⁸⁵ and was named on a curse tablet, probably in the 320s

(*CIA* App. 67a, 2). Most intriguingly, he proposed a decree to honour Hermo[. . .] of Heraclea in 318/7, under the restored democracy (*IG* II² 535 + *SEG* 21.318). Like Thrasycles, Archedicus was well known and prominent before the oligarchy. The fact that he was able to carry a motion after the oligarchy was overthrown and democracy restored is a further indication of his popularity. Perhaps his role as a comic playwright is the key to understanding his continued favour with the Athenians. His prominence and status as one of Antipater's friends makes it unlikely that Archedicus was chosen for such an important office by random chance. This suggests that for this office at least the rules of sortition no longer applied.

Demetrius of Phalerum appears to have abandoned sortition as part of his reforms. Tracy (2000b, pp. 337–8) argues that Demetrius showed 'some scruple with regard to the traditional archonships', noting that 'he was archon eponymous, the chief magistrate, chosen by lot' in 309/8. However, it seems that Demetrius showed anything but scruple when it came to the archonships, for Demetrius' tenure as archon suggests very strongly that the rules of sortition were abolished or at least manipulated. How else would Demetrius have been chosen as archon eponymous in 309/8? It is surely too much of a coincidence that Demetrius just happened to be chosen as archon by lot during the time that he was 'managing' the city on behalf of a foreign overlord? It is far more likely that the archons were elected (or directly appointed), particularly if Sundwall (1906, pp. 11–13) was correct in identifying Polemon (archon 312/11) as the head of the Academy and Democleides (archon 316/15) as the orator who opposed Demochares of Leuconoe.⁸⁶ The possibility that three well-known figures were chosen by lot during the ten years that Demetrius ruled Athens is too much to countenance.

O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 131–8) has recently criticized modern scholars for seeing Demetrius' tenure as archon as a sign that his regime abandoned sortition in favour of election. A not inconsiderable part of her defence of Demetrius' regime as democratic depends upon debunking this 'common-place'. O'Sullivan seems on relatively safe ground when critiquing the notion that Polemon and Democleides should be linked with famous homonyms on the grounds that this is 'tenuous and speculative'.⁸⁷ But when suggesting that 'informal manipulation of the lot process to impose a preferred candidate may suffice to explain any tenure of office by Demetrius or his partisans', O'Sullivan takes things too far, and her suggestion that 'the mere publicizing of the fact that Demetrius had entered his name for the tribal lot . . . could have induced other prudent hopefuls to withdraw their names, leaving him as the unchallenged nominee for office' would

surely have seemed worse to the supporters of democracy than an election! Whichever way one looks at it – election or ‘manipulation’ – Demetrius’ tenure as archon cannot have come about by chance or by established democratic procedures. Explaining away Polemon and Democleides is not enough to balance out the equation. Furthermore, his tenure as *archon eponymos* would have given him ex officio membership of the Areopagus. Williams (1985, pp. 180–1) suggests that by manipulating the choice of archons, Demetrius’ partisans would have, within a few years, dominated the magistracies at Athens and thereafter the Areopagus. Given the potential power of the Areopagus this cannot be insignificant, but to speculate further is difficult given the dearth of evidence.⁸⁸ Hammond and Walbank (1988, p. 137) argued that the regime was a ‘façade’ with Demetrius and his friends elected to the formal magistracies. On the basis of the violation of the rules of sortition, it seems difficult to dispute this interpretation.

What limited information we have about elections in this period is not encouraging either. I have already noted that the decree honouring Phaedrus of Sphettus is suitably vague when describing how Phaedrus came to serve as a general during the years of the pro-Demetrian oligarchy. The same is the case for his father, Thymochares’, service as general under Demetrius of Phalerum. Where the decree proudly states that Thymochares was ‘elected by the *dēmos*’ in 322/1, the decree makes no mention of how Thymochares was selected to commands in 315/4 or 313/2. Had Thymochares been elected by the Athenians surely this later decree would have said so.

Stone the Oligarchs! – Hyperbole or Commitment to a Cause?

By now it should be clear that two fourth-century regimes bear the hallmarks of oligarchy. With limited franchises, intrusive new officials and the disruption of many of the cornerstones of democracy, both regimes have much in common with the undoubtedly oligarchic regimes of the Four Hundred and the Thirty. In each of these cases oligarchy was only really made possible by outside intervention. Without the presence of the Macedonian garrison it is unlikely that extreme opponents of democracy like Callimedon would have remained anything other than marginalized and unpopular. Oligarchy only became a viable option in Athens when Antipater and Cassander were willing to back it with garrisons, as the Spartans had done in 403.

Attempts to defend these regimes overlook not only the clear similarities of the regimes, but also the testimony of the Athenians themselves. Diodorus (18.66.4–6) states that Phocion and his friends were put on trial for treason by the *dēmos* when the democracy was restored on the grounds that they had brought about ‘the enslavement of the fatherland’ and ‘the overthrowing of the *dēmos* and the laws’. Diodorus claims that the mob was led by the ‘political opponents’ (*antipoliteuomenoi*) of Phocion, and many of those who had been exiles under Antipater. Demetrius’ contemporary, the Athidographer, Philochorus, alleged that Demetrius of Phalerum ‘overthrew the *dēmos*’, and described Demetrius Poliorcetes’ liberation of Athens as the ‘overthrow’ of this regime (*FGrHist* F328 = DH, *Deinarchus* 2).⁸⁹ Demetrius later wrote that he had ‘improved’ democracy. But even the author who preserved these words was clearly not entirely convinced by his claims. Even when quoting directly from the treatises that Demetrius wrote on the subject, Strabo (9.1.20) notes that the hatred and envy that the Athenians felt for the ‘oligarchs’ (*oligous*) grew so strong that Demetrius was forced to flee to Egypt. Clearly Strabo was using several different sources. He took Demetrius at his word, but the hostile sources still filter through into his account.

Both Tritle (1988, p. 133) and Tracy (2000b) dismiss such evidence as hyperbole.⁹⁰ For Tritle, Phocion and his adherents are not oligarchs; it is merely the case that their political opponents called them that. But the fact that democrats were driven to use ‘ideological hyperbole’ makes it clear that they were ideologically estranged from the regime. In a similar vein, Tracy sees Demetrius as the victim of a ‘big lie perpetrated by his successors’. Demetrius is no oligarch; it is just that Antigonus the One-Eyed and Demetrius Poliorcetes were posing as liberators and restorers of democracy who, therefore, cast Demetrius in the role of an oligarch to make their claim stick. Certainly there was an element of self-serving propaganda in the claims of Antigonus and his son, but they did expel Cassander’s Macedonian garrison and restore Athenian freedom and a full, direct participatory democracy to boot. Philochorus’ claim that Demetrius overthrew the democracy is unlikely to be empty pro-Antigonid rhetoric, because Philochorus was later executed by Demetrius Poliorcetes’ son Antigonus Gonatas. Clearly the contemporary opponents of Phocion and Demetrius thought their regimes oligarchic. Should we not do the same?

The level of hostility generated by the two regimes is difficult to ignore. Diodorus specifically tells us that Phocion’s defence of his behaviour was rejected by the ‘mob’ (*ochlos*) because the many supporters of democracy

who had lost their citizenship were bitter against those who had deprived the city of its autonomy. The cry ‘stone the oligarchs and the haters of the *dēmos*’ (Plut. *Phocion* 34.4) testifies to their bitterness. So too does that fact that one of Phocion’s enemies could not resist spitting in his face as he was being led away to his execution (Plut. *Moralia* 189a.17). Demetrius’ downfall was equally explosive. When Demetrius Poliorcetes barged into the Piraeus and announced that he had come to give the Athenians their freedom, the Athenians threw down their shields and hailed him as their saviour. Demetrius fled for his life, and was soon left writing his memoirs. The dazzling array of statues they set up in Demetrius Poliorcetes’ honour seem somewhat insignificant compared to the alleged 360 bronze statues of his Athenian namesake that were melted down and turned into chamber pots. Like Phocion, Demetrius’ fall was swift and unpleasant, but at least he survived to talk about it. Like ‘any out-of-office politician’ (Green 1990, p. 48), Demetrius put his own gloss on his time in office, claiming that he improved democracy. The fact that the Athenians immediately set about appointing *nomothetai* to rewrite the law code strongly suggests otherwise.

Chapter 4

Democracy in Hellenistic Athens

He was exiled for the sake of democracy, he took no part in any oligarchy, he held no office after the democracy had been overthrown, and he was the only Athenian of those who engaged in public life in his time who never plotted against the government of the country by changing it to a form other than democracy

[Plutarch] Moralia

Despite arguments to the contrary, this quotation from a request for the so-called highest honours for Demochares of Leuconoe from the year 271/0 clearly demonstrates that democratic ideology persisted in Athens long after democracy's putative demise in 322. Demochares' son Laches obviously saw his father as a supporter of democracy, and felt not only that his Athenian audience would agree with him, but also identify with that sentiment themselves. Clearly the Athenians did, because his request for the highest honours was upheld. This is not an isolated case. There is considerable evidence that at various points in the fourth and third centuries, Athenians thought of themselves as participating in democracies, and that Athenian political leaders were not only motivated by democratic ideology, but driven to use the rhetoric of democracy in the assembly.

The Rhetoric of Democracy in Hellenistic Athens

The epigraphical evidence in particular shows that democratic ideology remained strong at Athens after 322:

- During the brief democratic revival in 318, Hagnonides of Pergase stated (*IG II²* 448, 63–5) that ‘the *dēmos* has come back and recovered its

laws and the democracy', and differentiates this democratic regime from the Antipatrid oligarchy which preceded it, by describing its leaders as 'those who held office in the oligarchy' (οἱ ἐν τεῖ ὀλιγαρχίᾳ πολιτεύομεν[οι]);

- The Athenian regime backed by Demetrius Poliorcetes from 307 to 301 likewise employed the rhetoric of democracy, most notably in a decree according posthumous honours for the leading statesman of the 330s and 320s Lycurgus of Boutadae from 307/6 ([Plut.] *Moralia* 852d), where Stratocles of Diomeia stated that Lycurgus is being honoured 'so that all may know those choosing to carry out the affairs of government justly on behalf of democracy and freedom are held in the highest esteem while living and after death will be granted favour and remembrance everlasting';
- The regime that held sway in Athens between 288/7 and 263/2 styled itself a democracy, and (like that in 318) distinguished itself from the restricted regime that preceded it by branding that regime an oligarchy. Thus, in a decree honouring Callias of Sphettus from 270/69, Eucharès of Conthyle stated (*SEG* 28.60, 81–3) that Callias had previously 'allowed his own property to be confiscated in the oligarchy so as not to act in any way against the laws or against the democracy of all Athenians'.

Yet these claims to democracy have been disputed. The term democracy (*dēmokratia*), which is used so emotively by Laches, Hagnonides, Stratocles and Eucharès is therefore seen as a word without any real meaning in their mouths, and certainly not meaning the same things as it did to Classical politicians such as Demosthenes, Demophantus or Thrasybulus. But can we really justify such a line of thought? While we might be on safe ground when thinking that *dēmokratia* meant little more than some form of self-government to the citizens of *poleis* that were under the direct control of the Successor kings, such as Antioch-on-the-Orontes in the Seleucid kingdom, as Ste. Croix (1983, p. 322) contends, we should be more careful when considering Athens, where *dēmokratia* had a long history. Freedom and democracy will have meant something very different to the citizens of newly created cities that had never had an independent identity than it did at Athens, which had long been democratic, independent and autonomous. The long democratic tradition cannot be underestimated when it comes to evaluating the democratic regimes in early Hellenistic Athens.

Popular Participation in Hellenistic Athenian Democracy

As discussed above, in order to properly evaluate democracy in Hellenistic Athens, I have defined the guiding principle of Athenian democratic ideology as being that: all the citizens should be allowed to participate in the governing of Athens, at all (or most) levels.

By the time Antipater quashed democracy in 322/1 there was a longstanding tradition of democratic government at Athens, and an equally longstanding tradition that all Athenians had an equal right to participate in the day-to-day running of the *polis*, no matter what their property or qualifications were. The Athenian people called themselves ‘the *dēmos*’ (ὁ δῆμος), and defined the political order in which they held sway as *dēmokratia* (ἡ δημοκρατία), both of which could be shown as physical entities with human form. The term *demokratia*, literally ‘the power of the *dēmos*’, was a powerful ideological construct that empowered ordinary Athenians (Ober, 1996, p. 117), and ultimately became a consecrated goddess. Ordinary citizens were involved in the day-to-day running of the *polis* through such institutions as the popular assembly (the *ekklēsia*), the law courts (the *dikasteria*) and the council (*boule*).¹ The *dēmos* attended the assembly, and when it did so it voted upon laws and decrees. The resulting laws (*nomoi*) and decrees (*psēphismata*) were described as ‘resolved by the *dēmos*’ (ἔδοξεν τῷ δήμῳ), or more literally ‘it seemed (right) to the *dēmos*’. The crucial features of Classical Athenian democracy were sortition (the lot), and popular participation in the council, assembly and law courts.² Each of these features ensured that participation was possible for *all* Athenians, and each remained an integral part of Hellenistic Athenian government.

Even a cursory study of the Athenian regimes of the late fourth and early third centuries that claimed to be democratic in their official public output (i.e. their recorded decrees and laws) demonstrates that the traditional cornerstones of democracy were an integral part of these regimes. As under the fifth- and fourth-century democracies, participation was open to all citizens (as the third-century regime was especially keen to stress), offices were annual and decided by lot, the council and the assembly operated with full powers, as did the law courts. Decisions by the Athenian people emphasize the importance of *dēmokratia*, as well as the central role of the council and the laws. Thus, Habicht (1997, pp. 4–5) observes,

Nothing justifies the occasional claim that political participation by Athenian citizens declined in the Hellenistic Age . . . There was certainly enough business at hand to require the citizenry to continue to

participate actively in the running of the state. The Assembly met at least thirty-six times a year, and the Council met daily except on important holidays. The list of jurymen, revised annually, continued to carry the names of 6,000 citizens; from the list juries were chosen by lot for duty in the various courts, as needed for each trial, and sometimes consisted of more than 1,500 members. For the Assembly to pass certain resolutions, such as the relatively frequent grants of Athenian citizenship to foreigners, the law required 6,000 voting members to be present, and the evidence makes it virtually certain that this quorum was reached without difficulty at most sessions.

Yet modern commentators still tend to deny the commitment of the Hellenistic Athenians to democracy. This commitment can be clearly seen not merely in their continued participation in politics, but also in the emotion surrounding that participation. The dangerous passion of the mob that so disturbed the eighteenth-century Laconophiles continues to bubble away in the Hellenistic period. It flares up in the angry and bloody trials of Phocion and his friends in 318, the spontaneous acclamation of Demetrius Poliorcetes in 307, and the tumultuous events of 303 when an attempt to stymie interference from Demetrius Poliorcetes resulted in panic, anger and the hasty execution of several orators who had initiated the proceedings. The passionate commitment to democratic principles can even be seen in the supposedly apolitical pages of New Comedy. Philippides of Cephale accused his political opponent Stratocles of Diomeia of 'overthrowing the *dēmos*' by indulging the whims of Demetrius Poliorcetes (Philippides frag. 25 = Plut. *Demetrius* 12.4), and a fragment of Menander's *Sicyonian(s)* which can be dated to either 318–317 (Belardinelli, 1994, pp. 69–71), or between 307/6 and 301 (Sommerstein, pers. comm.), includes an ill-tempered exchange between two old men (*Sic.* 150–68), one rich, one poor, which ends with the poor man shouting 'By great Zeus, you're a wicked oligarch' and an exchange of curses.³ The very best and the very worst of the passionate nature of Classical Athenian democracy can be seen in each of the democratic revivals in early Hellenistic Athens.

Restoring Democratic Institutions

We have seen that the fourth-century oligarchic regimes imposed by Antipater and Cassander limited political participation not only by limiting citizenship to the wealthy, but by changing key Athenian institutions in order to constrain participation in the council, assembly and the law courts.

But these regimes were unpopular and short lived; each time the oligarchs were able to take the helm, democracy was relatively swiftly restored. Those denying the reality of Hellenistic democracy do so while overlooking or dismissing the fact that each time the Athenians were able to regain control of their own affairs (319/8, 307/6 and 288/7), they not only claimed to have restored democracy, but also set about substantiating those claims by reversing the changes the oligarchs had made. Each of these democratic restorations needs to be considered in some detail.

Democracy Returns, Part 1: The ‘Taking Back of The Laws’ 319/8–318/7

After the overthrow of the Antipatrid oligarchy, the orator Hagnonides of Pergase claimed:

When the people of Athens honoured him [Euphron of Sicyon] with citizenship and the other honours which are fitting for benefactors, both himself and his descendants, because of his merits and because of the benefactions of his ancestors, the political leaders of the oligarchy deprived him of his privileges and destroyed the stelae; but now since the *dēmos* has come back and has taken back its laws and the democracy, with good fortune, be it resolved by the *dēmos*, that all the privileges granted by the *dēmos* of Athens to Euphron in his honour should be confirmed, both for him and his descendants (*IG II*² 448, 58–67).

Hagnonides’ clear statement that ‘the *dēmos* has come back and has taken back its laws and the democracy’ ought to be sufficient evidence that we are dealing with a genuine democracy. But if that is not enough, the passion with which the laws and democracy were taken back should tip the balance in his favour. For Hagnonides’ plain speaking masks the fact that the *dēmos* took back the laws with such bloodthirsty violence,⁴ that it helped stain the reputation of Athens and democracy for millennia. Such was the passion of the democratic revival that many of those who were slammed as ‘the political leaders of the oligarchy’ (οἱ πολιτευόμεν[οι] ἐν τεῖ ὀλι<γ>αρχίαι) (*IG II*² 448, 61) – most notably Phocion – were forced to drink the hemlock after an ugly mass trial in the Theatre of Dionysus (Plut. *Phocion* 34–7; Nepos, *Phocion* 4.1). Dissenting voices were dismissed as ‘oligarchs’ and ‘haters of the *dēmos*’ (Plut. *Phocion* 34.4), and our sources make it clear that Hagnonides was chief among the accusers of the oligarchs.

Given the strong democratic tenor in this decree, it should come as no surprise to find that Hagnonides was one of several of the known leaders of

this regime who had been politically active prior to the Lamian War. These men who were committed to democracy, seem to have bided their time during the restrictions of the Antipatrid oligarchy, but stepped forward to seize control the moment the opportunity presented. Hagnonides had been active in politics immediately prior to the Lamian War, and is known to have proposed a decree concerning naval equipment in 325/4 (*IG II²* 1629, 14, 35, 57, 103, 120, 138, 157, 278). Plutarch refers to Hagnonides as *ὁ συκοφάντης* (Plut. *Phocion* 29.3), and he is perhaps one of defendants in the Harpalus trials in 324/3 (DH. *Deinarchus* 10.625.2; Dein. frag. 26.2; Hypereides 1.40), and was sufficiently democratic that Antipater had intended to exile him from Greece altogether until Phocion intervened on his behalf. Hagnonides was joined in prosecuting Phocion by Demophilus of Acharnae (Plut. *Phocion* 38.1) who had earlier made a name for himself in prosecuting Aristotle for impiety in 323 (Athenaeus 15.696b; DL 5.5) and is known to have proposed two assembly decrees, one in the 320s (*IG II²* 1631, 657) and another at a date unknown (*IG II²* 421, 3–4). Polyectus of Sphettus was another former democratic leader who came forward at this time, proposing a decree in the assembly in 318/7 (*IG II²* 350, 7–8).⁵ Polyectus had been active in politics as early as 356/5 when he proposed a decree honouring an embassy from Neapolis (*IG II²* 128). He had served as an envoy in the 340s (Demosthenes 9.72; [Plut.] *Moralia*, 841e), was active in the law courts,⁶ and had more than once played a central role in the Athenian opposition to Macedon: urging the Athenians to make war on Philip prior to Chaeronea (Plut. *Phocion* 9), and serving as an envoy in the Peloponnese in the build-up to the Lamian War ([Plut.] *Moralia* 846c-d). The democratic orator Moerocles of Eleusis may have returned to prominence at this point in time. We know that he proposed an Eleusinian decree (*IG II²* 1191) honouring Xenocles of Sphettus for his role in the building of a stone bridge across the Cephissus river in the archonship of Archippus, which is either 321/0 or 318/7. Given his democratic background should lead us to prefer 318/7.⁷ Moerocles' prominence prior to 322/1 suggests that he is unlikely to have limited his political activity to the Eleusinian assembly.

The rapid and bloody return to democracy demonstrates both the passionate support for democracy and the lack of mainstream support for oligarchy, which is hardly surprising when one considers that upwards of 60 per cent of the population had been deprived of the rights of citizenship. But the democratic changeover was not all frenzied. Although the new regime started with a bang, the Athenians waited until the end of the calendar year to make certain changes the constitution (Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 40). For instance, while the normal secretary was reinstated before the

end of the year, and the name of the *grammateus*, Aphobetus of Cothocidae, appears before that of Eucadmus the *anagrapheus* (IG II² 387), it was not until the following year that the office of *anagrapheus* disappeared from published documents (IG II² 448, 36–7) and tribal cycles were restored.⁸

It seems likely that the lot was re-established for other offices, and although the surviving decrees which can be dated to 318/7 all happen to be non-probouleumatic (Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 41), there is a strong emphasis on the role of the council in public documents e.g. the decree honouring Euphron of Sicyon which places considerable stress on the relationship between the councillors and the descendants of Euphron (IG II² 448, 75–7), and it was probably to the council that Polyperchon wrote when he requested honours for his associates (IG II² 387).⁹

There was also a revival of the law courts, which were reputedly destroyed under the oligarchy (Suda s.v. Δ 415), with Hagnonides of Pergase prosecuting Theophrastus for impiety in a case reminiscent of Demophilus of Acharnae's prosecution of Aristotle a few years earlier. The charge may have been religious, but the aim was political. Religion had proved an effective tool to use against political opponents in the fifth century (Mikalson, 1998, p. 49), as the trial of Socrates had shown,¹⁰ and this late-fourth-century trial was no different. Theophrastus' position at the Academy made him an obvious target. Like all scholars from Aristotle's school Theophrastus was seen by many as an opponent of democracy and a pro-Macedonian. With the two democratic politicians who combined to prosecute Phocion for 'overthrowing the *dēmos*' also conducting the two nominally religious prosecutions of Peripatetic philosophers who favoured Macedon we can see 'the nexus of religion and politics', for the defendants were tainted by association with Macedon (Mikalson, 1998, p. 49). Unfortunately for Hagnonides, Theophrastus was popular amongst the Athenians (DL 5.37), and had fought on behalf of democracy in his native town of Eresus (Plut. *Moralia* 1097b, 1126f. Cf. Athenaeus 3.90e, 8.333a, 10.438c). He was acquitted and Hagnonides barely managed to secure the fifth of the vote he required to avoid incurring a penalty.

Perhaps the most overtly democratic measure undertaken by the new leaders was Hagnonides' proposal in 318/7 to reaffirm the grant of citizenship for Euphron of Sicyon. Euphron had been awarded Athenian citizenship in 323/2 for his services to Athens and the rest of Hellas, in particular for fighting against Antipater in the Lamian War. Euphron was executed by Antipater at the end of the war, and his honours were subsequently rescinded at Athens. Hagnonides stressed his democratic leanings by playing upon the fact that the decree announcing Euphron's citizenship grant had been destroyed by οἱ πολιτευόμεν[οι] ἐν τεῖ

ὁλι<γ>αρχίαι (*IG* II² 448, 61), and included a graphic reference to Euphron preferring to be slain fighting on behalf of Athenian democracy rather than accept a settlement with Macedon (*IG* II² 448, 54–6). Hagnonides is keen to stress that the reaffirmation was passed after democracy had been restored (*IG* II² 448, 63–5). This reinscribed stele is physically impressive,¹¹ and includes both the original decree from 323/2 and the reaffirmed decision by the democratic assembly. The relief (see Figure 1) that sits atop these decrees is overtly democratic in its imagery,¹² depicting the personification of the Athenian *dēmos* crowning Euphron, as the goddess Athena looks on. Two copies were set up: one on the acropolis, and another alongside Zeus the Saviour in the agora (lines 70–1).¹³ This decree clearly testifies to the democratic convictions of the Athenians as well as the proposer. Williams (1985, p. 165) noted, ‘A strong note of patriotism pervades this decree, and it probably stood in conscious contrast to the undignified, subservient behaviour of the oligarchy in rescinding honours so justly granted’. On the basis of both the appearance and the wording of this decree it would be difficult to deny that the restored democracy was worthy of that title.



FIGURE 1. Pediment of the Athenian decree honouring Euphron of Sicyon (*IG* II² 448), 318/7 BC. Photograph courtesy of National Archaeological Museum, Athens. Copyright Hellenic Ministry of Culture and Tourism/Archaeological Receipts Fund.

Democracy Returns, Part 2: ‘Stratoclean’ Democracy?

After ten barren years under Demetrius of Phalerum the Athenians once again regained their freedom and democracy when Demetrius Poliorcetes liberated Athens in 307. From the moment that they threw down their shields and hailed Demetrius as ‘Saviour’ and ‘Benefactor’ to the moment when Lachares seized power as tyrant, the Athenians consistently demonstrated their passionate devotion to democracy, and more often than not, to the man who restored democracy. Although modern commentators have typically focused on the deification of Demetrius and the subsequent honours for his friends, which were sponsored by Stratocles of Diomeia, the evidence suggests that until 303 at least Athens enjoyed a spell of free, energetic, and responsible government under the leadership of a dynamic and heterogeneous group of political leaders, many of whom had strong democratic credentials.

Several democratic leaders – including Stratocles – had been active in politics prior to the Lamian War; many were sons of men who had been, and more than a few could boast ancestors who had been involved in Athenian politics as far back as the fifth century. These included Demosthenes’ nephew Demochares, who had once entered the assembly armed with a sword to urge the Athenians not to give in to Antipater’s demand to hand over the city’s leading politicians including his uncle ([Plut.] *Moralia* 847d).¹⁴ So too Habron of Boutadae, whose father Lycurgus had been conspicuous in his opposition to Alexander the Great (*IG* II² 457, 18; [Plut.] *Moralia* 852c–d)¹⁵ and whose great-grandfather had been executed by the Thirty ([Plut.] *Moralia* 841b), and boasted a family service record that dated back to the 470s. Also in this category are the cousins Diotimus and Olympiodorus of Euonymon, with a family history of political service dating back to the fifth century, including a victim of the Thirty.¹⁶ Likewise, Euphiletus of Cephisia, whose uncle proposed the original decree awarding citizenship to Euphron of Sicyon from 323/2 (*IG* II² 448, 6), and whose cousin proposed a rider to that decree (*IG* II² 448, 31). Lastly, the brothers Xenocles and Androcles of Sphettus, had both been prominent in Athenian affairs in the 330s.¹⁷

Table 1 charts the political leaders of this regime who boasted a democratic ‘pedigree’ (the political activity or the democratic background of those leaders with an asterisk is debatable).

All the evidence we possess suggests that a full participatory democracy had been restored, which was open to all citizens regardless of their wealth. Under the leadership of these politicians with democratic

Table 1. Political leaders with democratic backgrounds 307/6–301/0

Name	Political role	Democratic credentials
Stratocles of Diomeia	Orator in assembly	Active in assembly prior to end of Lamian War
Demochares of Leuconoe	Orator in assembly and law courts (<i>IG</i> II ² 463; [Plut.] <i>Moralia</i> 851d–e; Athenaeus 11.508f, 13.610f)	Nephew of Demosthenes; active in assembly prior to end of Lamian War; active in later democratic regime
Olympiodorus of Euonymon	General and Envoy (Pausanias 1.26.3)	Active prior to end of Lamian War; ancestor eliminated by Thirty
Habron of Boutadae	Financial officer 307/6 (<i>IG</i> II ² 463, 36); Treasurer of Military Fund 305/4 (<i>IG</i> II ² 1492, 123)	Son of Lycurgus; great-grandfather killed by Thirty
Xenocles of Sphettus	<i>agōnothetēs</i> 307/6 (<i>IG</i> II ² 3077); Envoy 306/5 (<i>IG</i> II ² 1492, 100)	Financial officer in the 330s
Diotimus of Euonymon	Orator in assembly 306/5 (<i>IG</i> II ² 467)	Cousin of Olympiodorus; ancestor murdered by Thirty
Euphiletus of Cephisia	Orator in council 302/1 (<i>IG</i> II ² 505)	Nephew of sponsor of original decree honouring Euphron of Sicyon destroyed in the Antipatrid-oligarchy
Cleænetus of Cydathenaeum	Envoy 306/5 (<i>IG</i> II ² 1492, 100)	Descendant of fifth-century orator Cleon
Pythodorus of Acharnae	Orator in assembly 307/6 (<i>Agora</i> 16.107)	Grandfather politically active in mid fourth century; great-grandfather politically active in 390s
Androcles of Sphettus	<i>agōnothetēs</i> 307/6 (<i>IG</i> II ² 3073)	Active in law courts in the 330s
Lysicrates of Melite	Orator 302/1 (<i>IG</i> II ² 506)	Family politically active in fourth century
Cleomedon of Cydathenaeum*	Orator (?)	Father of Cleænetus; descendant of fifth-century orator Cleon
Callias of Hermus*	Orator in assembly 303/2 (<i>IG</i> II ² 493)	Active in later democratic regime
Euchares of Conthyle*	One of the <i>nomothetai</i> 304/3 (<i>IG</i> II ² 487)	Politically active in later democratic regime
Glaukippos of Collytus*	Orator in law courts (?) ([Plut.] <i>Moralia</i> 850b)	Son of Hypereides; politically active prior to end of Lamian War
Meidias of Anagyrous*	Orator in the assembly ca. 305/4 (?) ([Plut.] <i>Moralia</i> 850b)	Grandson of the homonymous opponent of Demosthenes
Mnesitheus of Lamptrae*	Orator in the assembly (?) (<i>IG</i> II ² 592 + <i>SEG</i> 32.104)	Father of Aristides who was politically active in later democratic regime

'pedigree', and numerous others, the city flourished. Effective measures were taken to redress the damage done by Demetrius of Phalerum during his 'reforms' of the Athenian constitution, and restore democratic procedures. Straightaway the old secretary returned, and the tribal cycles were restored (Osborne, 1985, p. 284; Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 43).¹⁸ A board of *nomothetai* was appointed to revise the laws, which is reminiscent of the appointment of *nomothetai* after the overthrow of the Thirty (Andocides 1.83–4). The new laws were displayed so that they could be viewed 'by anyone who wishes to see', and so that 'no one should be ignorant of the city's laws' (*IG* II² 487, 7–10). The fact that Eucharès of Conthyle, the secretary of the *nomothetai* was honoured with an olive crown for a job done well (*IG* II² 487) serves as measure of the success of this board.

The new political leaders of Athens set about publishing their decisions with gusto. In stark contrast to the publication blackout during Demetrius of Phalerum's spell in charge, there are no fewer than sixteen securely dated Athenian assembly decrees from the year 307/6 alone (Tracy, 2000a, p. 232), and that this rate of publication continued until democracy was ended by Lachares. Such was their surge in output that Thonemann (2005, p. 64) observes:

The democratic constitution was restored, and the Athenians set to business with energy: in the next six years subsequent to the expulsion of the Macedonians, an astonishing deluge of decrees poured from the assembly, in stark contrast with the measly trickle under the governance of Demetrios of Phaleron.

According to Tracy (2000a, p. 227) after years of political oppression the leaders of the restored democracy even found ways of giving their names prominence on the published decrees, by using 'blank spaces or line-initial position'. Nearly two-thirds of the decrees from the years 307/6 to 302/1 give special emphasis to the name of the orator, including Stratocles, Demochares, Diotimus of Euonymon, Euphiletus of Cephisia, Euboulides of Eleusis and Callias of Hermus, the majority of whom have strong democratic pedigree. Tracy argues that 'they expected their fellow citizens to notice – that is, to read – their names'. Clearly the leaders of this new regime desired not only to play an active role in Athenian politics, but to be seen to do so and ultimately be remembered as doing so. Rather than stroking their egos, these political leaders should be seen as eager to express their devotion to the democratic cause.

The revival of the assembly led to a revival in the law courts, one of the key features of Athenian democracy.¹⁹ With the abolition of Demetrius' *nomophylakes*, the vital democratic institution of the *graphē paranomōn* returns, most notably in the case of Sophocles of Sounion, whose motion effectively banning new philosophical schools was overturned by the jurors despite a stirring speech by Demochares in Sophocles' defence (Athenaeus 13.610f; DL 5.38; Pollux 9.42). Jurors were also employed in overseeing honorific decrees when a scrutiny clause (*dokimasia*) was introduced for citizenship grants (Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 44). In combination with the fact that a law in 304/3 limited the value of honorific crowns,²⁰ this latter measure serves to contradict the notion that the Athenians were uniformly extravagant when it came to dishing out honours in this period.

Another of Demetrius' reforms was terminated when liturgies were revived under the altered format of the *agōnothesia*. This is often treated as a fundamental flaw in the revived democracy, whereby the reforms of Demetrius of Phalerum are seen to be left untouched.²¹ But just because Demetrius abolished the *chorēgia*, and it was later replaced by the *agōnothesia* need not mean that the restored democracy was merely following the Phalerean's lead. The lack of evidence from the Phalerean's reign should prompt caution.²² The first documents recording the *agōnothesia* from 307/6 clearly proclaim that the newly restored *dēmos* is acting in the capacity of *chorēgos* – ὁ δῆμος ἐχορήγει ἐπ' Ἀναξικράτους ἄρχοντος (IG II² 3073, 3077). Lambert (2000–3, p. 105 n. 19) argues that the 'striking wording' of these first monuments recording the *agōnothesia* were 'programmatic' in the first year of the democracy, with later *agōnothesia* documents using the more matter of fact phrasing ὁ δῆμος ἐχορήγει, ὁ δεῖνα ἦρχε. Whereas Ste. Croix (1983, pp. 305–6) would view the office as an oligarchic corruption of democracy, the reform would be better seen as a democratic response to the abolition of the *chorēgia* by the Phalerean. The liturgy of the *chorēgia* could not be revived, but the institution that replaced it was a liturgy in a different format.²³

One of the earliest acts of the new regime was Stratocles' decree awarding posthumous honours to Lycurgus of Boutadae. Stratocles' decree (IG II² 457 + 513; [Plut.] *Moralia* 851f–852e) singled out Lycurgus' policy of opposition to Alexander the Great for particular praise (852d), implicitly linking the contemporary struggles against Cassander with Lycurgus' hostility to Alexander. For a brief moment the Athenians were able to aspire to a return to the days when Athens headed a grand alliance against the Macedonians, making an alliance with Aetolia around 307 (Pausanias

1.26.3),²⁴ and another with Boeotia around 304 ([Plut.] *Moralia* 851e). The Athenians would ultimately join many of the Greeks in a grand alliance against Cassander headed by Demetrius Poliorcetes, but this would not survive beyond the Antigonid defeat against the combined armies of Seleucus, Lysimachus and Cassander at Ipsus in 301.

Stratocles also praised Lycurgus for his energy in providing funds for completing the Piraeus dockyards and arsenal, fitting out four hundred seaworthy triremes, repairing the walls, and stockpiling missiles on the acropolis (852c), which mirrors the efforts of the new regime to revive Athenian military power on land and sea.²⁵ The city walls, including the Long Walls, were rebuilt, and significant measures were undertaken to respond to modern siege technology, including a palisade, a closed parapet with shuttered windows, a roof over most of the wall walk, and the installation of catapults and other artillery (*IG II²* 505, 31–7; *IG II²* 463, 37–48, 74–5, 105; [Plut.] *Moralia* 851d).²⁶ In true democratic spirit Demochares' decree urged the Athenian citizens to go and see the work for themselves if they wished (σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ) to make sure that the work was being carried out satisfactorily.²⁷ There is clear evidence that the Athenian fleet was resurrected, with Antigonius giving the Athenians sufficient timber to build 100 triremes (Diod. 20.46.4). These measures proved effective. Thirty Athenian quadriremes assisted in Antigonius' victory over Ptolemy at Cypriot Salamis in 306 (Diod. 20.50.3), and Demetrius sent the Athenians twelve hundred panoplies from the spoils in gratitude for their performance (Plut. *Demetrius* 17.1). When Cassander attacked Athens during the Four Years War, the hoplites and cavalry managed to repel an enemy charge that breached the city walls ca. 304 led by Cassander's brother Pleistarchus (Pausanias 1.15.1), and an elaborate monument was set up near the Painted Stoa to commemorate the event.²⁸

All this suggests that the newly restored democracy was efficient and responsible, and by no means the gang of irresponsible cronies of Demetrius Poliorcetes it is often purported to have been. Athens was well run and remained that way until the post-Ipsus confusion allowed Lachares to seize power as tyrant. It would be more than a decade before Athens would again be free and democratic.

Democracy Returns, Part 3: The Democracy of All Athenians

The Athenians endured a long spell of restricted government until they revolted from Demetrius Poliorcetes in 288/7. As soon as it was known that

Pyrrhus and Lysimachus had driven Demetrius from his throne in Macedon (Plut. *Demetrius* 44.1) they overturned the oligarchic regime that had been in operation since the mid 290s. While the hoplite general Phaedrus of Sphettus and his men made sure that the grain was harvested so that the city was prepared to withstand a siege by Demetrius (*IG* II² 682, 30ff), Olympiodorus led the old men and youths in expelling the garrison from the Museum (Pausanias 1.26.1). Ptolemy sent a force to help them resist Demetrius (*SEG* 28.60). But while the Athenians were able to free the city, they were unable to recover the Piraeus. In contrast to that which preceded it, the new regime called itself 'the democracy of all Athenians'.²⁹ Presumably this term was coined in order to contrast it to the democratic regime established by Demetrius in 296/5, and to show that this regime had no restrictions.

Given that the regime was at such pains to employ the language of democracy in its publications, it is not at all surprising to find that once again several of the leaders of this regime had strong democratic credentials, including Demochares of Leuconoe, who did not return to Athens from exile until 286/5 after the city was again free and democratic ([Plut.] *Moralia* 851e). Callias of Hermus, who like Demochares had been active under the democracy from 307/6 to 301/0, also returned to prominence in the 280s, proposing two motions in the council (*IG* II² 659; *Agora* 15.71, 8). A new generation of political leaders also stepped forward, including Agyrrius of Collytus, who was not only the son of the notorious 'misodēmos' Callimedon the Crayfish (Davies, 1971, p. 279), but more importantly a descendant of the homonymous democratic orator who introduced payment of three obols for attending the assembly in 403/2 (*Ath. Pol.* 41.3), Phytius of Thoricus, whose paternal grandfather, Mantitheus, was a prominent orator (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1398b) and general (Diod. 16.2.6–3.5), and whose maternal great-grandfather, Pamphilus of Ceiriadae, had served as a hipparch during the Corinthian war (Lysias 15.5) and a general in 389 (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 5.1.2), and Callippus of Eleusis, the son of the fourth-century orator Moerocles. Table 2 lists those leaders with democratic backgrounds (once again the political activity or the democratic background of those leaders with an asterisk is debatable).

This regime was eager to demonstrate its links with Athens' democratic past. This is perhaps most obvious in the decree awarding posthumous honours for Demosthenes proposed by his nephew Demochares ([Plut.] *Moralia* 850f–851c). The decree stresses Demosthenes' services to Athenian democracy, in particular his generosity in donating more than twelve talents of his own money for outfitting triremes and rebuilding the defences of the city and the Piraeus, his services as an envoy, and his consistent opposition

Table 2. Political leaders with democratic backgrounds 288/7–263/2

Name	Political role	Democratic credentials
Agyrrhius of Collytus	Orator in council 285/4 (<i>IG</i> II ² 653); Orator in assembly 282/1 (<i>SEG</i> 25.89)	Descendant of the like-named orator who introduced pay for the assembly
Aristides of Lamptrae*	General 280/79 (<i>IG</i> II ² 2797); General 268/7 (<i>Ergon</i> (2003) [2004], 15); Envoy 260s (<i>ISE</i> 53; <i>Ergon</i> (2003) [2004], 15)	Father probably active in earlier democratic regime
Callias of Hermus	Orator in council 283/2 (<i>IG</i> II ² 659)	Active in earlier democratic regime
Callippus of Eleusis	General 279/8 (Pausanias 1.4.2; 10.20.5); Envoy 260s (<i>Syll.</i> ³ 434/5; <i>ISE</i> 53)	Son of fourth-century orator Moerocles
Demades of Paeania*	Orator 288/7–263/2 (<i>IG</i> II ² 713)	Grandson of Demades, son of Demeas, both fourth-century orators (but both played an active role in an oligarchy)
Demochares of Leuconoe	Orator in assembly 280s ([Plut.] <i>Moralia</i> 851e); Envoy 280s–270s ([Plut.] <i>Moralia</i> 851e)	Nephew of Demosthenes; active in assembly prior to end of Lamian War; active in earlier democratic regime
Euchares of Conthyle	Orator in council 270/69 (<i>SEG</i> 28.60)	Politically active in earlier democratic regime
Laches of Leuconoe	Orator in assembly 271/0 ([Plut.] <i>Moralia</i> 847d–e)	Son of Demochares
Olympiodorus of Euonymon*	General 281/0 (<i>P. Herc.</i> 1418, column 33) ¹	Active in earlier democratic regimes (but tainted by oligarchic activity)
Phytius of Thoricus	Orator in council 266/5 (<i>IG</i> II ² 666, 667)	Descendant of fourth-century orators and generals

¹ For the date see Byrne, 2006/7, p. 173 n. 25.

to the Macedonians. Demosthenes is praised for his actions in support of Athenian liberty, and his exile and death is explicitly blamed on the ‘oligarchy’. In Demochares’ words,

[Demosthenes] advised the people to adopt many other excellent measures, and of all his contemporaries he performed the best public actions in the cause of liberty and democracy. And having been exiled by

the oligarchy when the democracy had been destroyed, and having died at Calauria on account of his devotion to democracy, when soldiers were sent against him by Antipater, persisting in his loyalty and devotion to the democracy and neither surrendering to its enemies nor doing anything in his time of danger that was unworthy of the democracy.

Demochares' son Laches made similar claims when he requested the highest honours for his father in 271/0 ([Plut.] *Moralia* 851d–f). Laches claims that Demochares had 'always been a benefactor and good counselor to the people', and was 'exiled for the sake of democracy'. Laches also stresses that Demochares only held office under democracy, and that 'he was the only Athenian of those who engaged in public life in his time who never plotted against the government of the country by changing it to a form other than democracy'. The message from Demochares and Laches is clear – supporting democracy means opposing Macedon, and maintaining your principles even to the point of suffering exile. The equating of exile with democratic principles is also present in the decrees honouring Philippides of Cephale (283/2), and Callias of Sphettus (270/69).

It was not just Demochares and his family who wanted to demonstrate links with Athens' glorious past. Chremonides of Aethalidae conjured up images of past glories in his decree announcing the alliance with Sparta and Ptolemy Philadelphus against Antigonus Gonatas in 269/8. Chremonides explains the motives behind the Athenian decision to make an alliance with Sparta and Egypt, and go to war against Macedon as follows:

Chremonides, son of Eteocles, from Aethalidae proposed: Since previously the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians and the allies of each, having made friendship and alliance in common
 10 with each other, struggled often and well together against those attempting to enslave the *poleis*;
 (and) they both gained renown for themselves, and for the other Greeks they established freedom; and now that crises
 of a similar kind are overtaking all of Greece because of those
 15 attempting to overthrow the laws and the ancestral constitutions in each of the cities, and King Ptolemy, in accordance with the policy of his sister, is openly
 concerned for the common freedom of the Greeks;
 (Syll.³ 434/5, 7–18)

Chremonides' decree thus opens with a reference to the Persian wars, arguing that Athens and Sparta had struggled often and well together against those attempting to enslave the *poleis*, and they had previously worked together to establish Greek 'freedom' (*eleutheria*). Chremonides goes on to explain that 'crises of a similar kind have overtaken all Greece because of those attempting to abolish the laws and ancestral constitutions of each *polis*'. The terms of the oaths sworn by both parties emphasize not only Athens' willingness to be involved in the wider Greek world, but also the central place of democracy.³⁰ Not only will the Athenians and Spartans promise to defend each other's freedom, the treaty underwrites the 'ancestral constitution':

- 70 Treaty and alliance [with the Lacedaemonians and the allies of the]
 Lacedaemonians towards [the Athenians and the allies of the
 Athen]ians
 for all [time; Each] being [free]
 and autonomous, [is to have its own] ancestral [constitution;]
 and if anyone [goes to war against the countryside of the
 Athenians]
- 75 or [subverts] their laws, [or goes to war against the allies]
 of the Athenians, [the Lacedaemonians shall help and the allies]
 of the L[acedaemonians as far as they are able; and if]
 anyone goes to w[ar against the countryside of the Lacedaemonians
 or]
 over[throws their] laws, [or goes to war against the countryside of
 the allies of the]
- 80 Lacedaem[onians, the Athenians are to help and the allies of the
 Athenians]
 [as far as they are able; -----]

Chremonides is clearly setting out 'the democracy of all Athenians' as the ancestral constitution, and ensuring that the Spartans will be ready to step in should anyone threaten that constitution.

Xerxes may have been very much in the psyche of the Athenians and other Greeks at the time of the Chremonidean war because of another great war on behalf of freedom – the Panhellenic effort to stop the Celts in 279 BC Polybius (2.35) treated the two invasions in the same breath. In his account, which explicitly links the Celtic invasion with that of Xerxes, Pausanias (10.20.5) makes it clear that the Athenians played a starring role in the defence of the pass at Thermopylae, and claims 'because of their ancient reputation the Athenians held the chief command'. The reference

to 'their ancient reputation' should probably be seen as a reference to their prominent role in the victory over Xerxes, but may also refer to their leadership of the Greeks during the Lamian War. The explicit references in the Chremonides decree to struggles against slavery, the desire for freedom, and the fear that the *patrios politeia* will be overthrown are reminiscent of the fourth-century equating the threat of Philip of Macedon with that of the Persians,³¹ which in some small way, takes us back to Demochares' decree honouring Demosthenes.

Under the leadership of men such as Demochares, Laches, and Chremonides, the Athenians immediately set about making constitutional changes that were clearly democratic. The oligarchic *anagrapheus* disappears from inscriptions, just as he did after the restoration of democracy in 318/7. Sortition returned, as did the appointment of secretaries by tribal cycles. The council and assembly appear to function normally. Both probouleumatic and non-probouleumatic decrees are found (Rhodes and Lewis, 1997, p. 48), and one decree (*SEG* 21.359) may even indicate that the assembly commissioned a *probouleuma* (Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 48). The prominent role of the council is emphasized in numerous epigraphical documents (e.g. *IG* II² 657, 57; *IG* II² 686 + 687, 62; *SEG* 25.89, 16), but none more so than a dedication from 280/79 which recorded the crowning of Philippos of Thymatidae, Himeraeus of Eitea and Nicocrates of Phegaea by the people and the council for being 'the best councillors' (*IG* II² 2797).³² There is also evidence that the law courts once more flourished. During these years a certain Phyleus was praised for having supervised the allotment of the courts (*IG* II² 1163, 8–14), and a decree from 286/5 indicates that the *thesmothetai* were to introduce scrutiny the next time they manned the law courts (*IG* II² 663, 25–30).³³ It seems to be a case of 'all systems go' for democracy.

Preparations were made to safeguard Athens against incursions from Antigonos Gonatas' garrison in the Piraeus, and a failed attempt was made to oust the garrison (Polyaenus 5.17). An arsenal was built in the city in the 270s (Pounder, 1983, p. 252; Bouras, 1990, p. 274), and the navy seems to have been revived despite the fact that the Athenians did not have access to the Piraeus.³⁴ The Athenians followed a policy of fiscal responsibility, and sought financial support from various quarters including Ptolemy, Lysimachus, Seleucus, Audoleon, King of Paeonia and Spartocus, King of Bosphorus, each of whom had reason to support Athens over the Antigonids. This was not shameless begging: the decree honouring Audoleon explicitly states that the king 'participated in the successes which were occurring believing the safety of the city to be shared in common with him' (*IG* II² 654, 18–22). The successes were not small: Athens played a prominent role in the Celtic invasion

(Pausanias 1.4.2–3; 10.20.4–21.7), and joined Sparta and Ptolemy Philadelphus in what would prove to be a disastrous attempt to regain full independence from Antigonus Gonatas in the Chremonidean War (*IG II²* 686 + 687).

Perhaps the most significant change in this period is the expansion of the cavalry to protect the Attic countryside.³⁵ The extent to which Hellenistic Athenian democracy was reliant on the wealthy cavalrymen rather than the poor rowers in the fleet represents a political evolution of sorts. Because of their prominent role in patrolling the countryside and repelling invaders, the cavalry effectively took over from the fleet as the protector of Athenian democracy,³⁶ a rather astonishing turnaround given the rather murky role the cavalry had played in the fifth-century oligarchies. The reciprocal relationship between Athenian *dēmos* and the cavalry in the late fourth and early third centuries was affirmed by the fact that the *dēmos* continued to provide their wealthy horsemen with grain for their maintenance at a time when they were strapped for cash and often desperately short of grain supplies. This is of no little significance when one considers that to maintain a force of between 200 and 500 horsemen would cost between 8 and 20 talents per year,³⁷ a financial commitment that is not often properly appreciated.³⁸ The importance of the cavalry to Athenian freedom in the third century is confirmed by the fact that Antigonus Gonatas made a point of destroying the headquarters of the Athenian cavalry – the shrine of Poseidon Hippios – during the Chremonidean War (Pausanias 1.30.4). The shrine of Poseidon Hippios was also the scene of the fateful decision to disband democracy in 411 (Thucydides 8.67). It is a remarkable turnaround that the destruction of a site that is so evocative of oligarchy heralded the disruption of democracy in 262.³⁹

Diversity of Opinion – True Democracy?

One of the key features of the Classical democracy had been genuine diversity of political leadership. Indeed, democracy at Athens traditionally tolerated – if not encouraged – diversity of opinion. In fact, the system passively encouraged differences of opinion. Because there were no organized parties, the system was essentially comprised of individuals who were vying for political dominance. In the fifth century Pericles had to contend with conservative opponents such as Thucydides, son of Melesias. After his death Nicias, Demosthenes, Cleon, Alcibiades, Hyperbolus and Cleophon were all competing for the ear of the Athenian populace. In the fourth century Demosthenes and Aeschines were archenemies, and at the

same time as their feud dominated Athenian politics, Eubulus, Lycurgus, Hypereides, Polyectus of Sphettus, and other orators all played leading roles in Athenian politics.

This diversity of opinion is perhaps best illustrated by the list of leading Athenian politicians Alexander the Great drew up around 335. According to Arrian, Alexander held these men responsible for the wrongs committed by the Athenians against his father and himself (Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.10.4). Included in this list were Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Polyectus of Sphettus, Moerocles of Eleusis, Diotimus of Euonymon, Ephialtes, Demon, Callisthenes, Charidemus, Chares and Hypereides (Plut. *Demosthenes* 23.3; Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.10.4; Suda s.v. A 2704). We might be tempted to think that these men represented a party or at least a faction. We know that Hypereides and Demosthenes were friends until they fell out in 324 over the Harpalus affair, and we also know that Demosthenes was closely associated with Polyectus (Plut. *Demosthenes* 10.2; Plut. *Phocion* 5.9). But apart from this, the evidence we have about the personal alignments of these political leaders suggests that they were not linked closely at all. Diotimus is hardly likely to have been partial to Demosthenes, because he was a friend of Demosthenes' archenemy Meidias who in turn was a friend of Eubulus (Dem. 21.208). Moerocles is not likely to have been partial to Eubulus, because we know that Eubulus sued him (Dem. 19.293). We also know that Moerocles brought about the imprisonment of Lycurgus' sons after he died in 325 (Dem. *Epistle* 3.16), which suggests that Moerocles and Lycurgus did not move in the same social circles. It seems that when Alexander selected these politicians he was not selecting a particular faction that would be hostile to him, but rather that he selected prominent Athenians somewhat 'indiscriminately' (Sealey, 1993, p. 205). That he could do so highlights the very diversity of the Athenian political system, a diversity that can be found in each of the restored democracies.

319/8 to 318/7: Hagnonides & Associates

This very diversity was obvious after the return to democracy in 318. Although Hagnonides has been traditionally seen as the leader of the government during this brief period of democracy,⁴⁰ it is clear that he was but one of many leaders. Certainly Hagnonides looms larger than the others in our sources,⁴¹ but the fact that he played a key role in the trials of Phocion and Theophrastus – the two most infamous events at the time – explains his exaggerated prominence in the sources. Aside from

Demophilus of Acharnae and Polyeuctus of Sphettus, we know that Moerocles of Eleusis was politically active in Eleusis, and the fact that Demochares commented on Theophrastus' performance during his trial (Aelian *VH* 8.12) could indicate that he was also prominent during this brief period of democracy. Despite the condemnation of Phocion and many of 'Antipater's friends' including Callimedon and Demetrius of Phalerum, there was still a place at the *bēma* for Archedicus (*Agora* 16.104) who had been the *anagrapheus* under the oligarchy in 320/19. Given the prominence of the office of *anagrapheus* in the public documents of the oligarchic regime, the fact that Archedicus survived the cull of oligarchic leaders speaks volumes for the tolerance of democracy for those who opposed its principles. The democracy was also ready to praise those who had acted in their interests no matter what their past actions, with Conon of Anaphlystus receiving a crown from the *dēmos* in 318 (*IG* II² 1479, 20) despite having been prominent in the final days of the oligarchy (Diod. 18.64.5).

307/6-301/0: Stratocles (Un)Cooperative

The same diversity of opinion can be seen in the democracy restored by Demetrius Poliorcetes in 307/6. While modern scholars tend to focus on the role of Stratocles,⁴² often seeing Stratocles and Demetrius as stifling opposition,⁴³ it is clear from our sources that there was considerable diversity of leadership and opinion at this time. Although Stratocles and Demochares dominate our literary and epigraphic sources, we know the names of twenty-seven other orators during this period, and the names of a further seven men who could be described as regular political leaders due to their prominence in the sources, including Philippus of Acharnae, Chionides of Thria, Ischyrius of Aexone, and Euboulides of Eleusis. Moreover, while we know that the likes of Stratocles, Demochares, and Habron who participated in the governing of Athens can be safely described as 'democrats', we also know that not all the men who participated in the governing of Athens in these years were quite so overtly democratic in their leanings. Clearly there was room for discordant voices.

This is made clear by the lists of the councillors from these years. These lists have proved extremely helpful in identifying those who were participating in the governing of Athens. Although these men might not be described as 'political leaders' their identities are still significant because they were participating in the governing of Athens. Significantly, we find Telocles of Alopece serving in the council in 303/2 (*Agora* 15.62, 309).

Although Telocles does not appear in a more substantial role than as a councillor in this period, he had previously proposed motions in the assembly during the Antipatrid oligarchy in 319/8 (*SEG* 21.312), and during the tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum, in 311/10 (*IG* II² 453 + *SEG* 32.100). Given his past history as an orator in the assembly, it is difficult to imagine that Telocles sat quietly in the council chamber in 303/2 minding his own business. His active participation in periods of both oligarchy and democracy indicates the diversity permitted by this particular democracy.

The appearance of Meidias (II) of Anagyrus as a councillor in 304/3 again highlights the diversity of Athenian politics (*Agora* 15.61, 177). While Demochares – the nephew of Demosthenes – played a particularly prominent role the political arena in the new democratic *politeia*, there was still space in the council for the son of Demosthenes' archenemy Meidias. There was likewise a place in the council for Meidias' grandson Euthydicus in 302/1 (*Agora* 16.123, 8). The younger Meidias is central to an incident that sheds considerable light on the nature of this regime. Modern scholars have at least tacitly accepted the existence of this political diversity ever since Schäfer (1854, pp. 163–5) claimed that the younger Meidias proposed a motion to honour Phocion in the archonship of Euxenippus (305/4).⁴⁴ According to [Plutarch], *Moralia* 850b, Hyperides failed in a *graphē paranomōn* against a motion to honour Phocion that was proposed by Meidias 'in Xenias's archonship' (ἐπὶ Ξενίου ἄρχοντος). Since there was no archon with the name Xenias, Schäfer suggested that Ξενίου should be emended to Εὐξενίππου, and that the prosecutor of Meidias should be identified as Glaucippus, the son of Hyperides.⁴⁵ Schäfer's suggestion is attractive for several reasons. Firstly, as Schäfer himself points out, there is no known archon with the name Xenias. Secondly, Schäfer observed that some manuscripts of Diodorus actually name the archon of 305/4 as Ξενίππος rather than Εὐξενίππος, which is even more similar to the Ξενίου in the Plutarch manuscripts. Schäfer's hypothesis seems more solid if one considers the possibility that the original source referred to the author of the *graphē paranomōn* as Γλαύκιππος ὁ Ὑπερείδου. This would account for the appearance of Hyperides's name in the final text, and the -ίππου ending of the archon's name could easily have been confused with the ending of Glaucippus' name, which would help explain the use of the name Xenias instead of (Eu)xenippus. But regardless of whether the younger Meidias proposed a motion in 305/4, we do know that both he and his nephew participated in the governing of Athens under the democracy of 307/6 to 301/0.

But the most obvious indication of political divisions in Athens at this time is the incident that occurred when Cleomedon was sentenced to pay a fine of fifty talents (Plut. *Demetrius* 24). His son, Cleaenetus, an intimate of Demetrius Poliorcetes who had also served as an envoy to Antigonos in 306/5 (*IG* II² 1492, 100–1), obtained a letter from the king ordering the *dēmos* to cancel the fine.⁴⁶ The Athenians complied with his wishes, but then passed a motion that no citizen should ever again bring a letter from Demetrius before the people. Clearly, elements opposed to Demetrius, and his partisans such as Stratocles were responsible for this motion. When the king expressed his outrage at this motion, the *dēmos* took fright, rescinded the decree, and put to death or exiled some of those who had spoken in favour of the motion. Stratocles then proposed a motion to the effect that whatsoever Demetrius should decide in the future should be considered righteous towards the gods and just towards man.

We could assume that all the dissenting voices would have now been silenced (Plut. *Demetrius* 24). But we know that at least some of the wealthier citizens of Athens – the so-called *kaloi k'agathoi* – were still actively expressing dissent about the actions of Stratocles and his supporters. According to Plutarch, one such citizen declared that Stratocles was mad to propose such a motion (Plut. *Demetrius* 24.4). Furthermore, when Demochares retorted that Stratocles 'would be mad if he were not mad,' he was driven into exile. By whom he was exiled we cannot say for certain.⁴⁷ Whatever the case, this incident showed how clear and deep the political divisions were in Athens at this time.

The fact that Cleomedon had been sentenced to pay a fine of fifty talents also suggests that there were clear divisions within the political leadership at Athens. Such a hefty fine may suggest that Cleomedon was the losing party in a *graphē paranomōn*. At the very least it indicates that the Athenian *dēmos* was particularly displeased with Cleomedon.

288/7-262/1: Not Just 'Demochares & Son'

Scholars often depict Demochares of Leuconoe as the leader of this new democracy. Thus, Osborne (1985, p. 280 n. 20) has Demochares returning 'to head the government'. This idea perhaps has its origins in an overly credulous reading of Laches' decree requesting the 'highest honours' for Demochares. Korhonen (1997, p. 45) even has Demochares as 'one of the leading members behind the revolt', despite the fact that even Laches cannot conceal the reality that Demochares did not actually return to Athens until 286/5. In a similar vein Mossé (1973, p. 130) goes so far as to describe Demochares as one of the leading players in the

build up to the Chremonidean War even though he must have been dead by the time Laches proposed the decree in his honour in 271/0. But there was much more to the 'democracy of all Athenians' than one old politician and his son.

Athens was (once again) actually led by a diverse and heterogeneous group of politicians. Aside from Demochares (after his return), and Olympiodorus and Phaedruss of Sphettus who kicked off the revolt, we know of numerous figures who played leading roles in the governing of the Athenian state. These included Agyrrhius of Collytus, Simonides of Hagnous, Leon of Aexone, Callistratus of Cropidae, Eubulus of Melite, Epicharmus of Colonus, Philippus of Thymatidae, Comeas of Lamptrae, Callippus of Eleusis, Aristides of Lamptrae, Phaedruss' son Thymochares, and the brothers Chremonides and Glaucon of Aethalidae. There was significant continuity at leadership level with many of the leaders having already participated at the highest level under previous democratic regimes, for example Demochares and Callias of Hermus. Many had ancestors with strong ties to democracy, such as Agyrrhius of Collytus, Phytius of Thoricus, and Callippus of Eleusis, and of course Demochares' son Laches. But there was also quite a degree of diversity in terms of who was involved, and in terms of the activities they undertook.

Byrne (2004, pp. 323–4) argues that the majority of decrees are probouleumatic, and sees this as sign that there was a 'constricted circle of leadership' at this time. But this argument seems to owe more to the fact that later in the Hellenistic period democracy is often seen as dominated by a set of wealthy 'plutocrats' rather than a balanced view of the entire Athenian political structure. There was more to Athenian leadership than speaking in the assembly or the council. Table 3 lists those who held important offices during the 'democracy of all Athenians' and the year(s) in which they held office.

Despite not having any substantial literary sources for this period we know of at least eight prominent generals, five ambassadors (each of whom played other roles), six hipparchs (some of whom also served as generals), seven holders of the office of *agōnothetēs*, and many more treasurers and other officeholders. Given the overall paucity of our sources, this speaks for significant diversity of leadership.

The Need for Compromise

While the Hellenistic Athenians were keen to demonstrate their links to the past, there was one crucial difference between the restored democracies

Table 3. Main office holders 288/7–263/2

Name	Office
Phaedrus of Sphettus	Hoplite general 288/7 (<i>IG</i> II ² 682; <i>agōnothetēs</i> 265/4 (<i>IG</i> II ² 682))
Hipparchus	General 280s (?) (Polyaenus 5.17)
Mnesidemus	General 280s (?) (Polyaenus 5.17)
Olympiodorus of Euonymon	General 281/0 (<i>P.Herc.</i> 1418, column 33)
Aristides of Lamprae	General 280/79 (<i>IG</i> II ² 2797); General τῆς παραλίας 268/7 (<i>Ergon</i> (2003) [2004], 15); Envoy 260s (<i>ISE</i> 53; <i>Ergon</i> (2003) [2004], 15)
Callippus of Eleusis	Hoplite general 279/8 (Pausanias 1.4.2; 10.20.5); Envoy 269/8 (<i>Syll.</i> ³ 434/5); Envoy 260s (<i>ISE</i> 53)
Epichares of Icarion	General τῆς παραλίας 269/8 (Petrakos, 1999, no.3)
Glaucon of Aethalidae	Hoplite general and Hipparch 286–262 (<i>IG</i> II ² 3079); <i>agōnothetēs</i> 282/1 or 266/5 (<i>IG</i> II ² 3079); Envoy 260s (<i>ISE</i> 53)
Comeas of Lamprae	Envoy 281/0 (<i>IG</i> II ² 672); Hipparch 280/79 (<i>IG</i> II ² 672)
Alcimachus of Myrrhinous	Hipparch 282/1 (<i>SEG</i> 21.525); also <i>paredros</i> to the archon Nicias of Otryne in 266/5 (<i>IG</i> II ² 668)
Nicogenes of Euonymon	Hipparch 282/1 (<i>SEG</i> 21.525)
Diocles of Teithras	Hipparch 286–262 (<i>SEG</i> 21.357)
Philius of Phrearrhioe	Hipparch 286–262 (<i>SEG</i> 21.357)
Demochares of Leuconoe	Envoy 280s ([Plut.] <i>Moralia</i> 851e)
Callias of Sphettus	Envoy 280s (<i>SEG</i> 28.60)
Philippides of Cephale	<i>agōnothetēs</i> 283/2 (<i>IG</i> II ² 657)
Thrasycles of Decelea	<i>agōnothetēs</i> 271/0; also Phylarch 282/1
Deinias of Ercheia	<i>agōnothetēs</i> 266/5 (<i>SEG</i> 25.186); also <i>sitōnēs</i> 275/4 (<i>IG</i> II ² 792)
Lysimachus of Athmonon	<i>agōnothetēs</i> 266/5 (<i>SEG</i> 25.186)
Hebesarchus of Paiania	<i>tamias</i> 266/5 (<i>SEG</i> 25.186)
Thymochares of Sphettus	<i>agōnothetēs</i> 265/4 (<i>IG</i> II ² 682) ¹

¹ For the date see Osborne, 2004, p. 210.

and the democracy of old: they were no longer *completely* independent. No longer could Athens maintain her freedom or independence without some form of foreign support. With Antipater and Cassander actively sponsoring limited-franchise oligarchic regimes, and a Macedonian garrison in the

Piraeus keeping a stranglehold on the means of supply, the Athenian democrats (and democrats in other *poleis*) needed to find backers amongst the Successors who would be favourable to their cause.

This harsh new reality did not sit well with the principles underlying democracy, or with those who believed in such principles. But the Athenians had to contend with this troubling situation as best they could. In 318 Polyperchon provided support for the democratic cause. His importance can be seen in two Athenian decrees that were passed after he wrote to the Athenians recommending that these measures be taken.⁴⁸ Polyperchon's letters and judgements were not decisive, but the fact that they were taken very seriously is attested by literary and epigraphic evidence. When Polyperchon's support proved ineffective, the Athenians were forced to submit to the authority of Cassander. The Athenians could not entertain hopes of a democratic revival until viable external support appeared. This support would not materialize for ten long years when it appeared in the form of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Even then the Athenians were dependent upon the whims of their Macedonian backers and vulnerable to their interference. From now on the Athenians would need to compromise in order to retain or regain their freedom and democracy.

Coping with a Benefactor – Demetrius the Protector of Democracy

The relationship between the Athenians and their royal benefactors was complicated. On the one hand, the Antigonids publicly supported the idea that the Greeks should be free and autonomous.⁴⁹ On the other hand, the influence and occasional presence of the Antigonids and their officials in Athens generated tensions. The Antigonids supported the idea of Greek freedom because it suited their interests rather than because of any ideological commitment to the Greek cause. Yet the Greeks they freed considered their benefactions and the freedom they provided as much more than acts of political expediency. Thus when Antigonos sent his son Demetrius to liberate Athens from Cassander's tyrant, he did so for strategic and propaganda purposes. But for the Athenians their liberation was more than mere propaganda. The recovery of their freedom and dignity was an emotionally charged event that led to an emotional response on their part.⁵⁰ It was one thing to proclaim that the Greeks should be free as Antigonos did in 314, and Ptolemy had done in 309, but it was quite another to actually deliver the goods, which goes a long way towards explaining the extremity of the Athenian reaction to their liberation. As soon as Demetrius announced that he intended to expel Cassander's

garrison and restore democracy, the Athenian hoplites threw down their shields and hailed Demetrius their ‘Saviour’ (σωτήρ) and ‘Benefactor’ (εὐεργετής).

Over the following years Demetrius became almost synonymous with democracy. Simultaneously his chief opponent, Cassander, was equated with slavery and tyranny. Various inscriptions from this period refer to Demetrius’ wars against Cassander as struggles for ‘freedom’ (*IG* II² 558, 14; *IG* II² 559, 9; *SEG* 36.164, 14) and ‘democracy’ (*IG* II² 559, 10; *SEG* 36.164, 15; *RFIC* 20, 1942, p. 12 no. 6, 6). Demetrius is regularly referred to as the ‘Saviour’ of the Greeks, and there are several references to the ‘liberation’ and ‘salvation’ of the Greeks, while Cassander is described as putting the Greeks ‘in slavery’ (ἐπὶ δουλείᾳ) (*IG* II² 469, 9–10; *Agora* 16.114, 7–8 (Cf. *SEG* 30.69). Numerous decrees hark back to the Lamian War and Athens’ struggle against Cassander’s father, Antipater (*IG* II² 476, 7–8; *IG* II² 505, 17ff; *IG* II² 506, 9ff), which ended with the abolition of democracy, thus further emphasizing the image of Cassander as the enemy of democracy.

The masses informally hailed Demetrius as ‘Saviour’ when he arrived in 308/7, and the assembly passed a motion proposed by Stratocles of Diomeia formalizing this arrangement. On the strength of Stratocles’ proposal, both Demetrius and his father were enrolled as Saviour-gods. Two new tribes in their honour – Antigonis and Demetrias – were created, thus linking Demetrius and his father to the intricacies of Athenian democracy. Divine honours were accompanied by civic privileges and responsibilities, with both kings being awarded Athenian citizenship. This would allow both to participate in the newly restored Athenian democracy if they so chose, a privilege that would cause problems further on down the track when Demetrius began to openly interfere in Athenian affairs. Their images were even woven into Athena’s *peplos* alongside the Olympian deities.

The status of Demetrius and Antigonus as ‘Saviours’ of Athens and democracy was confirmed by the placement of their statues alongside those of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, the Tyrannicides whose role in the overthrow of the Peisistratid tyranny had made their names virtually synonymous with democracy.⁵¹ By rescuing Athens from Demetrius of Phalerum and Cassander – the hated embodiment of slavery – Demetrius and Antigonus had emulated Harmodius and Aristogeiton’s role in the salvation of Athens in the sixth century. The linking of the new Saviours with the old Tyrannicides was strong symbolism for the newly restored democracy and its newfound protectors.⁵² Images of Antigonus and Demetrius were set up alongside the tyrant slayers. That the laws ordinarily

specifically prohibited this indicates just how highly the Athenians valued their new saviours. Mikalson (1998, p. 79) refers to Antigonos and Demetrius as ‘tyrant removers’ rather than ‘tyrannicides’,⁵³ but the distinction is academic. As far as the Athenians were concerned, the newfound ‘Saviours’ of democracy were just like Harmodius and Aristogeiton.⁵⁴ A decree from 314/3 honouring Asander of Caria stipulates that the statue in the agora was to be set up ‘anywhere *except* alongside Harmodius and Aristogeiton’ (IG II² 450, 32–5). Afterwards the law would stipulate that statues could be set up anywhere except alongside Harmodius and Aristogeiton *and the Saviours* (IG II² 646, 40–2). This shows that Antigonos and Demetrius were catalysts for political change and potent symbols for the new democracy just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton had been for the old democracy.⁵⁵ Why else would they have tampered with the law prohibiting the placement of honorific statues near the Tyrannicides?⁵⁶ Although striking and innovative, the linking of Antigonos and Demetrius with the Tyrannicides was by no means a bolt from the blue – Demosthenes had likened Conon and Euagoras with the Tyrannicides (Demosthenes 20.70) for their military intervention that brought about the liberation of Athens from the Spartans at the beginning of the fourth century several decades before Stratocles thought of formalizing the arrangement for the Antigonids.

Demetrius the Saviour-god was even more closely linked to democracy around 304/3 when the Athenian-picked volunteers (*ethelontai epilektoi*) who served with the king (presumably in his Peloponnesian campaigns) resolved to honour Demetrius with sacrifices and a golden equestrian statue (SEG 25.149). Because of Demetrius’ endeavours to restore and preserve democracy, the soldiers resolved to make sacrifices to and on behalf of Demetrius the Saviour, and to place a statue of Demetrius, whom they surnamed the Great (ὁ Μέγας), in the agora alongside the statue of the goddess Demokratia. The decree clearly links Demetrius the Great (the man), Demetrius the Saviour of Democracy (the god), democracy (the *politeia*), and Demokratia (the goddess) together. Although this is not a state decree, since the picked volunteers rather than the *dēmos* in the assembly passed the motion, it is a motion decided and endorsed by Athenian citizens who must have had some sort of official authorization to set up a gold statue in the agora. This was no empty gesture either. The gilded bronze statue must have been magnificent, as well as prominent,⁵⁷ and the marble stele on which the motion was inscribed is a particularly striking piece of stone that surely cannot have been chosen at random.⁵⁸

While the Athenians have often been criticized for this stance vis-à-vis Demetrius, this was no isolated case. Not only was their behaviour echoed in the wider Greek world, Athenians from non-Attic communities (in what Oliver [2007] recently termed the 'Peraea') behaved in a similar fashion when responding to assistance from the other Successors of Alexander. The first such instance followed the Battle of Ipsus, after Seleucus destroyed the city of Antigoneia. Many of the settlers at Antigoneia were Athenians, and when Seleucus moved the population to his new settlement at Antioch-on-the-Orontes, these Athenians erected a statue of Seleucus bearing the horns of a bull. We have two separate accounts of the foundation of Antioch as it relates to the Athenian settlers. Libanius indicates that when the Athenians realized that Seleucus was not going to harm them, and they were going to a better place, they set up a bronze statue of Seleucus with the horns of a bull at the front of his head, because they were the token of Io (Libanius, *Orations* XI.92). Malalas indicates that Seleucus set up a 'large' (μεγάλη) statue of Athena for the Athenians, 'because they worshipped her' (Jonathan Malalas, *Chronographica* 201). It seems then, that Seleucus recognized the benefits for himself in granting a favour to his new subjects and set up a colossal statue of Athena.⁵⁹ When the Athenians discovered that Seleucus was going to treat them well, and presumably allowed them to maintain democracy,⁶⁰ they responded by setting up a cult (?) statue of him in the guise of Io.⁶¹ The Athenian cleruchs on the island of Lemnos behaved in a similar fashion when Seleucus 'liberated' them from Lysimachus after the Battle of Couroupedium in 281. According to Phylarchus (*FGrHist* 81 F29 = Athenaeus. 6.254f–255a) the Athenians showed their gratitude to Seleucus (literally 'gave a *charis*'), for rescuing them from 'the bitter rule' of Lysimachus and restoring democracy, by erecting temples to Seleucus and his son Antiochus. They also made toasts to Seleucus as their 'Saviour'. By restoring freedom and democracy to the two Athenian settlements on Lemnos, Seleucus was thus considered to be their Saviour and new founder in the same way as Demetrius and Antigonus were the hailed as the Saviours and founders of the new democratic *politeia* in 307/6.⁶²

The close ties between Demetrius the Saviour-god and democracy can also be seen clearly in the manner in which the Athenians set about incorporating the new Saviours into their civic space. The arrangement of the agora can be seen in Figure 2. Aside from the statues of Demetrius and Antigonus alongside the Tyrannicides towards the centre of the agora (Thompson and Wycherley, 1972, p. 157), two new bronze statues of Antigonus and Demetrius were added to the group representing the

almost unavoidable. Upon entering the city through either the sacred or dipylon gates, an Athenian citizen would pass the statues of *Demokratia* and Demetrius on his way into the central agora. If he continued along the Panathenaic way he would pass Antigonos and Demetrius alongside the Tyrannicides on his way towards the acropolis. If he turned right upon entering the agora he would pass the two sets of Tyrannicides on his left before encountering Antigonos and Demetrius again alongside the other Eponymous Heroes on his right. For the citizens of Athens the new god Demetrius must have seemed almost omnipresent!

Too Much Compromise?

But while Demetrius Poliorcetes restored and saved democracy, his continued presence in Athens and his interference in Athenian affairs were incongruous with the ideals of *demokratia*. It is for this reason that Habicht's chapter (1997, pp. 67–81) on this regime is entitled 'Democracy without Full Freedom' or 'Die halbfreie Demokratie'.

Now is not the place to discuss the breakdown in the relationship between Athens and Demetrius in too much detail, because this will be discussed in considerable detail in the context of the career of Stratocles below, but it must be mentioned that Demetrius (and his entourage) interfered in Athenian politics in many ways. First, he wrote letters to the council recommending honours for his *philoï* (*IG* II² 486; *IG* II² 739; *SEG* 36.164). Polyperchon probably employed this practice in 318/7 when he wrote a letter to the Athenians recommending honours for two of his *philoï* (*IG* II² 387). There is nothing inherently wrong with this – the process of *πρόσδοον γράφεσθαι* allowed foreigners to make written applications to the Athenian council – but Demetrius seems to have irritated the Athenians when he wrote the letter on behalf of Cleomedon, demanding that his heavy fine be quashed (Plut. *Demetrius* 24.3). The Athenians responded by banning the reading of letters from Demetrius before the people. Demetrius responded with open anger. This incident ended with the deaths of those who supported the motion banning letters from Demetrius and the exile of Demochares. It may well be that Demetrius or his *philoï* brought about the banishment of Demochares after the acid-tongued nephew of Demosthenes made one too many witty jibes at his expense (Plut. *Demetrius* 24.5; [Plut.] *Moralia* 851e). If so, it would be another example of Demetrius' interference. A serious crisis was narrowly averted at this point in time by some clever footwork on the part of Stratocles. He proposed a motion to the effect that 'whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in the future should be considered righteous

towards the gods and just towards men' (Plut. *Demetrius* 24.4), ensuring that any future letters from Demetrius would be accepted without undue fuss. It also ensured that Demetrius would not need to display his anger again. Provided the Athenians did not openly disagree with Demetrius they would remain safe to run their own affairs.

The challenge of coping with a benefactor was made more difficult when Demetrius was physically in Athens. Demetrius did not endear himself to many Athenians by residing in the Parthenon with his prostitutes. He even dared to call Athena his 'elder sister'. His loose sexual habits caused much fuss, because it seemed that he was pursuing Athenian women and boys relentlessly. Demetrius caused more unrest when he demanded that the Athenians allow him to be initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries all at once and at the wrong time of year, and it took some more clever footwork from Stratocles to avert another serious crisis. It has even been suggested that Demetrius appointed generals, which would be a clear violation of Athenian autonomy. But this is by no means certain, and it is arguable that the sole piece of evidence to support this notion comes from a much later period of Athenian history.⁶⁴

But it is taking things too far when modern commentators suggest that Demetrius' interference renders the Athenian democracy a 'caricature' as Mossé (1973) does or 'restricted' as does Dreyer (1999). Infrequent interference from Demetrius did not mean that there was not genuine democracy at Athens. There was no limit on the franchise and Demetrius did not maintain a garrison as Cassander had done. Admittedly Demetrius did regularly house troops and his fleet at Athens, but that was because the city was his Greek capital, and with the Piraeus boasting ship sheds sufficient for four hundred warships Athens was the obvious place for his massive fleet to dock. Where else in Greece could he have housed a fleet of such size? Dreyer (1999, pp. 151, 174–80) equated Demetrius' sojourn on the acropolis in the winter of 304/3 with a garrison, and on the strength of this he has called the government between 304/3 and 301 a 'restricted' regime. He referred to Demetrius' party of friends and prostitutes as 'foreign troops' ('fremden Truppen'), but the only evidence that he can provide to support this argument relates to the very different regime that was in operation in the 290s when Demetrius occupied the Piraeus, Mounychia, the Museum, and the border forts with troops.

The tendency to see Demetrius' interference as destroying democracy is perhaps attributable to an over-readiness on the part of modern commentators to accept the claims of Philippides of Cephale that Demetrius' supporter Stratocles 'overthrew the *dēmos*' (Plut. *Demetrius* 12). As I will

argue in a later chapter, this tendency to take Philippides' comments at face value overlooks the fact that Philippides was not a trustworthy source due to the fact that he was a *philos* of Demetrius Poliorcetes' archenemy Lysimachus. The reliability of Philippides' comments about the 'overthrow of the *dēmos*' is further reduced by the fact that they are from a comic work, not history, and were perhaps even written after Philippides had gone into self-imposed political exile (Sommerstein (2009, p. 275 n. 13). The similar claims that Demochares of Leuconoe was exiled by 'those who overthrew the *dēmos*' ([Plut.] *Moralia* 851f) are equally unreliable. Like Philippides, Demochares was associated with Lysimachus, and these claims come from Demochares' son Laches some thirty-five years after Demochares had been driven into exile by the Athenian people. There must be some exaggeration in the decree honouring Demochares – are we really to believe Laches' claim that his father was 'the only Athenian of those who engaged in public life in his time who never plotted against the government of the country by changing it to a form other than democracy'? This is clearly hyperbole, and the dismissal of those who brought about Demochares' exile as 'those who overthrew the *dēmos*' should be judged in the light of this and other obvious exaggerations. Laches' choice of wording bears considerable resemblance to Demochares' own proposal to award the highest honours to his uncle Demosthenes. Demochares said of his uncle, 'in defending the rights and liberties of the people, no man in his time had done more or deserved better; and in regard of his sufferings when the commonwealth was ruined, being banished by the insolence of the oligarchy . . . his hearty affection to his countrymen was still the same, insomuch that he never to the last offered any unworthy thing to the injury of his people'. In a similar vein Laches claims that Demochares had been 'exiled for the sake of democracy' and was the only man of his generation 'who never promoted or consented to any other form of government'. There is even a replication of the injustice Demochares felt that Demosthenes had suffered in his son's complaint that he had been exiled 'in return' for all the good that he had done for the *polis*. Both decrees equate being sent into exile with the strength of democratic conviction. If so, then Demochares was effectively 'doing a Demosthenes', and the equating of the exile with 'overthrowing the *dēmos*' is by no means as secure as first impressions might suggest.

To Compromise, or Not to Compromise

The so-called democracy of all Athenians was also forced to compromise with foreign kings. But rather than a single benefactor, this regime was

compelled to deal with numerous potential benefactors. Several leading Athenian political figures sought and gained similar donations from various kings and dynasts in the Graeco-Macedonian world. Early in 285/4, Agyrrhius of Collytus put forward a motion honouring Spartocus the King of Bosporos for his gifts of grain to Athens (*IG* II² 653). Simonides of Hagnous proposed motions honouring Audoleon the king of Paeonia and one of the king's *philoï* for donating grain and money to Athens later that same year (*IG* II² 654; 655). In 283/2, Philippides of Cephale was honoured for his services to Athens, which included obtaining gifts and donations from Lysimachus (*IG* II² 657). The decree honouring Callias of Sphettus refers to diplomatic missions to Ptolemy Philadelphus that acquired 20,000 *medimnoi* of grain for Athens and paraphernalia for the celebration of the Great Panathenaea (*SEG* 28.60, 53–5, 67–70). We also know that Comeas of Lamptrae travelled to see Seleucus in 281/0 after his victory over Lysimachus (*IG* II² 672, 39ff). Presumably Comeas did more than merely thank Seleucus for returning the island of Lemnos to Athens.

Modern commentators often seek to separate the 'anti-Macedonian' Demochares from this activity. In this vein Demochares is labelled a 'nationalist' (Shear, 1978, p. 54), a man whose 'dislike of Macedonians . . . lasted all his life' (Tracy 2000a, p. 228), and 'an intransigent Gaullist somehow now accommodated among the more pliable men of Vichy' (Green 1990, p. 129; 2003a, p. 5). But how accurate is such a claim? The bitter and acerbic Demochares who had spent his exile at the court of Lysimachus probably had little in common with more pliant political leaders such as Olympiodorus and Phaedrus who had been content to play a leadership role in the pro-Demetrius regimes from which he had been excluded. Nor is Demochares likely to have seen eye to eye with the next generation of politicians like Glaucon and Chremonides; they were young and wealthy idealists who frequented the philosophical schools and gymnasia. In the case of Callippus of Eleusis and Agyrrhius of Collytus, they were even sons of political rivals of his uncle Demosthenes. Their patron would be the young King Ptolemy Philadelphus, not one of Alexander's old marshals. But it is not really appropriate to describe Demochares as 'an intransigent Gaullist . . . among the more pliable men of Vichy'. On the contrary, Demochares *was* willing to accommodate the Macedonians and to embrace new diplomatic techniques, and played a leading role in the field of diplomacy. Laches claims that his father twice served as an envoy to Lysimachus, securing thirty talents of silver on the first occasion, and one hundred talents on the second. Demochares also proposed the sending of an embassy to Ptolemy, a mission that secured fifty talents of silver. Lastly, Demochares served as an

envoy to Antipater and brought back to Athens a further twenty talents.⁶⁵ Demochares was clearly using his close connections at the court of Lysimachus to benefit Athens. Despite his hostility toward the philosophers – he once denounced the philosophers as ‘the Peripatetic nest of traitors’ (Athenaeus 6.509)⁶⁶ – Demochares was even willing to attempt to convince Zeno of Citium to use his influence over Antigonus Gonatas on Athens’ behalf (DL 7.14). Demochares’ diplomatic activity neatly complemented that of the other political leaders, which makes it clear that he was not anchored in the past and was willing to negotiate with the Macedonians and other foreigners in order to benefit and safeguard Athens.⁶⁷

By now the extent to which politics in Hellenistic Athens was driven by ideology should be clear. But in order to investigate the politics of Hellenistic Athens more thoroughly, it will be illuminating to look at the careers of some key individuals in more detail. The first, Phocion, favoured oligarchy, and was destroyed by his connections with Macedon. The second, Stratocles, is inextricably linked with the democracy backed by Demetrius Poliorcetes, and he too was compromised by his dealings with Macedon. The third, Callippus of Eleusis, also stands for democracy, but unlike Phocion and Stratocles, he made a name for himself with his opposition to foreigners. Each stands here as an emblem of the negative ‘reception’ of Hellenistic Athens. Each is a victim of the ‘politics’ of Hellenistic Athens.

Chapter 5

Phocion: ‘The Good’ or ‘The Bad’?

[Phocion] said, ‘I admit my own guilt, and I assign death as the penalty for my political conduct; but these men with me, men of Athens, are not guilty at all, and why will you put them to death?’ ‘Because they are your friends’, answered many.

Plutarch, Phocion

For eighteenth-century detractors of Athens, Phocion’s execution was the ultimate crime of Athenian democracy, one final act of infamy by a horrible system of government in the midst of the throes of death. So bitter and cruel were the Athenian masses that they condemned to death Phocion’s dearest companions merely because they were his friends. Such was Phocion’s reputation amongst eighteenth-century commentators that his condemnation by the Athenians could serve as the definitive proof of the flawed nature of democracy. Phocion’s fall could also be seen as a symbol of Athens’ decay after Demosthenes’ death. For the nineteenth-century historian Droysen (1878, vol. 2, p. 224) Phocion was ‘the last gentleman of the better days’, the symbol of the collapse of all that had been good and great about Athens.

But Phocion’s potency as a symbol swiftly diminished in the face of the nineteenth-century rehabilitation of Athenian democracy, with Grote and Thirlwall transforming Mably’s anti-capitalist hero into a traitor who was justly punished for betraying his fellow citizens to loathsome Macedonian foreigners. The image of Phocion as a traitor to the Athenian cause continued in the twentieth century and reached its zenith when Ste. Croix (1983, p. 609 n. 2) cast Phocion as a Nazi stooge overseeing the deportation of his enemies to foreign death camps. In recent years the ground has shifted again, and Phocion has come to be seen as little more than a bumbling, decrepit old fool who naïvely placed his trust in the Macedonian conquerors and paid the ultimate price for his folly.¹

But Phocion was none of these things. He was by no means the last great Athenian, let alone the last great Greek; but he was certainly not Hellenistic Athens' answer to Pétain either. Phocion was undoubtedly a traitor, and a self righteous one at that, but he was no goose-stepping Nazi, and he was anything but naïve in his dealings with the Macedonians. The last phase of Phocion's career reveals much about his political leanings, and about political ideology in Hellenistic Athens. A political conservative who led an extremely ascetic lifestyle,² Phocion stood out from his peers for his admiration of the Spartan way of life, and was said to have put his son Phocus through the *agoge* in order to prevent him from being tainted by Athenian luxury (Plut. *Phocion* 10.1; 20.2–3.). Phocion's admiration of Sparta (not to mention his loathing of luxury) goes a long way towards explaining his appeal for Enlightenment Laconophiles such as Mably. But Phocion did not only admire Sparta – he was also a friend of Macedon, with Philip of Macedon, Alexander the Great, and Antipater counting him among their *philoi*. Unsurprisingly, given his fondness for Sparta and Macedon, Phocion was no great fan of Athenian democracy, and when Antipater presented him with the opportunity to put an end to democracy in 322 he seized it with both hands. Phocion's final years represent the attempts of an elderly political conservative to stymie the democratic hopes and ambitions of his younger countrymen. His failure to cling on to control cost him both his reputation and his life.

Phocion the Good: *Le Mirage du Phocion*?

François Ollier (1933) coined the term *le mirage spartiate* to describe the manner in which the image of Sparta was gradually transformed through the work of philosophers, biographers, historians, and romantics into that of a radically unique state unlike any other in Greece. The powerful spell the Spartans cast over their Greek contemporaries is still with us today.³ A similar air of confusion surrounds Phocion, which is undoubtedly a product of the work of Phocion's ancient apologist Demetrius of Phalerum,⁴ and those who followed in his footsteps. The mirage generated by these apologetic works – 'le mirage du Phocion' (to borrow Ollier's metaphor) – can be seen in the enduring notion that Phocion was 'Phocion the Good'.⁵

This mirage, which presents Phocion as an *exemplum virtutis*, has coloured scholarly opinions on Phocion in antiquity and beyond. Plutarch clearly fell under the spell of the mirage of Phocion the Good. As a consequence,

Plutarch's eighteenth-century admirers were particularly vulnerable to the strength of the mirage, as the following quotation from John Aikin (1799–1815, vol. 8, p. 160) demonstrates:

Such, B.C. 318, was the unmerited end of *Phocion the Good*, a title which perhaps no man in public or private life ever better deserved. He may be regarded as a Socrates in the character of a statesman and a warrior; not less a philosopher that [sic] that sage, in circumstances which render the part of a philosopher much more difficult to be maintained. His patriotism might have shone with more brilliancy had he lived at a time when his country was capable of acting a higher and more independent part: his virtue and disinterestedness could never have been more conspicuous.

This extract could have been written by almost any other eighteenth-century commentator on Phocion. The remarkable uniformity of opinion on Phocion in during the long eighteenth century was due almost entirely to fact that we are heavily dependent upon Plutarch for our knowledge of Phocion. Aside from snippets of information provided by Cornelius Nepos and Diodorus, Plutarch is our sole source for Phocion. The eighteenth-century admirers of Phocion – such as Mably, Hamilton, Robespierre, Marat – were admirers of what Lamberton (2003, p. 8) recently called 'Plutarch's Phocion' rather than 'History's Phocion'. Every aspect of Phocion's life – his ascetic lifestyle, his Laconism, his seemingly guileless opposition to the whims and vagaries of the Athenian masses, his resemblance to Socrates in life and death, even his epithet 'the Good' – are elements of 'Plutarch's Phocion'. Yet the real Phocion remains clouded in mystery.

The elusiveness of the real Phocion has been exacerbated by the nineteenth-century rehabilitation of Athenian democracy that minimized the importance of his execution. No longer the symbol of all that was wrong about Athenian democracy, Phocion's execution comes to be seen as a sad end for a veteran servant of the state. The increasing focus on Demosthenes in the nineteenth century effectively pushed Phocion aside and minimized his role in Athenian politics when compared to that of Demosthenes, Lycurgus and even Aeschines, reducing Phocion to more of a footnote than a central figure in Athenian history. The reduced focus on Phocion has led to doubts about his military competence, oratorical skills and political acumen, with Phocion cast as either an innocent victim or a 'respectable sergeant' figure rather than a frontline political leader.⁶ But both views rely on a too naïve reading of Plutarch, and both underestimate not only his military successes and his political acumen, but also his ruthlessness and

sheer bloody-minded determination to see Athens ruled in the way that he saw best. They also underestimate the potency of Plutarch's smokescreen. The purpose of this chapter is to look beyond the mirage to try to find 'History's Phocion'.

Phocion's Politics – Un-Athenian?

The problem of pinning down Phocion's political outlook has been exacerbated by the fact that his political beliefs have been concealed by pithy one-liners and moralizing put-downs. In a city dominated by gasbags, 'Plutarch's Phocion' is 'the cleaver of speeches' (Plut. *Phocion* 5.4), employing Spartan-style brevity to undermine his wordy political enemies, including Demosthenes, Demades, Lycurgus, Leosthenes and Polyeuctus of Sphettus. 'Plutarch's Phocion' selflessly refuses to pander to the masses – he never attends the elections (Plut. *Phocion* 8.2), yet is elected anyway – and claims to disagree with everything that the Athenians resolve to do. When Phocion saw that the people were accepting his argument he turned to his friends and asked if he had made a bad argument inadvertently (Plut. *Phocion* 8.3). When an oracle from Delphi declaring that one man was at variance with the city was read out in the assembly, Phocion stepped forward and announced proudly that he was that man (Plut. *Phocion* 8.3); When Demosthenes warned Phocion that the Athenians would condemn him to death if they ever lost their senses, Phocion retorted that they would condemn Demosthenes if they ever saw sense (Plut. *Phocion* 9.5). Later events would prove both men correct; Demosthenes' death sentence was one of the first acts of the Antipatrid oligarchy, Phocion's execution the first act of a frenzied return to democracy in 319/8.

It is usually assumed that Phocion was an oligarch – or at the very least uncomfortable about democracy – but even this is difficult to pin down.⁷ Phocion was still sufficiently popular (or at least respected) to be elected general on no less than forty-five occasions by the very same mob he so regularly criticized. Given that Phocion was elected general forty-five times in fifty-four years, his success at the ballot box must be virtually unparalleled in any ancient society (or any genuine democracy for that matter). He actively participated in the democratic organs of government – both the council and the assembly – and he was known to be an excellent (albeit terse) orator. Despite his claims to dislike the decisions of the Athenians, Phocion clearly achieved (and perhaps sought) a degree of popularity that the notorious '*misodēmos*' Callimedon of Collytus could never have attained.

Phocion seems far more like Nicias or even Alcibiades in his views of the *dēmos*, democracy, and serving the state. Like Nicias he was willing to lead the Athenians in a war he had spoken against, and like Alcibiades, he was happy to participate in a regime that he personally considered to be absurd, because that was the only possible option at the time.⁸ But when the opportunity for Athens to become an oligarchy Phocion seems to have seized it with both hands. Alcibiades would have no doubt approved; whether Nicias would have done so is less certain.

Phocion and Sparta

Phocion's attitude regarding Athenian democracy may have been coloured by his admiration of Sparta. In fourth-century Athens to be seen to be a supporter of Sparta was to be seen as an opponent of democracy, and Phocion appears in our sources as the archetypal Athenian Laconizer: he shows no emotion, he avoids the public baths, he wears little clothing and no shoes even on campaign, he does not wave his hands, he scowls, and chooses his words with care (Fisher, 1994, p. 360).⁹ Phocion's admiration for the Spartan way of life led Demades to tease Phocion by suggesting, 'Suppose, Phocion, you and I advise the Athenians to adopt the Spartan constitution. If you like, I am ready to introduce a bill to that effect, and to speak in its favour'. Phocion rejected the false offer with a retort laden with irony that Demades, with his strong scent of perfumes, and cloak on his shoulders, was 'just the very man to speak in honour of Lycurgus, and recommend the Spartan messes' (Plut. *Phocion* 20). If Phocion did indeed desire Athens to resemble Sparta, Antipater provided him with the opportunity to make it do so in 322, with citizenship now limited to 9,000 landowners who were effectively turned into Athenian *homoioi*, and the masses reduced to a status akin to that of *perioeci*, or else packed off to Thrace. The figure of 9,000 citizens under the limited franchise is remarkably similar to the 9,000 *klaroi* Lycurgus was said to have distributed to the newly named *homoioi* when reorganizing the Spartan constitution (Plut. *Lycurgus* 7, 16). Given that Phocion was a noted Laconophile, the recurrence of 9,000 citizens could well be more than a mere coincidence. Plutarch's claim (*Phocion* 29) that Phocion taught the poorer Athenians to be fond of home and to delight in tilling the soil (behaviour Spartans associated with Helots) suggests that as under the Spartan-sponsored regime of the Thirty, the newly disenfranchised were more or less excluded from the city,¹⁰ as non-citizens tended to be at Sparta.

In fourth-century Athens the lines between Laconizing and pro-Macedonian behaviour were blurred, whether there was any evidence of such links or not.¹¹ In Phocion's case there was clear evidence of both. Phocion was known to be counted amongst the friends of Philip of Macedon, his right-hand man Antipater, and Alexander the Great. Phocion's relationship with Macedon is crucial when trying to understand his attitude regarding democracy.

Phocion and Macedon

'Plutarch's Phocion' consistently urges the Athenians to be cautious when dealing with the might of Macedon. His role is that of the wise old man who tries and fails to prevent the Athenians from destroying themselves battling the might of Macedon. This Phocion sees clearly what the Athenians themselves cannot: that they are not sufficiently like him to make correct decisions. Unlike him, they lack the resources – both physical and mental – to prevail against Philip, Alexander or even Antipater in war. When Philip offered the Athenians peace terms, Phocion argued that they should accept them. After Demosthenes convinced the Athenians to go to war against Philip and argued that they should fight Philip as far from Attica as possible (339 BC), Phocion still urged caution, arguing that they should not be discussing where to fight Philip, but how to beat him (Plut. *Phocion* 16.3). Phocion is proved right when Philip routs the Athenian phalanx at Chaeronea (with Demosthenes one of the masses in flight). When Philip offers the Athenians a chance to join his League of Corinth, Phocion urges against accepting before they know Philip's terms. Phocion is proved right when Philip asks for Athenian triremes and horsemen for his Asian campaign (Plut. *Phocion* 16.5). After Philip's death and Alexander the Great's accession (335 BC), Demosthenes urged the Athenians to go to war against him. Phocion was said to have replied, 'rash one, why do you seek to provoke a man who is savage?' (Plut. *Phocion* 17.1). Phocion is once again proved right when Alexander destroys Thebes and then demands that the Athenians hand over ten prominent political leaders to guarantee their good conduct. Asmug Phocion argues that they should give in to Alexander's demands (Plut. *Phocion* 9.6). When asked to give his opinion on the Athenian preparations for the war against Antipater (323 BC), Phocion's reply was typically cautious: 'They are good for the short course; but it is the long course which I fear in war because the city has no other money, ships, or hoplites' (Plut. *Phocion* 23.2). Phocion is again proved right when the Macedonians muster far too many ships and infantrymen for the combined

Greek army to overcome. Plutarch's message is clear: the Athenians should never have ignored Phocion.

This image of Phocion's caution seems simple enough, but there is more to Phocion's dealings with Macedon than immediately meets the eye. For starters, given the number of times that he served as an Athenian general on land and sea, and his leadership of successful campaigns against Philip in 348, 343, 341/0, 340/39, and 339/8 (Tritle, 2009, p. 137), Phocion shows remarkable political negativity, servility and even inconsistency in his dealings with Macedon. First he urges peace with Philip, and then he urges the Athenians to join Sparta in remaining aloof from the League of Corinth, curious behaviour for a man who was reputedly a *philos* of the Macedonian king. But where Phocion's hopes that Athens could follow a Laconian-style policy in 338/7 were simply naïve, his behaviour in 335 when he advised the Athenians to comply with Alexander's demand to hand over the ten most prominent political leaders (Diod. 17. 15.2; Plut. *Phocion* 9.6; 17.2–3) was positively 'spineless' (Williams, 1985, p. 31), if not downright sinister.¹² Had the Athenians followed Phocion's advice and given in to Alexander at this time, it would have been curtains for Demosthenes, Lycurgus, Hypereides, Chares, Charidemus, Polyeuctus of Sphettus, Moerocles of Eleusis, and Diotimus of Euonymon (Plut. *Demosthenes* 23.3; Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.10.4), and control of Athenian affairs would have been effectively left in the hands of Demades and Phocion and their supporters. Tritle defends Phocion by arguing that it was down to him that Alexander changed his mind. But this is by no means clear. Diodorus explicitly names Demades as the Athenian who changed Alexander's mind, but includes the slur that he had to be bribed to do so (Diod. 17.15.4). Arrian tells us merely that an embassy from the Athenians convinced Alexander to change his mind. Plutarch provides three conflicting stories of Alexander's change of heart: in his *Life* of Alexander, it is the king himself who decides against eliminating the troublesome Athenians (Plut. *Alexander* 13.1–2); in his *Life* of Demosthenes, it is Demades who convinces the king to change his mind (Plut. *Demosthenes* 23.5); only in his *Life* of Phocion, is it Phocion who proves to be the hero at the final hour (Plut. *Phocion* 17.4–5). Clearly for Plutarch, the details change according to the circumstances. In his work focusing on Alexander, the king has a change of heart as a sign of his growing maturity; the Atheno-centric work focusing on Demosthenes has the Athenian orator rescued by his sometimes friend and fellow demesman Demades; lastly, the work eulogizing Phocion the Good has the great man step in to rescue his political opponents. On this point, Plutarch can hardly be cited as a reliable source.

While one could argue that in his *Life* of Phocion Plutarch salvages his subject's reputation by suggesting that Phocion convinced Alexander to change his mind, this version of the story cannot disguise the fact that Phocion's advice that the Athenians should hand over the ten leading statesmen would have placed him in the perfect position to seize control of Athenian affairs. In spite of Plutarch's eulogizing tone, Phocion is delighted at the prospect of eliminating the likes of Demosthenes, Lysurgus and Hypereides whom he blamed for the present plight of Athens, and even callously suggests that he would happily sacrifice his close friend Nicocles if his name were on Alexander's list along with those of his enemies. 'Plutarch's Phocion' cares so deeply for Athens that he would sacrifice his closest friend to save the city. If we look beyond the mirage we can see that 'History's Phocion' would have gained considerable political profit from the sacrifice. If Phocion hoped that Alexander would eliminate his rivals, his hopes were soon dashed. A further embassy was sent to treat with Alexander (Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.10.4). The weight of evidence suggests that it was Demades, not Phocion, who brought about reconciliation with the king (Diod. 17.15.4; Plut. *Demosthenes* 23.5).¹³ When compared to Phocion's cringing response to Alexander's demands, this really was Demades' finest hour. The Athenians showed what they thought of his feats when they awarded Demades a bronze statue and *sitēsis* in the *prytaneion* (Deinarch 1.101). He was the first Athenian to receive such an honour since Cleon almost a century earlier.

Phocion's negativity continued in the 320s both before and after the outbreak of the Lamian War. When the Athenians desired to rebel against Antipater after Alexander's death, Phocion regularly attempted to prevent them from going to war. Once the war had broken out, Phocion persisted in sniping away, belittling the achievements of Leosthenes, and criticizing his fellow citizens (Plut. *Phocion* 21–23). Both Phocion and Demades tried to smooth relations between Athens and Macedon, but Phocion's behaviour was far more negative. Demades pursued an active policy, proposing motions in the assembly honouring various Macedonian officials (a policy that Stratocles of Diomeia would later make his own when dealing with the Antigonids), and met or corresponded variously with Philip, Alexander, Antipater and Perdiccas in his attempts to persuade them over to the Athenian point of view. Phocion was much more negative, attempting to block motions in the assembly, and criticizing the Athenians for their shortcomings. It is illustrative of Phocion's negativity, given that he had served as a general on forty-five separate occasions, that the self-confessed highlight of his military career was the fact that the citizens were buried in their own cemeteries (Plut. *Phocion* 23.1).

In a forerunner to later events, the Athenians began to distrust Phocion, and according to Plutarch overlooked the old general in favour of Antiphrilos when replacing Leosthenes after he was killed at Lamia. In the light of this distrust, it is ironic that what is arguably the true highlight of Phocion's career turned out to be a stirring defence of the Attic countryside during the Lamian War, a war he had tried his utmost to prevent.¹⁴ According to Tritle (2009, p. 139) Phocion's role at Rhamnous 'should argue, if the circumstances are examined critically, that his loyalty and commitment to democracy cannot be challenged'. But the fact remains that when it comes to dealing with Macedon, 'Plutarch's Phocion' is overwhelmingly negative, unappealing and self-righteous. Green (1990, p. 40) argues,

In Plutarch's *Life* he emerges as a stiff-necked, overly righteous, singularly unlikable character, much given to aphoristic one-liners and moral putdowns. His advice against embarking on the Lamian War may, in retrospect, have been sound, but is totally undercut by his contemptuous, patronizing denigration of the courageous commander Leosthenes. There is a meanness of spirit about Phocion for which no amount of rectitude can compensate: his readiness to urge acceptance of Macedonian requests for the surrender of various Athenians (who would be going to almost-certain death) conveys an unpleasant mixture of cold indifference and creeping servility.

I would argue that Phocion's behaviour is not merely negative and servile. The evidence that we possess concerning his relations with the Macedonians – while distorted by the mirage Demetrius of Phalerum and Plutarch created – suggests that Phocion is far more conniving and ambitious than we might otherwise think. The Phocion who cunningly argued in favour of the elimination of his main political rivals returns to the fore when another opportunity to eliminate his rivals presents itself.

Phocion and the Antipatrid Oligarchy: *Das Phokion-Regime?*

Phocion's political career reached its zenith in 322/1 when Antipater abolished the democracy and installed a garrison in the Piraeus. Phocion was undoubtedly the dominant force in Athenian politics at this time. His prominence was such that modern scholars typically portray Phocion as the leader (or a leader) of the oligarchic regime, which was dominated by a group the sources call 'the friends of Antipater'. The evidence suggests that

within this cabal, Phocion and his friends were particularly prominent. As noted above, Phocion's prominence in the sources led Dreyer (1999, p. 159) to refer to the oligarchy as 'das Phokion-Regime', a view shared by other modern scholars.

Defeat at Crannon prompted the leading democratic orators – most notably Demosthenes and Hypereides – to flee the impending wrath of Antipater, which placed Phocion and Demades (and the other friends of Antipater) at the forefront of Athenian affairs. Yet while Phocion was a key figure in the peace negotiations at the end of the Lamian War, and seems to have had a hand in the framing of the terms of peace that ensured the abolition of democracy at Athens in favour of an oligarchy backed by a Macedonian garrison, 'Plutarch's Phocion' is part of the embassy to Antipater because he was the only leader the Athenians trusted (Plut. *Phocion* 26.2). Yet our eulogizing sources cannot hide the fact that Phocion betrayed that trust by accepting Antipater's terms – namely that Athens should have a constitution based on property ownership, receive a garrison in the Piraeus and pay a war indemnity. Demosthenes, Hypereides, and the other leading anti-Macedonians were condemned to death. Most of the other democratic leaders were exiled. Where Phocion was compliant, the philosopher Xenocrates objected to Antipater's terms, arguing that the terms were moderate if Antipater considered the Athenians to be slaves, but harsh if he considered them to be free men (Plut. *Phocion* 27.4), and even Demetrius of Phalerum clashed with the Macedonians (Demetrius, *On Style* 289).¹⁵

Tritle (1988, p. 130) has sought to employ Plutarch's account of a conversation between Antipater and Phocion regarding the garrison as evidence to acquit Phocion of imposing the garrison (Plut. *Phocion* 27.5). But the evidence does not fit. According to Plutarch, after unspecified Athenian envoys objected to the imposition of a Macedonian garrison, Antipater asked Phocion whether he could 'guarantee' that the *polis* would abide by the peace and 'not become turbulent' – turbulence being a standard charge levelled at democracy. Phocion remained silent after Antipater asked him this question, presumably because he could not truthfully answer in the affirmative (or else he did not want cause himself trouble at home by being seen openly saying no), whereupon Callimedon of Collytus 'sprang up' (from where we are not told) and exclaimed 'But even if he should speak this nonsense, Antipater, will you believe him and not do what you have resolved to do?'

Tritle believes that Callimedon and Phocion were 'associates' and that it was Phocion who asked Antipater not to impose a garrison. He takes

Callimedes' outburst to be an angry response to Antipater's 'ridiculing' of Phocion. Because of this, he argues that Callimedes was not an 'ardent supporter of Macedon,' since nothing would explain his angry outburst. Tritle argues that Callimedes' statement implies that the garrison would be imposed regardless of Phocion's answer, and that Antipater was just 'baiting' the Athenians. He also claims that Callimedes' tone indicates that he opposed the garrison '*as much as Phocion*' (italics added), and that this suggests that Callimedes was not under Antipater's protection.¹⁶

However, Tritle's arguments are flawed on several grounds. First, it seems highly unlikely that Callimedes was on good terms with Phocion when he accused him of answering 'foolishly'. In fact, the way Plutarch's narrative runs seems to suggest that Callimedes 'sprang to his feet' and interrupted Phocion before he could answer (i.e. to prevent him from answering in the affirmative).¹⁷ Antipater was not the main target of Callimedes' criticism. The criticism was levelled firmly at Phocion for even contemplating *guaranteeing* (a very strong claim) that he could keep Athens under control without a garrison. Callimedes calls it 'talking nonsense', and is critical of Antipater for presenting Phocion with an opportunity to make such a foolish claim, for there is no way that Phocion could have ever hoped to have achieved such a feat. Certainly Callimedes was rude towards Antipater, but Tritle (1988, p. 130) himself admits that he was 'a firebrand not noted for restraint'.

Furthermore, there is no evidence that Phocion asked the question about the garrison. It seems more likely that one of the other envoys – probably Demades (who would later serve on an embassy to Antipater charged with obtaining the removal of the garrison, whereas Phocion actively refused the commission) – asked Antipater to reconsider the issue of the garrison. Naturally Antipater would have turned to his friend Phocion, who was also the most reliable man, to see whether he could keep Athens under control without it. Although Tritle (1988, p. 130) argues that Phocion did not want the garrison, it seems more likely that he thought Athens would be better off with it. Surely the fact that Phocion took so long to answer makes it clear what he really thought.

Although Plutarch and Diodorus name Demades as the proposer of the motion condemning Demosthenes and Hypereides to death, Nepos states that Phocion made an agreement to turn the city over to Antipater and that it was commonly thought that it was on Phocion's advice that Demosthenes and the rest were exiled (Nepos, *Phocion* 2.3), so there must have been some suspicion that Phocion did more than report the bad news to the Athenians.¹⁸ One suspects that the Phocion who had earlier advocated

handing Demosthenes and Hypereides over to Alexander would not have second thoughts about sacrificing them to Antipater. 'Plutarch's Phocion' may have come out of the proceedings squeaky clean, but 'History's Phocion' – like Demades – had blood on his hands.

Phocion as *Epimelētēs*?

So what position did Phocion actually hold under the oligarchy? Once again we have to work hard to see past the mirage, for 'Plutarch's Phocion' is a benevolent force, merely keeping men of substance in office and the turbulent out. But that is not how his fellow citizens saw it, and modern scholars have increasingly come around to their way of thinking (although the image of the bumbling naïve Phocion is still strong). The exact role Phocion played is unclear and is more debatable than modern scholars typically admit. Tritle (1988, p. 137) has denied that Phocion had any special authority at Athens, arguing that 'within the framework of the Athenian constitution' Phocion exercised no authority greater than the generalship'. But this statement would only be true if the constitution operated exactly as it did under the democracy, which is by no means certain.¹⁹ It is usually assumed that Phocion held no official position apart from the office of general, but Plutarch (*Phocion* 32.4) describes him as a 'general and an archon', and even portrays him as 'managing' (ἐπιμελόμενος) Athenian affairs (Plut. *Phocion* 29.4), a significant turn of phrase given that Antipater appointed Deinarchus of Corinth as his *epimelētēs* of the Peloponnese (Suda s.v. Δ.333), and his son Cassander would later appoint Demetrius of Phalerum *epimelētēs* of Athens (Diod. 18.74.3).²⁰ The fact that Diodorus (18.65.6) singles Phocion out above all those who held office during the oligarchy, claiming that 'among them Phocion held the supreme authority under Antipater' (ἐν οἷς ἦν καὶ Φωκίων ὁ ἐπ' Ἀντιπάτρου τὴν τῶν ὅλων ἀρχὴν ἐσχηκώς), suggests that Phocion may have held a more official title (e.g. *epimelētēs*) than Plutarch would have us believe. So too would the fact that Nepos claims that Phocion held 'the highest office the people could give', literally *summum imperium* (Nepos, *Phocion* 2.4). The editor of the Loeb edition assumed that this passage meant the position of *stratēgos*, but the evidence provided in Plutarch and Diodorus suggests otherwise.²¹

Tritle (1988, p. 138) also criticized Plutarch for portraying Phocion 'as a benevolent Augustus, appointing his consuls, praetors and legates', arguing that this is 'another example of Plutarch's lack of understanding of the

Athenian political system'. He is right to argue that this was not ordinarily possible at Athens, but we have no evidence to suggest that the prevailing circumstances were at all ordinary. Furthermore, there are no grounds for assuming that Plutarch described Phocion 'directly appointing' officials. Plutarch's account reads that Phocion 'kept in office' men of culture. The verb *συνέχω* can mean 'to keep', 'to constrain' or 'to oppress', but not 'to appoint' as Tritle suggests. Rather than indicating that Phocion was personally appointing magistrates, this passage indicates that Phocion was ensuring that the limited franchise was carefully enforced. Plutarch gives us a window into Phocion's role in policing the new citizen lists when he describes Phocion 'discovering' that Xenocrates, the philosopher, was not on the new register of citizens and offering to 'enrol' (*γράφαι*) him. To his credit Xenocrates spurned the offer.

Phocion Loses His Grip

But Phocion's supremacy was short-lived due to events beyond his control. When Antipater died, leaving Polyperchon instead of his son Cassander as his successor, Athens was caught up in the ensuing power struggle. Cassander sent envoys to Ptolemy to organize a coalition against Polyperchon, and ultimately deserted to Antigonus the One-Eyed in Asia (Diod. 18.49.3; 18.54.3). Before Polyperchon realized that he was not to be trusted, Cassander had exploited his position as *chiliarch* to make contact with his father's garrisons in various Greek *poleis*, the most significant of which was Athens. Both Polyperchon and Cassander desired Athens because of her strategic position and her harbour. The considerable remnants of the Athenian fleet were also a valuable asset, which Cassander would later exploit to his advantage. Cassander made sure that he would not lose Athens by replacing the garrison commander Menyllus with his own nephew, Nicanor. Phocion lost no time in ingratiating himself with Nicanor. Plutarch makes it clear that the Athenians were very angry with Phocion, and accused him of collusion with Nicanor (Plut. *Phocion* 31.1–2).

When Polyperchon found that things were going against him, he needed to act quickly. In Macedon and Greece, support was divided between Polyperchon and Cassander. Heckel (1992, p. 194) noted that support for Cassander was 'based on allegiance to Antipater and an endorsement of his policies'. Polyperchon had been prominent at the court of Antipater,²² and clearly had personal connections with various Athenians, including Phocion's friend Hegemon,²³ so the change in *epimelētēs* ought not to have

adversely affected Phocion's position amongst the ruling clique of 'Antipater's friends'. But Cassander's success in installing his own men in the Greek *poleis* meant that Polyperchon needed to adopt a political stance that was diametrically opposite to that of his opponent (Heckel, 1992, p. 194; Green, 1990, p. 43).²⁴ Accordingly, Polyperchon tried to whip up support in Greece against Cassander by proclaiming (in the names of Philip Arrhidaeus and Alexander) the freedom of the Greeks and the restoration of the political arrangements that had existed under Philip and Alexander. For Athens this meant a return to democracy (Diod. 18.56.1–8), which would put Phocion in extreme danger.

Polyperchon's proclamation meant that the Athenians were to regain not just their democracy, but also Samos (Diod. 18.56.7). Plutarch describes this edict as a plot against Phocion. Polyperchon wished to use Athens for his own purposes, and he had no hope of succeeding unless Phocion was banished. Polyperchon is said to have believed that Phocion would be banished if the disfranchised citizens overwhelmed the *politeia* and the *bēma* was once again at the mercy of the demagogues and the sycophants, thus emphasizing Phocion's tight grip on Athenian affairs under the oligarchy (Plut. *Phocion* 32.2). But Phocion was not yet doomed; the fact that Phocion, Conon of Anaphlystus and Clearchus of Aegilia were sent as envoys to Nicanor to complain about the seizure of the Piraeus and to ask him to restore their autonomy according to Polyperchon's edict suggests the Athenians still trusted him to act in their best interests. According to Diodorus (18.64.5) these three were chosen because they were known to be Nicanor's *philoi*. If Nicanor could have been persuaded to switch sides at this point, Phocion may have been able to save his own life. But Phocion's subsequent behaviour suggests that he would never have even contemplated trying to persuade Nicanor to give up the Piraeus in the first place. It seems far more likely that Phocion took the opportunity to further ingratiate himself with Nicanor.

The crisis really came to a head when Nicanor wished to address the Athenians. A special session of the council was held in the Piraeus. Tritle (1988, p. 137) argued that the fact that the council was convened in the Piraeus provides evidence that the regime was democratic. But the Athenian council did not ever meet in the Piraeus. The fact that a session of the council was held in the Piraeus – where there was a Macedonian garrison – and that Phocion acted as the guarantor of Nicanor's safety should be seen as evidence of the extraordinary state of affairs under the oligarchy and Phocion's extraordinary role with regard to the Athenian constitution at the time. Clearly operating without Phocion's say-so, Dercyllus of Hagnous,

the *stratēgos* ἐπὶ τὴν χώραν, attempted to arrest Nicanor, but the Macedonian learned of the plot in the nick of time and escaped. Plutarch does not indicate how Nicanor learned of the plot, but he does make it clear that the Athenians blamed Phocion (Plut. *Phocion* 32.3).

Nepos states that Dercyllus warned Phocion that Nicanor was planning to seize all the Piraeus, but Phocion told the people that there was no danger, and promised to assume all responsibility (Nepos, *Phocion* 2.4.). Many others had also tried to warn Phocion that Nicanor had hostile designs on the Piraeus, was sending mercenaries across to Salamis, and tampering with the residents in the Piraeus (Plutarch, *Phocion* 32.5), but he chose to ignore that advice too. It does not take a great leap of imagination to suspect that Phocion warned Nicanor that some of the Athenians were planning to move against him. Phocion defended himself, arguing that he trusted Nicanor and expected no evil from him. Tritle (1988, p. 139) argued that this whole incident proves that Phocion 'did not control the other magistrates and was even unaware of the actions of his colleagues in the *strategia*'. This point of view has some merit, but the fact that Dercyllus acted independently from Phocion does not preclude the possibility that Phocion held more power than the other magistrates. Phocion would not be the first (or last) leader to discover that people were conspiring against him (or acting without his knowledge). In fact, the way in which events unfolded seems far more like a conspiracy against a ruler than colleagues acting independently.

Even Plutarch criticizes Phocion for allowing Nicanor to escape, arguing that he had 'too strong a confidence in Nicanor' (Plut. *Phocion* 32.5). It was soon proved that Phocion's confidence in Nicanor was misplaced, for the Macedonian seized the walls of the Piraeus and the boom of the harbour (Diod. 18.64.4). Philomelus of Lamptrae then proposed a motion that all the Athenians should stand under arms and await orders from Phocion, their general, again stressing Phocion's primary role. But Phocion chose to ignore this decision of the *deñmos* until it was too late, and Nicanor had taken control of the Piraeus and begun to run trenches around it (Plut. *Phocion* 32.5).

Why did Phocion allow Nicanor a free hand? By allowing Nicanor to gain complete control of the Piraeus, Phocion sealed the fate of Athens. With Nicanor in virtual control over the entire harbour-city, the Athenians were detached from their supplies and their fleet, which was still considerable, compared to the limited naval resources available to Cassander. They could not hope to starve the garrison out unless they won control of the sea. With Nicanor in possession of their fleet, the Athenians could only hope that

Polyperchon could defeat Cassander at sea and then dislodge the garrison. It is possible that Phocion was so naïve that he could not see what everyone else could see, but it seems unlikely that such an experienced military leader could have been so naïve as to blindly trust Nicanor in the face of all the evidence placed before him. It seems far more likely that Phocion was collaborating with Nicanor, as indeed several modern scholars have suggested.²⁵ Phocion's behaviour can only really be seen as treachery brought about by his reluctance to relinquish control of Athenian affairs. Phocion showed that he was not at all interested in doing anything to facilitate the recovery of Athenian freedom in accordance with the dictates of Polyperchon's decree. His subsequent attempts to bring about an understanding between Nicanor and Polyperchon's son Alexander made it clear that he had not given up hope that Polyperchon could be persuaded around to his point of view. Phocion perhaps genuinely believed that Athens was better off with the garrison – he did after all spend much time criticizing what he saw as the excesses of democracy, and consistently and frequently refused commissions from the *dēmos* to petition Antipater for its removal.²⁶

By now the Athenians were aware that things were going against them, and they made their displeasure clear. There are three very different accounts of the aftermath of Nicanor's coup. Plutarch states that Phocion finally tried to lead the Athenians into battle, but he was 'stormed at and held in derision' (Plut. *Phocion* 33.1). Nepos is far more critical of Phocion; he states that the people 'united' to demand the recovery of the Piraeus, but Phocion refused to take command of the people even when they had armed themselves (Nepos, *Phocion* 2.5). Diodorus' account is different again. It is at this juncture that he reports that Phocion went on a diplomatic mission with Conon and Clearchus (Diod. 18.64.5–6). Can we reconcile the three different accounts? Williams (1985, p. 149) placed the diplomatic mission before the extraordinary session of the council in the Piraeus. Habicht (1997, p. 48) follows the more hostile account of Nepos, arguing that Phocion 'refused' to expel Nicanor from the Piraeus, and omitting the diplomatic mission altogether.²⁷ The problem boils down to the reliability of Plutarch. If Plutarch can be trusted, we have to assume that Nepos is either incorrect, or he was erroneously referring to Phocion's earlier refusal to act against Nicanor. If this is the case, we must again determine why Phocion decided against attempting to expel the garrison. Treason is again our only real choice.

'Plutarch's Phocion' will soon – unjustly – meet his unhappy fate, but 'History's Phocion' went on to betray the Athenians one last time. Polyperchon sent his son Alexander into Attica with an army to try to dislodge

Nicanor from the Piraeus. According to Diodorus, Phocion talked Alexander around into his way of thinking and persuaded him to garrison any forts he captured in Attica rather than return them to the Athenians. He then convinced Alexander to open negotiations with Nicanor (Diod. 18.65.3–6). Phocion was clearly hedging his bets. He may have suspected (rightly) that Polyperchon had no genuine commitment to democracy, and probably hoped that he could persuade the new *epimelētēs* to allow a similar constitutional arrangement to that under Antipater. But when Alexander was seen meeting with Cassander's nephew, the Athenians snapped. They were tired of Phocion going against their decisions and compromising their autonomy. A full blown democratic revolution saw Phocion and his followers thrown out of office, and former democratic leaders such as Hagnonides, Polyeuctus of Sphettus, and Demophilus of Acharnae returned to the *bēma*. Phocion had only himself to blame. He had been consistently ignoring decisions of the *dēmos* for three years. With Polyperchon's decree granting them their freedom, and Phocion still ignoring their decisions, the Athenians had no good reason to keep him in office. If Phocion had proved himself useful, things may have ended differently. Phocion not only closed his eyes to Nicanor's activities, but also closed his ears to the voices of his fellow citizens.

It was now that Phocion made a fatal mistake. Many of the oligarchic leaders including Callimedon and Phocion's own son-in-law Charicles saw the writing on the wall and left Athens altogether (Plut. *Phocion* 33.3). Demetrius of Phalerum fled to Nicanor in the Piraeus (Athenaeus. 12.542e). But Phocion tried to cling to power, pinning his hopes on Polyperchon's son Alexander. Phocion seems to have persuaded Alexander around to his point of view, but he still had to convince Polyperchon. So Phocion, and 'those around him' resolved to go and speak to Polyperchon. Several of Phocion's companions – Hegemon, Deinarchus of Corinth (Antipater's 'manager' of the Peloponnese) and Solon of Plataea – were reputed to be 'intimate friends' of Polyperchon, so they must have been confident of a favourable hearing. But they were mistaken. It became quickly apparent that it was not in Polyperchon's interests to spare their lives.

The leaders of the resurgent Athenian democracy were rightly frightened by Phocion's departure to the court of Polyperchon, and an official Athenian embassy followed Phocion's delegation to the Macedonian court. Hagnonides was the leading figure in this embassy. Due to an illness Deinarchus suffered *en route*, the two embassies reached Polyperchon in Phocis at the same time. Polyperchon met the Athenians with great splendour, having set up a golden canopy for Philip Arrhidaeus and his

philoí. But it must have been an ominous sign for Phocion when Deinarchus was immediately led away to be tortured and put to death. Polyperchon would have known that Deinarchus had served Antipater well in his capacity as ‘manager’ of the Peloponnese, but it was necessary for Polyperchon to distance himself from the former friends of Antipater in order to distance himself from Cassander. Antipater’s Athenian friends fared a little better than Deinarchus; they were at least allowed the benefit of a show trial (Plut. *Phocion* 34; Diod. 18.66.2–3).

The audience with the king and his entourage ‘quickly degenerated into a shouting-match’ (Heckel, 1992, p. 196), after which Hagnonides suggested Polyperchon ought throw them all into a cage and send them back to Athens to render an account. The king was greatly amused, and burst out laughing. The other Macedonians decided that the ambassadors should make their denunciation there and then. Phocion attempted to defend himself, but Polyperchon interrupted him ‘many times’ forcing Phocion to bang his staff on the ground in frustration and give up. Hegemon tried to suggest that Polyperchon could bear witness to his ‘goodwill to the *dēmos*’, but Polyperchon denied this so vehemently that the king almost ran through Hegemon with a spear. Polyperchon managed to subdue Arrhidaeus, but the council ended in chaos, with Phocion and his friends sent back to Athens for trial. The veteran Macedonian general, Cleitus, oversaw their return to Athens. Polyperchon clearly wanted to ensure that Phocion returned to Athens, and did so alive.

The Vengeance of the Mob

While Plutarch presents a vivid image of Phocion’s trial, he conveniently omits the charges laid against Phocion and his supporters. This omission has clearly coloured modern opinions of Phocion and his trial. How else could so many Enlightenment commentators have been so firmly convinced of Phocion’s innocence? But while ‘Plutarch’s Phocion’ is an innocent victim of the mob, the other sources indicate that the trial had a clear focus. Diodorus states that Phocion and his co-accused were charged with ‘the enslavement of the fatherland and the overthrow of the *dēmos* and the laws’ (Diod. 18.66.5). The fact that Plutarch states that Hegemon tried to persuade Polyperchon to attest to his ‘goodwill to the *dēmos*’ should be seen as evidence confirming the veracity of Diodorus’ account. Hegemon was clearly trying to counter charges that he had acted against the *dēmos* (i.e. overthrown it). His protests of having shown goodwill to the *dēmos*

sound rather like Demetrius of Phalerum's later hollow claims to have 'improved' democracy. Nepos claims that Phocion was charged with having betrayed the Piraeus to Nicanor (Nepos, *Phocion* 3.3–4). This may be an additional charge, or part of the evidence of his 'overthrow' of the *dēmos*.

Before the trial, the defendants were dragged through the city from the Cerameicus to the Theatre of Dionysus in wagons.²⁸ Plutarch describes this as shameful (Plut. *Phocion* 34.1), but Nepos adds the mitigating detail that a wagon was required because of Phocion's age and inability to proceed on foot (Nepos, *Phocion* 4.1).²⁹ Green (1990, p. 43) speaks of the 'hooting mob' that greeted Phocion and his friends as they were wheeled through the city. The sources do not describe the actual manner of their greeting, and Green's term 'hooting mob' seems calculated to discredit the Athenian masses, and would not have been out of place in an eighteenth-century account of the trial. Certainly Phocion and his friends were met with extreme hostility, but our discomfort about Phocion's embarrassment does not mean that their hostility was unjustified or unwarranted. The trial itself was conducted in the Theatre of Dionysus, a location that seems apt given the theatrical nature of the trial. The trial began with the reading of a letter sent by Polyperchon (in the name of the Macedonian king) to the Athenians. The letter stated that in his opinion the men were traitors, but the Athenians who were free and autonomous should decide for themselves. Modern scholars who try to demonstrate the servility of the Athenians and underplay their claims to autonomy often seize upon this moment as proof of Polyperchon's direct control of the Athenian affairs. Bauman (1990, p. 160) believes that Polyperchon showed great 'ingenuity' by simultaneously acknowledging the autonomy of the *dēmos* and dictating the verdict. O'Neill (2000, p. 426) argues that Polyperchon's decision indicates that he exercised 'royal authority' over the city's laws. He observes that there was popular enthusiasm for his edict, 'but there was also pressure on his friends to keep silent and to deny the accused a chance to defend themselves'. But the Athenians did not deny Phocion the chance to defend himself because of Polyperchon's decree; they did so because they were in a frenzy brought on by their anger and hatred of Phocion due to his obvious treachery. The Athenians needed no orders from Polyperchon to convict Phocion; they were quite happy to do so by their own volition. If anything, the Athenians were forced to act more mildly than they might have wished during Phocion's trial due to Macedonian influence; Plutarch makes it clear that a proposal to torture Phocion was dropped due to the obvious displeasure of the Macedonian Cleitus who observed the trial (Plut. *Phocion* 35.2).

This mass trial was confused,³⁰ and has been seen by some as a farce.³¹ In a scene reminiscent of the ‘hearing’ before Polyperchon, each time Phocion tried to defend himself against the charges, he was shouted down (Plut. *Phocion* 34.4–5; Diod. 18.66.5–6). Nepos goes so far as to say that Phocion was not given an opportunity to speak, but the other accounts make it clear that the Athenian did *technically* provide Phocion with an opportunity to speak, but made it impossible for him to be heard. Hagnonides submitted a proposal that the *dēmos* (in the assembly) should vote with a show of hands whether they thought the men were guilty and should be put to death (Plut. *Phocion* 34.5). The motion was passed unanimously – no man remained seated – with the open ballot ensuring that no Athenian was brave enough (or sufficiently foolhardy) to voice his dissent.³² The fact that the majority of the Athenians in the assembly (οἱ πλεῖστοι) were wearing garlands (Plut. *Phocion* 35.2) should indicate the degree of hatred felt by the masses towards Phocion.³³

Many modern commentators have seen a direct parallel in the mass, unconstitutional trial of the generals after Arginusae in 406.³⁴ Enlightenment critics of Athens likewise highlighted the ‘illegality’ of the trial because it suited their case against Athenian-style democracy. The eighteenth-century political martyrs likewise stressed the ‘illegality’ of the trial because they saw Phocion’s trial as a precursor of their own trials. Rather than seeing such mass trials as illegal – they were after all sanctioned by a good portion of the *dēmos* – it would be better to see them as a lamentable byproduct of Athenian democracy in times of crisis. It is also worth bearing in mind that the law courts had suffered severe upheaval as a result of the limited franchise (Suda s.v. Δ. 415). In any case, the relative illegality of the trial should not prevent us from acknowledging Phocion’s obvious guilt.³⁵ The extraordinary circumstances of the trial highlight the degree of hatred felt by the masses. As Green (1990, p. 41) noted, ‘those who for three long years had been deprived of their cherished civic rights took a bloody revenge . . . the hysterical violence of which testifies eloquently to the outrage they felt’.

Phocion acted admirably in his final hours, and tried to save his friends by admitting his own guilt (a fact which is overlooked by most modern scholars). These friends included Nicocles, Hegemon, Thudippus of Araphen and Pythocles of Cedoe (Plut. *Phocion* 35.3). Hegemon, Thudippus and Pythocles were all politically prominent (see Chapter 3), but we know very little about Nicocles, except that he was considered to be Phocion’s closest friend (Plut. *Phocion* 17.2, 36.3. Given the political clout of most of the condemned, the dearth of information regarding Nicocles seems odd.

It may be the case that Nicocles was a younger man who was a lover or close relative (Fossey, 2003). Despite Phocion's attempts to rescue his *philoi*, the Athenians believed that they were guilty precisely because they were his friends (Plut. *Phocion* 34.5). Given the emotion-charged setting, death was the only likely sentence. The oligarchs who had escaped, including Charicles, Callimedon, Demetrius of Phalerum and 'some others', were tried and condemned to death *in absentia* (Plut. *Phocion* 35.2).

After their condemnation, Phocion and his friends were led away for immediate execution. According to Plutarch (*Phocion* 36.2) Phocion's 'enemies' (Diodorus 18.67.6 calls them 'democrats') ran alongside him as he was being led away, reviling and abusing him. One even ran up to him and spat in his face. Resolute in the face of his unjust death 'Plutarch's Phocion' manages to be somewhat patronizing and demeaning to his friends, rebuking Thudippus for bemoaning that he was to 'suffer unjustly with Phocion' on the grounds that he ought to be 'content to die with Phocion' (Plut. *Phocion* 36.5), and allowing Nicocles his request to drink the hemlock first because he has never in his life denied Nicocles anything for which he has asked. Plutarch spins out the drama further, making Phocion have to pay for his own hemlock because the poison had run short. This allows Phocion one last pithy remark at the expense of his fellow citizens, with the old man bitterly observing that 'a man could not even die at Athens without paying for it'. 'History's Phocion' drank the hemlock on the nineteenth of the month of Mounichion, the same day that the cavalry processed in honour of Zeus. Such was the anger of the Athenian masses that they were prepared to conduct a public execution on a festival day. Plutarch claims that 'all those who were not wholly savage and debauched by rage and jealousy thought that an impious thing had been done' (Plut. *Phocion* 37.1). The masses in their rage denied Phocion burial in Attic soil (Plut. *Phocion* 37.2–3).³⁶ This speaks volumes for their hostility – even Critias was not denied burial in his homeland.³⁷

The malice of the Athenians was not thoughtless, for not all Phocion's friends were prosecuted. Nepos (*Phocion* 4.3) records that an 'intimate friend' of Phocion, Euphiletus of Cephisia, conversed with Phocion as he was being led away to his execution, openly weeping at his fate. Despite his obvious connection with Phocion, Euphiletus was not harmed by the masses. The fact that Euphiletus was a member of a leading democratic family must have helped his cause. Euphiletus himself had been prominent under the old democracy, and had proposed a decree honouring Euphron of Sicyon (*IG* II² 448, 7), the very decree that was said to have been torn down by 'those who held office under the oligarchy' (*IG* II² 448, 62). There is no

direct evidence to suggest that Euphiletus played a leadership role under the oligarchy, but if he did, his previous democratic credentials may well have saved him. The fact that Archedicus of Lamprae and Eucadmus of Anacaea survived the bloodbath despite having held the influential office of *anagrapheus* suggests that the execution of Phocion and his friends was anything but a mindless act.

Evaluating ‘History’s Phocion’

Clearly Phocion was guilty of treason. He had collaborated with Antipater in replacing the full democratic *politeia* with a limited franchise, and played a leading role (if not *the* leading role) in the Macedonian-backed oligarchy. During this time, he consistently ignored decisions made by the Athenian people, and refused their commissions to go to Antipater in order to gain more freedom for Athens. When Polyperchon presented the Athenians with the opportunity to regain their freedom, Phocion passively and later actively prevented this from happening. Phocion not only prevented the Athenians from regaining their full freedom, but also allowed Nicanor to achieve such a strong position in the Piraeus that the failure of the democratic counter-revolution was inevitable.

Yet modern scholars still find it hard to penetrate the cloud Plutarch (and Demetrius of Phalerum) have generated. Green (1990, p. 44) ends his description of the affair by observing,

So, after being howled down without a hearing, Phocion the Good was made to drink the hemlock, and his remains were cast out beyond the frontier of Attica. He had been an Athenian general and administrator for almost half a century.

This seemingly implies that this is all very unfair for someone who has served Athens for so long. In the same manner, Tritle (2009, p. 140) who recently criticized Green for his overly negative view of Phocion’s time in charge of Athens, summed up the old general’s career in an equally doom-laden tone:

The frailties of his eighty-four years finally caught up with him, and Phocion was sacrificed on the altar of power politics.

But old age and forty-five years of excellent service does not annul two years of political oppression and treachery. It is unfortunate that a tendency to

see the worst in the actions of the Hellenistic Athenians clouds attitudes to their political actions, and that in this case clear evidence that the Athenians were still strongly motivated by democratic ideology has been overshadowed by the potency of Plutarch's image of Phocion as an *exemplum virtutis*. The majority of ordinary Athenians saw Phocion's execution as the just punishment of a man who had recently betrayed them, rather than a crime against a man who had served Athens for so long. We cannot ignore the fact that the majority of Athenians celebrated the downfall of 'History's Phocion'. It is our duty as historians to explain their venom, not judge it or their system of government.

Chapter 6

Stratocles of Diomeia: Audacious Buffoon or Shamelessly Bold?

In all other ways also Stratocles was an audacious fellow; he lived an abandoned life, and was thought to imitate the scurrility and buffoonery of the ancient Cleon in his familiarities with the people. He had taken up with a mistress named Phylacion; and one day when she had bought some brains and neck-bones in the market for his supper, he cried, 'Aha! You have brought just such delicacies as we politicians play ball with'. Again, when the Athenians suffered their naval disaster near Amorgos, before the tidings of the disaster could reach the city he put a garland on his head and drove through the Cerameicus, and after announcing that the Athenians were victorious, proposed a sacrifice of glad tidings and made a generous distribution of meat to the people by tribes. Then, a little later, when the wrecks were brought home from the battle and the people in their wrath called him out, he faced the tumult recklessly and said, 'What harm have I done you, if for two days you have been happy?' Such was the effrontery of Stratocles.

Plutarch, Demetrius

So Plutarch characterizes the political career of Stratocles of Diomeia, who was active in Athenian politics for more than thirty years between 323 and 292. Plutarch was his harshest critic, condemning Stratocles as 'foolhardy' (παράτολμος), someone who lived 'licentiously' (ἀσελγῶς), and a politician who imitated the 'buffoonery' (βωμολοχίαν) and 'loathsomeness' (βδελυρίαν) of Cleon. For Plutarch, Stratocles' liaison with the prostitute Phylacion (also known as Didrachma because anyone who wanted her could have her for two drachmas¹) serves as evidence of his degeneracy every bit as much as his conversation with her in which he makes light of politics as a kind of blood sport, while his deception of the people after the Battle of Amorgos serves as the ultimate proof of his 'audacity' (θρασύτης). As Mikalson (1998, p. 77) sums up, 'His reputation in the later biographical

tradition is uniformly bad; he had come to represent the supposed degeneracy of the Athenians who fawned upon Demetrius’.

Stratocles in Modern Scholarship

Stratocles’ reputation is equally poor in modern scholarship. In many ways Stratocles is emblematic of modern scholarly attitudes to Hellenistic Athens. Largely ignored in the eighteenth century – only a handful of writers mention Stratocles by name when referring to his antics after the Battle of Amorgos – Stratocles has been consistently condemned as a shameless demagogue and a servile flatterer of Demetrius since the early nineteenth century. Although his decree deifying Demetrius Poliorcetes achieved almost universal condemnation, Stratocles appears for the first time as the author of that decree and the architect of Athenian misbehaviour in the work of Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 7, p. 332). Thereafter the tone was set. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 566) charges Stratocles with ‘devising new varieties of compliance and adulation’; Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, pp. 94–5) considered Stratocles a ‘cringing dog’; while Smith (1849, p. 923) sees Stratocles as the author of ‘preposterous’, or ‘outrageously absurd’ decrees, and the architect of ‘extravagant flattery of Demetrius’. Muccioli (2008, p. 123) recently observed that modern scholarly opinions of Stratocles are based either consciously or unconsciously on Plutarch. The trend to take Plutarch at face value continued into and throughout the twentieth century. Ferguson (1911a, p. 119) took issue with his ‘shameless cringing’ before Demetrius. MacKendrick (1969, p. 37) and Shear (1978, p. 50) have both seen Stratocles as a ‘toady’ of Demetrius. In a similar vein, Philipp (1973, p. 504) sees Stratocles as a ‘Schmeichler’, Major (1997, p. 47) calls Stratocles an ‘underling’, and Gabbert (1997, p. 8) refers to Stratocles as a ‘sycophant’ of Demetrius. Most indelicately, Koumanoudes (1986, p. 18) calls Stratocles Demetrius’ σφουγγοκωλάριο or ‘arse-wipe’. Habicht (1979, p. 7) even went so far as to describe Stratocles as ‘der Führer des Demokratie’, a title so laden with meaning that it can only be imbued with a critical tone. Yet there is much more Stratocles than immediately meets the eye.

Stratocles’ Early Career

For starters, his pandering to the masses and dallying with cheap prostitutes belies his blueblood origins as part of one of the wealthiest and most notable families to have come from the deme of Diomeia (Davies, 1971, p. 494). His

grandfather Stratocles (I) performed no less than six trierarchies in the second quarter of the fourth century;² His father, Euthydemus, served as sole trierarch in 348 at the time of the expedition to Euboea (Demosthenes 21.165),³ and was victorious as *chorēgos* for the boys' dithyramb at the Dionysia in 342/1 (*IG* II² 2318, 292–4; *IG* II² 3041). Like many of the wealthier youths, Stratocles had sufficient leisure time to devote to athletic pursuits, winning the boys' pentathlon at the Amphiareia in 335/4 (*IG* VII 414, 26).

Secondly, Stratocles' boldness as an orator was matched by an equal measure of talent. So precocious was the young Stratocles that he was elected one of the ten *katēgoroi* who prosecuted Demosthenes for accepting bribes from Harpalus in 324/3 when aged only in his mid twenties.⁴ Stratocles spoke first for the prosecution,⁵ but most of the content of his speech is unknown. What little we do know comes from a speech composed by Deinarchus of Corinth, and a fragment of Stratocles' speech that Photius (447a) preserved in his discussion of the writings of Agatharchides of Cnidus, a second-century Peripatetic philosopher. What we can glean from this fragment is that the young Stratocles employed emotive language and imagery to sway the jury against Demosthenes, openly lamenting that, 'the city of the Thebans, which contended the war against Philip with you, is being ploughed and sown'.

Agatharchides discussed this passage when praising orators who spoke with 'clarity and propriety'. He praised Stratocles for juxtaposing the theme of the misfortune of the Thebans with that of Athenian friendship with the Thebans. Agatharchides believed that this made 'the compassion deeper' in the hearts and minds of the jury members; fine praise indeed from a writer who had the reputation in antiquity as a worthy disciple of Thucydides in expression. It may be the case that Stratocles turned his talent with words to historical narrative, as did his contemporaries Demochares and Demetrius of Phalerum, if scholars are right to identify the Stratocles whom Cicero criticized for inventing the 'pretty fiction' that Themistocles committed suicide with him (Cicero, *Brutus* 11).⁶

Despite the fact that Stratocles spoke first, Worthington (1992, p. 125) sought to diminish the role he played because of his youth, arguing that he would have delivered a short introductory speech before a lengthier and more important speech by Deinarchus' client. But in kick-starting his career by taking on Demosthenes, Stratocles was just one part of a fine tradition of oratorical 'giant slaying' at Athens. We know that Pericles began his political career by prosecuting Cimon (*Ath. Pol.* 27.1); somewhat ironically Pericles himself was prosecuted by a youthful Cleon at the beginning of his career (Plut. *Pericles* 35), and Callistratus – the architect of the Second Athenian Sea

League – launched his career by prosecuting Andocides (Philochorus, *FGrHist.* 328 F149a). Besides, apart from Hypereides, all the prosecutors seem to have been quite young.⁷ Moreover, as Worthington (1992, pp. 125, 294) himself admitted, his hypothesis would represent a reversal of trials involving multiple *synēgoroi* where one speaker delivered a short concluding speech.⁸

Exactly what motivated Stratocles is unclear. Whereas nineteenth-century writers such as Niebuhr were unable to fathom that Stratocles and his fellow prosecutors could have brought themselves to prosecute Demosthenes at all, many twentieth century scholars sought to link the prosecutors to a sort of ‘war party’. Ferguson (1911a, p. 13) described the prosecutors (aside from Hypereides) as ‘new or more extreme radicals’, who were violently opposed to Alexander. Likewise, Worthington (1992, pp. 44, 49, 53) called the prosecutors ‘warhawks’, and argued (1992, p. 53) that Stratocles ‘desired open war with Alexander’.⁹ But there is no evidence for this; Badian (1961, p. 32) argued, ‘not in a single case . . . can we make confident assertions about political alignments’. The same could be said for the defendants who do not seem to have been connected with each other in any real way.¹⁰ Thus, we find advocates of democracy who were consistently opposed to Macedon like Demosthenes and Polyeuctus of Sphettus on trial for accepting bribes alongside Phocion’s son-in-law Charicles and Demades whose links to the Macedonian court were notorious.

It is most likely that Stratocles was merely interested in kick-starting his political career by taking a prominent role in this high profile ‘show trial’.¹¹ There was an ostentatious aspect to most of Stratocles’ career, and to speak against Demosthenes – the greatest orator of his day – would certainly have appealed to his sense of self-importance. It would also have satisfied his *philotimia*, the quest for honour that inspired all Athenian politicians to strive for excellence. The manner in which Stratocles began his political career with a ‘giant slaying’ – like Pericles, Cleon and Callistratus – bears much resemblance to the ritual of the first public argument among the Sarakatsani shepherds in modern Greece (Campbell, 1964, pp. 280–1, cited by Strauss, 1986, p. 14). Just as a young Sarakatsani shepherd might prove his manhood and ‘self regard’ (ἐγώϊσμός) in his first quarrel, a young orator like Stratocles or Cleon could prove that he had the ability to lead the *dēmos* by besting Demosthenes or Pericles in legal debate.¹² It is also possible that Stratocles was eager to ‘pick a fight’ with Demosthenes on political grounds. He seems never to have been particularly well disposed towards Demosthenes’ nephew Demochares who was particularly close to his uncle,¹³ and Demochares clearly never felt able to push for posthumous honours while Stratocles dominated Athenian politics. Stratocles’ own

decree proposing posthumous honours for Lycurgus of Boutadae from 307/6 (*IG II²* 457+513; [Plut.] *Moralia* 851f–852e) might indicate where his political sympathies lay.

Such is Stratocles' reputation as a 'buffoon' that when he was involved in political activity that ought to have drawn praise, any positive motives have been diminished by modern scholars. Thus Ferguson (1911a, p. 102) sought to deny that Stratocles had any genuine motivation for proposing posthumous honours for Lycurgus of Boutadae in 307/6, arguing that 'personally he [Stratocles] had little in common with the uncompromising democrat and rigorist'. This is typical of the modern bias against Stratocles. An ostentatious man like Stratocles may not have had much in common with Lycurgus in terms of personality, but there is nothing to say they had nothing in common ideologically speaking, and it is entirely possible that Stratocles did have some personal connection to the late statesman.

The honours for Lycurgus should be seen to reflect the image that Stratocles was trying to create for Athens and for himself. Stratocles needed an image after almost fifteen years in the political wilderness, and Athens needed one too after ten years of oligarchic rule. What better image than that of Lycurgus? Lycurgus was a steady, respectable, experienced politician, from a wealthy and ancient family. Stratocles praised him for his fearless opposition to Alexander (the man who destroyed Thebes) and Macedon (the country that imposed oligarchy on Athens), and painted Lycurgus as the ideal democratic politician. This probably helped Stratocles to maintain or forge links with Lycurgus' son Habron and his friend Xenocles of Sphettus who were both prominent in politics in the early years of the restored democracy. It is possible that Stratocles had some links to the circle of Lycurgus; a fragment of a parodic epyllion by Matron portrays Xenocles of Sphettus hosting a dinner party that a certain Stratocles attended (*Athenaeus* 4.134d–137c). This may be our Stratocles (Habicht, 1988, p. 325; Olson and Sens, 1999, pp. 4, 30 ff.).¹⁴ Given that the main beneficiary of the honours for Lycurgus was his son Habron, it is possible that Stratocles was trying to curry favour with Habron, either due to an existing connection or in order to facilitate a new one.

Stratocles the Irresponsible Buffoon?

Stratocles' reputation as shameless 'buffoon' has led the majority of modern scholars to underestimate his political acumen, and to misinterpret many of his most important political acts. Several crucial episodes from his

political career have drawn severe criticism from ancient and modern scholars alike, and each has led to Stratocles being cast in the role of buffoon or pantomime clown, rather than that of a legitimate politician:

- In 323/2 Stratocles deceived the Athenians about the result of the Battle of Amorgos and proposed a motion to perform the εὐαγγέλια (a sacrifice for good news) to celebrate the successes of the Athenian fleet and distributed meat to the people at his own expense. When the truth came out, Stratocles defended himself by asking what harm he had done if the people were happy for two days (Plut. *Demetrius* 11.3; *Moralia* 799f);
- In 307/6 Stratocles successfully carried a motion that not only made Demetrius and Antigonus Saviour-gods, but also the eponymous heroes of two new tribes, and awarded them annual cult, games, a procession, and golden crowns worth a whopping 600,000 drachmas each. The figures of Antigonus and Demetrius were even woven into Athena's *peplos* alongside the Olympian deities (Diod. 20.46.2; Plut. *Demetrius* 10.3);
- Around 303 Stratocles proposed a motion to the effect that 'whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in the future shall be considered righteous towards the gods and just towards men' (Plut. *Demetrius* 24);
- In the aftermath of this incident Demochares of Leuconoe was driven into exile (Plut. *Demetrius* 24). Modern scholars unanimously blame Stratocles for this, despite the total absence of evidence that Stratocles was responsible;
- Soon after this, Stratocles proposed a motion that the month of Mounichion should be officially changed to Anthesterion in order to facilitate Demetrius Poliorcetes' initiation into the Lesser Mysteries at Eleusis, and then to Boëdromion so that the king could participate in the Greater Mysteries (Plut. *Demetrius* 26.1–3; Diod. 20.110.1);
- Stratocles is also heavily criticized for the many proposals he made honouring various friends and associates of Demetrius and Antigonus. No less than thirteen of the decrees known to have been proposed by Stratocles honoured *philoî* of Demetrius. These and other similar decrees are typically seen as examples of obsequious flattery of unworthy toadies.

Each of these episodes has seen Stratocles cast as an irresponsible buffoon by commentators from Plutarch in antiquity, to Grotius in the seventeenth century, to Grote in the nineteenth, and Green in the twentieth. Yet each episode can be seen to be justifiable provided one looks carefully at the

context, and takes into account the numerous historical precedents for each such action.

Stratocles and Amorgos: The Victory That Never Was

When Stratocles deceived the Athenian populace about the results of the Battle of Amorgos there may have been far more to the story than as it stands in Plutarch. Unfortunately we do not know the full story behind this incident because on both occasions when Plutarch describes the incident he provides no context whatsoever to explain Stratocles' behaviour. The problem derives from the fact that Plutarch was writing biography, not history (Plut. *Alexander* 1.2).¹⁵ It was not his intention to record the details of an individual's exploits or achievements, for this would tell his readers nothing about the 'vices or virtues' of his subject. Plutarch himself reveals (*Alexander* 1.2) that he was far more interested in a chance remark or joke that would (in his opinion) reveal more about a man's character than his winning battles, marshalling great armies, or besieging cities. When he related this incident in his biography of Demetrius, Plutarch was making a negative comparison between Stratocles and the comic poet Philippides of Cephale and the so-called *kaloi k'agathoi*.¹⁶ Thus, it suited him to remove the incident from its true context in order to paint Stratocles in the worst possible light. Plutarch's dubious legacy is clear in the criticism of Stratocles in many early modern discussions of the incident, especially the eighteenth-century works of Charles Rollin (1738, vol. 4, pp. 320–2),¹⁷ François Sabbathier (1776, vol. 1, pp. 134–5),¹⁸ and Pierre Bayle (1734–8, vol. 5, p. 749),¹⁹ and the early nineteenth-century writers such as Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 7, pp. 183–4).²⁰ In stark contrast to his contemporaries, Samuel Butler (1793, vol. 3, pp. 463–4) attempts to place Stratocles' proposal in context, likening the situation to the aftermath of the battle at Wickfield near Gloucester on 23 September 1642 in which the Parliamentarians suffered very heavy losses. The Parliamentarians bragged about this as a victory in order to boost morale. Butler also mentions Catherine de Medici's assertion that 'a false report, if believed for three days, might have a state'.

It is entirely possible that Stratocles had a legitimate reason for behaving in this manner – as indeed Butler suggested. We know of two occasions when the *euangelia* rites were performed under false circumstances due to political and/or military expediency. On both these occasions the *euangelia* were performed after the Spartans had suffered serious naval defeats – just like the Athenians suffered at Amorgos. After learning of the Spartan defeat

at the Battle of Arginusae in 406, Eteonicus, the Spartan commander at Mytilene, contrived to escape from a blockade by Conon by pretending that the Spartan fleet had been victorious. He ordered the crew of a single ship to leave during the night and return at dawn wearing garlands, singing paeans, and announcing victory. As part of this ruse Eteonicus performed the sacrifice of the *euangelia*. As a result Conon's forces lost heart, and Eteonicus' fleet escaped to Chios, while he led his land forces to the allied city of Methymna (Xen. *Hellenica* 1.6.36–7; Polyaeus 1.44). Similarly, after learning of the destruction of the Spartan fleet at Cnidus in 394, Agesilaus performed the *euangelia* to encourage his soldiers before the battle of Coronea (Xen. *Hellenica* 4.3.14; Plut. *Agesilaus* 17; Polyaeus 2.1.3). Xenophon explicitly states that the Spartans prevailed on the day because of the false sacrifice. There was nothing untoward in either of these instances – the Spartans were able to extricate themselves from difficult situations and lay the foundation for future military success. In the light of these earlier stratagems designed to foster morale after a potentially disastrous naval defeat, it seems likely that Stratocles was attempting to dupe his fellow citizens into believing that their fleet had prevailed at Amorgos in order to instil morale in the lead up to what would prove to be the decisive land battle against the Macedonians at Crannon. Given that the early stages of the war had led to a frenzy of festivals and sacrifices celebrating Leosthenes' victories over the Boeotians and Antipater (Plut. *Phocion* 23.6), the recent dearth of success would have left the Athenians in dire need of a morale boost. Unfortunately for Stratocles, any chance of such a stratagem working was lost because the Athenians learned of the true state of affairs well before the decisive showdown at Crannon. If, as is often assumed, Stratocles was a leading advocate of the war against the Macedonians, the performing of the *euangelia* may have been a delaying tactic designed to postpone criticism from those who were opposed to the war. Unfortunately, since Plutarch has taken the incident out of its true context (as is his wont) we shall never know the full circumstances that motivated Stratocles to behave in this manner.

Stratocles and Demetrius Poliorcetes: 'The King and I'

As discussed earlier, modern scholars have been particularly critical of Stratocles' proposal to grant divine honours to Demetrius; as noted above it is usually seen as 'extravagant' or 'excessive'. If one looks beyond Plutarch's antipathy towards both Stratocles and Demetrius,²¹ the honours can be seen in a very different light. They were certainly extraordinary, but in

proposing this motion Stratocles was responding to three serious issues, each of which was crucial to our understanding of his conduct:

- The spontaneous acclamation of Demetrius as their 'Saviour';
- The obligation that the Athenians had to Demetrius and Antigonus as their new 'benefactors';
- The need to reorganize the Athenian political structure after two disruptive periods of oligarchic rule.

When Demetrius came to liberate the Athenians he was met with wild enthusiasm. According to Plutarch, as soon as the Athenians heard that Demetrius was going to restore freedom and democracy at Athens (Plut. *Demetrius* 8.5), 'the masses' laid down their shields at their feet. They applauded and shouted their approval, and immediately hailed Demetrius as their 'Saviour' (σωτήρ) and 'Benefactor' (εὐεργέτης) (Plut. *Demetrius* 9.1). Stratocles' motion awarding divine honours to Demetrius was the natural sequel to these events. A large group of Athenians had already proclaimed Demetrius as their 'Saviour'; Stratocles' motion merely made this official.

We cannot underestimate the enthusiasm the Athenians must have felt. The hysterical scenes that ensued when Polyperchon restored the democratic *politeia* in 319/8 indicate just how excited the Athenians were about the restoration of democracy after just three years. How emotional must they have been they when democracy was restored after a decade of political oppression under Demetrius of Phalerum? Furthermore, the Athenians had not needed outside assistance to gain control of their own affairs since Cleomenes the Spartan 'liberated' them from the tyrant Hippias in the sixth century. They were probably quite overwhelmed by the situation, and by awarding honours to Demetrius and his *philoï* they were able to express their gratitude.

Such divine honours were by no means unprecedented or unparalleled. Some sort of divine honours were paid to Lysander at Samos as early as the end of the fifth century (Plut. *Lysander* 18.5–6). We know that Philip II acquired some sort of divine-like status during his life.²² So too did Alexander, who was recognized by numerous Greek cities as the son of Zeus in the 330s (Callisthenes, *FGrHist* 124 F14 = Strabo. 17.1.43),²³ and later as a god at Athens,²⁴ and other Greek cities.²⁵ The next attested case of divine honours comes from 311/10, when the people of Scepsis erected an altar and cult statue for Antigonus, and thereafter sacrificed to him and held games in his honour (*OGIS* 6). Other states followed Stratocles' example.²⁶ Soon

afterwards the people of Samos and Delos consecrated altars to Demetrius, and instituted annual games in honour of both Demetrius and Antigonus (*IG* XI.4.1036; *SEG* 1.362). A cult and games existed for Demetrius at Sicyon (Diod. 20.102.3), and at many *poleis* on the island of Euboea (Habicht, 1970, pp. 76–8). It is worth noting that Diodorus relates these events without criticism.²⁷ He also relates that Demetrius ‘received noteworthy honours’ from the Megarians when he liberated them by expelling Cassander’s garrison (Diod. 20.46.3). In his play *Dorcis*, Alexis has the fishmongers pass a resolution to honour Callimedon the Crayfish as their ‘sole saviour’, and award him a bronze statue in the fish market depicting him with a crayfish in his right hand (Athenaeus 3.104d). The reference to Callimedon suggests that the play was performed long before the Athenians deified Demetrius, which means that Alexis must be mocking what was by his time a rather formulaic honour. Yet modern scholars still see fit to criticize the Athenians for doing what others had happily done before them and would do so afterwards. In a passage where one can practically see the ghost of Plutarch, Buraselis (2003, p. 193) laments that Demetrius had to be honoured as a god at Sicyon because Stratocles’ Athenian decree meant that ‘he could no more be properly met by city honours but on a divine level’. But the evidence points to the fact that Stratocles was not entirely to blame, if indeed blame needs to be apportioned. One might safely argue that the honours accorded to Antigonus at cities like Scepis and the fact that the Athenian masses had spontaneously hailed Demetrius as their Saviour had already made divine honours the only appropriate way to thank Demetrius for his benefactions.

We must not forget that Stratocles was by no means the only Athenian to shower honours upon Demetrius and his father. Mikalson (1998, pp. 78–81) argued that these honours are all ‘explicable as extensions of Athenian religious traditions’. They were all honours, and as honours they are intelligible within the Greek tradition at both human and divine levels. The cult to Antigonus and Demetrius as saviour-gods became a recognized part of Athenian religion. A list has survived which recorded the names of eleven wealthy Athenian citizens who dedicated statues of the Saviours at their own expense (*IG* II² 3424); an Athenian decree has survived that decreed a sacrifice to Athena Nike, Agathe Tuche and ‘the Saviours’ for the safe return of the hoplites who were serving in the Peloponnese with Demetrius (*Agora* 16.114, 17, 22–3); the picked volunteers who served with Demetrius surnamed him ‘the Great’ and decreed a sacrifice to Demetrius the Saviour (*SEG* 25.149, 17); a fragment of Alexis (Athenaeus 6.254a) indicates that symposiasts toasted the Saviours as they did Aphrodite and

Eros. Mikalson (1998, p. 85) argued, 'from the Ekklesia to the sanctuary of Akamas, from the theater to the symposium, praises and divine honours were being showered upon Demetrius'. Even after Demetrius had fallen from favour it was never completely abandoned; instead it was swallowed up by the cult of Zeus and Athena the Saviours (Rosivach, 1987, pp. 272–4; Mikalson, 1998, pp. 110–13). Generally a harsh critic of Stratocles, Mossé (1973, p. 110) has admitted that the later hymn to Demetrius that was composed in the 290s 'proves' that when Stratocles conferred divine honours on Demetrius and Antigonus 'he was expressing the will of the people'.

When the Athenians officially made Antigonus and Demetrius Saviour-gods they consecrated an altar to them, calling it the altar 'of the Saviours'. They also held annual games in their honour, and a procession, and made sacrifices to them. Such honours were 'appropriate only for a deity' (Mikalson 1998, p. 80). In their capacity as Saviours, Antigonus and Demetrius were gods (θεοί), not heroes (Price, 1984, pp. 32–40; Mikalson, 1998, p. 80). This distinction helps explain why Stratocles proposed an additional motion that envoys sent to Demetrius and Antigonus by public decree and public expense should be referred to as 'sacred envoys' (θεωροί), rather than ambassadors (*presbeis*). This placed envoys to the Antigonids on the same level as the sacred envoys who performed the rights at the Olympic and Pythian games on behalf of the various Greek *poleis* (Plut. *Demetrius* 11.1). Plutarch scornfully related this incident as an example of the extravagance of the Athenians, but there was nothing excessive or unusual about this proposal. Having already proclaimed Demetrius and Antigonus as their 'Saviours,' it was only natural that they should send *theōroi* to address them rather than secular ambassadors. Besides, various Greek states had already sent *theōroi* to Alexander the Great after his request for divine honours (Arrian 7.23.2). It is typical of the modern bias against Stratocles that Tarn (1913, p. 435), who was particularly critical of Stratocles for this act which he considered to be a 'masterpiece of . . . servility towards Demetrius,' simultaneously dismissed a similar delegation of *theōroi* who were sent to Antigonus Gonatas from Arcadia as a mere formality.

When judging this event, many modern scholars focus on the fact that *some* Athenians at the time considered the decree to be impious. We know that some of the more cynical Athenians noted that the soil around the altars of the Saviours teemed with hemlock (Plut. *Demetrius* 12.3–4), and after Athena's *peplos* was ruined by a sudden gust of wind and the procession for the Dionysia had to be cancelled because of an unseasonable bout of cold weather that destroyed all the figs and the vines and most of the

grain crop, Philippides of Cephale attacked Stratocles in one of his comedies with the following verses:

Through him it was that hoar-frost blasted all the vines,
 Through his impiety the robe was torn in two,
 Because he gave the gods' own honours unto men,
 Such things overthrow the *dēmos*, not its comedy
 (Philippides frag. 25 = Plut. *Demetrius* 12.4)

But the existence of critics does not automatically mean that the majority of Athenian citizens were opposed to the measures. We should not forget that Philippides of Cephale was not an impartial observer. He was a *philos* of Lysimachus (Plut. *Demetrius* 12.5), and later abandoned Athens for the Thracian court.²⁸ Philippides was clearly ill-disposed towards Stratocles,²⁹ and lampooned him mercilessly in his comedies. Their adversarial relationship is not unlike that of Cleon and Aristophanes. Much as Aristophanes' lampooning of Cleon might amuse us, it affected Cleon's popularity not a jot. The same was probably the case for Stratocles – comic criticism does not necessarily equal unpopularity.³⁰ Indeed, Sommerstein (2009, p. 275 n. 13) suggests that Philippides would not have attacked Stratocles during his time in power, but rather waited until Stratocles was a 'soft target' after the Battle of Ipsus when Philippides himself was in exile at the court of Lysimachus.

One has to bear in mind the fact that in the 320s Demades had struggled to carry a motion awarding the most straightforward divine-like honours to Alexander. Even then Demades suffered *atimia* after he was successfully prosecuted for making an illegal proposal. Yet less than twenty years later Stratocles successfully carried a motion that not only made Demetrius and Antigonus Saviour-gods, but also the eponymous heroes of two new tribes, and awarded them annual cult, games, a procession, and golden crowns worth 600,000 drachmas each. It must have taken no small measure of courage and bravado to propose such a motion. It also required the immediate and continued endorsement of much of the *dēmos*. Rather than seeing the change as some sort of 'degeneration', it would be better to focus on the depth of Athenian feeling, and the ability of Stratocles to tap into that sentiment.

It is also clear that Stratocles was responding to an obligation the Athenians had to Demetrius and Antigonus when he proposed the motion awarding them divine honours. The Athenians had received their freedom and democracy by the grace of Antigonus. If they were to maintain their

freedom they needed to ensure that they maintained the goodwill of Antigonus and Demetrius.³¹ This required the exchange of 'favours' (χάριτες). A relationship based on the exchange of benefactions and favours already existed between Athens and Antigonus, and can be traced back to 321 when Antigonus fled Asia in the face of threatening behaviour from the then all-powerful Perdiccas. Antigonus escaped the wrath of Perdiccas on one of the Athenian ships that were transferring the Athenian cleruchs back home from Samos (Diod. 18.23.4), and perhaps even necessitated a brief stay in Athens. Significantly, Antigonus' then teenage son Demetrius and 'his personal friends' accompanied him on this journey to safety. Since Demetrius was only a boy at the time, both he and Antigonus must have surely remembered the debt that they owed to the Athenians. When Antigonus made his way back to Asia to reclaim his satrapy, it was again aboard an Athenian ship (Arrian, *Met' Alexandron* 1.26 = Roos, 1968, p. 281).³²

Antigonus clearly owed the Athenians a significant debt, and after they had rendered these services to Antigonus, the Athenians often looked to him for support. One tradition even had it that Demades wrote to Antigonus rather than Perdiccas when he asked for help in removing Antipater, the 'rotten old thread' on which the Greek *poleis* were hanging (Plut. *Phocion* 30.5). When Antigonus' nephew Polemaeus invaded Greece in 313 there were men in Athens ready to send secret messages to Antigonus asking him to free the city (Diod. 18.78.3–5). So, when Antigonus eventually returned the 'favour' or *charis* (χάρις) he owed the Athenians in such spectacular fashion, the Athenians responded exactly as they should have – by offering further favours to Antigonus. These favours took the form of divine honours. That Antigonus wanted the Greeks to see that he was granting the Athenians a *charis* is made clear by Plutarch who records that when some of Antigonus' adherents suggested that he should capture Athens and keep the city as his own possession since it was a 'gangway' into the rest of Greece, Antigonus would not hear of it, and replied that he needed no steadier gangway than a people's goodwill, and that Athens would speedily flash the glory of their good deeds to all men (Plut. *Demetrius* 8.2). It is worth noting that the *charis* relationship continued. After the Athenians signed an alliance with Antigonus and Demetrius, thirty Athenian quadriremes served with Demetrius at the battle of Cypriot Salamis in 306 (Diod. 20.50.3). Then, as a favour (*charis*) to the Athenians, Demetrius sent 1200 panoplies from the spoils to Athens (Plut. *Demetrius* 17.1).

The people of Scepis similarly conferred divine honours upon Antigonus because of the *charis* relationship that has been established between

them. The wording of the decree makes this clear: ‘so that Antigonus may receive honours worthy of his achievements, and the *dēmos* should be seen to be returning thanks for the benefits it has received’ (OGIS 6, 17–21). Although the actual decree proposed by Stratocles has not survived, it is reasonable to assume that it expressed such sentiments of gratitude for the benefactions of Demetrius and Antigonus. If the Athenians had failed to match such honours they would have risked being perceived as rude and ungrateful, particularly given the length of their reciprocal relationship with Antigonus.

The Athenian response to the liberation by Demetrius can also be better understood when one considers the response of the city of Erythrae to Alexander and his Successors. The Erythraeans created ‘one of the first divine cults’ in honour of Alexander after their liberation from Persian rule in 334/3. When Seleucus took control of the city in 281 they created a divine cult and founded a festival in his honour, and they did so for his son Antiochus when he confirmed their autonomy and saved the city from the Celts. After the Romans granted the city ‘free and tax-free’ status in 188 the Erythraeans instituted a cult and festival in honour of the goddess Roma (Mikalson, 2006, p. 214).

Modern commentators who criticize the deification of Demetrius seem to be concerned as much about race as they are about religion. On the whole scholars do not criticize the Greeks of Asia for their decrees deifying Lysander, Antigonus, Ptolemy or Antiochus, but the Athenian deification of the Antigonids more often than not leads to scholarly dismay. It seems that many modern scholars are tacitly following a line that Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, p. 95) explicitly took in the nineteenth century, holding the Athenians to a different standard of behaviour than he required for their ‘Asiatic’ neighbours. The perils of adopting such a racially charged double standard ought to be considered carefully when evaluating Stratocles’ proposal.

It is worth noting that not all of Plutarch’s allegations about Stratocles’ decree can be verified. The epigraphic evidence does not support his allegation that the ancient practice of naming the year after an eponymous archon was stopped and that henceforth the year was named after an annually elected priest of the Saviours (Plut. *Demetrius* 10.3).³³ There is no evidence to support Plutarch’s claim that the Athenians changed the name of the month Mounichion to ‘Demetrion’ (Plut. *Demetrius* 12.2),³⁴ or that the name of the last day of the month, the ‘Old and New day’ (ἐννι καὶ νέαι) was changed to ‘Demetrias’ (Plut. *Demetrius* 12.2).³⁵ Scott (1928, pp. 141, 149) suggested that Plutarch’s first error came about because he mistook the priest of the eponymous gods of the new tribes Demetrias and

Antigonis for the eponymous archon, and that the latter error came about because Plutarch was using comedy (perhaps that of Philippides of Cephale) as a source, and that 'working in his hasty fashion, may have found such lines and used them at once'.

Ferguson (1911a, p. 122 n. 1) very plausibly suggested that the notion that the name of Mounichion was changed to 'Demetrian' (Demetrius' month) might have been brought about by the irregular initiation of Demetrius into the Eleusinian Mysteries during that very month. Ferguson suggests the fact that Stratocles changed the name on the month from Mounichion to Anthes-terion and then to Boëdromion so that Demetrius could be legally initiated at the incorrect time would have given the wags of the day ample cause to refer to Mounichion as 'Demetrius' month'.³⁶ It is perhaps significant that two of Stratocles' decrees awarding Athenian citizenship to *philoî* of Demetrius were proposed on the 'Old and New day' (*IG* II² 456, 4; *IG* II² 471, 6), and that a further five decrees were passed on 'the day preceding the Old and New day' (ἐνῆι καὶ νέαι προτέροι) (*IG* II² 486, 6; *IG* II² 495, 4–5; *IG* II² 496 + 507, 5; *SEG* 16.58, 6–7; *SEG* 36.164, 4–5). Given that decrees conferring citizenship were usually dealt with at a single meeting of the assembly for each month (Hansen, 1991, p. 130), which in these cases fell on or around the 'Old and New day', it is plausible that this was also mocked, prompting the 'Old and New day' to be called 'Demetrius' day'.

There was also a practical side to the honours, which indicates that a key aspect of Stratocles' decree was certainly not empty flattery. By creating two new tribes, the Athenians brought the prytanies into line with the months, thus doing away with the discrepancy between the secular and sacred calendars (Ferguson, 1911a, p. 96). The creation of the new tribes enabled the Athenians to carry out a much-needed reorganization of the tribal structure and their respective allocations of demes and councillors. This structure had not changed since the time of Cleisthenes, and for some time several of the ten tribes had been considerably smaller than others, particularly Aiantis. However, with the creation of Antigonis and Demetrias, the Athenians were able to remedy this situation,³⁷ with the end result being that 'in general, the adjustments of 307/6 appear to have made the tribes more nearly equal in size' (Traill, 1975, p. 32). It should also be noted that the addition of an extra one hundred councillors each year also allowed more Athenians to participate in the political sphere each year. This change was not unusual; the Samians followed the Athenians in doing so only a year later (*AM* 44, 1919, pp. 8–9, K. Inv. 162, 36).³⁸

There may have been an additional practical side to the extraordinarily expensive golden crowns that Stratocles' motion awarded to Demetrius and

Antigonus. Mikalson has speculated that the Athenians might have presumed that Demetrius would dedicate the crowns to Athena, as Demetrius himself and others are known to have done (Mikalson, 1998, pp. 79–80),³⁹ thus transferring the money from the secular to the sacred treasury. As such, the two hundred talents may have been meant to cover the costs of the statues and all the other honours paid to Demetrius and Antigonus. If so, it was a sensible way of reorganizing the Athenian finances. Unfortunately it may have led to Demetrius viewing the treasures in the Parthenon as his personal property when he resided in the *opisthodomos* of the Parthenon with his courtesans and entourage.⁴⁰ Indeed, the practice of sharing a temple with a god (*synnaos theos*) was one with which Demetrius was already familiar: an inscription from Delos indicates that after Demetrius' brief sojourn on the island a not inconsiderable sum of fifty drachmas was required to pay for the removal of his divine excrement from the temple of Apollo (*IG* XI.2.146, 76). Little wonder then that Demetrius felt so at home in the Parthenon.

Stratocles is often held responsible for the excesses of the other Athenians, such as Dromocleides of Sphettus' proposal in the 290s to treat Demetrius as an oracular god (Plut. *Demetrius* 13.13), or the Ithyphallic hymn that was sung in his honour (Athenaeus 6.253b). But there is no evidence whatsoever that Stratocles was involved in either of these acts. Nor is there any evidence that Stratocles was responsible for awarding heroic honours to three of Demetrius' *philoi*, Adeimantus of Lampsacus, Oxythemis of Larissa and Bourichus, despite Habicht's claim that '[t]he impression given by these authors [Philippides of Cephale and Demochares of Leuconoe] that Stratocles was responsible for most of these resolutions is confirmed by the epigraphic evidence'. While most modern commentators portray this as a formal arrangement,⁴¹ there is in fact no clear evidence that the worship of the three *philoi* in question was anything other than a private affair akin to the toasts that some Athenians on Lemnos would later make to Seleucus the Saviour. Demochares does speak of 'altars, heroons and libations', but he does not say that these were formally decreed by the Athenian state, and this may be an exaggeration. He certainly does not mention Stratocles in this context, and surely he would have done so if that were the case.

Stratocles the Mad: 'Whatsoever King Demetrius Should Ordain in the Future'

Stratocles added to his notoriety with modern scholars for proposing a motion to the effect that 'whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in the

future shall be considered righteous towards the gods and just towards men'. On the surface this proposal seems excessive to say the least. But if one looks closely at the context in which Stratocles put this proposal forward, one can see that his actions were entirely understandable. According to Plutarch (*Demetrius* 24), Stratocles' proposal was part of a sequence of events that began when Cleaenetus, a favourite of Demetrius, 'got the *polis* into trouble':

Not so Cleaenetus the son of Cleomedon, who, in order to obtain a letter from Demetrius to the people and therewith to secure the remission of a fine of fifty talents which had been imposed upon his father, not only disgraced himself, but also got the city into trouble. For the people released Cleomedon from his sentence, but they passed an edict that no citizen should bring a letter from Demetrius before the assembly. However, when Demetrius heard of it and was beyond measure incensed thereat, they took fright again, and not only rescinded the decree, but actually put to death some of those who had introduced and spoken in favour of it, and drove others into exile; furthermore, they voted besides that it was resolved by the *dēmos* of the Athenians,⁴² that whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in the future shall be considered righteous towards the gods and just towards men.

That is Plutarch's account, but what are we missing? The first thing we are missing is that prior to this incident Demetrius seems to have made quite a habit of giving written instructions to the Athenians.⁴³ This was not a new practice; Demetrius was actually following a model set by Polyperchon in 318 (*IG* II² 387, 8–9). Before this case there is no evidence that the letters concerned anything other than requests for honours for his friends. These requests clearly had not caused significant resentment. But Demetrius' intervention in the case of Cleomedon clearly vexed the Athenians. The size of the fine – some fifty talents – may be the key. The purpose of such a fine was usually that the victim would not be able to pay it and hence suffer *atimia*, which indicates significant displeasure on the part of the Athenians, and a significant misdemeanour on the part of Cleomedon. The Athenians were baulked of their victim, and would not have appreciated this. The Athenian hostility to Demetrius' intervention in this case can be seen as a backlash relating to a specific event.

We are also missing just how foolhardy their open display of displeasure really was. The crucial information in Plutarch's account is the fact that Cleaenetus 'got the *polis* into trouble'. Athens was in trouble with Demetrius,

the king they 'enraged' with their display of independence. In the years between Demetrius' initial liberation of Athens and the Cleaenetus incident, Demetrius and his father had become increasingly autocratic and arbitrary in the treatment of the Greeks, and Demetrius' own behaviour in Athens had become an unpleasant mix of interference, neglect and personal gratification. Demetrius had become very dangerous to those who opposed his wishes.

Things had gone wrong between Athens and Demetrius almost as soon as he had ousted Cassander's garrison. After liberating Athens and restoring democracy, Demetrius was recalled by Antigonus to assist in the invasion of Egypt, and later an attack on Rhodes. Left to fend for themselves against Cassander in the so-called Four Years War, the Athenians were quickly overwhelmed. Cassander captured and placed garrisons in the border fortresses of Phyle and Panactum (Plut. *Demetrius* 23.3), and laid siege to the city of Athens itself. An assault on the walls by Cassander's brother Pleistarchus even breached the walls near the Dipylon Gate (Pausanias 1.15.1). The desperate Athenians were forced to appeal to Demetrius for assistance, but that assistance was a long time coming because Demetrius was busy trampling on the political autonomy of the Rhodians. Rhodes was a free state, and had hitherto maintained its neutrality by making treaties with all the competing dynasts (Diod. 20.81.2). Antigonus targeted the island because the Rhodians had recently refused to participate in his campaign against Ptolemy in Cyprus. Antigonus ignored their pleas of neutrality and sent Demetrius to attack them. The year-long siege was a spectacular, albeit ineffective, show of force, which achieved little more than to earn Demetrius' ironic epithet 'Poliorcetes' (Besieger) and to demonstrate that Antigonus acknowledged Greek freedom only when the Greeks supported him (Errington, 1990, p. 145). Only after fifty envoys from Athens and the other Greeks descended on Demetrius did he agree to a peace treaty (Diod. 20.98.2; Plut. *Demetrius* 22.4). Only then did Demetrius rescue the beleaguered Athenians. Demetrius landed at Aulis in Boeotia, behind Cassander's forces, captured Chalcis and Eretria on Euboea, and made alliances with the Boeotians and the Aetolians (Diod. 20.100.5–6). Cassander was forced to retreat, and once Demetrius had restored the fortresses of Phyle and Panactum to them, the grateful Athenians again hailed Demetrius as their 'Saviour'.⁴⁴ But it had been a close run thing. The Athenians had had to work hard to get Demetrius to come to their assistance, and even then he prioritized freeing the Chalcidians (Diod. 20.100.6). The Athenians now knew that they were not only totally reliant on Demetrius and Antigonus, but also vulnerable to their whims.

Having rescued the Athenians from a situation they need never have been in, Demetrius then spent the winter of 304/3 in Athens chasing women, raping pretty boys, and generally making a nuisance of himself. Demetrius demanded that he be housed in the Parthenon, which he then filled with harlots. Demetrius even took to referring to Athena as 'his elder sister' (Plut. *Demetrius* 24.1). His behaviour clearly caused considerable resentment in Athens. Modern commentators normally blame Stratocles and his followers for the ill behaviour of Demetrius, but the king ought to be held accountable for his own actions,⁴⁵ which made Athens' true position within the Antigonid dominion abundantly clear.

After his winter of self-gratification in Athens, Demetrius rampaged through the Peloponnese storming cities, crucifying those who opposed him, and denying the royal claims of his opponents. Such was Demetrius' arrogance that 'he told the inhabitants of Sicyon that their city was sited in the wrong place and persuaded them to move it' (Plut. *Demetrius* 25; Diod. 20.102.2).⁴⁶ At Orchomenus he crucified those who opposed him, making it clear to all that it was 'impossible to escape the might of the king' (Diod. 20.103.4–7). At Argos, presumably as part of a plan to portray himself as the legitimate successor to the Argead royal house (Ferguson 1911a, p. 122), Demetrius gave evidence of his ambitions by marrying Deidameia, who was the sister of Pyrrhus of Epirus and cousin of Alexander the Great and had been betrothed to Alexander IV. A further indication of his arrogance was the fact that,

Demetrius used to scoff and laugh at those who gave the title of 'king' (*basileus*) to anyone except his father and himself, and was well pleased to hear revellers pledge Demetrius as 'king', but Seleucus as 'elephant-commander' (*elephantarch*), Ptolemy as 'admiral' (*navarch*), Lysimachus as 'treasurer' (*gazophylax*), and Agathocles as 'Lord of the Islands' (*nesiarch*) (Plut. *Demetrius* 25; Plut. *Moralia* 823c–d; Athenaeus 6.261b).⁴⁷

The Cleaenetus incident took place while all this was going on. Demetrius had clearly demonstrated what happened to those who opposed him when he was campaigning in the Peloponnese, and only his incompetence had saved the Rhodians from paying a very high price for a similar display of independence. The Athenians were both indebted to Demetrius, and completely at his mercy. Their petulant display endangered the city, because the king was 'enraged' when he learned what had happened. At a time when people who enrage Demetrius are crucified, it is no wonder the Athenians panicked! Stratocles appears to

have been only too aware of the fact that the king needed to be placated. It is at this moment that he proposes his motion 'that whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in the future shall be considered righteous towards the gods and just towards men'. This was clearly designed to ensure that the Athenians would agree to whatever Demetrius proposed in the future.⁴⁸ Some modern scholars have suggested that the king was now an Athenian citizen and had the right to put forward *probouleumata*,⁴⁹ and that Stratocles' motion effectively meant that Demetrius could exercise his citizen rights *in absentia*. But it is not necessary to take things this far. As noted earlier, Demetrius' habit of writing to the Athenian council should be interpreted as part of the process of *πρόσοδον γράφεσθαι*, whereby citizens and foreigners could make written applications to the Athenian council. There was, however, no guarantee that their recommendations would be put before the assembly. Stratocles' decree presumably not only makes sure that Demetrius' suggestions will be put before the people, but also ensures that they would be endorsed by the *dēmos*. The phrase 'righteous towards the gods and just towards men' seems to have been something of a stock phrase in antiquity,⁵⁰ and Stratocles probably intended it to mean everything or nothing, depending upon the audience. It allowed the King to know that his opinions mattered (which was crucial given the circumstances), but it was not likely to cause the average Athenian to lose much sleep provided Demetrius didn't start expressing his opinions too frequently.

The majority of modern scholars from the nineteenth century onwards have thoroughly condemned the motion as an act of servile flattery. Stratocles' role has often been expanded to encompass far more than the hostile Plutarch ever suggests, dating right back to Grotius (1715, vol. 2, p. 639) who claimed that Stratocles was 'laughed at' for his proposal. Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 7, pp. 350–1) conjured up an image of Stratocles in the assembly explaining Demetrius' wishes to the Athenians,⁵¹ while more recently Shear (1978, p. 51) even holds Stratocles responsible for the reprisals taken against those who supported the motion banning citizens from bringing letters from Demetrius before the populace, a claim that is just not borne out by the evidence. Stratocles only appears very late in Plutarch's narrative, and is only mentioned by name as the sponsor of the motion because one of the *kaloi k'agathoi* suggested that he was mad to introduce such a motion. Rather than the instigator of the chaos – he clearly blames Cleanetus for that – Plutarch portrays Stratocles as profiting from the confusion, stepping in to settle the turmoil with a calculated piece of flattery. Clearly Plutarch disapproves of Stratocles' proposal, but there is

nothing in his account that suggests that Stratocles played any role at all in the crisis until his decisive action to end it.

Rather than acting as Demetrius' viceroy or trying to flatter the king, Stratocles was attempting to placate a powerful and capricious man who held the fate of Athens in his very hands. Philippides of Cephale and the *kaloi k'agathoi* were outraged, but what choice did the Athenians really have? They were faced with the choice between Demetrius and Cassander. Demetrius may have been developing into an interfering autocrat, but he had restored democracy to Athens, and he had not installed a garrison. His interference was fleeting and sporadic. If Cassander had regained control of Athens (which he very nearly did) he would not have hesitated to install a garrison and limit the franchise as he had done before. If the Athenians wanted democracy, they were stuck with Demetrius and had no choice but to placate him.

The Exile of Demochares: The Dog That Did Not Bark

But Stratocles' proposal was by no means the end of the Cleaenetus incident. Some of the Athenians were aghast at Stratocles' motion. According to Plutarch (*Demetrius* 24.5):

When one of the *kaloi k'agathoi* declared that Stratocles was mad to introduce such a motion, Demochares of Leuconoe said: 'He would indeed be mad not to be mad.' For Stratocles reaped much advantage from his flatteries. Demochares, however, was brought under accusation for this and sent into exile. So fared it with the Athenians, who imagined that because they were rid of their garrison they therefore had their freedom.

Modern scholars have routinely blamed Stratocles for the banishment of Demochares, citing Plutarch as their evidence.⁵² Their claims typically depend on the same arguments:

- The comments for which Demochares was exiled concerned Stratocles. On this basis it is assumed that Stratocles was angered by Demochares' sarcastic gibe and had him exiled;
- Philippides of Cephale accused Stratocles of overthrowing the *dēmos* (Plut. *Demetrius* 12.4);
- Demochares' son Laches much later (271/0) claimed that his father was exiled by 'those who overthrew the *dēmos*' ([Plut.] *Moralia* 851e).

Modern commentators typically suggest that Demochares' quip that Stratocles 'would be mad not to be mad' (μαίνοιτο μέντ' ἂν . . . εἰ μὴ μαίνοιτο), proves that there was a rupture between the two, which culminated in Stratocles driving Demochares into exile. It is also often thought that Stratocles brought about Demochares' exile because he was offended by his comment.⁵³ Bauman (1990, p. 167) goes so far as to portray Stratocles in court convincing a jury that insults were the same as treason. But if we look carefully at Plutarch's account we can see that there is no explicit evidence that Stratocles was responsible for the banishment of Demochares. In fact, Plutarch's account of the whole incident appears to indicate that Stratocles was definitely *not* responsible for Demochares' exile.

First, Demochares' comment that Stratocles 'would be mad not to be mad' was not directed at Stratocles. He was responding to criticism of Stratocles by a third party. Demochares was not seriously censuring Stratocles for his behaviour – his comment that Stratocles 'would be mad indeed not to be mad' actually suggests that Demochares thought Stratocles was anything but mad, meaning that he could understand why Stratocles had acted as he did. Plutarch supplies the reason why Demochares could understand Stratocles' actions with his own observation that Stratocles had 'profited much' from his servility.⁵⁴ Certainly there is criticism, but it is only mild criticism to say the least. There is an air of amused resignation to Demochares' riposte, which suggests he expected no better from Stratocles. Surely the same Stratocles who had the hide to run through the Cerameicus urging his fellow citizens to celebrate a naval victory that had never happened would not have been so thin-skinned or precious as to bring about Demochares' banishment for such an innocuous comment.

But the crucial factor is 'the dog that did not bark' – Plutarch does not actually blame Stratocles for Demochares' exile. In fact, Stratocles barely figures in Plutarch's account of Demochares' exile. Plutarch makes it clear that Demochares was attacked for his comment about Stratocles, yet where one would expect him to describe Stratocles' role in the prosecution, Plutarch concludes with the comment 'so fared it with the Athenians, who imagined that because they were rid of their garrison they therefore had their freedom' (Plut. *Demetrius* 24.5). He thus condemns the whole affair rather than any individual. In fact, it could be argued that Plutarch's wording shows that he was attempting to contrast the results of Demochares and Stratocles *both* flattering Demetrius, with Stratocles flattering Demetrius' ego, and Demochares flattering his generosity to Stratocles. Given that Plutarch had already criticized Stratocles' servility to Demetrius and the

fact that one of the aims of the passage is to criticize Stratocles' extraordinary proposal that 'whatsoever King Demetrius should ordain in the future shall be considered righteous towards the gods and just towards men', one can hardly imagine that Plutarch could have passed up such a golden opportunity to heap more scorn on Stratocles. Plutarch (*Demetrius* 9.3) had already made a point of stressing the role that Stratocles played in turning Demetrius' head with flattery, and was critical of Stratocles' proposal, so one would expect Plutarch to have provided explicit evidence of Stratocles' role in the prosecution of Demochares given his obvious delight in recording Stratocles' misdemeanours. The fact that he does not suggests that the impetus for the charges came from someone other than Stratocles.

Where would the impetus come from? In 271/0 Demochares' son Laches claimed that his father was exiled by 'those who overthrew the *dēmos*'. Modern commentators have typically seen this as a reference to Stratocles not only because of their interpretation of Plutarch's account of Demochares' exile, but also because Philippides of Cephale accused Stratocles of 'overthrowing the *dēmos*' with his sacrilegious flattery of Demetrius. But there are several problems with this interpretation. First, as a *philos* of Demetrius' archenemy Lysimachus, Philippides is hardly an impartial observer of Stratocles' pro-Demetrian activities. Secondly, Laches' claim comes some thirty-five years after the event, and is an integral part of a request for the so-called 'highest honours'. It was in Laches' interests to paint his father as a man who had been 'exiled for the sake of democracy' and the only man of his generation 'who never promoted or consented to any other form of government' rather than a man who had been driven into exile by a democratic regime. Demochares did not return to Athens as soon as the Athenians had revolted from Demetrius in 288/7; he was forced to wait until almost two years had passed before his recall in 286/5. The fact that he was recalled by a decree of the *dēmos* is telling. Had Demochares been driven out by an actual oligarchy surely he would have returned as soon as democracy was restored. There is a strong odour of 'spin' here. The same could be said of the claims that Callias of Sphettus had been driven out of Athens by 'those overthrowing the *dēmos*' (*SEG* 28.60, 79–80). The author of the decree is conveniently vague about when this took place, and certainly does not explain why 'those overthrowing the *dēmos*' were able to confiscate Callias' property at a time when his brother Phaedrus was playing a prominent role in Athenian politics. Exile (enforced or otherwise) would be a significant black mark on any career, and it may be that the authors of these two decrees are being deliberately vague to avoid causing Demochares or Callias any embarrassment. Glossing over the fact that one was exiled by

the *dēmos* and the other abandoned his homeland to serve the Ptolemies would certainly have helped the respective honorands to show the Athenians they were worthy of the highest civic honours. We should probably detect 'spin' in the case of Philippides of Cephale, especially if Sommerstein (2009, p. 275 n. 13) is correct in arguing that Philippides' play was not performed while he was in Athens, but was a later production whilst he was in exile at Lysimachus' court. Like Demochares and Callias, Philippides may well have wished to obscure the circumstance of his self-imposed exile.

The passage of time may be significant here. Memories would fade, and events might be confused, as well as the identities of those involved. We ought not forget that there was a constitutional revolving door at Athens at this time. The democracy did not long survive Demetrius' defeat at Ipsus, with the city soon racked by civil war and *stasis*. Lachares seized power as tyrant not long after Demochares was exiled, and soon after that the Piraeus split from the city. Demetrius Poliorcetes returned to Athens in 296/5 and restored what was initially purportedly democracy, but oligarchic features quickly crept in, not least because Demetrius allowed the oligarchic exiles to return to Athens in 292/1. It seems entirely possible that Laches deliberately lumped together his father's exile under an Antigonid-backed democracy, and the various restrictive regimes that followed.⁵⁵ The fact that Demetrius had later supported an oligarchy would certainly have helped Laches to sell his version of the story. In fact, Demochares' version of the story is not unlike the apologetic writings of Demetrius of Phalerum, and we should probably have as much confidence in Demochares' claims his exile was ordered by 'those overthrowing the *dēmos*' as we would in Demetrius' claims that he 'improved' democracy.

But if Stratocles was not responsible for the exile of Demochares, who was? One possibility is raised by the involvement of the conservative *kaloi k'agathoi* in the proceedings. The parochially democratic Demochares would have found little common ground with the more conservative elements of Athenian society, and his irreverent attitude to the whole Cleaenetus incident may have rankled with them. Perhaps one of these conservative men attacked Demochares (on charges unknown) for having effectively condoned Stratocles' behaviour. One of their number had already criticized Stratocles, and they would not have taken kindly to Demochares' flippant response to Stratocles' actions. Due to his close connection to Demetrius that had recently been sealed with gifts, Stratocles would have been in an untouchable position. But Demochares would have been an inviting target for some of the *kaloi k'agathoi* who were still fuming over the incident. Demochares was abrasive, and had many political

enemies. Some conservative thinkers would have already been ill disposed towards Demochares because of his recent stinging attack on the philosophers. The aftermath of the Cleaenetus fiasco would have provided the conservative elements of Athenian society with an excellent opportunity to even the score. Another possibility is another politician from Stratocles' circle, such as the infamous Dromocleides of Sphettus, but one would imagine that had he been responsible, some indication of this would have been preserved in the source material.⁵⁶ But it seems more likely that either Demetrius Poliorcetes or his *philoï* brought about Demochares' exile. Several scholars have advocated this idea,⁵⁷ and it is by no means implausible that either Demetrius himself or one of his entourage took offence at Demochares' comments. This would partly account for Demochares later stinging attacks on the king and his friends. Crucially, the surviving fragments of Demochares' work do not mention Stratocles by name. If Demochares had singled out Stratocles for criticism, surely a snippet would have survived. On balance Demochares' exile is one 'crime' for which Stratocles should be exonerated.

Stratocles Manipulates Time: Demetrius' Irregular Initiation into the Eleusinian Mysteries

Modern commentators are highly critical of Stratocles' proposals that facilitated the irregular initiation of Demetrius into the Eleusinian Mysteries. Both Plutarch and Diodorus record that Demetrius requested to be initiated into the Mysteries, and that the Athenians yielded to his demands. Plutarch's account is the most detailed:

[W]hen Demetrius was getting ready to return to Athens, he wrote letters to the people saying that he wished to be initiated into the mysteries as soon as he arrived, and to pass through all the grades in the ceremony, from the lowest (the *myesis*) to the highest (the *epopteia*). Now, this was not lawful, and had not been done before, but the lesser rites were performed in the month Anthesterion, the great rites in Boëdromion; and the supreme rites (the *epopteia*) were celebrated after an interval of at least a year from the great rites. And yet when the letter of Demetrius was read, no one ventured to oppose the proposition except Pythodorus the Torch-bearer, and he accomplished nothing; instead, on the motion of Stratocles, it was voted to call the current month, which was Mounichion, Anthesterion, and so to regard it, and the lesser rites at Agrae were

performed for Demetrius; afterwards Mounichion was again changed and became Boëdromion instead of Anthesterion, Demetrius received the remaining rites of initiation, and at the same time was also admitted to the highest grade of *epoptos* (Plut. *Demetrius* 26.1–3).

In principle it was not irregular or illegal for Demetrius to be initiated into the Mysteries. Any Greek (free or slave) who paid the required fee of fifteen drachmas and was pure of hand was eligible. The problem was that of timing. Not only was it the wrong time of year, but there were two stages to the initiation rites. But Demetrius was impatient, and wished to be initiated ‘as soon as he arrived’. When his letter was read before the assembly, only Pythodorus the *dadouchos* (torch bearer) for the Eleusinian rites objected, but to fulfil Demetrius’ wishes would have been sacrilege. Stratocles’ proposal that the month should be changed to Anthesterion so the lesser rights could be performed at Agrae and then changed to Boëdromion so that the *epopteia* could be celebrated was the only way that Demetrius could be initiated at that time without infringing holy law. The fact that the decision was made to formalize matters shows how literally the laws were taken (Kerenyi, 1967, p. 48), and that there were still some religious sensibilities at work.

Modern scholars make much of the fact that Philippides of Cephale later scornfully attacked Stratocles for having ‘abridged the whole year into a single month’, but we have already noted that such comic criticism does not mean that the Stratocles’ proposal was unpopular.⁵⁸ The fact that only Pythodorus objected at the time indicates that Stratocles was by no means the only Athenian who considered yielding to Demetrius’ demand, and if the majority of the Athenians were outraged by his proposal it might never have been passed.⁵⁹ Plutarch’s account suggests that the Athenians were acting dishonourably, and he laments the fact that Pythodorus’ objection was ignored. But crucially the Eleusinian *hierophant* did not object. One would expect it to be the other way around, with the Eleusinian official objecting to ‘outside’ interference, if the proposal was really that objectionable.

It should also be noted that, as with the divine honours for the Antigonids, Diodorus (20.110.1) recorded this incident without criticism. He also added the important fact that Demetrius ‘persuaded’ the Athenians to allow him to be initiated into the Mysteries ‘because of his benefactions’. The irregular initiation can thus be seen as an extension of the *charis* relationship that existed between Demetrius and the Athenians.⁶⁰ Demetrius’ desire to be initiated may also have been part of his family’s

wider policy of demonstrating their kinship with the Greeks (Muccioli, 2008, p. 131). Diodorus also explicitly states that Demetrius gave himself over to the priests unarmed, in accordance with the laws. One can imagine that the Athenians must have been somewhat at a loss about what to do when Demetrius made his request. They could not deny their 'Saviour' the favour that they owed to him, but to grant him his request would be sacrilege. Stratocles' proposal was an adroit solution to the problem; it kept Demetrius happy, yet ensured that the letter of the law was upheld. Rather than an act of subservient flattery on the part of Stratocles and the Athenians, the motion was prompted by an obligation to Demetrius, and fear of his wrath if that debt was not paid.

Although modern scholars have been quick to criticize Stratocles' proposal accommodating Demetrius' desires,⁶¹ such manipulation of the calendar for expediency was by no means unprecedented. Dunn (1999, pp. 226–7) has catalogued four other such manipulations of the calendar. Two involve Argos, and the other two involve Alexander the Great. In 419/8, the Argives, launching a punitive expedition against Epidaurus on the cusp of the holy month of Carneius when fighting was banned, froze the calendar in order to continue the fighting (Thucydides 5.54). In 388 the Spartan king Agesipolis asked the oracles of Zeus and Apollo whether it would be possible to reject a truce with the Argives on the grounds that the Argives 'proposed the months' at an improper time (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 4.7.2–3). Dunn argues that the Argives were attempting the same ruse involving the naming of the month of Carneius. In 332 Alexander renamed the thirtieth day of the month the twenty-eighth in order to facilitate the fulfilment of a seer's proclamation that the city of Tyre would fall by the end of the month (Plut. *Alexander* 25.2), and in 334 he renamed the month Daesius a second Artemisius in response to criticism of waging war in Daesius (Plut. *Alexander* 16.2). Dunn criticizes Stratocles' actions, arguing, 'they could not be justified as the others could'. But this line of thought is absurd. For starters, it completely ignores the fact that in 419/8 the Argives' allies rejected their calendric rearrangements and went home. Clearly they considered that decision unjustifiable. Secondly, Agesipolis is explicitly told by the oracles at Olympia and Delphi that it would not be sacrilegious to break the truce because the Argives have behaved incorrectly. Thirdly, Alexander's decision to change the month from Daesius to Artemisius is a symptom of his desperation to fight at Granicus and is followed by what Plutarch calls an 'act of a desperate madman rather than a prudent commander'. In comparison to these similar cases, Stratocles' manipulation of the calendar seems remarkably acceptable, rather than an 'irregular' and 'craven gesture

by the assembly'. Dunn's response to Stratocles' proposal seems typical of the modern scholarly bias against Stratocles.

Stratocles and the King's Entourage: 'I Get By with a Little Help from My Friends'

Stratocles also receives much scholarly criticism for his efforts to honour Demetrius' friends and associates. The honours are often thought to represent the servility of the Athenians, and Stratocles is typically seen as the most servile of the Athenians.⁶² Because of his links with Demetrius and his entourage, Stratocles is often seen as standing outside the normal sphere of Athenian politics, acting as Demetrius' agent, or as a kind of governor in the king's absence. This notion goes hand in hand with the idea that Stratocles was chosen to 'rule' Athens from amongst a group of several Athenians who could be found 'shamelessly cringing' before Demetrius and his *philoî*. Thus, we find Ferguson (1911a, p. 101) describing a situation where Stratocles 'outdid everyone else in waiting on the nod' of Demetrius, and Dinsmoor (1931, p. 14) suggesting that in Demetrius' absence Stratocles 'ruled as viceroy'.⁶³ O'Sullivan (2009a, pp. 77–8) takes this view of Stratocles to an extreme, suggesting that a papyrus fragment (*P.Oxy.* 1235, 105–10), which refers to 'Lachares the Tyrant', should be emended to read 'Stratocles the Tyrant'. But as O'Sullivan herself points out, no extant source refers to Stratocles as *tyrannos*. The only title, of sorts, that Stratocles received in our sources is one that he gives himself (Plut. *Demetrius* 11.2) – *politeuomenos* (ὁ πολιτευόμενος) – a standard term used to describe Athenian orators.

Such imagery is provocative and persuasive. From Ferguson's description one can almost visualize Demetrius seated upon a throne before the Athenian assembly, surrounded by his *philoî*, with Stratocles and others anxiously prostrating themselves before him. From the accounts of Dinsmoor and Ferguson one could almost believe that Stratocles could be found sitting upon that throne, presiding over the assembly when Demetrius was absent from Athens. But while this makes a stimulating and intriguing picture, it is a grossly inaccurate one. Notwithstanding the fact that Demetrius was seldom present in Athens aside from the notorious winter of 304/3, which would have made it particularly difficult for any Athenian politician to wait upon his nod, Stratocles is not known to have held any official position in Athens during this part of his career. He was neither a general, nor an archon, nor even a councillor,⁶⁴ and Demetrius undertook no formal measures to protect or secure Stratocles' position at Athens.

This simplistic view of Stratocles' dealings with Demetrius' entourage also fails to take into account both the vulnerable position that Athens was in at the time, and the ancient literary prejudice against the friends of the Hellenistic monarchs.⁶⁵ These *philoi* were important men in the Antigonid kingdom. They were envoys, military leaders and bodyguards. Because they were close to Demetrius, it was important for the Athenians to foster links with them.⁶⁶ Stratocles proposed honours for many of the *philoi* on the grounds that they were 'being well-disposed to the Athenian *dēmos*' (SEG 36.164, 12–14. Cf. IG II² 486, IG II² 492, IG II² 561). Others were honoured for real and tangible services such as providing military assistance (IG II² 469, 8–9), 'sharing in the contest on behalf of freedom and democracy,' (SEG 36.164, 15; IG II² 559 + 568, 12–14), or acting on behalf of both those Athenians who went to Antigonius individually and the Athenian *dēmos* as a whole (IG II² 492, IG II² 495, IG II² 496 + 507). The honours voted to the *philoi* of Demetrius also indicate how precarious a position the Athenians found themselves in during the war with Cassander. Several of the *philoi* honoured in decrees proposed by Stratocles had given assistance during the war with Cassander (IG II² 469, 471, 486), and it is significant that another decree also honours an individual who assisted the Athenians during the fighting against Cassander (IG II² 503). It is likely that the decrees reflect a degree of genuine gratitude, and probably represent yet another aspect of the Athenian effort to maintain the *charis* relationship between themselves and the kings.⁶⁷

Stratocles was by no means alone in proposing honours for these important officials. Other Athenians proposed many other similar honorary decrees. A fine example is Philostratus of Cephisia's decree honouring Medius of Larissa from 303/2 (IG II² 498). Men like Medius were powerful men because of their connections to Demetrius and Antigonius. Medius was the most senior admiral in the Antigonid fleet, and had recently led thirty Athenian quadriremes in battle when he commanded the left wing of Demetrius' fleet at the battle of Cypriot Salamis in 306 (Diod. 20.50.3). He was mostly likely present in Athens at the time that he received his honours, which made it appropriate and politic to honour him.⁶⁸ Other Greek *poleis* such as Samos, Delos, Ephesus, Iasus, Nesus, Eretria, Miletus, Smyrna and Samothrace felt the need to honour the *philoi* of Demetrius and Antigonius.⁶⁹ Indeed, the citizens of other Greek *poleis* likewise honoured some of the same *philoi* who were honoured by the Athenians on the advice of Stratocles.⁷⁰

Stratocles' decrees honouring Demetrius' *philoi* fit a schema discernable throughout the Greek world. Herman (1981, pp. 104–5) observed that the

Greeks from different *poleis* developed a set formula for honouring the *philoî* of the kings. After the prescript there were two clauses – the *epeidē* and *dedochthai* – that contained some or all of the following information:

epeidē:

- (1) the name, patronymic and *ethnikon* of the *philos* being honoured;
- (2) a description of his relationship with the king;
- (3) a description of his benefaction.

dedochthai:

- (1) the honours voted to the *philos*;
- (2) instructions to the relevant magistrate(s) to inscribe the decision on a stone stele and to set it up in a public place.

The extant decrees Stratocles proposed follow this pattern. One of the clearest examples is that honouring Alcaeus of Aenus (*IG* II² 495) from 303/2. The *epeidē* clause notes that Alcaeus has been ‘residing with’ (διατρίβων παρὰ) the king,⁷¹ and that he has ‘continued doing what good he could through words and actions concerning both those Athenians going in private to the King, and concerning the *dēmos* of the Athenians’. The *dedochthai* clause promises to praise Alcaeus for his virtue and goodwill, to award him a golden crown, and to make him an Athenian citizen. The decree ends with instructions for the secretary to set up a stele on the acropolis. Significantly, Alcaeus was also honoured at Epidaurus. According to his honorific decree (*IG* IV² 1.58) Alcaeus was named as a *proxenos* and *euergetēs*, and awarded freedom from taxes, and the protection of the Epidaurians on land and sea, in wartime and in peace. This clearly indicates that Stratocles’ motion was by no means unusual, and that Alcaeus could be seen to be an important figure in the Antigonid set-up. Stratocles was certainly doing more than honouring parasites and hangers-on.

Stratocles was well organized in his dealings with Demetrius’ entourage, and it seems that he developed a kind of ‘template’ document for honouring Demetrius’ friends and associates, because the word of three such decrees (*IG* II² 495; *IG* II² 496 + 507; *Agora* 16.117) is identical apart from the names of the honorands. Given the number of such citizenship decrees that he proposed it must have saved Stratocles a considerable amount of time by using the same wording each time.⁷² In each of the cases, the honorand was rewarded because of his proximity to Demetrius (διατρίβων παρὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ Δημητρίῳ), and for ‘doing whatever good he is able to in words and deeds both privately for those Athenians coming to the king, and

publicly for the Athenian *dēmos*. Apart from their names and patronymics, the wording is identical. All he needed to do was substitute the appropriate name on each occasion.

These honours were clearly part of a bigger plan. Demetrius had effectively abandoned Athens during the Four Years' War. The Athenians must have greatly feared that they might lose their democracy again. The best way to ensure that they did not lose their democratic *politeia* was to ensure that they maintained Demetrius' goodwill.⁷³ Stratocles was probably trying to develop a network of support that would ensure that would not happen again. The honours for Demetrius' *philoi* need also to be considered in the context of Stratocles' other proposals honouring non-Antigonids. Despite suggestions to the contrary, Stratocles was not preoccupied with proposing motions honouring Demetrius' *philoi*. At least two honorific decrees that he introduced point to the fact that Stratocles was attempting to resurrect Athens' standing in the Greek world by re-establishing relations between Athens and various *poleis* in Asia Minor that had once been connected to Athens. The first such decree from 307/6 honoured three ambassadors from Priene (*SEG* 3.86), and the second from the same year honoured the *dēmos* of Colophon (*IG* II² 456 + *SEG* 21.328). This clearly indicates that Stratocles was attempting to foster useful relationships with not only Demetrius and his *philoi*, but also other *poleis* within the Antigonid dominions. Other Athenians joined Stratocles in this process. Other Athenian decrees from this time honoured the Colophonians (*IG* II² 470), the Prienians (*IG* II² 565 + *SEG* 33.92), and the citizens of Tenos and Paros in the Cyclades (*IG* II² 466 + *SEG* 24.110 + *SEG* 42.94; *IG* II² 573). These motions may well have been related to grain supply, since one decree dated to 305/4 refers to the importation of grain 'from Asia' (Habicht, 1997, p. 69). Taken together, this evidence suggests that Stratocles – like those around him – was clearly engaged in more than the empty flattery of Demetrius and his entourage.

Stratocles' Fall from Favour

The Athenians had clearly begun to tire of Demetrius' autocratic ways and his interference in their affairs. When news of his defeat at Ipsus reached Athens it galvanized them into action. Once they realized that Demetrius could no longer offer them any real assistance – or offer a sufficient threat to them – the Athenians severed their ties with him. Demetrius clearly planned to return to Athens and use the city as the centre of his operations.

But when Demetrius reached the Cyclades, a delegation from Athens met the king and informed him that he was not welcome in their city.

The defeat of Demetrius had a devastating effect on the career of Stratocles. Stratocles is known to have proposed a successful motion in the assembly only one month after Demetrius' defeat at Ipsus (*IG* II² 640), but after this he disappears from the sources altogether until 293/2, after Athens has again fallen under Demetrius' sway. Habicht (1997, p. 81) observes, 'Obviously, Stratocles' influence must have ended the moment the Athenians received a reliable account of the outcome of the battle in Asia Minor'. But while Stratocles' influence declined, there is no reason to assume that he was forced to leave the city. The laws deifying Demetrius were not rescinded, and the Athenians did not completely burn their bridges with regard to relations with their former 'Saviour' and 'Benefactor'. But with Demetrius banned from entering the city gates, the man who had made every effort to placate him would have found it exceedingly difficult to influence the Athenian assembly at this time.

Stratocles was not the only Athenian politician affected by the Athenian volte-face in relations with their erstwhile benefactor. It is telling that neither Demochares nor Philippides of Cephale returned to the city even though Demetrius Poliorcetes' supporters must have been swept from power. The Athens that soon sought a rapprochement with Cassander would have had as little room at its head for them as it would for Stratocles. Besides, the city was soon racked by the *stasis* that allowed Lachares to seize power as tyrant. Lachares' position was not compatible with political participation. Like the majority of his contemporaries, Stratocles must have remained in the political wilderness while Lachares controlled Athenian affairs. Things would have changed, however, when Demetrius liberated Athens from Lachares in 296/5 (Plut. *Demetrius* 33–4). Demetrius' return clearly offered Stratocles an opportunity to return to the forefront of Athenian politics.

Scholars often speak of Demetrius' return to Athens as a restoration of the 'the government' of Stratocles.⁷⁴ Ferguson (1911a, p. 135) used powerful imagery to describe the relationship between Stratocles and the king at the time of the ouster of Lachares, referring to Demetrius as 'the iron hand which put the rudder in the feeble grasp of Stratocles.' But there is little evidence to suggest that Stratocles held any real power at Athens at this time. In fact, he does not seem to have been very prominent at all. Stratocles is entirely absent from the literary sources, and is known to have proposed just a solitary motion in the assembly after Demetrius' return (*IG* II² 649).⁷⁵ Even that was in 293/2, more than two years after Lachares was swept from power. One must wonder what role Stratocles played in Athenian affairs in

this period. If any Athenian should be seen as Demetrius' right-hand man in Athens at this time it should be Olympiodorus who held the eponymous archonship for two consecutive years in 294/3 and 293/2 (DH, *Deinarchus* 9.2; *IG* II² 378; *IG* II² 649; *IG* II² 389; *Agora* 16.167) in a clear violation of democratic practice. Habicht (1997, p. 91) has seen Olympiodorus as 'the king's commissar or representative', and others have cast Olympiodorus as holding a kind of dictatorship.⁷⁶ Compared to Olympiodorus' involvement in Demetrius' Athens Stratocles' solitary assembly decree seems rather limited.

The one decree we know Stratocles proposed in this period honoured Philippides of Paeania for the services he and his ancestors had rendered to the state. This decree has usually been seen as the result of a political 'reconciliation'⁷⁷ between Stratocles, the 'democrat' and Philippides, the 'moderate oligarch'. But such a view is based upon two assumptions that rest upon very tenuous grounds. The first, that Philippides was an oligarch relies entirely upon a forced reading of the dubious testimony of Demosthenes who numbers Philippides amongst the friends of Meidias. This 'condemnation' from Demosthenes has proved sufficient for most modern scholars to cast Philippides as an opponent of democracy. Shear (1978, p. 54, n. 152) even claimed that Demosthenes referred to Philippides as ὀλιγαρχικός in his speech against Meidias; but this not the case. Demosthenes (21.208, 215) actually referred to Philippides as one 'of those wealthy men'. The second assumption is that there was a need for 'reconciliation' between Stratocles and Philippides in the first place. If Philippides were an oligarch, this may have been the case, but if he were merely a wealthy political leader who had participated during democratic regimes (as seems likely) and an opponent of Demosthenes (which also seems likely), it is entirely possible and indeed plausible that Stratocles and Philippides were quite well disposed to each other. In that case, the substantial honours paid to Philippides could be seen as the natural product of goodwill that existed between Stratocles and Philippides.⁷⁸ Given that Philippides and Stratocles were both senior citizens (or thereabouts), the motion may have been little more than one old man ensuring a state hand-out for another.

But having passed this motion, Stratocles disappears entirely from our sources. One must question why this was the case. Most modern scholars have noted the 'prominence' of Stratocles in this period. Indeed, Habicht (1997, p. 91) has Stratocles step into Olympiodorus' shoes when he has a hypothetical falling out with Demetrius. Only Ferguson has noted his disappearance from the record. To account for this, Ferguson (1911a,

p. 138) hypothesized that Stratocles died in the year 293, which seems plausible given that Stratocles would have been around 57–9 years of age. If Stratocles did pass away in 293 it could well explain why Demetrius suddenly lost confidence in the Athenians and ordered the recall of oligarchic exiles in 292/1 (DH, *Deinarchus* 9). The king could not have failed to notice the role Stratocles played in smoothing things over for him in the past, and the loss of his hitherto helpful supporter may have prompted Demetrius to place additional restrictions on the Athenians, particularly if Habicht is correct in speculating that Demetrius fell out with Olympiodorus. Clearly, Demetrius had learned not to trust too blindly the goodwill of the Athenians, and Stratocles' demise may well have been the last straw for him.

Stratocles Re-Evaluated

How does one evaluate Stratocles' career? Was it a success or a failure? Did he squander his great talents, or did he use them for the good of Athens? Should we blame Stratocles for the excesses of Demetrius and his entourage, or should we congratulate him for his efforts to placate Demetrius as he became increasingly erratic and domineering? The answer to all these questions must be both 'yes' and 'no'. By putting all his eggs in one basket, Stratocles had six years of unparalleled influence at Athens. But at the same time Stratocles compromised the long-term viability of his political career by associating himself too closely with Demetrius. By linking himself so closely to Demetrius, Stratocles compromised himself in the same way that Phocion and Demetrius of Phalerum had done before him. Their ideological viewpoints may have been different, but the result was no different. Although Stratocles can have had no way of knowing that power would affect Demetrius as it did, Stratocles' efforts to placate Demetrius could be seen as a case of him trying to tame a monster that he helped create in the first place. But when all things are considered, we must not forget that Stratocles did help to preserve Athenian democracy after many years of oligarchy.

Rather than the 'audacious buffoon' who appears in Plutarch's pages, it is my contention that Stratocles was simply a politician who did his best for Athens and himself, albeit with an air of showmanship about him. Stratocles was never condemned like Phocion or Demetrius of Phalerum; he was never driven into exile like Demochares; and in later years other orators could cite his decrees without fear of censure.⁷⁹ Certainly Stratocles was trying to further his own career when he flattered Demetrius. But what politician has not acted in a self-serving manner? Perhaps the best indicator

of Stratocles' worth is what happened in the 290s when the Athenians failed to keep Demetrius happy, and everyone saw what might have happened earlier had Stratocles not done his best to indulge the king. There would have been many Athenians who felt that democracy 'Stratocles-style' with its strings attached would have been preferable to what followed.

Chapter 7

Callippus of Eleusis: Tin-Pot General, or Generalissimo?

Hard by is the council chamber of those called the Five Hundred, who are the Athenian councillors for a year. In it are a wooden figure of Zeus the Counsellor, and an Apollo the work of Peisias, and a Demos by Lyson. The thesmothetai were painted by Protogenes the Caunian, and Olbiades portrayed Callippus, who led the Athenians to Thermopylae to stop the incursion of the Gauls into Greece.

Pausanias, Description of Greece

So Pausanias introduces his audience to Callippus of Eleusis, one of the outstanding figures of a new generation of Athenian political leaders who took centre stage after the revolt from Demetrius Poliorcetes. So important a figure was Callippus that ‘the democracy of all Athenians’ commissioned a portrait of him for the council chamber, one of the cornerstones of Athenian democracy. Partly on the strength of his passage, Habicht (1998, p. 86) described Callippus as ‘an Athenian nationalist, a general, and a political figure, one of a handful of men predominant in Athenian politics in the 270s and 260s’. Yet if it were not for this all too brief reference, and another snippet or two from Pausanias, we would know very little about Callippus. The same could be said of the other leading figures contemporary with Callippus: Chremonides of Aethalidae is known only from one inscription and a handful of literary fragments; his brother Glaucon’s career has to be pieced together from a similar hotchpotch of sources; and the sources for Aristides of Lamprae and Agyrrhius of Collytus are even less impressive.

But while scholars are content to accept and even praise the achievements and prominence of Chremonides, Glaucon, or even Aristides, whose democratic credentials have recently been restored by Byrne’s revelation (2006/7, pp. 170–5) that he first served as general in 280/79 – not during

the pro-Demetrian oligarchy – Callippus’ achievements in leading the Athenians against the Celts at Thermopylae, which were once glorified by the Athenians and Pausanias, are now denied altogether by modern scholars. This denial is a relatively recent phenomenon. In eighteenth-century historiography, Callippus (along with Olympiodorus and Demochares) was seen as a shining light in the darkness that befell Athens after Phocion’s death, and is a rarity in being named at all, given the tendency of eighteenth-century historians to avoid naming individual Athenians after Demetrius of Phalerum. For Gast (1793, vol. 2, p. 204) Callippus was an Athenian ‘of whom history makes the most honourable mention’, while Gillies (1807, vol. 1, pp. 576, 584) described his role against the Celts in considerable detail. The expanded edition of Goldsmith’s *Grecian History* (1796, vol. 2, p. 311) took pains to note that when the Greeks resolved to fight against the Celts ‘the Athenians, under Calippus [sic] took the lead in this important service’. Nineteenth-century authors were even able to credit Pausanias’ account of Callippus’ career. Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 8, pp. 52–64) devotes considerable space to the Celtic invasion, and observes (p. 57), ‘[o]ld recollections, which in the presence of such a danger would have more than ordinary influence, seem to have induced the allies to assign the supreme command to the Athenian general, Callippus’. Even Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, p. 240) found reason to praise the events that led to Callippus’ portrait going on display in the council chamber. While Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 579) does not mention Callippus by name, he did nonetheless manage to bring himself to mention the defence against the Celts as a brief ‘awakening’ of the Greeks. But in the twentieth century, source criticism took its toll on Callippus’ reputation, with the perception that Pausanias was biased towards the Athenians leading the majority of modern scholars to doubt his account of Callippus’ greatest achievement altogether. Thus one of Hellenistic Athens’ most prominent figures, who must have loomed large in Philochorus’ lost *Atthis*, is reduced to a footnote at best even in the works of those who see value in Hellenistic Athens. Callippus is no longer a generalissimo, but instead a tin-pot general. Callippus’ treatment by modern commentators is perhaps even more emblematic of the modern denigration of Hellenistic Athens as a whole than that of Stratocles. There is certainly much about Stratocles’ career that was regrettable, but the same cannot be said of Callippus. In the light of the general prejudice against Hellenistic Athens and its political leaders in modern scholarship, the assumptions that have been made regarding Callippus’ career would benefit from a thorough re-examination.

Callippus' Career Unadorned

It would be best to start with the evidence that we have. Whatever Pausanias' tendency to exaggerate, we know that Callippus had a particularly distinguished career, playing a leading role in the two most significant events in the first half of the third century: the Celtic invasion and the Chremonidean war. Pausanias' description of the portrait of Callippus in the council chamber confirms his prominence; why else would the Athenians have a set up a portrait of him in such a prominent place?¹ Pausanias explicitly states that this portrait was the result of Callippus' service as the Athenian general at Thermopylae in 279 (1.3.5), and even states that he was commander-in-chief of all the Greeks who fought against the Celts there (1.4.2; 10.20.5). Aside from his leadership of the Athenian contingent at Thermopylae, the Athenians entrusted Callippus with other important military and diplomatic roles during the Chremonidean War. Callippus was elected as one of the *synedroi* to consult with King Areus of Sparta, and the Spartans' allies (*Syll.*³ 434/5, 70), and in the 260s he was awarded *proxenia* along with two other prominent military men, Glaucon of Aethalidae and Aristeidēs of Lamprae by the Orchomenians in Arcadia (Moretti, *ISEI*.53). All this suggests that Callippus played a particularly important role in Athenian affairs in the 270s and 260s.

Callippus' Family Background

It ought to come as no surprise to find Callippus serving 'the democracy of all Athenians' in such high profile positions, since many of the members of Callippus' immediate family were politically active at Athens – especially under democratic regimes.² Callippus was the son of one of the most prominent orators of the third quarter of the fourth century, Moerocles (II), who is known to have proposed at least three decrees,³ and was sufficiently prominent and overtly hostile to Macedon to be one of the ten political leaders whose extradition Alexander demanded in 335 (Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.10.4; Plut. *Demosthenes* 23). Like many other political leaders, Moerocles had a somewhat questionable reputation. Moerocles himself fanned the flames by naming a 'respectable' man as more of a swindler than himself (Aristotle, *Rhetoric* 1411a.15). Moerocles was prosecuted for extorting twenty drachmas apiece from some lessees of the silver mines (Demosthenes 19.293), brought about the imprisonment of Lycurgus' children in 324 (Demosthenes *Epistle* 3.16), and the comedian Timocles

accused him of taking bribes from Harpalus in 324/3 (Timocles, frag. 4 = Athenaeus 8.341e). Moerocles may have retired to Salamis after democracy was abolished in 322/1, if modern scholars are right in their interpretation of the fact that Harpocraton gives Moerocles the surname 'the Salaminian' (Harpocraton s.v. Moerocles), but returned to some prominence in 318/7, proposing a decree of the Eleusinians and the Athenians in the fortress at Eleusis honouring of Xenocles of Sphettus (*IG II*²1191).

Callippus' family was clearly one of the more prominent at the large deme of Eleusis. They can be traced back to Callippus' great-grandfather Moerocles (I), who is known only from his grave stele (*IG II*²6043), but we know that Callippus' grandfather, Euthydemus (I), was honoured for his services as priest of Asclepius (*IG II*²47), and was also named on a votive monument (*IG II*²4962). Moerocles was honoured by his deme of Eleusis in 332/1 (*SEG* 28.103), appears on a dedication to Dionysus at Eleusis – possibly in connection with the fort there (*IG II*²2845), and was named on a catalogue of *diaitetai* in 330/29 (*SEG* 27.124). Callippus' elder (?) brother Euthydemus (II) served as *demarch* of Eleusis ca.300 (*IG II*² 1194 + 1270 = *Hesperia* 8, 1939, pp. 177 ff.), which was presumably a significant career steppingstone given the size and importance of the deme. Euthydemus was also honoured in a decree of the *genos* of the Kerykes for his services as *paredros* of the archon *basileus* at some time in the fourth century (*IG II*² 1230).

Political activity continued into the next generation, with Callippus' son, Archander also having a prominent career as a general. He is named as *stratēgos* τῆς παραλλίας during the 240s in the archonship of Diomedon on an unpublished decree from Rhamnous (Petrakos, 1999b, p. 7), at a time of crisis when the Athenian countryside was 'full of pirates' (Habicht, 2003, p. 54), and made a donation in an important subscription in that same year (*Agora* 16.213, 61). He was also honoured by the Paroikoi in Rhamnous (Petrakos, 1999b, no. 27), and named as general on a dedication made by the *koinon* of those living in Rhamnous (Petrakos, 1999b, no. 28).⁴ Clearly this was a family of some consequence in Hellenistic Athens.

Pausanias' 'Exaggeration' of Callippus' Achievements

The fact that Callippus came from such a prominent political and military family would appear to match Pausanias' information that Callippus served as commander-in-chief of all the Greeks who assembled at Thermopylae in 279 to repel the Celtic invasion. Pausanias (10.20.5) writes:

The Athenian general was Callippus, the son of Moerocles, as I have said in an earlier part of my work, and their forces consisted of all their seaworthy triremes, five hundred horse and one thousand foot. Because of their ancient reputation the Athenians held the chief command.

Whereas eighteenth-century scholars accepted Pausanias' account without question, scholars from the late nineteenth century onwards have doubted the veracity of just about every element of Pausanias' account of Athenian involvement in the campaign against the Celts because it is essentially unparalleled.⁵ This is in stark contrast to the manner in which modern commentators normally treat Pausanias. While Pausanias is by no means the most reliable of sources, modern commentators typically accept his veracity, especially on geographical matters. Thus, Tarn (1913, p. 442) argued that while 'Pausanias' narrative is not to be used blindly . . . the kernel of it is good and from good sources', and Habicht (1998, p. 71) suggests 'though he makes mistakes, the odds, when there is a contradiction, are not that Pausanias is wrong, but that modern scholars are'. In the light of this, it is not that surprising then to find Dreyer (1998, pp. 252–3) criticizing Habicht for doubting Pausanias when he speaks as a *periegete* because he typically enjoys Habicht's trust when he does so. The almost universal denial of Pausanias' information is startling given the lengths that scholars have gone to in order to explain Pausanias' entirely unique claim (1.26.1–3) that Olympiodorus 'recovered' the Piraeus. Every effort has been made to salvage Pausanias' information, with some scholars hypothesizing that Olympiodorus recovered the Piraeus at various points in the 280s,⁶ others arguing in favour of the 290s (Oliver, 2007, p. 61; Bayliss, 2003, p. 140; Gabbert, 1996, pp. 61–3), and others (Habicht, 1979, pp. 95–112; 1997, p. 75; Lanciers, 1987, p. 63; Hammond and Walbank, 1988, p. 203 n. 5) interpreting Pausanias' term ἀνασωσάμενος as meaning 'rescuing' rather than 'recovering',⁷ and dating this to the time of the Four Years War. Dreyer's explanation even requires the Athenians to lose the Piraeus again at an otherwise unattested time in order to accommodate both Pausanias' account and the realities of the Chremonidean War. All this is done despite the fact that some of the same scholars admit that there are strong grounds for doubting Pausanias' account of Olympiodorus' recovery of the Piraeus altogether (Ferguson, 1911a, p. 152 n. 4; Habicht, 1997, p. 75).⁸ While every effort has been made to avoid throwing out the baby with the bathwater when it comes to Olympiodorus and the Piraeus, there is no leeway in the case of Callippus, where it seems that the baby, the bathwater, and even the bath itself have been jettisoned.

The following quotation from the leading scholar on Hellenistic Athens for the last half a century best illustrates the typical view of modern scholars. Habicht (1997, p. 132) writes that Pausanias' account:

is colored by close imitation of Herodotus (since Pausanias treats the invasion of the Celts and the Persians as more or less equivalent), particularly Herodotus' description of the battles at Cape Artemisium and Thermopylae in 480. Pausanias followed Herodotus in his strongly pro-Athenian standpoint [*der bescheidenen athenischen Streitmacht*]. Thus, for example, Pausanias turned Callippus of Eleusis, leader of the modest Athenian contingent, into the supreme commander of the Greek allied forces, and placed every seaworthy ship in the Athenian fleet at the scene. When the Celts bypassed Thermopylae, he gave the Athenian navy the starring role as rescuers of infantry troops, just as Herodotus had made the Athenians, along with the gods, the saviors of Greece in the struggle against Xerxes.

Habicht raises the three main objections that modern scholars typically deploy against Pausanias' account:

- that Pausanias was imitating Herodotus when describing the events at Thermopylae and is therefore unreliable;
- that Callippus was placed in command of the entire allied Greek force;
- that an Athenian fleet was present at the battle.

Each of these issues needs to be addressed in considerable detail, because a closer examination of the evidence suggests that there is more to Pausanias' account than modern scholars typically assume.

Imitating Herodotus?

Modern scholars regularly assert that Pausanias' account was coloured by an imitation of Herodotus.⁹ Undoubtedly Pausanias links the Celtic invasion with Xerxes' invasion. His account also bears some similarity to Herodotus. But how could this be any other way? The similarities between the two accounts exist because of the similarities between the two battles every bit as much as they do because of a conscious attempt by Pausanias to imitate Herodotus. Pausanias and Herodotus both describe large-scale invasions of Greece by foreigners coming from the north. Both describe attempts to

halt the invaders at Thermopylae, and subsequent attacks on Delphi. How can they not be similar when their subject matter is so similar?

The fact that a Greek force attempted to stop Brennus at Thermopylae was surely no exaggeration. Thermopylae was the obvious route into southern Greece, and despite Leonidas' failure there, the subsequent veneration of his famous last stand meant that the pass at Thermopylae became *the* place that Greeks mustered to stop foreign invasions. This was partly because it was the practical place to mount a defence, and partly because of the mystique associated with Leonidas' famous stand, which made Thermopylae a symbol of Greek unity and freedom. One need look no further than the works of Isocrates to see the enduring strength of the imagery of the stand against Xerxes in the face of overwhelming odds (Isocrates, *Panegyricus* 90, 92; *To Philip* 147–8; *Panathenaicus* 187). Aside from Callippus' attempt to hold Thermopylae there were numerous other attempts to block the Hot Gates including a successful Athenian venture against Philip of Macedon in 353 (Diod. 16.38; Justin 8.2.8; Dem. 19.84), and Leosthenes' charge north to Thermopylae to prevent Antipater from entering southern Greece during the Lamian War (Diod. 18.11.5; Pausanias 1.1.3). Callippus' failure against the Celts in 279 did not deter the Aetolians from trying to stop Philip V from entering Greece via Thermopylae in 207 (Livy 28.7.3), or Antiochus the Great from trying to halt the Romans there in 191 (Livy 36.15.5–19.13; Plut. *Cato* 13 f.; Appian, *Syrian Wars* 17ff.). The Greeks reputedly tried to halt an invasion by the Goths there in AD 257 (George Syncellus 1. 715), Alaric passed through Thermopylae in AD 395 (Zosimus 5.5; Eunapius frag. 55), and in AD 540/39 the Slavs forced their way into Greece via the Anopaea pass (Procop. *Goth.* 2.4.10). The near consistent failure to hold the pass did nothing to stop would-be defenders of Greece from trying to better Leonidas.¹⁰ Callippus' stand at Thermopylae is just one of many attempts to follow in Leonidas' footsteps.

Pausanias' decision to treat the two invasions as equivalent is hardly surprising given the similarities between Xerxes' invasion and that of Brennus. It is also vital to remember that Pausanias was by no means the first author to link the two invasions. In fact, Mitchell (2003, p. 282) has gone so far as to describe the linking of the two invasions as 'a commonplace of Hellenistic historiography'. A prime example is Polybius, a historian with a far better reputation than Pausanias, who likewise links the two invasions when describing the character of the Celts as part of his account of the Roman campaigns against the Celts in northern Italy. Hannestad (1993, p. 16) argues:

The Celtic attack on Delphi had by then clearly the same status in the Greek mind as the invasion of the Persians, since Polybius does not comment on his juxtaposition of the two events – it was apparently just as familiar and obvious to the reader as to Polybius himself.

The Celtic invasion was clearly a pivotal moment in Hellenistic history. The Aetolians would later exploit their starring role in defending Delphi against Brennus' forces to make their entry in to the wider Greek world, and accepting two votes on the Amphictyonic Council in the process (Scholten, 2000, p. 30). Antigonos Gonatas exploited a victory over a band of Celts near Lysimacheia in 277 to seize power in Macedon (Justin 25.1.2–10), and Antiochus I 'earned' the epithet 'Saviour' for his victory over yet more bands of Celts in Asia Minor at the so-called Battle of the Elephants (Appian, *Syrian Wars* 65). Even Ptolemy Philadelphus got in on the act, with Callimachus (*Hymn to Delos*) comparing Ptolemy's putting down of a revolt by Celtic mercenaries on an island in the Nile with the repulse of the Celts at Delphi (Mitchell, 2003, p. 283), a claim so spurious as to make Pausanias resemble Thucydides for reliability. Polybius (2.35) goes so far as to claim that the Celtic invasion was 'second to none recorded in history' when it came to 'the obstinacy of the battles fought, and for the number of those who fell and of those who were engaged' – heavy stuff when one considers that he is talking of Xerxes' invasion in the same breath.¹¹ Pausanias (10.19.5, 12) is thus hardly alone in seeing the fighting against the Celts as an event of great significance in Greek history.

Modern scholars typically see Pausanias as the victim of a source with a 'pro-Athenian' bias. Many authors including Timaeus, Phylarchus, and even Demochares of Leuconoe have been suggested as this dodgy 'Atticizing' source,¹² that led Pausanias to exaggerate the Athenian role at Thermopylae. Habicht (1997, p. 133) argues that elements of Pausanias' account (such as the involvement of an Athenian fleet and Callippus' role as supreme commander) were 'invented' by this unreliable writer because he wanted to 'create a further parallel with the events of 480'. His solution is thus to strip away the things that seem exaggerated and keep the parts of Pausanias' story that can be seen to be 'a precise account, rich in concrete and often verifiable details, based on the work of an extremely well-informed contemporary'. This is effectively what Grainger (1999, pp. 101–2) has done, reconstructing the events as Pausanias does, but completely ignoring his references to the Athenians or their fleet:

- The Greeks block the Celts at Thermopylae, and the Celts 'crashed into the Greek army at Thermopylae without success';

- Brennus divides his forces, and sends a detachment to Delphi. This force ‘first threatened to surround the Greeks in the pass, and this sufficed to break up the allied army, and the various contingents left for their homelands’;
- The Aetolians repelled the Celts as they advanced towards Delphi, and pursued them northwards;
- The Athenians and Boeotians joined in the pursuit of the Celts as they retreated (Pausanias 10.23.11). These forces must not have retreated very far from Thermopylae to be in a position to join in the fighting (Grainger, 1999, p. 102 n. 49).¹³

But even if this approach can be followed, can we really justify the claim that either Pausanias or his ‘pro-Athenian’ source made things up entirely? Surely the possibility that one of our primary sources made up an event altogether should be the last possible resort rather than the first choice.¹⁴ Certainly there are signs that Pausanias and his sources were imitating Herodotus, but given the powerful tradition linking the two invasions how can they not? While there are similarities between Pausanias’ accounts of the two invasions, there are very clear differences. For starters, Pausanias sets out to make it clear that the Celtic invasion was more important than that of Xerxes. Pausanias begins (10.19.12) by *contrasting* rather than synthesizing the two invasions:

The spirit of the Greeks was utterly broken, but the extremity of the terror forced them to defend Greece. They realized that the struggle that faced them would not be one for liberty, as it was when they fought the Medes, and that giving water and earth would not bring them safety . . . every man, as well as every state, was convinced that they must either conquer or perish.

For Pausanias’ Greeks this is not Xerxes’ invasion 2.0. Giving earth and water will not make the Celts go away; this is a struggle for their very survival. There are other clear differences, which suggest that Pausanias and his sources are not making things up to mirror Herodotus’ account. The most obvious is the absence of a last stand. Callippus and his men escape from the battlefield on Athenian ships. If this is an attempt by Pausanias or his pro-Athenian source to reinvent the key moments of Brennus’ invasion and to cast Callippus in the role of Leonidas, it is a very poor one.¹⁵ Pausanias does not invent an invading fleet accompanying Brennus to rival Herodotus’ account of Artemisium – he does not mention Artemisium at all when describing Xerxes’ invasion. In fact, the very involvement of Athenians is

the significant difference between the accounts of the two battles, even more so than the special prominence Pausanias gives to the Phocians both at Thermopylae and Delphi.¹⁶ Certainly both the Athenians and the Phocians play important roles in Pausanias' account, but does it really mean that Pausanias or his Atticizing source made things up? Surely we are dealing with overly partial sources rather than completely invented ones. As far as that generation was concerned this was the biggest invasion in Greek history. The Phocians would have been keen to demonstrate that they had redeemed themselves for their pathetic show against Xerxes, and the Athenians would have been anxious to demonstrate their importance in the wider Greek world too. So too were the Aetolians. The problem for Callippus' later reputation is that it was the Aetolian version of the story that prevailed in most of our sources.

It seems more likely that Pausanias' source is tapping into an already existing mindset that linked the two invasions. We have clear evidence that the Greeks – particularly the Athenians – had the Persian Wars in their minds at around the same time as Brennus' invasion, with Chremonides reminding the Athenians in 268/7 that in the not so distant past the Athenians and Spartans had stood together 'against those attempting to enslave the *poieis*', that is against Xerxes and his Persian host. This tendency to hanker back to the old days of the Persian Wars is also demonstrated by the third-century republication of the 'Themistocles decree' at Troezen. The Aetolians too linked their successful defence of Delphi against Brennus with the Persian invasions, casting themselves in the role of the Athenians by setting up shields taken from the Celts in the metopes of the west and south sides of the temple of Apollo in deliberate imitation of the gilded shields the Athenians set up on the east and north sides after their victory over the Persians at Marathon (Pausanias 10.19.4).

Rather than seeing Pausanias' account as containing elements of 'fiction', it would be safer to assume that there is a kernel of truth within Pausanias' account – as indeed scholars typically do outside these particular passages – and that the third-century tendency to equate the Celtic invasion with that of Xerxes led Pausanias' source to be less stringent with the truth than we would otherwise wish he had been. Rather than seeing Pausanias as imitating Herodotus in *content* as modern scholars typically do, it would be better to return to Niebuhr's significantly less damning assertion (1852, vol. 3, p. 242) that Pausanias is imitating Herodotus in terms of *style*. The similarities in the content of the two accounts could then be seen as the natural product of the similarity between the two events, as well as the fact that the two invasions were almost immediately inextricably linked in the

Greek psyche. Herodotean imitation is not reason enough to ignore Pausanias' testimony – we really must look for other reasons to doubt his account altogether.

Callippus the 'Generalissimo'?

Scholars are also highly critical of Pausanias' claim that Callippus was the leader of the combined Greek forces at Thermopylae.¹⁷ Dreyer (1998, pp. 252–3) is perhaps the only modern scholar in recent years to accept Pausanias' claim. Davies' description (1971, p. 165) of Callippus as the 'generalissimo' in 279 appears to be another rare exception to this rule, but the fact that he describes Callippus as 'the Athenian generalissimo' is ambiguous, perhaps suggesting that he does not accept Pausanias' information. But there is no real reason to assume that Callippus could not have been chosen to command the entire Greek force,¹⁸ and certainly not one that is sufficient to justify completely ignoring a primary source. No extant source contradicts Pausanias' information – he is, in fact, our only source on this matter, and the negative response to his information seems to owe more to the tone of criticism that colours accounts of Hellenistic Athens than anything else.

Most modern authors assume that the Aetolians were placed in command merely because they provided the largest contingent of troops. Scholten (2000, p. 33 n. 11) has even cited Pausanias as evidence that the Aetolians were in command, quoting Pausanias as stating that Eurydamus was 'hegemon of the Greek defence'. But Pausanias does not say this at all. Rather, he states that Eurydamus was *hēgēmon* of the *Aetolian* forces (Pausanias 10.16.4).¹⁹ Pausanias earlier described Eurydamus as the *stratēgos* of the Aetolian forces (Pausanias 6.16.1), which surely removes any possibility that the reference in Book 10 is an error. Clearly neither reference contradicts Pausanias' statement that Callippus was *hēgēmon* of the Greek forces at Thermopylae.

Rather than trying to find additional evidence to support Pausanias' claim, it might help to turn this question on its head and ask what evidence there is to support the argument that the Aetolians were in command, an argument that is after all uncorroborated by any ancient source material. Aside from the fact that the most numerous contingents at Thermopylae were those of the Boeotians and the Aetolians there is not a scrap of evidence to suggest they were in command at Thermopylae. There are actually rather clear reasons to suggest that they would not have been chosen for overall command. First we have their long-term reputation for unreliability. Until

this time the Aetolians had stood on the fringes of the Greek world.²⁰ Thucydides claimed that the Aetolians of his day considered piracy an occupation of which to be proud (Thucydides 1.5), while Polybius (admittedly not exactly the most reliable source when it comes to the Aetolians) described (4.3.1) the Aetolians as,

accustomed to live on their neighbours, and their natural ostentation required abundant means to support it. Enslaved by this passion they live a life as predatory as that of wild beasts, respecting no tie of friendship and regarding every one as an enemy to be plundered.

Polybius even has the *Macedonian* king, Philip V, question the Greek identity of the Aetolians (18.4.8–5.8),²¹ a fine case of the pot calling the kettle black! Only a few years before Brennus invaded, the Athenians had been asking the divine Demetrius Poliorcetes to rid Greece of the Aetolian sphinx (Athenaeus 6.253b–f), and the Aetolians themselves had been the subject of more than one sacred war over their occupation of Delphi. The most recent was in 281 against the Spartans (Justin 24.1), less than two years before the Celts arrived in Greece.²² Given their dubious status in the Greek world, why would the other Greeks have trusted the Aetolians with the overall command? If we consider that the pass at Thermopylae did not even protect Aetolian territory, their reputation for unreliability becomes more even crucial. Brennus clearly recognized that he could attack Aetolia without forcing the pass at Thermopylae, and sent a force to attack their territory to draw their soldiers away. That his tactic worked is certainly food for thought.²³ The fact that the Aetolians were at pains to set up their dedications at the temple of Apollo at Delphi to emulate those set up by the Athenians after the Battle of Marathon may have been aimed squarely at the Athenians because they had been denied the leadership of the Greek forces. Whereas Callippus the Generalissimo had been defeated by Brennus, and forced to make an ignominious retreat, the Aetolians were triumphant, and clearly wanted to rub the Athenians' noses in it.²⁴

We also need to consider the impact that placing the Aetolians in command might have had on the rest of the Greeks. The invasion of the Celts was a serious threat to all the Greeks. Brennus led so many soldiers into Greece that they really needed every state to contribute troops to defend southern Greece. Even though the Greeks assembled more than 23,000 foot and over 1,500 horsemen at Thermopylae (another significant variation from the account of Xerxes' invasion), they were still completely

outnumbered by the Celtic invaders. This numerical disparity could have been overcome (to an extent) if the Peloponnesians had sent armies to Thermopylae. But they did not. They were, in fact, 'conspicuous by their absence' (Scholten, 2000, p. 35), aside from a small force of hoplites sent by the Patraeans (Paus. 7.18.5). Athens and Megara were the most southern of the Greek *poleis* to send significant forces to help repel the Celts. The Spartan absence was particularly conspicuous given the decision to defend Greece at Thermopylae. The opportunity to relive past glories must have been appealing – only a few years earlier the Spartans had attempted to revive their old place as the protectors of Greek liberty and expel the Aetolians from Delphi (Justin 24.1). But they had had their fingers' burnt with the Locrians fighting against their would-be liberators. Their failures would only have served to intensify the hostility the Spartans felt towards the Aetolians. The Boeotians would have been equally unpalatable to the Spartans given their long history of animosity.

In these circumstances, it is entirely possible that the Athenians were placed in charge of the allied force in an attempt to make it more palatable for the Spartans and other Peloponnesians to send a force to Thermopylae. The Athenians and the Spartans had stood together in leadership against the Persians (as Chremonides would later emphasize), which is presumably partly what Pausanias means by the 'ancient reputation' of Athens being the reason for choosing Callippus as generalissimo. So placing an Athenian in command may have been aimed squarely at the Spartans and their allies. That the Spartans did not send a force to help repel the Celts perhaps indicates the degree of ill will they bore towards the Aetolians.²⁵

The choice of an Athenian in overall command thus seems considerably more plausible. It is also rather reminiscent of the last great Panhellenic alliance against Macedon in the Lamian War, when Leosthenes held the supreme command of the Greek forces (Pausanias 1.1.3). Leosthenes' role in the Lamian War may have also been in Pausanias' mind when he wrote that Callippus was chosen to command the Greeks because of the 'ancient reputation' of the Athenians. The choice of Callippus may have been a largely symbolic gesture designed to conjure up images of the fifth-century salvation of Greece, and the last great attempt to stop the Macedonians. As the son of a well-known orator and prominent politician who often served Athens in important diplomatic endeavours,²⁶ Callippus was clearly a suitably able and prominent leader to be placed in charge of the allied force. The fact that the Athenians commissioned the artist Olbiades to paint a portrait of him in the council chamber to commemorate his

achievements (Pausanias 1.3.5) confirms his prominence. Dreyer (1998, pp. 252–3) claims that the portrait confirms that Callippus was in command of the entire Greek army. But this is stretching the evidence too far. Pausanias does not state that Callippus was in command of all the Greeks when he describes the portrait. He actually describes Callippus as the leader of the Athenians. But it is worth bearing in mind the possibility that Pausanias gained more information from this portrait than he explains in his account. Pausanias is usually thought to be citing a decree when he explains the details of Olympiodorus' career.²⁷ Perhaps the portrait in the council chamber was accompanied by an inscription that provided Pausanias with considerably more reliable information than modern scholars usually consider to be the case.

The Fleet That Cannot Be?

If the Herodotean overtones are no real obstacle to accepting Pausanias' account, and Callippus could really have been the commander at Thermopylae, then we have only one remaining objection to consider: Pausanias' reference to the Athenian warships. Commentators in the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries accepted this aspect of Pausanias' account without question. But since Beloch (1904, vol. 4, pp. 452 ff.) objected on the grounds that Athens no longer had control of the Piraeus, this aspect of the account has been dismissed as at best 'curious' (Bugh, 1988, p. 188), or at worst a downright fabrication.²⁸ Modern scholars dismiss the story for two reasons:

- the inscription (*IG* II² 680) from ca. 246/5 announcing Athens' response to an Aetolian invitation to the festival of the *Sōtēria* – games instituted to commemorate the successful repulse of the Celts – mentions that the Athenians sent cavalry and *epilektoi* to fight against the Celts, but makes no mention of ships (*IG* II² 680, 12–13);
- the Athenians cannot have a fleet because the Piraeus is occupied by Antigonos' garrison.

Both of these reasons need to be discussed fully, because there is considerable cause to doubt this scholarly consensus.

The Athenian decree announcing Athens' response to the Aetolian invitation to the festival of the *Sōtēria*, which was proposed by Cybernis, son of Cydias, of Halimous, whose father died in the fighting at Thermopylae (Pausanias 10.21.5), begins with:

Since the *koinon* of the Aetolians (showing reverence to the gods) have resolved to set up the *Sôtēria* games to Zeus *Sôtēr* and Pythian Apollo, in memory of the battle against the barbarians, who were marching against the Greeks and the sanctuary of Apollo common to the Greeks, when the *dēmos* sent both *epilektoi* and horsemen to fight for common salvation. (*IG* II² 680, 5–13).

It was Droysen (1878, vol. 2, p. 348 n. 1) who first observed that there is no mention of the fleet in this inscription, although he does not seem to have been overly troubled by the omission. But after Beloch observed the same discrepancy, Pausanias' account began to be seriously questioned. Soon Ferguson (1911a, p. 158 n. 3) was arguing, 'the ships are not mentioned [in *IG* II² 680] where they could not have been missing'. By the end of the twentieth century this line of thought had become standard to the extent that Habicht (1997, p. 133) could argue, 'Cybernis' decree makes no mention of the fleet; its participation must have been invented by a later writer who wished to create a further parallel with the events of 480'.²⁹

On the surface this seems simple enough. But there is more to this inscription than meets the eye. First, the decree dates to some thirty years after the events it describes. Secondly, it is not an eyewitness account of the Athenian contribution to the Celtic invasion, and it does not mention the battle at Thermopylae at all. The decree is in fact a formal response to an invitation from the Aetolians to participate in the *Sôtēria* games that were instituted to celebrate the Aetolians' successful repulse of the Celts at Delphi. It is vital to remember that the Athenians are not only accepting the invitation, but also attempting to demonstrate that Athens is entitled to share in the glory of defending *Delphi*. Thus the decree has nothing to do with Thermopylae. The Athenian response bears a strong similarity to responses from Chios, Tenos and Teos. The date and context of the various documents accepting Aetolian invitations to participate in the *Sôtēria* games has been more than adequately discussed by several scholars.³⁰ But it is worth examining, a few particulars about these documents, especially the Athenian.

Each of the surviving documents responding to Aetolian invitations emphasizes the fact that the target of the Celtic invasion was 'the sanctuary of Apollo common to the Greeks'. Thus the Athenian decree speaks of the Celts as 'the barbarians who were marching against the Greeks *and the sanctuary of Apollo common to the Greeks*' (9–11). The contemporary documents prioritize the attack on Delphi, which is not surprising given that each relates to an invitation to the *Sôtēria* games, which celebrate the salvation of

Delphi – not Greece as a whole. Brennus attacked Delphi, and the Aetolians saved the Panhellenic sanctuary almost single-handedly. The Aetolians thus saved Greece, and that is how the majority of the ancient sources prioritize matters.³¹ We are clearly dealing with Aetolian ‘spin’ here. Several of the documents more contemporary with Cybernus’ decree focus even more closely on the attack on Delphi itself. Thus the document from Chios prioritizes Delphi over Greece by referring to ‘the barbarians who marched against the sanctuary of Apollo, and against the Greeks’ (*Syll.*³ 402, 6–8), while the Smyrna document (*FD* III 1. 483) focuses on ‘the sanctuary of Apollo common to the Greeks’ (1–2), and emphasizes the role of Apollo in the salvation of Delphi (4). Likewise a much earlier Coan decree from 278 mentions the general threat to the rest of Greece, but makes it clear that the attack on Delphi was more important, and that Delphi was the site where the attack been halted due to the divine epiphany of Apollo (*Syll.*³ 398, 4–8).

The Athenians are the only ones who mention their own contribution to the war effort, because unlike the Chians, Tenians, and Teians, the Athenians actually fought against the Celts. Cybernus, whose father died fighting the Celts, is at pains to point out that the Athenians sent ‘both *epilektoi* and horsemen to fight for common salvation’ in the official response to the Aetolians. But aside from this there are very few differences between the documents, which are particularly formulaic. This was clearly not the time and place for Cybernus to mention the details of the defeat at Thermopylae, and it was certainly not the time to mention the fleet, which would only serve to remind the reader that at the same time that the Aetolians were earning their place at the forefront of the Greek world by rescuing Apollo’s sanctuary with the god’s assistance, the Athenians were beating a hasty retreat from the Hot Gates. The Athenians had no involvement in the fighting at Delphi. Despite the supposed pro-Athenian tendencies of Pausanias and his sources, Pausanias makes it clear that only after sending scouts to Delphi to learn what had happened there did the Athenians again take the field against the Celts (10.23.11) after the disaster at Thermopylae. By mentioning the land forces they sent to fight against the Celts – the very land forces that Pausanias describes being defeated at Thermopylae before Delphi was saved, and those who fought the remaining Celts *after* Delphi was saved – the Athenian document is stretching the meaning of the reference to ‘the barbarians who were marching against the Greeks’ to its limits in order to imply that they actually shared in the salvation of Delphi. There is no cause to mention Thermopylae here. Not only would doing so draw attention to a battle that the Aetolians, their generous new hosts, had

abandoned, it would also draw attention to the Athenian defeat at Thermopylae, which would have been inappropriate given that the document refers to the victory over the Celts. The decree thus proves to be no barrier to accepting Pausanias' mention of Athenian ships in support of the army at Thermopylae, because the decree does not relate to Thermopylae at all. The argument is a non-starter.

The only remaining barrier to the Athenians manning ships at Thermopylae is the argument that the Athenians could not have had a fleet due to Antigonus' occupation of the Piraeus (Nachtergaele, 1977, pp. 143–4). But it is hard to believe that the loss of the Piraeus would have completely ended Athenian naval ambitions. Athens was still a sovereign state surrounded by the sea, and it would have been foolhardy for the Athenians to offer their considerable coastline no form of protection from pirates or foreign raiders. After all, there was the threat posed by the large Macedonian force in the Piraeus, and more Macedonian troops at Cape Sounion. It is untenable Athenians still boasted a large fleet of warships. But there were other harbours in Attica (cf. *IG* II² 654, 29–30 which refers to 'the harbours of the *polis*'), and there is considerable circumstantial evidence suggesting that the Athens had some sort of naval resources at their disposal in the 270s and 260s. These snippets of information come from the time that Antigonus Gonatas had a secure hold on the Piraeus, which suggests that the Athenians were deploying naval ships out of other harbours in Attica, for example modern Vouliagmeni (near the demes of Halae Aexonides, Anagyrous and Aexone),³² Porto Rapti (adjacent to Stereia and Prasiae, and close to Myrrhinous), Rhamnous and Eleusis. Significantly, each of these harbours is adjacent to a well-established fortified camp, or the rubble camps, which date between the 280s and the time of the Chremonidean War.³³ The fleet mentioned by Pausanias could have been docked (and even built)³⁴ at any or all of these locations. The clues pointing to the existence of Athenian naval resources at this time are as follows.

First, an inscription from ca. 266/5 (*SEG* 25.186, 11), refers to a magistrate whose title ends in *πλοῦ τῶν ναυτικῶν*. The term *ναυτικῶν* can only be a reference to some sort of naval office. Habicht (2000–3) recently suggested the office should be restored as *[ἐπιμελητῆς (-ταὶ) τοῦ] πλοῦ τῶν ναυτικῶν*. The term 'plou' is unclear, but is undoubtedly nautical in sense.³⁵ Secondly, the Athenians regained the island of Lemnos in 280. Their control of an island more than 200 km from Attica must have required some naval resources. The Athenians also appear to have sent a force of horsemen there, which again implies significant naval resources. On the basis of a decree from 280/79 honouring Comeas of Lamptrae, the

'hipparch to Lemnos' (*IG* II² 672), Bugh (1988, p.188) argued that the despatch of Comeas would have necessitated an increase in the number of Athenian *hippeis*, 'some of whom would have been expected to serve with this commander during his tenure on Lemnos'. This force could only have travelled by sea, and would have required a considerable fleet.³⁶ At the very least the Athenians must have sent Comeas to Lemnos in some sort of official ship. They can hardly have sent him on a private trading ship!³⁷ Thirdly, the Athenians are known to have sent several embassies to Ptolemy in Egypt, which secured donations of large amounts of silver. Such shipments again could only have been transported by sea, and it seems rather unlikely that they would have been using hired vessels for such journeys. Fourthly, a fragmentary inscription from the time of the Chremonidean War (*Agora* 16.19),³⁸ which seems to be honouring a Spartan, appears to contain a reference to a donation relating to warships. Line 14 reads: [— — εἰς τὰς ν]αῦς ἐπ[έ]δωκε[ν — —]. Finally, a fragmentary papyrus may refer to the general Olympiodorus sending a ὑπηρέτης (possibly a seaman?) with a message for a Macedonian in the Piraeus (*P. Herc.* 1418, column 33). The reference to 'generals' is typically interpreted as indicating that Olympiodorus was with an army, but the possibility that the messenger was a rower might just as easily indicate that Olympiodorus and the generals were with a fleet. The text reads: 'a servant (ὑπηρέτης) of the generals was sent bearing letters from Olympi[o]dorus <and> me'. Byrne (2006/7, p. 173 n. 25) has recently established a date of 281/0 for Olympiodorus' generalship, which would fit with the Athenians having a small naval presence at Thermopylae only two years later.³⁹

The Fleet That Could Be after All?

Individually, these snippets would not count for much. But together they suggest that the Athenians had some limited naval resources at the time of the Celtic invasion. The fact that Pausanias refers to the Athenian deploying 'all the seaworthy' triremes (δύναμις δὲ τριήρεις τε <αἱ> πλώιμοι πᾶσαι) is perhaps the most crucial piece of evidence from his account (Pausanias 10.20.5). Such a statement implies that the Athenians were eking out what limited resources they possessed. It also implies that they possessed a number of ships that were not seaworthy, which fits with the fact that the Athenians no longer had access to the first class docking facilities at the Piraeus. Presumably their flotilla was poorly maintained because they lacked the excellent shipyards at Zea and Mounychia. Other harbour facilities at

Vouligameni, Rhamnous or even Stereia would never have proved an adequate replacement for the facilities at the Piraeus.

The involvement of a small Athenian fleet means that the strategy Callippus employed makes tactical sense. When Xerxes invaded Greece, his fleet accompanied his troops as they marched south. The Greek fleet accompanied their own hoplites and tried to interrupt the advance of the Persians by engaging their fleet in several battles. Employing ships to accompany their troops in 279 would have assisted communications with the southern Greeks, and would have been useful in moving troops quickly. As it turned out the presence of the fleet was vital in extricating the Greek hoplites from the battlefield (Pausanias 1.4.3; 10.22.12). Otherwise the Athenians and their allies would have been slaughtered as Leonidas and his companions had been in 480.

The presence of an Athenian fleet at Thermopylae would also remove another sticking point for accepting Pausanias' claim that Callippus was the commander-in-chief: the small size of the Athenian contingent compared to the Aetolians and Boeotians. Pausanias states that the Athenians only sent 1,000 picked hoplites and 500 cavalry to Thermopylae. But if we trust the rest of his story that the Athenians sent a flotilla to support the army at Thermopylae, the small size of their army is more explicable. Each trireme needed 170 rowers, 16 deck crew, and 14 hoplites to serve as marines (Morrison, 1996, p. 345). If the Athenians committed a flotilla of about 20 triremes at Thermopylae, it would mean an additional 4,000 Athenian citizens were present at the battle. Between 322 and 300 the Athenians regularly maintained a flotilla of between 20 and 30 warships, so a figure of twenty ships would be plausible, particularly given that Pausanias nowhere implies that the Athenian fleet was particularly sizable.⁴⁰ If the Athenians scraped together perhaps ten more 'seaworthy' triremes to support their troops, this would mean the Athenians sent some 7,500 men to Thermopylae, which would put their contingent on a par with the Boeotians and the Aetolians. The choice of Callippus as 'generalissimo' would no longer be at all unlikely, particularly in light of the starring role the fleet seems to have played in extricating the troops from the field of battle.

It is worth returning to Grainger's reconstruction of events. If we supplement his key steps (in italics), we can see that this reconstruction of the events actually lends support to Pausanias' account of the Athenian naval operations:

- The Greeks block the Celts at Thermopylae, and the Celts 'crashed into the Greek army at Thermopylae without success';

- Brennus divides his forces, and sends a detachment to Delphi. This force 'first threatened to surround the Greeks in the pass, and this sufficed to break up the allied army, and the various contingents left for their homelands'. *The Aetolians return to their homelands at the same time as the Greek position at Thermopylae is turned. The Athenian ships then evacuate the remaining soldiers from the pass;*
- The Aetolians repelled the Celts as they advanced towards Delphi and pursued them northwards;
- The *recently evacuated* Athenians and Boeotians joined in the pursuit of the Celts as they retreated (Pausanias 10.23.11). These forces must not have retreated very far from Thermopylae to be in a position to join in the fighting (Grainger, 1999, p. 102 n. 49).

If the Athenians, Boeotians and others were extracted from Thermopylae by ships that were heavily laden down by the troops on board, they would not have wanted to travel very far. Presumably they sailed as far as it was necessary for safety, and then disembarked. Rankin (1987, p. 90) suggested a similar sequence of events, and observed:

The doubt is based on silence, after all; and unless the whole scene at Pylae has been grossly exaggerated, the Athenians would have suffered as famous a massacre at the hands of the Celts as the Spartans did in 480, if ships had not come to take them off.

It is worth noting that in his discussion of Pausanias' claims about Callippus being the *Athenian* general, and that the Athenians sent troops and horsemen to Thermopylae, Habicht (1997, p. 133) observes:

All these facts have been verified: Callippus was really the son of Moerocles and a member of a prominent family from Eleusis. An assembly decree of 246/5 responding to an invitation from the Aetolians to the festival of the Soteria was introduced by none other than Cydias' son Cybernis . . . The decree also confirms that a contingent from Athens took part in the fighting against the Celts, for it mentions that the city sent the cavalry and the corps of elite soldiers known as the *epilektoi*.

If this much of Pausanias' account can be rescued, then we must think a bit more carefully before we discard his account of the involvement of the Athenian fleet.

I am by no means suggesting that we should accept all of Pausanias' account at face value. That would mean being overly generous where others have been overly cautious. Certainly there is exaggeration. His portrayal (10.21.4) of Athenian slingers onboard the triremes coasting through the mud to wreak 'unspeakable distress' amongst the Celts seems a little overblown. Perhaps it would be preferable to stick with Pausanias' initial unelaborated account (1.4.2–3), which makes no mention of Athenian slingers hurling their bullets at the deranged Celts. This simple version is quite plausible:

The Athenians, although they were more exhausted than any of the Greeks by the long Macedonian war, and had been generally unsuccessful in their battles, nevertheless set forth to Thermopylae with such Greeks that joined them, having made the Callippus I mentioned their general. Occupying the pass where it was narrowest, they tried to keep the barbarians from entering Greece; but the Celts, having discovered the path by which Ephialtes of Trachis once led the Persians, overwhelmed the Phocians stationed there and crossed Oeta unperceived by the Greeks. Then it was that the Athenians put the Greeks under the greatest obligation, and although outflanked, offered resistance to the barbarians on two sides. But the Athenians in the fleet suffered most, for the Lamian gulf is a swamp near Thermopylae – the reason being, I think, the hot water here that runs into the sea. These then were more distressed; for taking the Greeks on board they were forced to sail through the mud weighted as they were by arms and men.

When Pausanias first refers to the battle at Thermopylae against the Celts here, he provides few details, noting only that Callippus was the general of the Greeks, that the Greeks were surrounded by the Celts, and that they had to be evacuated by sea. Not surprisingly he observed that the Athenians in the ships had a difficult time since their ships were weighed down because of the extra men they had to carry. There is a minor, and entirely understandable, reference to Herodotus' account of Xerxes' invasion, and Callippus' place is explicable, as is the presence of Athenian warships. Moreover, this account also does little to glorify the Athenian part in the war effort that cannot be explained by Pausanias' aside regarding the portrait of Callippus in the council chamber. This should perhaps be seen as the 'kernel' of truth in Pausanias' account that Habicht, Tarn, and others have sought all along.

After Thermopylae

Callippus continued to have a distinguished career after the Celtic invasion in the military and diplomatic sphere. Callippus was clearly connected with many of the most important figures of the second quarter of the third century, including Aristides of Lamprae and Chremonides' brother Glaucon. The old guard of the ilk of Olympiodorus and Phaedrus of Sphettus may have led off the revolt against Demetrius Poliorcetes, but it was a new generation of political leaders including the orators Agyrrhius of Collytus, Phytius of Thoricus, and Chremonides of Aethalidae, and the generals Aristides of Lamprae, Chremonides' brother Glaucon, and Callippus himself who spearheaded Athenian politics in the 270s and 260s.

The disaster at Thermopylae clearly did not harm Callippus' reputation. If Pausanias' description of the portrait of Callippus in the council chamber was not adequate testimony of his continued reputation, the Chremonides decree indicates that when Athens made an alliance with Sparta and Ptolemy Philadelphus, Callippus was one of two Athenians who were elected as *synedroi* (*Syll.*³ 434/5, 70). The other was probably Glaucon, Chremonides' brother (Habicht, 1997, p. 144). This places Callippus at the centre of Athens' second great venture of the third century – the Chremonidean War – a great war for freedom against Macedon. Given his role as the generalissimo against the Celts, the Athenians' choice of Callippus is not surprising. Callippus' duties as one of the two *synedroi* are not specified, but the decree does indicate that they 'are to take care of the common interest' (*Syll.*³ 434/5, 69 ff.). Presumably Callippus and his colleague consulted with King Areus, the Spartans and their allies regarding the conduct of the Chremonidean War. This important task required an Athenian of considerable prestige given the unusual prominence of Areus at Sparta. Areus achieved such a strong position at Sparta that he even minted silver coinage (he was the first Spartan to do so) with the words 'of King Areus' on the obverse and the image of Alexander on the reverse.⁴¹ Areus received honours from Elis (Pausanias 5.5.1; 6.7.5; 6.15.9), Orchomenus in Arcadia (*ISEI*.54), two Cretan communities (Cartledge and Spawforth, 1989, p. 36), and even Ptolemy Philadelphus (*Syll.*³ 433). The fact that Areus, the Agiad king, is mentioned personally in the Chremonides decree without any reference to his Eurypontid counterpart, provides further evidence of Areus' prestige (Cartledge and Spawforth, 1989, p. 36). Given Callippus' track record as the general who led what was Athens' sole foreign campaign in several decades,⁴² he would have had sufficient experience and clout to deal with Areus as a relative equal.

Callippus' continued prominence during the Chremonidean War is confirmed by a frustratingly brief inscription from Orchomenus in Arcadia, which indicates that Callippus served as an envoy to Orchomenus at the time of the Chremonidean War (*ISEI*.53). The Athenian declaration of war indicates that Orchomenus was one of the key *poleis* allied to Ptolemy, Sparta and Athens, so it seems likely that this diplomatic activity was related to the war and his duties as *synedros* (*Syll.*³ 434/5, 24, 39). Callippus' service as envoy to the Orchomenians is ample testimony to his importance at this time. So too is the fact that the experienced generals Aristides of Lamprae and Glaucôn of Aethalidae were his fellow ambassadors. All three were honoured with the titles of *proxenos* and *euergetēs* for their goodwill to Orchomenus. The fact that the Orchomenians also honoured the Spartan king, Areus, with a statue (*ISEI*.54) serves to place the honours for Callippus in context. Clearly Orchomenus was a centre of diplomacy, and an important ally against Antigonos Gonatas. Callippus' involvement is a clear measure of the trust the Athenians felt for the man who had led their forces to Thermopylae against the Celts, and whose achievements earned him a portrait in the council chamber.

Unfortunately our sources for the Chremonidean War are limited,⁴³ and we have no further details for the career of Callippus after the 260s. It seems more than likely that his career dwindled after the abolition of democracy at the end of the Chremonidean War. Athens' submission to Antigonos Gonatas brought about serious changes. The Athenians were forced to accept a Macedonian garrison in the Museum (Pausanias 3.6.6; Apollodorus, *FGrHist.* 244 F44), and for the next few years at least the Athenians were subject to the will of Antigonos.⁴⁴ Given the political climate it seems unlikely that a man who had played such a prominent role in the Chremonidean War would have been able to maintain any sort of political power. Indeed, Callippus' contemporaries Glaucôn and Chremonides are known to have left Athens altogether to serve as 'assessors and advisors' at the courts of Ptolemy Philadelphus and Ptolemy Euergetes (Teles 23H). We are in the dark as to what happened to Callippus. But the fact that his son Archander would go on to have a successful military career, reaching the heights of *stratēgos* τῆς παραλίας, suggests that the family stayed put in Athens after the defeat at the hands of Antigonos Gonatas and the imposition of a Macedonian garrison in the city of Athens itself. Perhaps this fact might serve those who wish to push the line of thought that the regime imposed by Antigonos Gonatas was not nearly as undemocratic as has traditionally been seen to be the case. It is perhaps fitting given the modern denigration of Hellenistic Athens that the career of one of the

shining lights of the first half of the third century disappears into such obscurity. In his own day Callippus was one of the most important men in his city. Today, like the Athens that he called home, he is virtually unknown outside of a relatively small circle of experts. It is to be lamented that those who know of his career have seen fit to doubt his achievements for such tenuous reasons.

Conclusion

This book has firmly rejected both the notion that Athenian politics came to a shuddering halt in 322 with the death of Demosthenes and the imposition of a Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus, and the line of thought that genuine advocates of democracy and oligarchy cannot be found in Hellenistic Athens. It has examined the politics of the early years of Hellenistic Athens in order to demonstrate the similarities between Classical and Hellenistic Athens. This is not to say that there was no difference between politics in Hellenistic and Classical Athens; such a line of thought would be absurd. The intention, rather, has been to demonstrate that there was political continuity in terms of ideology, institutions, and personnel, and that the notion that Hellenistic Athens and her political leaders were *radically* different from their Classical counterparts is fundamentally flawed. In short, Hellenistic Athens was a city where one could find real democracy, with real democratic institutions, and where one could see real supporters of democracy, real supporters of oligarchy, and people who fitted somewhere in between.

The first part of this book demonstrated that the origins of the idea that there was a qualitative difference between Classical and Hellenistic Athens lie in an intellectual discourse that was tied to the agendas of particular intellectual debates in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, rather than a context that would be considered appropriate within the modern disciplines of classics and ancient history. The origin of the negative comparison of Hellenistic Athens to Classical Athens lies not in the context of the modern methodology of comparative thought, but rather the intellectual debates of the eighteenth century, in which political commentators were probing antiquity for political models as alternatives to *ancien régime* Europe.

For the commentators who haggled over the merits of both Athens and Sparta as alternatives to the status quo of modern Europe in the so-called Athens–Sparta debate, Hellenistic Athens had no appeal as a potential role model. For the Laconophiles, the Athenians who cast Phocion's remains unburied outside the borders of Attica, rejected the enlightened

philosophical tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum, and worshipped Demetrius Poliorcetes as a god were little different from their wild Classical predecessors who heeded the advice of Cleon over that of Nicias, condemned the Arginusae generals, and forced Socrates to drink the hemlock. For the 'Athenophiles' who ultimately prevailed in that intellectual debate, the Hellenistic Athenians were nothing but a travesty when compared to the victors at Marathon and Salamis, or even the losers at Aegospotami. Subject to the whims of their Macedonian benefactors and overlords, the Hellenistic Athenians could never be seen as positive political role models. But this way of thinking should not be affecting the responses of modern classicists to Hellenistic Athens. Nor should the naïvety of nineteenth-century responses to the notion that ancient Greeks would willingly worship mortal men as gods, or their racially charged visions of Macedon and the Orient still be influencing modern scholarship. In fact, the nineteenth-century unease regarding Athenian submission to Macedonians should make the majority of modern scholars very uncomfortable indeed. Nor should we be influenced by late nineteenth- and twentieth-century visions of antiquity, which saw Anglo-German hostilities and the tensions reflected in accounts of the tensions between Athens and Macedon. Nonetheless the view of Macedonians and the Hellenistic successors as 'others' is still to be found in modern scholarship. But we should beware projecting modern analogies onto past actions: the Macedonians are not Nazi Germans any more than the Athenians of Pericles' or Demosthenes' day are the citizens of modern Britain or America.

Such value-laden comparisons have clearly affected modern views of Hellenistic Athens and its political leaders. That the Athenians who deified the Macedonian Demetrius Poliorcetes, or allowed him to reside in the Parthenon with his entourage of courtesans, are somehow inferior to those Athenians who listened to Pericles or Demosthenes in the assembly is a moral judgement that has no place in modern scholarship. By pinpointing the racially charged origins of this line of thought, this book has sought to undermine the notion of a difference between the character of Classical and Hellenistic Athens, and as a consequence, to challenge the resulting implication that post-Classical Athens is somehow less worthy of scholarly and popular interest.

No serious historian would advocate evaluating the place of modern Britain through the distorted lens of colonial Britain – the modern state would obviously fail to measure up to such an exacting imperial standard. So why should we subject post-Classical Athens to such treatment? Late

twentieth-century Britain should not (and probably will not) be seen as less relevant for study than imperial Britain by historians of the future, so why should we condemn Hellenistic Athens as less important than Classical Athens? If we must compare Hellenistic Athens to Classical Athens, then we should leave our moral judgements and our own politics at the door, and make such a comparison with the context of both societies clearly in mind. The second part of this book took such an approach, setting out to demonstrate continuity between the political institutions and practices of Classical and Hellenistic Athens against the background of Macedonian imperialism.

With this in mind, it is worth pondering what an Athenian citizen from Pericles' day would have thought of Hellenistic Athens. Modern scholars are right to think that much that he would see would appal him, such as the Macedonian garrison in the Piraeus, the almost complete absence of an Athenian navy or the loss of all the empire except for Lemnos. How could he not be horrified by these changes? But the overwhelming emotion afflicting our visitor from Periclean Athens would be confusion, because the situation in which he would find Athens would be unfathomable. He could never have imagined that the Macedonian state could grow to the extent that it would be capable of toppling the Persian Empire. Nor could he have foreseen the complete collapse of Spartan power, the razing of Thebes to the ground, or the Epirots and Aetolians playing a prominent role in the Greek world. The place Athens held within the Hellenistic world would baffle him. His Athens was a superpower in the Greek world; to him, Hellenistic Athens would more resemble the dependent democracies within the Athenian empire he knew.

But what would our Periclean visitor make of the city of Athens itself? What would he think of the day-to-day running of the Athenian state? He would walk through the streets of a city that still called itself a democracy, and still allowed all its citizens to participate in the running of the state at meetings of the assembly, the council and the law courts. He would find a city that still published decisions made by the people on stone for all to see, and that still held its political leaders accountable for their actions while in office. He would even find a hard-core group of Athenians ready to act against democracy if the opportunity were to arise, as well as a group of fanatics who would shout 'stone the oligarchs' if they tried. Our Periclean visitor would find a city that was chosen to lead the Greeks against a massive barbarian invasion, and a city that fought with the Spartans against a foreign enemy threatening Greek freedom and independence. By these criteria Hellenistic Athens would more than measure up to the Classical ideals.

The third part of this book explored the modern scholarly reception of the political activities of three leading figures in Hellenistic Athenian history: Phocion, Stratocles and Callippus. What would our hypothetical visitor from Periclean Athens have made of their careers? In the case of Phocion he would recognize a Laconizer hostile to democracy not unlike Nicias. But he would also see a man who betrayed the trust of his fellow citizens. It is difficult to imagine that a fifth-century Athenian would have lamented his demise. In Stratocles he would have seen a democratic orator with the audacity of a Cleon or an Alcibiades, but one who ultimately went too far in pandering to Demetrius Poliorcetes' whims. In Callippus, the leader of a Panhellenic force against invading barbarians, he would see a general and ambassador broadly resembling some of the leaders of his own day.

Certainly he would have been aghast at Athens' loss of power and prestige, but we could say the same of a hypothetical visitor from Pitt's Great Britain to today's United Kingdom. But such observations are irrelevant in determining the value of either society as a subject for academic study. A more useful way to assess post-Classical Athens might be in terms of its value to a modern audience as a means of thinking about the modern world. In justifying his fascination with fourth-century Athenian democracy in preference to Periclean democracy, Paul Millett (2000, p. 354) described the Athens of Demosthenes as

a post-war, post-imperial society, with limited public resources, in which political leaders were not an entrenched élite, but were perpetually accountable to public opinion; and where in straitened circumstances, the sense of priorities ordained that the democratic system should be buttressed by the substantial reallocation of wealth from rich to poor.

Millett was clearly thinking of fourth-century Athens' value as a frame of reference for understanding modern British society. One could argue that the fate of the less free democratic Athens in the Hellenistic period is even more relevant in our time than its imperialist counterpart. Perhaps the manner in which the Hellenistic Athenians coped with a new world order having lost their empire having lost any true independence in foreign policy, and knowing that their only lasting imperial legacy was the spread of their language by a new world superpower they considered to be culturally deficient and unable to speak their language properly could be seen as particularly relevant to those who seek to understand our own world?

Notes

Introduction

- ¹ Liddel (2007, p. 90) argues, ‘Ober, Hansen, and others advocate Athens’s defeat in the Lamian War in 322 and the date of the last preserved piece of forensic oratory as a convenient cut-off point for the study of Athenian democracy’. A very recent example of the tendency to use 322 as a cut-off point is Robin Osborne’s *Athens and Athenian Democracy* (2010). There is no room for the big names of Hellenistic Athens such as Phocion, Stratocles, Demochares or Chremonides in this thorough reappraisal of Athenian democracy. A rare exception to the rule that surveys of Athenian politics or democracy end in 322 is Harris’ monograph (2006) which discusses the continuity of democratic institutions into the Hellenistic period.
- ² Aside from that of Plutarch, and Cornelius Nepos’ short biography of Phocion, Demetrius of Phalerum’s lost work on Socrates almost certainly contained a detailed study of Phocion.
- ³ Lamberton provides no evidence whatsoever to justify this claim. It may indeed be the case, but some evidence would be helpful.
- ⁴ Fisher Ames likewise adopted Phocion as a pseudonym (Shalev, 2003, p. 160 n. 19).
- ⁵ See Burstein, 2003; Bugh, 2006; Shipley, 2006.
- ⁶ Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.16.7–8, 7.19.2 and Pliny, *NH* 34.70 both state that it was Alexander the Great who did so.

Chapter 1

- ¹ Thus, Holm (1894–1911, vol. 1, p. 7) could write at the turn of the twentieth century, ‘The conception of a history of Greece belongs only to recent times. The Greeks themselves might have conceived the idea, since they contrasted Hellenism with barbarism; but we find no Greek history written by a Greek . . . In modern times Englishmen were the first to write histories of Greece, and even after the brilliant performances of Germany . . . the exhaustive history of Greece of Grote still deserves special recognition as a model of careful investigation of detail, and of deep insight both into the politics and character of the Greeks’. Vlassopoulos (2007, p. 15) discusses the relatively recent origins of Greek history as a discipline.

- ² Demetriou (1996, p. 281) observes that scholars 'were far from approaching Greek history for its own sake'.
- ³ Frederick is said to have reformed his army after reading the ancient accounts of Philip's military reforms, and when Voltaire suggested he ought to emulate Cato, he responded by mimicking Alexander's famous retort to his adviser, Parmenio, 'I would if I were Parmenio' (Plutarch, *Alexander* 29.4), with the words, 'Croyez que si j'étais Voltaire'. Frederick's conscious emulation of the Macedonian royal house no doubt inspired Gillies to write his 1789 work *View of the Reign of Frederick the Great with a Parallel between that Prince and Philip II of Macedon* after a considerable sojourn at the Prussian court. Even the British Ambassador to Prussia drew the parallel, observing, 'Here one frequently draws comparisons between the Prussian army and that of the Macedonians. If Alexander the Great with just a handful of well-drilled soldiers was able to achieve wondrous things, what will the Prussian army not be capable of undertaking, since their army is without doubt the best and most select in all Europe?'
- ⁴ Mitford would later serve as MP for Bere Alston, Devon, under the patronage of the Earl of Beverley.
- ⁵ Likewise Robert Wood was appointed undersecretary of state by Pitt the elder, and served as MP for Brackley during the time that he was writing much of his accounts of Baalbec and Troy. In the preface to his essay Wood wrote that his work had been delayed by 'objects of so very different a nature, that it became necessary to lay Homer aside, and reserve the further consideration of my subject for times of more leisure'.
- ⁶ Other pioneering historians were amateurs. Oliver Goldsmith was also a poet and wrote on numerous subjects. Clarke (1945, p. 103) observes that Mitford (like Gibbon) was a Hampshire squire and an officer in the militia, while Stanyan added Esq. to his name.
- ⁷ Clarke (1945, pp. 102–3) observes 'though educationalists might talk vaguely of the political lessons that could be learned from the noble and generous sentiments that could be imbibed from ancient history, they did little to teach it. Nor did the professional scholars pay any attention to the subject; it remained one for amateurs'.
- ⁸ See Shilleto, 1851. Thirlwall had earlier tried and failed to reform classics at Cambridge and change the focus from textual criticism and composition to the study of ancient history, as we would recognize it. His failed attempt cost him his tutorship at Trinity College. It was after this that he wrote his *History of Greece* (Clarke, 1959, p. 39).
- ⁹ In his dedication to King George III, Gillies went so far as to observe that 'The History of Greece exposes the dangerous turbulence of Democracy', and to announce that it was his intention to describe 'the incurable evils inherent in every form of Republican government'.
- ¹⁰ Voltaire, for instance, tried to make the best of incidents from Hellenistic Athens by arguing that Phocion's execution was one of only 'five or six acts of judicial iniquity' that 'stained' Athens' reputation. Cf. Roberts, 1994, p. 170.
- ¹¹ Adams (1927, p. 150) observes that Mitford wrote from an 'ultra Tory' standpoint. Macaulay (1824, p. 299) attacked Mitford's work as a 'party-pamphlet' for panegyricizing the 'aristocratic' Aeschines and slandering the demagogic

Demosthenes. Mitford's 'Tory' approach likewise offended James Mill who reputedly gave his son (John Stuart Mill) a copy of Mitford's work and warned him of his prejudices. Cf. Demetriou, 1996, p. 290.

¹² Cf. Roberts, 1994, p. 249. For a recent discussion of the influence of Grote's work see Macgregor Morris, 2008.

¹³ According to Jenkyns (1997, pp. 518–19) the nineteenth-century Greek syllabus at Oxford 'could be said to be focused upon the "best periods", fifth-century poetry and historiography and fourth-century oratory, plus Homer'.

¹⁴ Macgregor Morris (2004, p. 348) recently argued, 'They were not praising Athens at all – they were eulogizing the maritime commercial, modern states – England and the United Provinces to the Netherlands'.

¹⁵ Not only were Grote and Mitford Members of Parliament, but Mably wrote the first draft of the new constitution for Poland and Voltaire had the ear of Frederick the Great.

¹⁶ The fact that three recent companions to the Hellenistic period have each included a chapter discussing the relative unpopularity of the discipline (Burstein, 2003; Shipley, 2006; Bugh, 2006) demonstrates the marginal place the Hellenistic period holds in the fields of classics and history.

¹⁷ Green (2007, p. xxxii) observes 'Plutarch's importance as a source is hard to overvalue'.

¹⁸ For a recent discussion of Plutarch's popularity with eighteenth-century commentators on the Battle of Actium, see Lange, 2008, especially pp. 117–25, 132–6.

¹⁹ Roberts (1994, p. 158) observes that Plutarch 'enjoyed a popularity matched by no other author', and notes that in eighteenth-century America the only volume in more homes than Plutarch was the Bible. Plutarch's popularity in France was such that as an eight-year old Madame Roland (1795, p. 30) carried a copy of Plutarch to church instead of her prayer book!

²⁰ Clarke (1945, p. 103) describes Rollin as 'perhaps the most popular work on ancient history for the general reader'. Rawson (1969, p. 355) stresses that 'many people in these years [the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries] got their knowledge of Greece from the histories of Rollin, in original or translation, and his not much more epitomator Oliver Goldsmith'.

²¹ In 1795 the new curriculum for moral and political philosophy and history at the University of North Carolina incorporated Millot's history alongside the works of Montesquieu, Hume, William Paley, Emer de Vattel, Jean-Jacques Burlamaqui and Joseph Priestley (Robson, 1983, p. 330), while in 1804 an attempt had been made to teach history as a separate discipline at South Carolina College, using Millot's *Elements* as the basis of the course (Durrill, 1999, p. 487).

²² For a recent detailed discussion of Robertson's reworking of Allet's work see Ceserani, 2005, p. 419 ff. Briant, 2005, also discusses the work of Robertson, but unfortunately confuses this William Robertson with the greater homonymous Scottish historian.

²³ Rawson (1969, p. 364) observes that 'At the lowest educational level, as ever, outworn ideas persisted, and from such historians as Goldsmith . . . children might learn to admire Spartan virtue'. At the same time they learned to despise the Hellenistic Athenians for their 'unjust' execution of Phocion.

- ²⁴ The same could perhaps be said of a recent popular history of Athens (Scott, 2010, pp. 246–50), which concludes Athenian history by rattling through the deaths of Demosthenes, Phocion and the deification of Demetrius in four pages.
- ²⁵ Early in the nineteenth century Henry Fynes Clinton lamented the fact that Oxford and Cambridge classicists neglected authors crucial to the Hellenistic Athens such as Athenaeus, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Stobaeus and even Arrian (Clarke, 1959, p. 36).
- ²⁶ Most unusually, Goldsmith does not see Demosthenes' downfall as a bad thing. When describing Demosthenes' prosecution during the so-called Harpalus trial, Goldsmith argues that 'Antipater's deep policy in promoting the above charge [of accepting bribes from Harpalus] against Demosthenes, has very justly been admired'. By whom it has been admired remains a mystery.
- ²⁷ In a similar vein Mahaffy (1896, p. 125) felt that compared to Old Comedy of the Classical period, the New Comedy of Menander portrayed 'the most decayed gentility of Athens'.
- ²⁸ Freeman (1863, p. 173) sees the Aetolians as 'barely Hellenic'. For more on the slower progress of the Aetolians and other Greek peoples on the fringes see Vlassopoulos, 2007, p. 209.
- ²⁹ In a similar vein de Pauw (1794, vol. 1, p. 128) implies that the Macedonians were less evolved than their Greek cousins. When describing the growing power of Philip, de Pauw suggests that 'the general interest of Greece required that Macedonia should be smothered in its cradle'. Compared to the Athenians, the Macedonians are mere infants, but like the Athenians, they too will decline into old age and infirmity.
- ³⁰ Rather ironically, only a year after Niebuhr's translation of Demosthenes was published, Gillies published his *History of the World* in which he portrayed the Roman conquest of Greece as analogous to the threat posed by Napoleon. Niebuhr (1852, vol. 2, p. 301) later compared Philip's desire to campaign in Asia to Napoleon's obligation to wage war against Russia.
- ³¹ Helvétius (1759, p. 223) singled out Phocion of all the Athenians for praise when commenting on the decline of Greece and Italy in modern times, asking, 'Why do we no longer find a Phocion at Athens, a Pelopidas at Thebes, or a Decius at Rome?'
- ³² Macgregor Morris (2006, pp. 209 ff.) discusses this concept with regard to Socrates. Given the manner in which Enlightenment writers parallel the lives and deaths of Socrates and Phocion, the same can be safely said of Phocion.
- ³³ Richard Steele, *Spectator* 133, Thursday, 29 August 1711.
- ³⁴ Parker (1937, p. 143) observes that 'so many Phocians, Horaces, Scaevolus and the like began to walk among men that the [National] Convention was asked to prohibit the "usurpation of classical names"'.
- ³⁵ According to Macgregor Morris (2004, p. 358 n. 27) 'French thinkers of the post-Revolutionary years argued that it was the thought of Mably, rather than that of Rousseau, that had influenced the utopian aspirations of the Jacobins. Constant argued that 'it is not Rousseau' who was responsible, but Mably, whose views were 'a thousand times more exaggerated' (Wright, 1996, p. 8).
- ³⁶ Wright (1992, p. 81) describes this as Mably's most widely known and best received work. There were twelve reprints in French before the Revolution, and it was translated into Italian, German, English, Swedish, Polish, Spanish and Greek.

- ³⁷ Lyttelton (1768, p. 398) puts into Aristides' mouth the idea that Phocion dies because he was 'betrayed by a vain Confidence in the insecure Friendship of a perfidious Macedonian' rather than because he was guilty of any crime.
- ³⁸ According to Hamilton (1788, vol. 2, p. 194), if the Athenians had controlled the mob, 'Popular liberty might then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing the same citizens the hemlock on one day, and statues on the next'. The mention of statues makes it clear that this can only be a reference to Plutarch's account of Phocion's death (especially *Phocion* 38.1), not the execution of Socrates, or the Arginusae generals.
- ³⁹ The reviewer of Grote's work for *Bentley's Miscellany* (1856, p. 646) was unimpressed by Grote's failure to see this as a vindication of Phocion.
- ⁴⁰ The obvious exception to the nineteenth-century trend towards exonerating the Athenians is Droysen (1878, vol. 2, pp. 223–4) who categorizes Phocion's death as 'even more disgusting' than the execution of the Arginusae generals. However, given Phocion's long relationship with Macedon and Droysen's own partiality towards Macedon, his view of the 'justice' of the case against Phocion is not exactly surprising.
- ⁴¹ For Gast, (1793, vol. 2, p. 136) Phocion's execution is the first of many occasions when the Athenians will disgrace themselves as a result of their 'degenerated character'. He claims that after executing Phocion to please their new masters, '[t]here was no government, however oppressive, to which they did not tamely submit, nor any governor, however profligate, whose great virtues they were not ready to extol, transferring their homage from tyrant to tyrant during all the vicissitudes of power'.
- ⁴² Scholars who condemn the honours as 'extravagant' and/or 'excessive' include: Gast, 1793, vol. 2, p. 212; Robertson, 1793, p. 496; Gillies, 1807, vol. 1, p. 411; Grote, 1862, vol. 8, p. 567; Ferguson, 1948, p. 114; Hauben, 1974, p. 105; Parke, 1977, p. 40; Jordan, 1980, p. 234; Woodhead, 1981, p. 358; Gabbert, 1986, p. 30; Hammond and Walbank, 1988, p. 170; Bauman, 1990, p. 66; Green, 1990, p. 48; Cargill, 1995, p. 51; Patterson, 1998, p. 190; Hurwit, 1999, p. 261; Kralli, 2000, p. 117; Lambert, 2000–2003, p. 104; Braund, 2003, p. 28; Oliver, 2007, pp. 167, 240; Harding, 2008, p. 171. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 566) also described the honours as 'exorbitant'; Tarn (1913, p. 42) claimed Stratocles and the other radical democrats 'disgraced their cause and their city by the most noisome adulation of Demetrios'; Williams (1985, p. 210 n. 555) went so far as to describe the honours as 'unseemly' and 'disgusting'. Lattey (1917, p. 328) condemned the honours as 'the earliest and most outrageous example of the city worship'. Boegehold (1995, p. 41) is very much in the minority in calling the honours 'politic and innovative, not the cringing response of an enslaved populace'.
- ⁴³ Cf. Koumanoudes and Miller, 1971, p. 456; Camp, 1984, p. 163.
- ⁴⁴ In doing so they demonstrate how heavily reliant they are on the account of Plutarch who describes the deification of Demetrius and its impact *before* mentioning Stratocles by name.
- ⁴⁵ Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 501 n. 5) appears to have corrected this somewhat Herodotean omission.
- ⁴⁶ Demosthenes (9.31) claims, '[Philip] is not only no Greek and no way akin to Greeks, but not even a barbarian of a place honourable to mention; in fact, a vile

fellow of Macedon, from where a respectable slave could not be purchased formerly’.

⁴⁷ For a detailed discussion see Bayliss, 2008.

⁴⁸ According to Knipfing (1921, p. 661) Droysen also drew criticism from prominent German classicists such as Schäfer and Blass for favouring Philip of Macedon over Demosthenes. Although Blass and Schäfer identified with Demosthenes, many scholars from the recently unified German states could easily identify with Philip of Macedon’s achievements in unifying the hitherto fragmented Greek states. Adams (1927, p. 150–1) argues, ‘[i]f a Grote saw in Demosthenes the champion of their own ideal democracy, then men enjoying the prosperity of imperial Germany could not fail to see a Frederick the Great or Wilhelm I in Philip’. For Droysen, who followed up his *Geschichte des Hellenismus* with a seven-volume history of Prussia, Macedon’s unification of the Greek cities could be seen as a precursor to the Prussian unification of the smaller German states. Beloch’s Philip likewise triumphed over ‘Lokalpatriotismus’ in unifying the Greeks, much as his own Germany had been unified.

⁴⁹ It is not surprising that during Rawlinson’s long tenure as Camden Professor of Ancient History at Oxford (1861 to 1889) the new statutes for the ancient history examination (1872) set Greek history as ‘(1) To the end of the Peloponnesian War; (2) From BC 500 to the death of Philip’.

⁵⁰ Freeman (1857, p. 306) accused Grote of being ‘strongly anti-Macedonian’, and lamented the fact that his bias against the Macedonians led him to stop his history before the struggles of the Achaeans against the Macedonians he so loathed. He condemns Grote’s coverage of the rise of Macedon under Philip and Alexander as ‘the least satisfactory part of his noble work’.

⁵¹ Demochares of Leuconoe is typically seen as ‘anti-Macedonian’ like his uncle Demosthenes. This is nowhere more evident than in the account of Ferguson who claimed (1911a, p. 103) ‘In spite of Chaeronea and Crannon he upheld stoutly the imperialistic policy of his uncle’. Shear (1978, pp. 55, 63), described Demochares as one of the ‘anti-Macedonian democrats’ and an advocate of ‘nationalist democracy’. Other scholars who see Demochares as ‘anti-Macedonian’ include Marasco (1984), Vatai (1984, p. 15), Green (1990, p. 126), Pomeroy (1996, pp. 181, 201), and Tracy (2000a, p. 228). Mikalson and Clinton have followed Grote in casting Phocion’s treachery as ‘pro-Macedonian’ behaviour in contrast to the ‘anti-Macedonian’ stance of his opponents; Mikalson (1998, p. 49) praises Hagnonides the chief prosecutor of Phocion as an ‘anti-Macedonian’, and Clinton (1974, p. 21) speaks admiringly of Hagnonides’ co-prosecutor Demophilus of Acharnae’s ‘implacable anti-Macedonianism’. Mari (2003, pp. 87–8) contrasted Demochares with Stratocles and the ‘pro-Macedonian’ supporters of Demetrius Poliorcetes. Shear (1978, p. 54), Burstein (1985, p. 5) and Dow (1934, p. 180) all give Stratocles the negative tag ‘pro-Macedonian’. In a similar vein Leiwo (1997, p. 113) characterizes Phaedrus of Sphettus as ‘an eager pro-Macedonian’ and his brother Callias as ‘an ardent anti-Macedonian’. Dreyer (1999, pp. 107–8) discusses the origins of the ‘pro-Macedonian tradition’ that Phaedrus (II) of Sphettus followed. According to Dreyer, his grandfather Phaedrus (I) of Sphettus was ‘proven’ (*nachgewiesen*) to be a pro-Macedonian in 346, but later changed sides in 341

and supported Demosthenes (Dreyer cites the fact that Phaedruss was named as one of the guarantors of the ships for Chalkis (*IG II² 1623*, p. 174) as evidence that he went over to Demosthenes). Dreyer believes that Phaedruss ‘founded’ (*begründete*) a line of political thought that his son Thymochares (I) would follow until he fell under the sway of Demetrius of Phalerum and the family reverted to its pro-Macedonian stance. Dreyer saw in the career of Thymochares the origins of would later follow. This clearly reflects the mainstream, with Waterfield (2004, p. 279) making Phaedruss’ brother Callias ‘the black sheep of a prominent pro-Macedonian family’. Korhonen (1997, p. 45) sees Athenian society divided along the lines of ‘radical democrats’, ‘pro-Macedonian aristocrats’, and ‘moderate oligarchs’.

⁵² Roberts (1994, pp. 294–5) argues, ‘when the time came to seek classical analogies for the phenomenon of Nazism they [British and American thinkers] were by and large prepared to line up the Third Reich with both the Spartans and the Macedonians’.

⁵³ For a recent analysis of the problem see Tritle, 2009, pp. 136–40.

⁵⁴ See for example Ferguson, 1911a, p. 269; Dinsmoor, 1931, p. 189; Shear, 1970, p. 200; Mossé, 1973, p. 139; Traill, 1975, p. 129; Habicht, 1997, p. 197; Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 552; Mikalson, 1998, p. 187; Tracy, 2003, p. 24 n. 35; Thonemann, 2005, p. 76 n. 46; Osborne, 2006, p. 80.

⁵⁵ For a very rare example see Dinsmoor (1931, p. 189) who even uses inverted commas around the term ‘[t]he new “Egyptian” tribe’ to indicate that the tribe is not really Egyptian.

⁵⁶ We can see this in the subtitle of Waterfield’s (2004) Athenian history – ‘Ancient Ideal’.

⁵⁷ Vlassopoulos (2007, p. 216) observes ‘[t]he autonomous classical city-state is a fiction, most *poleis* were not independent and it makes no fundamental difference whether a *polis* was dominated by another *polis* or by a monarch’.

⁵⁸ Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 580) himself felt that Polybius was right to treat the period that would come to separate their two works as ‘having no history of its own’.

Chapter 2

¹ Aristotle also employs the term *teleutaios* to indicate the last of four types of oligarchy. Given the fact that Aristotle explicitly states that oligarchy is the second worst form of deviation from his preferred constitution (1289a–b), and the fact that he singles out the ‘final’ form of oligarchy as the worst of its type, it should be clear that Aristotle does not employ *teleutaios* to indicate a superior form of democracy.

² Aristotle also describes this as the ‘fourth’ type of democracy. He also describes this democracy as ‘administered at the present day’. Had Aristotle lived to see the Hellenistic democratic regimes, then perhaps he would have introduced more types of democracy into his schema.

³ Aristotle is still critical of this type of democracy, arguing that it corresponds ‘to dynastic oligarchy and to tyrannical monarchy’.

- ⁴ Likewise, Hornblower (1992, p. 11) observes, 'Athenian politicians, from Kleisthenes through Pericles and Kleon to Demosthenes . . . tended to be rich and well-born'.
- ⁵ See also Williams, 1989, p. 25; Lehmann, 1995, p. 142.
- ⁶ Hansen (1991, p. 247) argues that when an Athenian listed the most important institutions, he named the assembly, the council and the law-courts. Tracy (2003, p. 10) argues that the four cornerstones of Athenian democracy were sortition, annual terms of office for magistracies, citizen bodies with meaningful powers and the law courts. Ultimately this analysis derives from Herodotus who named the lot, accountability of officials and the popular assembly as the key features of democracy (Herodotus 3.80.6). See also Sinclair, 1988, pp. 17–23.
- ⁷ Wallace (1989, p. 201) calls this line of thought 'conservative ideology'.
- ⁸ This question was little different from the guiding principle behind the Athens–Sparta debate in the long eighteenth century.
- ⁹ For a detailed discussion of Finley's definition see Ober, 1989, p. 38.
- ¹⁰ Strauss and Ober (1990, p. 46) described democratic ideology as 'emphasizing freedom, equality, and participation'. Habicht (1997, p. 139) noted that in the Hellenistic period the term 'democracy' came to be a matter of interpretation, seeing that political leaders claimed that they represented democracy even in periods when citizenship depended on a new census figure for which many Athenians would not qualify. For this reason I feel that my definition of democracy is particularly appropriate in that it allows us to exclude such regimes when we are considering the nature of democracy at Athens.

Chapter 3

- ¹ Lehmann (1995, p. 142) suggests Callimedon was the 'model' for Theophrastus' oligarch.
- ² O'Neil (1995, p. 85) has downplayed the significance of oligarchic sentiment on the grounds that the excesses of the oligarchic leaders when they were in power 'discredited the whole idea of oligarchy, strengthening the Athenians' loyalty to democracy'. Lehmann (1995, p. 142) has also highlighted that oligarchy lacked popularity because of the abhorrence the Athenians felt for the purges of the oligarchic revolutions of the fifth century. Lehmann pinpoints the 'grotesken Attitüden und Präentionen' of the 'radikal antidemokratischen Parteirichtung', focusing in particular on Theophrastus' portrayal of the 'oligarch' in his *Characters*, and the hatred the Athenians felt for Callimedon of Collytus.
- ³ Although considerably longer and containing some original points which are discussed below, O'Sullivan's argument rests largely on the same points Tracy raised almost a decade previously.
- ⁴ Although O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 160) concludes her defence of Demetrius' regime with regard to the democratic institutions by arguing emphatically that 'the evidence simply does not support the notion of a reimposition in 317 of the 322 oligarchy', this appears to be a straw man, because I cannot find any modern scholarship where such a claim has been made.

- ⁵ The identity of these soldiers has been obscure, but I have elsewhere (Bayliss, 2003) argued that they should be identified as a special Athenian force formed after the ouster of Demetrius of Phalerum, and dedicated to protecting the Piraeus.
- ⁶ The presence of two garrisons implies that democracy at Athens was restricted. It is significant that when the Colonels began their *coup d'état* on 21 April 1967, the only place they occupied in Athens was the Museum hill (Garland, 1987, p. 188).
- ⁷ Whereas the decree honouring Phaedrus of Sphettus (*IG* II² 682, 21–3) stresses he was appointed general in 296/5 ‘having been chosen by the *demos*’ (ὕπὸ τοῦ δήμου χειροτονηθείς) during Lachares’ tyranny and a second time during the period of nominal democracy that followed, the decree is very vague about how Phaedrus came to serve as a general ‘many times’ (πλεονάκις) in the years of the pro-Demetrian oligarchy.
- ⁸ The regime was probably initially democratic. A miniature prytany-year was organized in 296/5 so that each tribe could preside during the remaining months. (*IG* II² 644 passed by the assembly on the tenth of Mounichion – the tenth month of the Attic year – is dated to the fourth prytany. Habicht [1997, p. 88] argues that each of the remaining tribes must have presided for around nine days). New elections were held, and Phaidrus of Sphettus who had served as a general during Lachares’ tyranny was re-elected – *IG* II² 682, 21–3 states that Phaedrus was elected general ‘twice’ (δὶς) in 296/5, and served out the rest of the year. *IG* II² 646, 22–4 from 295/4 honours an Antigoniid official, Herodorus, for ensuring that the *demos* ‘[might continue having] democracy’. Plutarch (*Demetrius* 34) states that Demetrius κατέστησεν ἀρχὰς αἱ μάλιστα τῷ δήμῳ προσφιλεῖς ἦσαν, which means that Demetrius either ‘established the most popular offices’ or ‘the most popular leaders’. Scholars once thought this meant that Demetrius immediately imposed an oligarchy. But they have increasingly come around to the idea that the regime was initially democratic. See for example Osborne, 1981–3, vol. 3, p. 149; Green, 1990, p. 125; Habicht, 1997, p. 88. Green sees the oligarchic features as part of a later ‘tightening up’.
- ⁹ Demetrius clashed with Craterus during the negotiations (*Demetrius*, *On Style*, 289), which may have been partly due to the fact that the terms of the peace involved the death of his own brother.
- ¹⁰ Just how many citizens were disfranchised is a matter of contention. Plutarch states that ‘more than 12,000’ Athenians were disfranchised because of their poverty (Plut. *Phocion* 28.4). But Diodorus indicated that some 22,000 lost their citizen rights (Diod. 18.18.5). Scholars who opt for 22,000 include Hansen (1985, pp. 31–2), Hammond and Walbank (1988, p. 115 n. 2), and O’Sullivan (2009b, pp. 27, 108–11). Those who argue in favour of 12,000 include Jones (1957, p. 76), Ruschenbusch (1994, 1999), and Sekunda (1992, p. 319). Worthington (1999, p. 16 n. 52) bizarrely argues for 12,000 as the citizen population before the imposition of the franchise, which would see only 3,000 excluded. Those who advocate following Plutarch emend Diodorus’ δισμυρίων καὶ δισχιλίων (22,000), to μυρίων καὶ δισχιλίων (12,000). Sekunda (1992, p. 319) argued that it is preferable to assume that Diodorus made the error because ‘he did that sort of thing’. But Plutarch’s reliability is by no means beyond reproach,

and it does seem more likely that Plutarch accidentally omitted the prefix *dis* rather than Diodorus erroneously added the three extra letters. Whatever the case, the new franchise still excluded significantly more than half the population of Attica.

- ¹¹ According to the Suda (s.v. Δ415) Demades 'emptied' or 'destroyed' the law courts and the rhetorical contests. Liddel (2007, p. 91 n. 113) takes this comment at face value, arguing, 'the evidential claim that the law courts were closed is weak'. But the Suda's comments ought not to be taken so literally. His claim can be easily assimilated if one accepts that the emptying or destruction of the law courts was a consequence of the limited manpower pool, rather than a deliberate closure of the law courts. Green (1990, p. 42) certainly had such a scenario in mind when he argued that this passage suggests, 'the populist hold on jury courts was broken'.
- ¹² Mossé (1973, p. 100) claims 'it is understandable that it needed the presence of a Macedonian garrison to make them accept the loss of their citizenship and all the material advantages that went with it, and that Phocion made no great efforts to persuade Antipater to withdraw his garrison'.
- ¹³ Green (1990, p. 43) argues that this passage is probably 'an oligarchic canard against the reenfranchised,' and (1990, p. 750 n. 43) compares it to the allegations that Cleisthenes enrolled slaves and foreigners in the new tribes (Aristotle, *Politics* 1275b37).
- ¹⁴ It is usually assumed that the disfranchised were effectively placed on the same level as the *atimoi*. Cf. Dreyer, 2000, p. 158; Habicht, 1997, p. 44; Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 39; Gehrke, 1976, p. 105. For a recent discussion of the issue see Grieb, 2008, pp. 53 ff.
- ¹⁵ Curiously, Liddel sees great 'upheaval' taking place after Demetrius of Phalerum was installed as tyrant in 317/16 but sees no such upheaval with more than half of the population of Attica losing their right to participate in the governing of their homeland.
- ¹⁶ Modern scholars perhaps underplay the significance of Demades' decree from 320/19 (*IG* II² 380, 17–18) taking control of the Piraeus from the *astynomoi* and giving it to the *agoranomoi*. This is typically seen as merely reflecting reduced citizen numbers. This may be the case, but there is reason to see this as a far more significant change. For starters, it is a decision proposed by Demades, whose willingness to propose the decree condemning Demosthenes and the other democratic leaders demonstrates his capacity to act against Athenian freedom. Secondly, the decision to alter the arrangements for policing the Piraeus bears some resemblance to changes made by the Thirty (*Ath. Pol.* 35.1). One of the first acts of the Thirty (after appointing a new council) was to appoint the Eleven, a body of ten to oversee the Piraeus; among these was Critias' cousin Charmides (Xenophon, *Hellenica* 2.4.19), and a police force of 300, armed with whips. The Eleven and the Piraeus Ten were 'to administer the *agora*, and all other matters pertaining to their respective *poleis*' (Plato, *Epistle* 7). That these new boards were explicitly excluded from the amnesty when the oligarchs and democrats were reconciled is ample evidence that they were seen as eager participants in the oligarchy. The termination of a police force chosen by lot, and its replacement with a new board to police the Piraeus recalls the Thirty's concern with controlling

the Piraeus and policing Athens in general, and suggests that the abolition of the *astynomoi* for the Piraeus is more sinister than is often thought.

- ¹⁷ Rollin (1738, vol. 7, p. 39) dismisses the disenfranchised as 'a poor and despicable populace, who had nothing to lose, and who would be only guided by caprice'. Rollin's dismissive tone is even more remarkable when one considers that he believed that the property qualification was 2,000 drachmas 'annual income'.
- ¹⁸ Thirlwall writes, 'it remains an inexplicable mystery . . . that out of 21,000 persons then exercising the franchise, no more than 9,000 could be found possessing that sum. It would follow that 12,000 were living nearly in the condition of Lazzaroni: for it appears that the interest of 2,000 drachmas at the highest ordinary rate, would have been scarcely sufficient to purchase the mere necessities of life for a man who had no family to support'.
- ¹⁹ See Poddighe (2002, pp. 109–40) for a detailed discussion of the Solonian social classes in relation to the 2,000 drachmas qualification. O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 27) briefly discusses and discounts the possibility that the 2,000 drachmas census was equivalent to the hoplite class.
- ²⁰ Williams cites the 'exact parallel' constitution in Cyrene (*SEG* 9.1) where the census was limited to those possessing 2,000 drachmas as evidence that this amount was the accepted line between the *beltistoi* and the *ponëroi*.
- ²¹ It is worth pointing out that when Hammond and Walbank (1988, p. 115 n. 2) advocated accepting Diodorus' figure of 22,000 disfranchised, they based their calculations on the fact that the Athenians manned 170 triremes during the Lamian War, which would have had crews totalling some 30,000 men. This would require a population of 20,000 *thêtes*, and a *zeugite* population of 14,000. If the *zeugite* population was 14,000 as Hammond and Walbank suggest, then a large proportion of the disenfranchised would have included quite wealthy landowners.
- ²² Citizenship of Cyrene was based on 'permanent property' (*SEG* 9.1, 7), which could be defined as land or flocks of which the fruits could be consumed (Baynham, 2003, p. 24).
- ²³ Ober (1989, p. 131) provides a figure of 84 *medimnoi* of barley as sufficient to feed an ordinary family of four for a year.
- ²⁴ Values calculated by Spence, 1993, pp. 183, 276.
- ²⁵ Vatai (1984, p. 118) calls Demetrius' regime 'less severe' than that of Antipater. Scholars often focus on the 'moderate' nature of the oligarchy for example, Lehmann (1995, p. 140), who labels the regime a 'moderate-oligarchic census-constitution' ('gemäßigt-oligarchischen Zensus-Verfassung'), and Landucci Gattinoni (2008, p. 111) who recently described the regime as 'una oligarchia moderata'. This perhaps leads to a more generous view of the franchise than the evidence ought permit. Hedrick Jr. (2000a, p. 328) emphasizes the fact that the franchise was half that Antipater imposed, but observes that it was 'still steep enough to severely limit the number of Athenians who could participate in the activities of the state'.
- ²⁶ Gehrke (1978, pp. 174–8) postulated that only 15,000 out of a projected 21,000 retained the rights of citizenship. But given that the population of Athens was more likely more than 30,000, many more citizens may have been disfranchised.

- Williams (1997, p. 330 n. 6) accepted Hansen's figure of 31,000 citizens in 322, and argued that 'well over half' of these may have retained their citizenship under Demetrius. Hedrick Jr. (2000a, p. 328) rightly notes that while the property qualification was less than in 322, it was 'still steep enough to severely limit the number of Athenians who could participate in activities of the state'.
- ²⁷ In her recent attempt to defend Demetrius' regime O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 114) effectively replicates Tittle's argument (1988, p. 134) that 'exclusion of the *thetes* [from holding office after 322/1] would not necessarily be an oligarchical or radical act' and applies it to Demetrius of Phalerum's regime. Thus she argues that Diodorus' statement (18.74.3) that Cassander insisted that the government was to be managed on the basis of property qualifications 'could betoken merely the restriction of *magistracies and offices*, not the franchise as such, to those above one thousand drachmas in property'. But the same flaws that were clear in Tittle's argument are present here too. Although it was technically forbidden, the poorest citizens were used to participating at all levels of Athenian politics if they so chose. They would have felt the loss of those rights keenly.
- ²⁸ According to Theophrastus, *Historia plantarum* 4.3.2, the campaign was so problematic that the soldiers in Ophellas' army had to live on the fruit of the lotus for several days during their march through the African desert (Habicht, 1997, p. 65 n. 81). Certainly Ophellas and his followers would not have anticipated such awful conditions, but the risks inherent in a desert campaign would have been obvious.
- ²⁹ When using the same calculations as used above, 1,000 drachmas can be expressed as roughly equivalent to 1.5 years' wages for an ordinary Athenian.
- ³⁰ Gabbert (1986, p. 30) argued that the frequency of tyrannies in the Hellenistic period indicates that 'it may be that there were more true believers in tyranny than in oligarchy'. But the distinction would have been lost on many Athenians.
- ³¹ Williams (1985, pp. 97–168) entitled his chapter on this regime 'The Oligarchy of Phocion and Demades'. Lehmann (1995, p. 142) described Phocion and Demades as 'autorisierte Vertrauensleute' (authorised-trusted-people) of the Macedonians, and spoke of a 'Führungskreis' (ruling circle) that held sway at Athens. Dreyer (1999, p. 184) also refers to the oligarchy as 'die Regierung des Phocion'. Wilson (2000, p. 270) has argued that Demetrius of Phalerum 'played a prominent rôle in the oligarchy *led by Phocion*' (italics added). Similarly, Grieb (2008, p. 52) has recently referred to 'die Gruppe um Phocion'.
- ³² Diodorus (18.48.2) claims that Antipater was 'well-disposed towards Demades'.
- ³³ O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 31) seems to play it both ways: she doubts that Phocion's friends played any political role, yet also refers to 'Phocion and his *de facto* cabal'!
- ³⁴ There is clear evidence that Hegemon was a prominent orator before the oligarchy came to power: he was a defendant in an *eisangelia* ca. 331 (Demosthenes 25.47), and had proposed a *nomos* concerning the theoric fund before 330 (Aeschines 3.25), and another concerning the naval equipment before 326 (*IG* II² 1628, 300), and two decrees in the assembly, one in 322/1 (*IG* II² 375), and one at an unknown date (*IG* II² 1469, 122).
- ³⁵ Unfortunately for Hegemon – like Phocion and Deinarchus of Corinth – this friendship counted for little once Polyperchon was compelled to distance himself

from Antipater's friends and policies because of his power struggle with Cassander.

- ³⁶ Thudippus was sufficiently well known that the comic poet Timocles ridiculed him in the *Icarian Satyrs* (Athenaeus 9.407 f.). His father Cleon had been the treasurer of Athena in 377/6 (*IG* II² 1410, 1; *IG* II² 1411, 6), and was the main opponent of the speaker of Isaeus 9, sometime after 371 (Is. 9.17). His grandfather Thudippus had proposed a decree in the council in 425/4 (*IG* I³ 71, 4, 55). His uncle Anaxippus managed the naval dockyards in 365/5 (*IG* II² 1622, 417). Pythocles was an adversary of Demosthenes (Demosthenes 18.285, 19.225, 314; Suda I 607; Harpocration s.v. Pythocles), whose arrogant manner of living prompted the phrase 'with a stride like that of Pythocles' to become popular (Demosthenes 19.314; Athenaeus 5.213e). Pythocles came from a wealthy liturgical family (*IG* II² 1622, 776), and his father Pythodorus had acted as an arbitrator between Theophemus and the speaker of [Demosthenes] 57 in 356/5 ([Dem.] 57.5).
- ³⁷ For a recent discussion of the Polybius passage see O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 133–7).
- ³⁸ Thus Tritle (1988, p. 137) cites the involvement of Demades as an indication that there was not an oligarchic clique. Williams (1989, p. 28) argued that the fact that the assembly chose Demades to treat with Antipater indicates that it was 'free of Macedonian control and was not completely controlled by the oligarchs'.
- ³⁹ Plutarch (*Demosthenes* 31.6) claims that after the letter leaked out, Deinarchus of Corinth acted as prosecutor and denounced Demades, after which Cassander flew into a rage and slew Demades' son Demeas. Cassander is then said to have ordered that Demades be put to death. A fragment of Arrian's *Ta Met' Alexandron* preserved by Photius (Arrian, *FGrHist.* 156, frag. 1.14–15) confirms that Deinarchus acted as prosecutor. The Demades-papyrus (*Berlin Papyrus* 13045), which purportedly records the dialogue between Demades and Deinarchus, implies that Demades was tried before his fellow Athenian ambassadors.
- ⁴⁰ Arrian (*FGrHist.* 156, frag. 1.14–15) provides the tantalising detail that Demades was 'led' into Macedon by Cassander, who 'instigated' the charges against him. Diodorus states that Antipater kept his enmity hidden until the right opportunity presented itself (Diod. 18.48.2).
- ⁴¹ The fact that Cassander himself acted as the executioner, one of Antipater's men was the prosecutor and the other Athenian envoys (aside from Demades' son Demeas) acted as jurors does not speak well for the legality of the trial.
- ⁴² Any attempt to cast Demetrius of Phalerum as anything other than an oligarchic stooge must adequately explain not only his role while in charge of Athenian affairs, but also how Demetrius could have any claim to being a supporter of democracy after playing a prominent role in the Antipatrid oligarchy, before even considering his position under Cassander. Explaining the latter is even more crucial when one considers that one of the first acts of that regime had been the condemnation of Demetrius' own brother for his democratic political views. That Tracy does not attempt to do so is a considerable flaw in his argument. Like Tracy, O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 25, 32) is ready to admit that the preceding regime is an oligarchy, but unlike Tracy she seems uncomfortable with that conclusion because of Demetrius' role. She dodges the issue somewhat by

tentatively suggesting that Demetrius had been chosen as an envoy because of his philosophical training rather than his political leanings, and suggests that his later condemnation was solely the result of his involvement in the negotiations rather than any formal role in the oligarchy itself. This seems a little too convenient and rather implausible. We know that Demetrius not only played a prominent role in the peace delegations that preceded the imposition of oligarchy by Antipater (Demetrius, *On Style*, 289), but that he went on to play an important role under the oligarchy – according to Nepos (*Phocion* 4), Demetrius was one of the leaders of the ‘aristocratic cause’ (*optimatum*) along with Phocion – and was forced to flee Athens upon the restoration of democracy in 319/8. The fact that he fled to Antipater’s grandson Nicanor in the Piraeus tells us all we need to know about his political leanings.

⁴³ Diodorus also refers to Demetrius as *epistatēs* at 20.45.5, as does Strabo (9.98). Polybius (12.13.9) describes Demetrius as *prostatēs*.

⁴⁴ Ferguson (1911a, p. 37) had no doubts that ‘the city was in the hands of a tyrant’. Mossé (1973, p. 102) called his regime a ‘philosophical tyranny’; Green (1990, pp. 36, 45) described Demetrius variously as a ‘Macedonian-backed puppet dictator,’ a ‘philosopher-king’ and an ‘absolute ruler’; Mikalson (1998, pp. 53–4) called Demetrius a ‘virtual tyrant’; Wilson (2000, p. 270) describes the regime as ‘externally imposed tyranny’; Even O’Sullivan (2002, p. 251) refers to ‘the long tyranny of Demetrius’.

⁴⁵ As does Dreyer, 1999, p. 161.

⁴⁶ Dow and Travis (1943, p. 151) argued emphatically that Cassander was the one who ‘chose’ Demetrius. Williams (1985, p. 169) described Cassander’s intervention in Athenian affairs as ‘more blatant’ than any change imposed by Antipater. Gottschalk (2000, p. 370 n. 7) observes that the term αἰτέω is ‘neutral and could mean no more than that Cassander selected Demetrius’. The aorist passive third person singular form ἤρθεθι used here appears in Diodorus on eleven other occasions. Not one of these other usages is consistent with an election by Athenian citizens. Diodorus uses ἤρθεθι when referring to the appointments of Peithon, Arrhidaeus and Antipater to the post of *epimeletēs* of the Macedonian kings (18.P.1), on five occasions when referring to the appointment of kings of Egypt (1.62.1; 1.68.4), Rome (8.14.1) and Media (2.32.3; 9.20.4), to Alexander’s appointment as *stratēgos autokrator* of Greece (17.P.1), twice to the election of Roman generals (33.3.6; 36.10.1), to Viriathus’ selection as leader of the Lusitanians (30.1.2), and to Zaleucus’ appointment as *nomothetēs* at Locris (12.20.1). Other authors employ ἤρθεθι to denote the choice of a candidate in a manner that is not consistent with Athenian democracy. Thus, Lysias (12.66) states that Theramenes was chosen as *stratēgos* by the Four Hundred, Xenophon (*Hellenica* 2.2.17) uses ἤρθεθι to describe the appointment of Theramenes by the Thirty as an extraordinary envoy to Sparta, while Sophocles (Frag. 126) employs ἤρθεθι to describe the selection of Andromeda as a sacrifice and Aeschylus (*Seven Against Thebes* 505) uses ἤρθεθι to describe the choice of Hyperbius to fight in a single combat against Typhon. This brief survey tends to suggest that Diodorus is most likely to have used the term ἤρθεθι to indicate that Demetrius ‘was chosen’ by Cassander, rather than by the Athenian *demos*. For Cassander, who would not long afterwards execute his own nephew for suspected political unreliability, to

choose for himself would have been the only safe option. Hammond and Walbank (1988, p.137 n. 2) noted Antigonos Gonatas later employed 'the same specious combination of nomination and "election"' that Cassander employed. Cf. Petrakos 1999b, no. 8 which describes the honorand as 'having been appointed general by King Antigonos and elected by the people'.

⁴⁷ Green (1990, p. 44) argued that Cassander's 'prime objective was not the conquest of Athens, but the throne of Macedon'.

⁴⁸ There is an example of crowding in line 6 of *IG II² 1201*, so we cannot dismiss this possibility out of hand.

⁴⁹ In the same volume Tracy (2000b, p. 337) correctly noted that the office was 'extraordinary'. Dow and Travis (1943, p. 152) likewise ruled out *prostatēs* or *epistatēs* on the grounds that they were not regular Athenian offices.

⁵⁰ Cassander would later appoint an *epimeletēs* at Megalopolis, and Deinarchus of Corinth had been Antipater's *epimeletēs* of the Peloponnese. Green (1990, p. 45) suggests the position was akin to that of Perdikkas, Antipater and Polyperchon had held in relation to the Macedonian kings.

⁵¹ Dow and Travis (1943, p. 152); Williams (1985, pp. 198–9); Whitehead (1986, p. 375); Rhodes and Lewis (1997, p. 41). O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 96–7) tentatively discusses the possibility. Modern scholars have also suggested *thesmothetēs*, *anagrapheus* (10 letters), *stratēgos*, *prostatēs*, *epistatēs*, *nomothetēs* (9 letters). Tracy's discovery that *IG II² 2797* refers to Demetrius of Phalerum's homonymous grandson has eliminated any reliable evidence that this Demetrius ever held the office of *stratēgos*. We can easily rule out *thesmothetēs* and *anagrapheus* as anachronistic: it was Demetrius' grandson who held the office of *thesmothetēs* when Athens was under the sway of Antigonos Gonatas (see Oetjen, 2000), and there is no evidence the office of *anagrapheus* was revived until the 290s. They are also one letter too long, with no possibility of crowding.

⁵² Habicht (1997, p. 45) noted 'Demades' forum was the Assembly'.

⁵³ For the most recent detailed discussion see O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 120–3).

⁵⁴ O'Sullivan also attempts to sidestep the issue by highlighting 'the traces of *grammateis*' on *IG II² 418* and 585, despite the fact that Tracy does not accept either for the years of Demetrius' regime.

⁵⁵ Tracy (1995, p. 40) correctly dates the decree to the period of oligarchy, as does Habicht (1982, p. 198).

⁵⁶ Poddighe (2004) gets around this potential problem by dating this decree to the period of Demetrius' tyranny. The problem with this interpretation is that it would force us to view Polyeuctus of Sphettus' earlier decree as coming from the period of Demetrius' regime as well. This seems most unlikely given Polyeuctus' implacable attitude toward Macedonian influence in Athens.

⁵⁷ The fact that Telocles sat in the council in 303/2 (*Agora* 15.62, 309) is of little consequence. His presence serves only as a further indicator of the dangerous tolerance of Athenian democracy. O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 130) sees considerable significance in the fact that Telocles survived the fall of Demetrius' regime, despite the fact that to do so contradicts her own stance that Demetrius' regime was not hateful to the majority of Athenians.

⁵⁸ O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 117, 123) attempts to put four more documents – *IG II² 418*, 585, 592 and 727 – into the mix, but is forced to admit that they are only

- 'possibly of Demetrian provenance'. Crucially, Tracy (1995, 2000) does not attempt to link *IG II²* 418, 585, and 727 to Demetrius' regime. Tracy (1995, p. 156) tentatively suggested that *IG II²* 592 proposed by Mnesitheus of Lamprae might belong to the years of Demetrius of Phalerum. This was at least plausible while Mnesitheus' son Aristides was thought to have been politically active during the oligarchy of the 290s. But the fact that any connection between Aristides and the oligarchy has been removed by the redating of *IG II²* 2797 to 280/79 by Byrne (2006/7, pp. 170–5) makes this significantly less likely.
- ⁵⁹ Lape (2004, p. 48–9) argues that Demetrius' reforms 'operated to erode rather than engender democratic practice and habits of thought, because the rules of political engagement had been fundamentally transformed'.
- ⁶⁰ Lambert (2000, p. 488) suggests that decrees and statues might have been set up only 'at private initiative and expense'. O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 117) briefly discusses the possibility that less durable materials were used for financial reasons, but this seems far-fetched.
- ⁶¹ Tracy (1995, p. 37) has suggested that the prescripts of the surviving documents indicate that the assembly was meeting on regular days. But this does not preclude the possibility that extraordinary meetings of the assembly were forbidden.
- ⁶² Ferguson (1911b, p. 276) argued that the 'curbing' of the Athenian assembly was 'obvious' because of the paucity of the decrees from this period and 'implied' because of the tyranny attributed to Demetrius.
- ⁶³ Marasco (1984, pp. 34–5) had a similar view of this incident. Likewise O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 115, 137, 268–9) who again appears unaware of the similarity of Tracy's argument.
- ⁶⁴ Thirlwall (1835–44, vol. 7, p. 328), and Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 562) both recognized that this manoeuvring took place behind Demetrius' back.
- ⁶⁵ When Demetrius Poliorcetes barged his way into the Piraeus in 308/7, Dionysius was powerless to prevent the Athenians from welcoming Demetrius with open arms.
- ⁶⁶ Simpson (1955, p. 34) argued that the incident proved that 'as at all times of oligarchic or tyrannical government, there persisted the threat of a democratic revolution should an opportunity arise'.
- ⁶⁷ A decree from 330/29 honouring a certain Callicratides of Steiria for his service as *anagrapheus* (*IG II²* 415, 11) and a list of officials from 335/4 (*Agora* 15.43, 229) are our only evidence that the *anagrapheus* was part of the bureaucracy of democratic Athens.
- ⁶⁸ A rather odd example is Dreyer (1999, p. 159). Because the office of *anagrapheus* returned to prominence between 294/3 and 292/1 (*IG II²* 378; 649; 389; 385a + *SEG* 21.355), Dreyer suggests that the position of the *anagrapheus* indicated that the basic democratic procedures remained intact because the *anagrapheis* were prominent between 294/3 and 293/2. This argument effectively makes no sense. If the *anagrapheis* had held such a prominent position *before* the imposition of the oligarchy, then one could argue that the prominence of the *anagrapheis* was compatible with democracy. But when Dreyer's sole evidence comes from a regime that was in place almost thirty years *after* the regime in question, and was tainted by claims that it was an oligarchy, the argument has no merit.

- ⁶⁹ O'Sullivan claims that these men held an office called *anagrapheus*, but this is an exaggeration.
- ⁷⁰ Bosworth (1993, p. 420) even went so far as to call this 'the most influential office of state' under the oligarchy. Habicht (1993, p. 255) argued that the *anagrapheus* 'replaced' the *grammateus* and 'obviously enjoyed greater powers'. Dow (1963, p. 38) noted that 'the mere change of term was doubtless felt to be, and was meant to be, significant'.
- ⁷¹ Oliver (2003a, p. 42) describes this as a *damnatio memoriae* reminiscent of the Thirty.
- ⁷² O'Sullivan (2001) has reconsidered the possibility that there was a fifth-century precedent for Demetrius' introduction of the board of *nomophylakes*. According to the *Lexicon Cantabrigiense*, Philochorus stated that the board of *nomophylakes* was created at the time of Ephialtes' reforms. O'Sullivan takes modern scholars to task for ignoring this. There may well have been a short-lived fifth-century board of *nomophylakes* as O'Sullivan postulates. However, a fifth-century precedent for the *nomophylakes* does not mean that Demetrius' regime was not oligarchic. Their swift removal after the restoration of democracy in 307 should help us to evaluate Demetrius' claims. Harding (2008, p. 169) recently dismissed any connection with Ephialtes as 'simply confusion'.
- ⁷³ O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 72–86) argues that we should take Pollux at face value, and that the *nomophylakes* were merely a police force overseeing Demetrius' new social legislation along with the *gynaikonomoi*. Leaving aside the anti-democratic nature of Demetrius' legislation, such relatively limited powers are not consistent with term *nomophylakes* as Aristotle understood it, or even as Cicero (an advocate of Demetrius of Phalerum) understood these officials. Cicero (*de Legibus* 3.46) describes *nomophylakes* as officials who 'used to observe the deeds of men and recall them to the laws' – a much more 'Big Brother' remit than O'Sullivan would have us believe. In any case, O'Sullivan is on very weak ground in suggesting that the transferral of duties from the Eleven to the *nomophylakes* is not in keeping with oligarchic thought. One of the first acts of the Thirty had been the creation of a new body of Eleven, a shadowy group whose wishes were backed up by a group of 300 whip bearers (*Ath. Pol.* 35.1). Along with the notorious Ten and the Piraeus Ten, the Eleven were explicitly excluded from the amnesty (39.6). They presumably would have had much in common with Demetrius' men whose office door led to Hades. O'Sullivan herself seems to want to hedge her bets, suggesting that the *nomophylakes* may have had 'broader competence' than the Eleven. Stears (2000, p. 219) suggests that the *nomophylakes* policed both the assembly and Demetrius' new sumptuary legislation.
- ⁷⁴ According to de Laix (1973, p. 71) Demetrius expanded the powers of the *nomophylakes* in order to 'curtail' the power of the assembly. Vatai (1984, p. 118) talks of both the *gynaikonomoi* and the *nomophylakes* being 'intrusive'. Williams (1997, p. 331) has argued that the duties of the seven *nomophylakes* 'were so extensive as to be incompatible with the principles of Periclean democracy'.
- ⁷⁵ According to Aristotle, the duties of *nomophylakes* were in the hands of the council in democratic regimes. In Plato's *Laws* the highest ordinary officials form a college of thirty-seven *nomophylakes* to ensure compliance with the laws. These are clearly not democratic officials.

- ⁷⁶ The *graphê paranomôn* was a potent political weapon in Athenian democracy. Its prevalence under democracy as well as its potency as a political weapon is indicated by the fact that Aristophon of Azenia (who is otherwise unknown) was acquitted from this charge on seventy-five occasions (Aeschines 3.194). The long-running political squabble between Aeschines and Demosthenes was decided in the law courts when Aeschines unsuccessfully prosecuted Ctesiphon for proposing an illegal motion. Demosthenes successfully defended Ctesiphon, and Aeschines was forced into exile. Demades suffered *atimia* after his opponents successfully prosecuted him for a third time on a *graphê paranomôn* (Dein. 1.89; 2.15; Athenaeus 6. 251b; Hypereides, 5.32).
- ⁷⁷ O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 91–2, 99–102) defends the *gynaikonomoi* as democratic on the grounds that there are third-century examples of the office. But this argument is akin to Dreyer's (equally flawed) suggestion that the office of *anagrapheus* can be seen as democratic in the Antipatrid oligarchy because the office existed in the 290s.
- ⁷⁸ Ferguson (1911a, p. 23) argued that payment was suspended 'now that the poor had no citizen status to maintain'. Green (1990, p. 42) suggests that payment was abolished on ideological grounds, as 'a further anti-populist measure'. It is unlikely that either Phocion or Demetrius would have wished to offer the poorer citizens any incentive to participate. Indeed, Phocion is said to have taught the Athenians to be happy farmers rather than political activists. Demetrius of Phalerum would have had an equally dim view of those requiring payment playing an active role in the governing of Athens – especially if Menander's vision of 'poverty' in Demetrius' Athens is anything to go by!
- ⁷⁹ According to Hansen (1987, p. 61) 'Athenian democracy was, ideally, based on the principle of rotation by which the highest number of citizens became involved in the running of the democratic institutions whereas no citizen could acquire a degree of professionalism that would turn the democracy into an oligarchy'.
- ⁸⁰ According to the *Ath. Pol.* 24.3, there were some 700 *archai*.
- ⁸¹ Hansen (1985, pp. 35–6) has highlighted the difficulty in staffing a 500-man council with only 21,000 citizens as part of his larger argument that there were normally more than 30,000 citizens at Athens.
- ⁸² A decree from 320/19 (*JG II*² 380, 17–18) stipulated that the duties of the *astynomoi* were to be incorporated into those of the *agoranomoi*.
- ⁸³ Morgan (2002, p. 296) has speculatively identified the third *anagrapheus*, Eucadmus of Anacaea, as the grandson of a sculptor who worked on the frieze of the Erechtheum.
- ⁸⁴ Oliver (2003a, p. 50) suggests that selection at random would require the *anagrapheis* to be otherwise 'virtually unknown'.
- ⁸⁵ Tracy (1993) tentatively dated the decree to 338 or 337. Bosworth (1993) dates the decree to 322/1.
- ⁸⁶ Williams (1985, p. 196; 1997, p. 341) argued that Demetrius' appointment as *archon eponymos* 'could certainly not be by chance'; so too Gehrke (1978, p. 152–3); Hammond and Walbank (1988, p. 137).
- ⁸⁷ O'Sullivan provides a detailed explanation (2009b, pp. 133–7) of why the attack on Demochares normally linked with Demochares should in fact be associated with Archedicus of Lamprae. O'Sullivan also correctly points out (2009b, p. 138)

that none of the surviving literature associates Polemon with the Athenian archonship. But removing Democleides and Polemon from the mix cannot counterbalance the fact that Demetrius himself cannot have been chosen by chance.

⁸⁸ For a recent critique of the notion that Demetrius expanded the powers of the Areopagus see O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 147–59).

⁸⁹ Dionysius of Halicarnassus who preserved this fragment described the regime as 'the oligarchy set up by Cassander'.

⁹⁰ Tritle advocates considering contemporary opinions, but underplays the significance of the fact that the restored democracy called this regime an oligarchy, dismissing this as 'democratic and ideological hyperbole' caused by resentment of Antipater's peace settlement. But the very existence of that 'democratic hyperbole' clearly shows that the democrats were ideologically estranged from Phocion's regime. This was demonstrated not merely by the language Hagnonides employed, but also by the imagery employed on the stele itself. In the relief Athena is shown watching on as the personification of the Athenian *demos* crowns the honorand – an image clearly intended to distance the newly restored democracy from its oligarchic predecessor.

Chapter 4

¹ The poorest class (*thētes*) were excluded from serving as treasurers of Athena (only those from the richest class were eligible) and were 'officially' ineligible to put their names forward for the selection of archons by lot (*Ath. Pol.* 7.4.). However, the *Ath. Pol.* makes it clear that *thētes* were actually serving as archons as the rules were not being strictly followed (Hansen, 1991, pp. 107–8).

² Hansen (1991, p. 247) argues that when an Athenian listed the most important institutions, he named the assembly, the council and the law courts. Tracy (2003, p. 10) argues that the four cornerstones of Athenian democracy were sortition, annual terms of office for magistracies, citizen bodies with meaningful powers and the law courts. Ultimately this analysis derives from Herodotus who named the lot, accountability of officials, and the popular assembly as the key features of democracy (Herodotus 3.80.6). See also Sinclair, 1988, p. 17–23.

³ This exchange takes place after a meeting of the Eleusis deme assembly in which an emotional appeal has been made. We are clearly intended to empathize with the democratic viewpoint, because the one accused of being an oligarch, Smicrines, after criticizing the other's readiness to believe anyone who makes an emotional appeal, and arguing that a small committee is better to judge what is true and false than a public meeting, will ultimately discover that the maker of that emotional appeal, Stratophanes, is his own long-lost son (*Sic.* 280–311), and that his initial judgement was completely wrong, and that of the democratic assembly right (Sommerstein, pers. comm.).

⁴ Major (1997, p. 41) claims 'the democrats took charge briefly and bloodily'.

⁵ O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 13) paints Polyeuctus as 'a figure of some importance during Demetrius of Phalerum's later regime', but later (pp. 245–6) correctly has

Polyeuctus speaking against the Macedonian cause, thus making his decree one of the last acts of the democracy.

- ⁶ Polyeuctus brought a *graphê paranomôn* against Cephisodotus in 336/5 (Polyeuctus frag. 1–2).
- ⁷ There is some scholarly debate regarding the chronology here. Modern scholars often favour 321/0 over 318/7, but Ampolo (1979, p. 174) opted for the latter date, on the grounds that Xenocles' absence from the record during the Antipatrid oligarchy and the period of Demetrius of Phalerum should lead one to think that he was opposed to oligarchic policy. Clinton (2008–10, vol. 2, p. 106) recently argued in favour of 321/0 on the grounds that the conditions in 318/7 were 'unsettled and not conducive to such a major undertaking as building a bridge in the countryside'. But the fact that the decree was decided by 'the Eleusinians and the Athenians in the fort' is not at all incompatible with the dangerous conditions in 318/7. In fact, the troubled times would make Xenocles' endeavours to safeguard pilgrims to Eleusis more praiseworthy.
- ⁸ The secretary for 318/7 represented the tribe Aegeis (II), following on from the last normal secretary from 322/1 who had represented tribe Erechtheis (I).
- ⁹ Oliver (2003a, p. 44) suggests that Polyperchon wrote to the *demos*. But given that Demetrius Poliorcetes later addressed his correspondence to the council under similar circumstances, it seems likely that Polyperchon did so too. This should be interpreted as related to the process of *πρόσδοον γράφεσθαι* whereby interested citizens could write to the council, and then if the motion was put forward, make a formal proposal in the assembly. This process was open to noncitizens (*IG* II² 103, 107, 226), although – like Polyperchon – they could not actually speak in the assembly on behalf of their proposal. For more on this procedure see Jones, 1957, p. 120.
- ¹⁰ According to Plato (*Euthyphron* 3b) religion was 'easily slanderable to the common people'.
- ¹¹ Lawton (1995, p. 108) described the relief as 'unusually large and impressive for a document relief'.
- ¹² Lawton (2003, p. 127) describes the relief as a 'provocative statement of the democratic cause'.
- ¹³ For a recent discussion of Athenian documents being set up near the altar of Zeus the Saviour see Oliver, 2003b, pp. 105 ff.
- ¹⁴ According to [Plut.] *Moralia* 847d there was a statue in the *prytaneion* of Demochares clad in this array. This statue was part of the honours accorded to Demochares in 271/0 in response to the request of his son Laches ([Plut.] *Moralia* 851d–f). Marasco (1984, p. 25) has cast doubt on the validity of this story, arguing that it was the invention of a periegetic source explaining the symbolism of the statue in the agora that showed Demochares armed with a sword. Marasco argued that the atmosphere at the time would have prevented such a show of bravado on the part of Demochares, and that the wearing of armour in the assembly was contrary to democratic practice. But Habicht (1993, p. 256) argues that the source 'is very likely correct after all, even if this has often been doubted'. Given the extraordinary circumstances it would not be unlikely that normal 'rules' would be broken.

- ¹⁵ Lycurgus was one of the ten leading Athenian politicians Alexander demanded be handed over to him in 335 (Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.10; Plut. *Demosthenes* 23).
- ¹⁶ Strombichides (I) of Euonymon who was the brother of their great-grandfather Strombichus, was executed by the Thirty (Lysias. 13.34; 30.14; *IG* II² 4881). See Davies (1971, pp. 163–5).
- ¹⁷ Xenocles had held the financial post of ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει between Lycurgus' two terms ([Plut.] *Moralia* 841c), while his brother is known to be the speaker of [Demosthenes] 35.
- ¹⁸ There was clearly some sort of disruption of tribal cycles under Demetrius of Phalerum. In the last year of the democracy (318/7) tribe II (Aegeis) had presided. No tribal presidency is attested until 307/6 when the new tribe II (Demetrias) presided. If the cycle had continued normally, Hieromnemon in 310/9 ought to be the old tribe X (Antiochis), Demetrius of Phalerum in 309/8 ought to be the old tribe I (Erechtheis), Caerimus 308/7 ought to be the old tribe II (Aegeis), and Anaxicrates 307/6 ought to be tribe III (Pandionis). The choice of the tribe Demetrias in 307/6 is clearly an honour rather than part of a sequence, because in 306/5 tribe XI (Aiantis, the old tribe IX) presided (Osborne, 1985, p. 283 n. 24; Tracy, 1995, p. 37 n. 6). After this, the sequence is unbroken aside for the omission of Demetrias in favour of tribe III (Erechtheis) in 303/2 to make up for the exceptional appearance in 307/6. Osborne (1985, p. 285 n. 30) suggests that the new tribe XI (the old tribe IX) was chosen in 306/5 by lot. Tracy also suggests this, but adds the possibility that the old tribes III–VIII had already served. Osborne (1985, pp. 292 n. 61) discusses and largely rejects the idea that the choice of Aiantis in 306/5 could be attributed to the so-called 'privilege of Aiantis', which meant that the Aiantis chorus was never judged last (Plut. *Moralia* 628). O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 121–2) discusses these options and concludes that 'the question of tribal rotation remains purely speculative'. A possible explanation is that tribal cycles operated unchanged until tribe X served in 310/09, and that Demetrius' archonship, which should have recommenced the cycle, actually terminated it altogether. This would explain why the sequence began at the next tribe after X (i.e. the new tribe XI) in 306/5 after the 'special' presidency of Demetrias in 307/6.
- ¹⁹ Boegehold (1995, p. 41) observes, 'the popular courts therefore would have been included in such a constitution as an integral function of democracy'.
- ²⁰ Until 304/3 honorific crowns were given a specified valued. After that year, crowns are described as being 'in accordance with the law' (κατὰ τὸν νόμον). Cf. Rhodes with Lewis, 1997, p. 44.
- ²¹ For example Green, 1990, p. 49; Habicht, 1997, p. 67.
- ²² Lape (2004, p. 45) observes, '[I]ike most aspects of Demetrius's regime, the *agōnothesia* is strikingly unattested by epigraphic evidence'. Hakkarainen (1997, p. 22) suggests that the abolition of the *chorēgia* was 'probably' carried out by Demetrius, which seems to imply that there is some degree of doubt. O'Sullivan (2009b, pp. 171–3) even uses the doubt to suggest that Demetrius did not abolish the *chorēgia*. On balance it seems far more likely that Demetrius abolished the liturgies and the *agōnothesia* was a democratic solution to that problem.
- ²³ O'Neil (1995, p. 107) rightly describes the *agōnothesia* as 'a new form of liturgy, placed on magistrates'.

- ²⁴ The fact that Olympiodorus ‘sailed’ (πλεύσας) to Aetolia to make the alliance provides perhaps further evidence of the renewed Athenian navy.
- ²⁵ Lape (2004, p. 57) refers to this as the ‘remilitarisation’ of Athens.
- ²⁶ For a recent discussion see Conwell, 2008, pp. 162–5.
- ²⁷ Cf. Hedrick Jr (2000b) for a detailed discussion of democratic usage of the phrase σκοπεῖν τῷ βουλομένῳ.
- ²⁸ Cf. Shear, 1984, pp. 19–24, plates 4–5a. Shear also speculates that this gate was associated with the gilded-bronze statue of Demetrius Poliorcetes found in a well in the agora. In a rare case of praise for Hellenistic Athens, Bouras (1990, p. 272) suggests that this victory arch prefigures Roman triumphal arches.
- ²⁹ The decree honouring Callias of Sphettus (*SEG* 28.60, 82–3) praised Callias for having acted in no way contrary to the laws or ‘the democracy of all the Athenians’ (τεῖ δημοκ[ρατί]αι τεῖ ἐξ ἀπάντων Ἀθηναίων).
- ³⁰ Mikalson (1998, p. 138) argues that the wording of the alliance with the Spartans ‘reveals how far Athenian independence and nationalism had progressed since 287/6’, with the Athenians now ‘prepared, at least mentally, to play a major, independent role in international affairs’.
- ³¹ The harking back to the Persian Wars and the equating of the threat from Macedon with that of Xerxes is reminiscent of a sentiment that was present in Athens when the city was coming under pressure from Philip of Macedon there was a strong tendency to focus on struggles against Xerxes. This is the time when the Oath at Plataea was republished at Acharnae (Tod, *GHI* II no. 204, 1–19), and there is a strong emphasis on that oath in the sole surviving speech of Lycurgus of Boutadae (Lycurgus, *Against Leocrates* 80–2). The same sentiment can be seen in Demosthenes’ speech *On the Crown*, when he invokes as divine witnesses ‘our forefathers who bore the brunt of warfare at Marathon, who stood in array of battle at Plataea, who fought in the sea-fights of Salamis and Artemisium’, to his oath that ‘that the Athenians cannot have been wrong when they took upon themselves the peril of war for the freedom and salvation of all’ when fighting against Philip (Dem. 18.208).
- ³² For the new dating of this dedication see Byrne, 2006/7.
- ³³ For more detail see Boegehold, 1995, p. 42.
- ³⁴ See Chapter 7 for a full discussion of the evidence indicating that the Athenians possessed a fleet of some sort after 288/7.
- ³⁵ The Athenians endeavoured to increase the size of their cavalry after the number of horsemen was depleted to 200 by 282/1. The hipparchs from that year were honoured for their efforts in increasing the number of *hippeis* to 300 (*SEG* 21.525), and tribal selection for phylarchs was abolished after there had been difficulties in finding a suitable phylarch for each tribe. We know from a decree of the *tarantinoi* proposed by an Achaean mercenary (*Hesperia* 65, 1996, pp. 252–61) that the Athenians also created a mercenary force of *tarantinoi* – light-armed horsemen who carried a javelin – so that by the time of the Celtic invasion in 279/8, the Athenians were able to fit out a force of 500 horsemen (Paus. 10.20.5). For recent discussions of the importance of the Athenian cavalry in this period see Oliver, 2006, *passim*; 2007, pp. 173–5.
- ³⁶ The pride the Athenians in for their horsemen is evident in the honours they occasionally accorded to various hipparchs including Comeas of Lamprae (*IG*

II² 672; *Hesperia* 10, 1941, pp. 338–9), Glaucôn of Aethalidae who is honoured in a dedication for his achievements that include service as phylarch (*IG* II² 3079), and Epichares who was crowned in 272/1 by the council, assembly and his fellow horsemen for his services as hipparch at a time when democracy was under severe threat (*SEG* 24.154, 4–5). The pride the horsemen themselves felt about their role is evident in the series of honours they accorded to their commanders (*SEG* 21.357; *SEG* 21.525; *Hesperia* 65, 1996, pp. 252–61; *SEG* 46.167).

³⁷ Based on a figure of 40 talents for 1000 horsemen (Bugh, 1988, p. 190). Oliver (2006) calculates that a force of 300 horsemen would have cost *at least* 1.25 to 1.5 talents per prytany to maintain.

³⁸ For a recent exception see Oliver, 2006, pp. 112–17.

³⁹ The fateful decision to disband democracy in 411 was taken at a special meeting of the assembly near the shrine of Poseidon Hippios (Thucydides 8.67).

⁴⁰ Ferguson (1911a, p. 35) claims that Hagnonides was ‘in control of the government in Athens’; Williams (1985, p. 165) saw Dercyllus of Hagnous as representing the more ‘moderate’ elements of Athenians society who operated as an opposition to Hagnonides and Polyuctus as ‘leaders’ of the more radical elements of the democrats; Habicht (1997, p. 49) suggests that Athenian affairs were ‘in the hands of Hagnonides and a circle of radical democrats who had returned from exile’.

⁴¹ A measure of Hagnonides’ prominence is the fact that he was honoured by the *demos* of Troezen (*IG* II² 2796 + *AM* 67, p. 41 no. 49).

⁴² A clear example from recent scholarship is O’Sullivan’s (2009a) attempt to portray Stratocles as a tyrant.

⁴³ A rare example of the opposite line of thought is Marasco (1984, p. 40), who went so far as to suggest that Demetrius Poliorcetes encouraged political diversity at this time.

⁴⁴ Ferguson (1911a, p. 120) spoke of Glaucippus’ *graphê paranomôn* without mention of the problems with the source material. Mossé (1973, p. 112) put this passage together with Plutarch’s *Phocion* to explain when the ashes of the old general were returned to Attic soil, whereas Green (1990, p. 50) used this incident as the basis for his claim that Stratocles and the other ‘extreme democrats were opposed by a more moderate group . . . who were thoroughly alarmed by the excesses of the extremists.’

⁴⁵ See also Traill, 1966, p. 235.

⁴⁶ Like Polyperchon’s letters to the Athenians in 318, this should be seen as part of the process of πρόσοδον γράφεισθαι.

⁴⁷ Modern scholars usually see Stratocles as responsible for the exile of Demochares, but Plutarch’s account does not suggest this at all. For a detailed discussion of Demochares’ exile see Chapter 6.

⁴⁸ Polyperchon was careful to allow the Athenians the impression of freedom when it came to Phocion’s trial. According to Plutarch, Polyperchon made it clear that he and therefore the king felt that Phocion and his friends were guilty of treachery, but nominally left it to the Athenians to decide upon Phocion’s guilt.

⁴⁹ In 314 at Tyre Antigonus issued a proclamation that all the Greeks should be free, autonomous, and ungarrisoned (Diod. 19.61.3–4). Soon afterwards Ptolemy issued a similar proclamation. He claimed that he wanted ‘the Greeks to know

- that he, no less than Antigonus, had their autonomy in mind' (Diod. 19.62.1–2).
- ⁵⁰ Woodhead (1989, p. 301) suggests 'the armchair objectivity of the scholar's study is not enough: one must enter into the emotions of the occasion'.
- ⁵¹ The images of Harmodius and Aristogeiton held a special place in Athenian history and ideology. They were first set up in 510/09 after the expulsion of the tyrant Hippias (Pliny, *NH* 34.17). These were made by Antenor and carried off as booty by Xerxes in 480 (Pausanias 1.8.5). A new set of statues by Critius (Pausanias 1.8.5) were set up in 477/6 (*Marmor Parium*. 54). The original statues were said to have been returned to Athens by Alexander after his conquest of Persia and entry into Susa in 331 (Pliny, *NH* 34.70; Arrian, *Anabasis* 3.16.7–8, 19.2), although Pausanias records that they were returned by Antiochus, whilst Valerius Maximus 2.10, ext. 1 states that they were returned by Seleucus. These stories have been persuasively contested by M. Moggi (1973, pp. 1–42). Each year the Polemarch made offerings to Harmodius and Aristogeiton (*Ath. Pol.* 58.1), and during the 430s it was decreed that the closest direct descendants of Harmodius and Aristogeiton were entitled to *sitēsis* in the *prytaneion* (*IG I³* 131).
- ⁵² Lape (2004, p. 56) suggests that by linking Antigonus and Demetrius with Harmodius and Aristogeiton the Athenians were seeking to evoke the historical foundations of democracy to bolster the democratic pretensions of the new regime. For a detailed discussion of the relationship between the fall of the Peisistratids, the liberation of Athens in 307 and the City Dionysia see Connor, 1989.
- ⁵³ It seems rather pointless to distinguish between the two liberations of Athens when one considers that the so-called Tyrannicides are known to have slain the brother of the tyrant rather than the man himself.
- ⁵⁴ The Athenians would again show their rhetorical commitment to freedom in 44 when they set up statues of Brutus and Cassius alongside the Tyrannicides after the assassination of Julius Caesar (Dio 47.20.4).
- ⁵⁵ For a recent discussion of the role of Harmodius and Aristogeiton as symbols for democracy see Ajootian, 1998, pp. 3–4.
- ⁵⁶ That the Athenians did not make exceptions to the rule for Cassander's ally Asander of Caria in (*IG II²* 450) during the tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum, or Herodorus an adherent of Demetrius Poliorcetes (*IG II²* 646) when he controlled Athenian affairs with a garrison on the Museum hill, should make it clear that the Athenians did not make the decision to place the images of Demetrius and Antigonus alongside Harmodius and Aristogeiton lightly.
- ⁵⁷ If indeed Shear (1984, pp. 19–24) is correct in associating the gilded-bronze statue found in a well in the agora with this stele and the victory monument at the Painted Stoa.
- ⁵⁸ Based on examination of the stele in the Epigraphical Museum in Athens in 1999.
- ⁵⁹ Takács (2000, p. 198) argues, 'Seleucus understood that a powerful divine link to the newcomers' past would facilitate their integration and further legitimise his power'.
- ⁶⁰ Grainger (1990, p. 152) argued, 'it seems unlikely that such people would accept any other type of constitution than a democracy'. The fact that Seleucus later allowed the Athenians on Lemnos to have democracies may be decisive.

- ⁶¹ The fact that Seleucus was the founder of the city meant that it would be appropriate to accord him heroic honours. This may well go a long way towards explaining why the Athenians chose to show him in the guise of Io; according to Libanius and Malalas, the site of Antioch at Mt. Silpios had previously been the site of a city called Iopolis, so named because the Argives who were searching for Io abandoned their search and settled there because of its beauty. For the myths of the founding of Iopolis see Libanius 11.44–52; Malalas, *Chronographika* 28–30. Downey (1963, p. 38) suggested that the horns were a reference to Seleucus single-handedly wrestling a bull. But this is not at all consistent with the information provided by Libanius.
- ⁶² The decree (*IG* II² 672, 28ff) honouring the hipparch to Lemnos, Comeas of Lamptrae, clearly indicates that democracy had been restored to the Athenians on Lemnos.
- ⁶³ That the Athenians set up statues of Antigonus and Demetrius in their capacity as eponymous heroes of the new tribes Antigonis and Demetrias can be inferred from the fact that Pausanias reports that images of Antigonus and Demetrius were added to Phidias' group of statues commemorating the Athenian victory at Marathon which included the eponymous heroes, various deities, and Miltiades (Pausanias 10.10.2), as well as the fact that changes were made to the foundations of the monument to the Eponymous Heroes in the agora.
- ⁶⁴ An unpublished decree from Rhamnous states that King Demetrius appointed a certain Adeimantus to a two-year term as *stratēgos ἐπὶ τὴν χορὰν*. The limited information provided by Petrakos (1999a, pp. 32–3) indicates that this Adeimantus took charge of Rhamnous and the demesmen of Rhamnous, and 'with war pressing from all sides, looked after bringing in the harvests' (following the translation by Oliver, 2007, p. 167 n. 48). Petrakos dated this decree to around 303. Oliver sees this appointment as prompting an exodus from Athens including Philippides of Cephale. But the date postulated by Petrakos is by no means certain. For starters, Petrakos himself introduces an element of doubt into his date by arguing that it is 'perhaps' (πιθανῶς) dated to 303, but 'uncertain' (ἀμφίβολη). Petrakos relies on the fact that the decree refers to a war and the fact that Demetrius has the title *basileus* to link this decree to the Four Years War. However, it seems far more likely that the King Demetrius in question is in fact King Demetrius II 'Aetolicus', and that the war in question was not the Four Years War but the war against the Aetolians in the 230s. A decree from Rhamnous from the archonship of Ecphantus (235/4) honours a certain Dicaearchus who is described as 'having been appointed by King Demetrius' (the exact same formula) to serve as garrison commander at Eretria in the context of warfare described as τὸν πόλεμον after having been appointed to serve in the fortress at Rhamnous by Antigonus Gonatas (Petrakos 1999b, no. 17). A decree from Eleusis also refers to this war, stating that it began in the archonship of Lysias some two years prior to the archonship of Ecphantus (*IG* II² 1299, 56–7). Antigonus Gonatas also appointed Athenian generals in the third century (Petrakos 1999, no. 8; *IG* II² 1225). However, it is pointless to speculate further until the full text of the Adeimantus decree is published.
- ⁶⁵ The identity of this Antipater and the date of the mission has been the subject of much debate. Both Cassander's son Antipater, and his nephew Antipater 'Etesias'

have been suggested. Cf. Marasco, 1984, pp. 73–4; Shear, 1978, p. 82; Hammond and Walbank, 1988, p. 254 n. 1; Gabbert, 1997, p. 17.

⁶⁶ In his speech defending Sophocles of Sounion, Demochares ridiculed Socrates' performance as a hoplite; he alleged that Plato and Xenocrates produced impious and disreputable students; he pointed out that Callippus of Syracuse, Euaeon of Lampsacus and Timaeus of Cyzicus were all treacherous tyrants.

⁶⁷ Shear (1978, p. 80) was probably much closer to the truth than most modern scholars have been when he argued that Demochares 'concerned himself at once with the collection and husbanding of resources for the defense of Athens, just as he had during the Four Years' War, and his voice was plainly heard in the assembly advising that Athens apply for foreign aid from the kings who opposed Demetrios'.

Chapter 5

¹ Phocion's fall from grace has been so great that Waterfield (2004) finds no place for his trial and execution in his recent popular history of Athens. If Mably, Robespierre and Hamilton were alive today they would no doubt shake their heads in disbelief. The eighteenth-century admirers of Phocion would be much heartened by Scott's recent popular history of Athens (2010, pp. 247–8), which has weeping Athenians executing Phocion merely because Polyperchon desired it.

² Plutarch (*Phocion* 4.2) reports that Phocion always walked without shoes or a cloak even on campaign, unless it was excessively cold, and his soldiers jested that it was a sign of a severe winter if Phocion wore a cloak.

³ This 'mirage' is by no means unique in antiquity. Scholars have long struggled to penetrate the cloud of mystery surrounding Alexander the Great, a cloud partly generated by the Macedonian king himself, partly by his successors, and ultimately perpetuated by his biographers in later antiquity.

⁴ Tritle (1988, pp. 29–30) argues that the image of 'Phocion the Good' is probably ultimately derived from the writings of Demetrius of Phalerum, in particular his apologetic tracts *Apology of Socrates* and *On the Ten Years*; Fisher (1994, p. 360) argues that Plutarch's 'hagiographic' bibliography 'no doubts owes a good deal to Demetrius of Phaleron's desire to elaborate the moving story of another philosophical victim of the wicked democracy'. The undoubtedly Socratic allusions in Plutarch's tale of Phocion – being led away by the Eleven for execution, his farewell to his friends, his advice to his son Phocus – can all be plausibly traced back to Demetrius' account of Socrates' demise.

⁵ Bearzot (1985) critiqued Plutarch's vision of 'Phocion the Good', but with somewhat limited impact.

⁶ Tritle (1988, p. xiv) began his spirited defence of Phocion by observing, '[p]ast judgments of Phocion have minimized or denigrated his ability as a soldier, ignored his oratorical skills, and overlooked the key to understanding his relationship with the Macedonians'. In this vein Ober (1989, p. 92) suggests that Aeschines may have been thinking of Phocion when he claimed that generals who had done great deeds could complain of poor treatment because they lacked oratorical skills, despite Phocion's fine reputation as an orator, while Williams (1985, p. 147) suggests that Phocion was 'gullible'.

- ⁷ Modern scholars seem united in their opinions on this matter: Williams (1985, p. 102) describes Phocion as a 'moderate oligarch'; Green (1990, p. 40) sees Phocion as 'antidemocratic, antipopulist . . . the natural opponent of Demosthenes and Hypereides, a master of *Realpolitik*, the darling of the conservatives'; for Duff (1999, p. 145) Phocion is 'an ardent opposer of democracy'.
- ⁸ Alcibiades argued that although democracy was an absurd system, 'while the city was a democracy, it was necessary in most respects to conform to the existing conditions' (Thucydides 6.89.4).
- ⁹ According to Fisher (1994, pp. 358–9) the same type of behaviour was attributed to other reputed Athenian Laconizers such as Philippides of Paeania, Diotimus of Euonymon and Mnesarchides.
- ¹⁰ For a discussion of the status of those who were not part of the 3000 citizens enrolled under the Thirty see Mertens, 2002, pp. 294–5.
- ¹¹ Fisher (1994, pp. 358–9) cites Hypereides' speech against Philippides of Paeania as evidence of the tendency to link oligarchic sentiments with both Laconizing and pro-Macedonian behaviour.
- ¹² Diodorus adds that the Athenians were so unimpressed by Phocion's advice that they riotously drove him from the *bema*.
- ¹³ Poddighe (2002, p. 109) argues that the situation was resolved as a result of 'bilateral negotiations with Demades and Phocion'. Errington (1990, pp. 91–2) is probably right to suggest, 'it was only through exerting his personal influence to the limit' that Demades was able to persuade Alexander to drop his demand.
- ¹⁴ According to Plut. *Phocion* 25, when the Macedonian general Micion landed at Rhamnous, Phocion led the Athenian reserves against him, repulsed his force, and slew Micion in the process.
- ¹⁵ Phocion's willingness to play a leading role in the new oligarchy earned him the tag of 'that Pétain-like figure' from Ste. Croix (1983, p. 609 n. 2). On a certain level the comparison to Pétain is apt. But overall it is unfair and unhelpful to compare a Macedonian garrison and a limited franchise to a Nazi-backed regime that actively participated in sending thousands of Jews to the gas chambers.
- ¹⁶ O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 24) also sees Callimedon as an official envoy from Athens, but this is extremely unlikely given that he had fled to Antipater's court at the beginning of the Lamian War.
- ¹⁷ Williams (1985, p. 101) suggested that Phocion would have been offended by Callimedon's 'denigration' of him. Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 521) claimed that Callimedon 'repelled the proposition with scorn'.
- ¹⁸ Green (1990, p. 40) described Phocion as 'working with Antipater' to limit the franchise.
- ¹⁹ Even if that was the case, with Phocion able to address the council – Athenian generals could propose motions in their own name (Hansen, 1991, p. 253) – he wielded considerable power and authority.
- ²⁰ O'Sullivan (2009b, p. 30) suggests that 'Plutarch portrays Phocion as Antipater's agent, or *epimelêtês*, within the city', but curiously disregards the possibility that Phocion's official position was analogous to those of Deinarchus at Corinth, Solon at Plataea or Demetrius of Phalerum at Athens under Cassander.
- ²¹ Mitchel (1964, p. 340 n. 15) claimed, 'Even if it were not spelled out in the ancient sources, it would still be clear that Phocion held the chief command and preempted the duties of the other generals'.

- ²² When Antipater and Craterus went to Asia to deal with Perdiccas, they left Polyperchon behind to defend Macedon (Justin 13.6.9). He defeated the Thessalians when they joined the Aetolians in rebelling against Macedon. Presumably Phocion and his friends dealt with Polyperchon while Antipater was away.
- ²³ When Phocion and his friends went to Polyperchon to try to save their lives, Hegemon claimed that Polyperchon could bear witness to his goodwill to the *dēmos* (Plut. *Phocion* 33.7).
- ²⁴ Heckel (1992, p. 194) argues that the reassertion of Argead power in Europe in 319/8 required the eradication of the family of Antipater from power. As such, 'not only Antipater himself needed to be replaced, but the pro-Antipatrid oligarchies which had been established in the south'.
- ²⁵ Ferguson (1911a, p. 30) believed that Phocion and Nicanor 'came to an understanding' about the garrison'. Heckel (1992, p. 196) argues that Phocion 'collaborated with Nicanor in his seizure of Piraeus'. Williams (1985, pp. 146–7) suggested that Phocion felt the need to retain the garrison in order to 'help maintain the rule of the few'.
- ²⁶ Green (1990, p. 43) noted 'though he had tried to keep the garrison from being installed, [Phocion] soon came to realize its advantages, consistently – and with good reason – refusing to ask for its withdrawal'.
- ²⁷ Habicht (1997, p. 49, n. 37) refers briefly to Conon's 'role' under the oligarchy in an unrelated footnote.
- ²⁸ It is no wonder that the eighteenth-century French political martyrs about to make their way to the guillotine in a tumbrel identified with Phocion's fate.
- ²⁹ Was the old man playing for sympathy? He had after all just been serving as hoplite general!
- ³⁰ Mossé (1973, p. 104) spoke of the 'tumultuous atmosphere'; Wiles (1984, p. 171) described the trial as 'chaotic'; Habicht (1997, p. 49) also described the trial as 'tumultuous'.
- ³¹ Mossé (1973, p. 103) speaks of the 'disturbed and almost farcical atmosphere' at the trial.
- ³² Plutarch does indicate that the assembly was filled not only with the disfranchised and foreigners, but also slaves and women. Mossé (1973, p. 104) suggested that the presence of women showed 'the extent to which the traditional ideal of the *polis* had altered in a few years'. I prefer to follow Green (1990, p. 43) in rejecting these claims as a later 'oligarchic canard'.
- ³³ Baynham (2003, pp. 28–9) discusses the venom of the masses by comparing Phocion's fate with that of Socrates. She notes, '[i]t is true that in Socrates' case more Athenians voted for the death penalty than voted for his guilt. But unlike the virtuous Phocion there is no tradition . . . which describes the Athenians who condemned Socrates wearing garlands of flowers as they did so'.
- ³⁴ Mossé (1973, p. 104) claimed 'the procedure was unquestionably illegal, and recalled the trial of the Arginusae'; Wiles (1984, p. 171) described the trial as 'a chaotic, unconstitutional assembly in the theatre'; Tritle (1988, p. 140) noted that the proceedings were 'a gross miscarriage of justice and bear similarities to those that condemned the generals of Arginusae in 406 bc'; Bauman (1990, p. 161) described the trial as 'a travesty in the best traditions

of Arginusae'; Green (1990, p. 44) claimed 'the procedure was as illegal, and as fraught with hysteria, as the mass condemnation of the commanders at Arginusae in 406'.

³⁵ Bauman (1990, p. 161) noted that Phocion's 'treachery must have been very great to arouse such bitterness'.

³⁶ A certain Conopius took his remains into Megarian territory and ensured that Phocion's body was cremated outside Attica.

³⁷ Baynham (2003, p. 28) discusses the fact that there are very few examples of Athenians being denied burial in Attic soil. She cites the cases of the Alcmaeonidae due to pollution, and Critias' exhuming of Phrynicus' corpse as exceptions that prove the rule, so to speak.

Chapter 6

¹ Two drachmas being the standard limit for the price of an ordinary flute girl (*Ath. Pol.* 50.2) as opposed to considerably more expensive *hetaerae*.

² Stratocles (I) was sole trierarch before 356 (*IG II²* 1612, 317f, 320f, 322f), and sole trierarch in 366/5 (*IG II²* 1609, 17). He also served as syntrierarch with his son Euthydemus before 356 (*IG II²* 1612, 271f), and again with Euthydemus, with their spell of duty beginning in early 357 and continuing through the summer of 356 (*IG II²* 1612, 136f).

³ According to Demosthenes, Euthydemus did not merely furnish a trireme, but also 'insisted on giving his personal service.'

⁴ Given that Stratocles was young enough to have competed in the boys' pentathlon in 335/4, but was sufficiently mature to have been elected as one of Demosthenes' prosecutors, Stratocles must have been born some time around 352–350. According to Berve (1926, vol. 2, p. 364) at the time of the Harpalus case Stratocles must have been 'ungefähr 25 jährig'. Davies (1971, p. 495) suggests that Stratocles was in his late twenties in 324/3. Both suggest that Stratocles was born around 350. Davies argued that the fact that Stratocles' father Euthydemus does not seem to have established his own separate household before 356 would also tend to indicate that a birthdate significantly before 350 would be unlikely.

⁵ The fact that Stratocles spoke first is made clear by the fact that Deinarchus twice (1.1, 1.20–1) refers to points that Stratocles made in his speech. According to Deinarchus' client: 'Much has already been said by Stratocles and most of the charges have been made, and concerning the *apophasis* itself, the Areopagus has expressed opinions which are just and true, and concerning the following things Stratocles has spoken, and read the decrees concerning them'.

⁶ For more detail see Wiseman, 1979, pp. 31–3, 119, 207.

⁷ Hypereides (5.22) explicitly contrasted the youth of the *katēgoroi* with the advanced age of the defendants, describing the prosecutors as 'the youths' (οἱ νέοι) and the defendants as the 'men over sixty'.

⁸ Blackwell (1999, p. 24) argues that 'we might suspect that it was more than a short introduction'.

- ⁹ Worthington cites Deinarchus 1.1 as evidence for this, but there is nothing in that passage that explicitly (or implicitly) indicates that Stratocles was opposed to Alexander.
- ¹⁰ Mossé (1973, p. 88) describes them as 'a heterogeneous group having little in common save venality and the love of money'.
- ¹¹ Worthington (1992, p. 125) described it as a 'show trial'.
- ¹² Ashton (1977, p. 10 n. 65) suggests that Stratocles possessed 'sufficient standing and *Frechheit* in Athens' on the basis of Deinarchus' references to Stratocles by name.
- ¹³ Ferguson (1911a, p. 120) seems to be the only modern scholar who has noted the obvious incompatibility between Stratocles and Demochares vis-à-vis Demosthenes. Most scholars seemingly feel no need to go beyond comparing the attitudes of Stratocles and Demochares vis-à-vis Demetrius Poliorcetes and/or Athenian liberty.
- ¹⁴ The tenuous nature of the connection is made clear by Hunter (2001, pp. 300–1): 'For Olson-Sens the Athenian dinner-party may be read as a greedy fantasy which attacks the pro-Macedonian Élite which ran Athens at the end of the century (one of the guests at Matro's party is Stratocles, the leading supporter of Demetrius Poliorcetes); the argument is attractive, and I would like it to be correct'.
- ¹⁵ Plutarch stated, 'For I am not writing history, but biography'.
- ¹⁶ Plutarch (*Demetrius* 12.5) claims that he is comparing 'the man of the *bēma*' with 'the man of the stage'. Later (*Demetrius* 24.2–3) Plutarch contrasted the servility of the masses towards Demetrius Poliorcetes with the modesty and virtue of a young aristocratic boy who chose to throw himself into a cauldron of boiling water rather than yield to the sexual advances of Demetrius.
- ¹⁷ Rollin cites Plutarch twice in a section entitled 'Peculiar Character of the Athenians' – the first example is Cleon's request that the Athenians defer a meeting of the assembly so that he could entertain some friends; the second is Stratocles' false proclamation of a victory at Amorgos. Both are examples of how the Athenians were prone to 'believe people of low condition and mean circumstances'.
- ¹⁸ Sabbathier appears to paraphrase Rollin.
- ¹⁹ In his discussion of 'Defamatory Libels', Bayle argues that the Athenians received little advantage from Stratocles' ruse, and 'if Stratocles had been treated as he deserved, he had been severely punished'. Isaac Disraeli (1859, vol. 2, p. 443) when citing Bayle's work, contrasts the fate of the Sicilian barber who reported the fate of the doomed Sicilian expedition with that of Stratocles, and suggests that he – the barber – should have falsely reported success as Stratocles did because he would have escaped punishment. This does not mean that he condones Stratocles' actions. In fact he observes, 'I think that this spreader of good, but fictitious news, should have occupied the wheel of the luckless barber who had spread bad but true news; for the barber had no intention of deception, but Stratocles had'.
- ²⁰ Grote (1862, vol. 8, p. 572 n. 5) mistakenly placed this event during the Four Years' War and saw it merely as 'a very good story'.
- ²¹ Mikalson (1998, p. 77) claims, 'Plutarch takes out on Stratocles his dislike of Demetrius and the divine honors he was given at Athens'.

- ²² The people of Ephesus introduced a secular statue of Philip into the temple of Artemis (Arrian, *Anabasis* 1.17.11); the people of Eresus erected altars to Zeus Philippios (Tod, *GHI*, no. 191, 6); In Macedon his statue was associated with the Olympians (Diod. 16.92.5).
- ²³ Ambassadors came to Alexander from Miletus concerning an oracle that stated that he was 'the son of Zeus' (Διὸς γενέσσεως).
- ²⁴ According to Hypereides 5.32, '[someone] wished . . . to set up a statue of Alexander, king and invincible god'. Unfortunately, we lack any explicit information aside from this aside from the late and unsubstantiated claim of Aelian (*VH*. 5.12) that Demades proposed a motion that Alexander be recognized as the thirteenth Olympian.
- ²⁵ For a detailed discussion of the evidence for cult to Alexander at other Greek *poleis* cf. Habicht, 1970, pp. 17–36; Price, 1984, pp. 25–6; Shipley, 2000, p. 159.
- ²⁶ According to Green (2003b, p. 263) 'the idea caught on'.
- ²⁷ Muccioli (2008, p. 123) suggests that we should prefer the more sober account of Diodorus to that of Plutarch.
- ²⁸ It is typical of Plutarch's attitude towards Stratocles that Philippides draws no criticism for his friendship with Lysimachus. Plutarch explicitly contrasts the behaviour of the two because Stratocles was a disreputable 'man of the *bēma*', whereas Philippides was a responsible 'man of the stage'.
- ²⁹ Errington, *OCD*³, p. 1448 claimed that Stratocles proposed a decree honouring 'Lysimachus' friend, the poet Philippides' in 292. But the Philippides honoured in this decree (*IG* II² 649) came from the deme *Paeania*, and must be distinguished from the comic poet from *Cephale*. This most atypical error undermines the validity of Errington's claim that 'inscriptions confirm Plutarch's unsavoury picture of him [Stratocles]', because it betrays a lack of familiarity with the very decrees that Stratocles proposed. Errington's uncharacteristic error has unfortunately been replicated – see for example Hazel (2004, p. 443).
- ³⁰ A rather illuminating modern analogy to the relationship between Stratocles, the Athenian public and comedians, comes from the build-up to the Victorian State elections in Australia in 1999. In the weeks prior to the election, Victoria's leading left-wing satirists 'officially' conceded defeat to Jeff Kennett, the incumbent right-wing state premier, because after 'years of hectoring and harassing', Kennett's Liberal Party government was more popular than ever. One leading satirist – Rod Quantock – admitted that 'Jeff's won . . . because 60 per cent of them [Victorians] approve of Jeff Kennett'. Likewise, Anthony Morgan abandoned his stand-up routines because 'he tired of trying to persuade young audiences, who the polls indicate overwhelmingly support Mr Kennett's leadership, against the Premier' (Anthony Dennis, 'Jeffed: it might be funny if it wasn't serious', *Sydney Morning Herald*, Saturday, 4 September 1999). Ironically, despite overwhelming opinion polls to the contrary, Kennett lost the election to Labor Party leader Steve Bracks.
- ³¹ Woodhead (1981, p. 366) observed, '[a] city did not spend this kind of money, and commit itself in perpetuity to the spending of it, without very strong reasons which transcended even that extravagant adulation of Demetrius to which one might at first think of ascribing it'. Genuine ideological commitment to democracy is one such reason; this obligation is another.

- ³² For a detailed discussion of the role of the Athenian flotilla in Antigonos' return to Asia see Bayliss, 2006.
- ³³ See Dreyer (1998) for a recent (unsuccessful and largely unnoticed) attempt to demonstrate that Plutarch's claims can be substantiated by associating the elected office of the priest of the Saviours with the elected office of *anagrapheus* in the 290s.
- ³⁴ *IG* II² 471, 6 indicates that the name of the month was still Mounichion in 306/5. Scott (1928, p. 159) argued that the fact that the month in which the Demetreia games were celebrated in Eretria was called Demetrian 'points to the veracity of Plutarch'. But the Athenian inscriptions from the time clearly do not support Plutarch's allegations.
- ³⁵ Seven decrees from this period proposed by Stratocles (*IG* II² 456, 4; *IG* II² 471, 6; *IG* II² 486, 6; *IG* II² 495, 4–5; *IG* II² 496 + 507, 5; *SEG* 16.58, 6–7; *SEG* 36.164, 4–5) indicate that the last day of the month was still referred to as ἐνῆι καὶ νέαι, and not 'Demetrias'.
- ³⁶ Habicht (1997, p. 88) links the changing of Mounichion to Demetrian to the pro-Demetrian oligarchy of the 290s, but the paucity of the epigraphical material cannot confirm or rule out this suggestion.
- ³⁷ When the Athenians created the two new tribes they did not create any new demes. Instead, three demes were taken from each of the original tribes, with the exception of the smallest, Aiantis, which contributed none, and the two largest, Aegeis and Leontis, which contributed four and five demes respectively. Erechtheis, Aegeis, Pandionis and Leontis each yielded three demes to Antigonis, while Oineis and Kekropis gave up three to Demetrias. Akamantis, Antiochis and Hippothontis each yielded one deme to Antigonis and two to Demetrias. Kekropis and Pandionis (the most over-represented tribes in 308/7) contributed approximately fifteen councillors each to the new tribes. Erechtheis, Aegeis, Leontis, Akamantis and Antiochis (the medium-sized tribes) each surrendered about ten councillors. Oineis and Hippothontis (the smaller tribes) each gave up about five councillors, while Aiantis contributed none because of its small size (Traill, 1975, pp. 26–32).
- ³⁸ Shipley (1987, pp. 173, 288) suggested that this tribe was matched by an Antigoneis named after Antigonos.
- ³⁹ For crowns dedicated to Athena by Antigonos and Demetrius ca.303 see *IG* II² 1477 + *Hesperia* 40, 1971, p. 454, 14–21.
- ⁴⁰ Hurwit (1999, p. 262) argued that 'it would have been entirely in character for Demetrius to use the gold and silver vases of Athena's sacred store as his personal tableware and avail himself of whatever utensils, thrones, and furniture he found suitable'. This is certainly the case, given what we know about Demetrius' character, but it may be that he was more inclined to think that way because he had donated so much of the gold that was stored there.
- ⁴¹ Mikalson (1998, p. 88) states, 'the Ekklesia voted heroic honors for three important generals and agents of Demetrios'; Habicht (1997, pp. 79–80) has Demochares criticizing 'the assembly' for honouring these men; Billows (1990, p. 378) says of Bourichus, 'the Athenians went so far as to grant him heroic honours', thus at least implying that it is a formal resolution.
- ⁴² The fact that Plutarch uses the phrase 'resolved by the *dēmos* of the Athenians' (δεδόχθαι τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ἀθηναίων) probably indicates that he was citing an

actual decree (Bauman, 1990, p. 167), or at the very least a source that cited the original decree.

- ⁴³ Three motions that Stratocles proposed in the assembly indicate that there was a standard formula for referring to letters from Demetrius; each of these decrees opens with a clause along the lines of 'Concerning the things which the King has written to the council and the *dēmos*' (*IG* II² 486, 11–12; *SEG* 36.164; *IG* II² 739 + *CSCA*, 1972, p. 170).
- ⁴⁴ It was almost certainly at this time that the Athenians set up a cult statue to Demetrius *Kataibatēs* – 'the Descender' (Plut. *Demetrius* 10.4; *Moralia* 338a) – on the spot where Demetrius had dismounted from his chariot (Habicht, 1970, pp. 48–50).
- ⁴⁵ Mikalson (1998, p. 87) has observed (quite rightly) that the fact that 'the divine honors awarded to Demetrius had led to this should be viewed largely as the fault of Demetrius'.
- ⁴⁶ The Sicyonians responded by renaming their city Demetrias and awarding him divine honours. Not surprisingly, these honours were short-lived.
- ⁴⁷ For a detailed discussion of this passage see Hauben, 1974.
- ⁴⁸ Ferguson (1911a, p. 122) believed that the decree ensured 'the will of Demetrius was to be decisive in all matters, both secular and religious'. Bauman (1990, p. 167) went so far as to suggest, 'the formula covered all law, and the king would be *nomos empsychos* in respect of both religious and secular affairs'. But Green's suggestion (1990, p. 50), 'whatever Demetrius proposed in future was to be endorsed' seems more appropriate.
- ⁴⁹ Osborne (1981–83, vol. 3–4, p. 83) argued, '[a]s *eponymoi* of the two new tribes Antigonos and Demetrios surely became citizens of Athens, and members of their own tribes'. Gauthier (1985, pp. 208–9) has strongly denied that the deified kings were also citizens of Athens.
- ⁵⁰ See Xenophon, *Anabasis* 2.5.21; Polybius 32.15.9; Diogenes Laertius 3.83; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *AR* 4.9.2; 8.4.42; Marcus Aurelius, *Meditations* 7.66.1.
- ⁵¹ In a similar manner, Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, p. 109) and Smith (1864, vol. 3, p. 101) even managed to have Stratocles propose a motion making Demetrius Athena's guest in the Parthenon.
- ⁵² Smith (1962, p. 115) argues that Plutarch 'makes the banishment a direct consequence of Demochares' criticisms of the sycophantic activities of Stratocles'; Mossé (1973, p. 113) suggested there was a 'rupture' and a 'quarrel' between the two politicians; Shear (1978, p. 48) spoke of 'a bitter controversy' between Stratocles and Demochares; Bauman (1990, p. 167) noted that 'the remark earned Demochares a trial and exile'; Habicht (1997, p. 72) claims 'Demochares castigated an especially servile action of Stratocles with such cutting irony that he was banished'; Mari (2003, p. 87) sees Demochares as yielding to Stratocles and being banished after having 'fought against Stratocles' impious policy'; Lape (2004, p. 58) claims that Demochares was 'exiled for indiscreetly voicing his hostility to Stratocles' sycophantic behavior'; Oliver (2007, p. 232) states 'Demochares . . . went into exile as a result of his dispute with Stratokles'; Muccioli (2008, p. 124) sees Demochares' exile as a direct consequence of a quarrel with Stratocles; O'Sullivan (2009a, pp. 72–3) speaks of 'direct conflict' between Stratocles and Demochares, and suggests (2009a, p. 73 n. 49) 'the narrative of Plutarch

makes it clear that the ‘overthrow of the democracy’ that caused Demochares’ exile is to be associated with Stratocles’.

⁵³ Ferguson, 1911a, pp. 122–3; Mossé, 1973, p. 113; Shear, 1978, pp. 48–51; Marasco, 1984; Billows, 1990, p. 170; Habicht, 1997, p. 79.

⁵⁴ It is clear that this is Plutarch’s own interpretation of Demochares’ sarcastic jibe, rather than a direct quotation of Demochares.

⁵⁵ Rhodes with Lewis (1997, p. 45) suggested ‘[t]he men who later honoured Demochares and Callias must have either regarded the last years of this régime as a tyranny or else have run together their expulsions and the ending of this régime’.

⁵⁶ Plut. (*Moralia* 798e) refers to ‘those around Stratocles and Dromocleides’ (οἱ περὶ Στρατοκλέα καὶ Δρομοκλείδην). The use of the term ‘those around’ (οἱ περὶ) suggests that they were politically linked. However, Dromocleides’ first securely dated activity does not come until the 290s when Stratocles’ career was well and truly on the wane, which would make his appearance at this stage somewhat unlikely.

⁵⁷ Kralli (1999–2000, p. 154) claims that ‘Demetrius made his discontent clear and Demochares had to leave Athens’; Mikalson (1998, p. 88) speculates that Demochares was exiled for his comment ‘and no doubt other anti-Demetrian sentiments’.

⁵⁸ The criticism by Philippides echoes a speech in Aristophanes’ *Clouds* (lines 615–26) from 423 BC where a complaint is brought from the moon: the Athenians have been playing round with the months, ‘running them up and down’ so that human activity and the divine order are completely out of kilter. ‘When you should be holding sacrifices, instead you are torturing and judging’.

⁵⁹ The Athenians had been sufficiently foolish to cross Demetrius before, so it is possible that they might have considered crossing him again.

⁶⁰ Martin (1996, p. 185) took Diodorus at face value, arguing that ‘[t]he favor he asked for and was granted on this occasion emphasized his close relationship with the city. The relationship stemmed from his role in the liberation of Athens in 307 from the decade-long tyranny supported by Cassander, the restoration of the city’s democracy, and the extraordinary honors, including divinization, bestowed on him as a result’.

⁶¹ For example Lape (2004, p. 58) who describes Stratocles’ behaviour as ‘sycophantic’.

⁶² See for example Ferguson (1911a, p. 119); Shear (1978, p. 115). Herman (1987, pp. 87–8) cites Stratocles as a ‘negative example’ of ritualized friendship.

⁶³ Ferguson (1911a, p. 120) suggests that Stratocles ‘was content to rule as the vicegerent of Poliorcetes’.

⁶⁴ Byrne (2004, p. 322) discusses the slight possibility that Stratocles was a councillor in 307/6. The evidence is weak at best.

⁶⁵ For detailed studies see Herman, 1981; Savalli-Lestrade, 1998.

⁶⁶ Kralli (2000, p. 122) observed that the Athenians ‘fully acknowledged the importance of these ‘middlemen’ in their diplomatic relations’.

⁶⁷ It is worth noting that despite the scholarly emphasis on Athenian decrees honouring Demetrius’ *philoi* the honorific decrees for Antigonid officials dry up after 303/2. Only one decree honouring an Antigonid official (*IG* II² 562 + *Hesperia* 9, 1940, p. 342 + *SEG* 32.103. Cf. *SEG* 38.91) can be securely dated after

303/2. Clearly something happened that year. The fact that Demetrius was able to organize a multi-state Greek alliance against Cassander in that year could indicate that the Athenians felt secure in their position and no longer felt the need to court Demetrius' friends. On the other hand, it could be that they had learned to fear Demetrius and decided that it was not worth going out of their way to honour him and his friends.

⁶⁸ For a detailed treatment of the Athenian honours for Medius see Bayliss, 2002.

⁶⁹ For a list of these decrees see Herman, 1981, pp. 138–49.

⁷⁰ Alcaeus of Aenus (*IG* II² 495) was also honoured at Epidaurus (*IG* IV² 1.58); Apollonides of Cyzicus (*IG* II² 492) was honoured by the Ephesians (*Syll.*³ 352).

⁷¹ Savalli-Lestrade (1998, pp. 251–354) argues that there was a complex mentality hidden behind the use of vague terms like διατρέβων and φίλος. She observes that independent *poleis* usually used vague terms, whereas subject cities tended to use specific titles. Whereas in the past this was interpreted as a means of concealing the 'shameful' behaviour of the honorands, Savalli-Lestrade (1998, pp. 277–9) sees this as free *poleis* emphasizing their personal relationship with the kings. Thus the use of the term φίλος enhances the prestige of the honorand rather than confining him to the status of an office-holder.

⁷² Drafting a proposal in advance is by no means unusual. After all, an orator might also be referred to as a *graphēn*, and an indictment against a proposal was known as a *graphe*. Demosthenes (19.47) describes how Philocrates drafted (γράφας) a motion to be put to the vote, and handed it to the clerk. Plutarch (*Phocion* 35.5) describes Hagnonides as having read aloud a motion that he had drafted (γεγραμμένον) during Phocion's trial.

⁷³ This behaviour is not dissimilar to the manner in which the Athenians honoured the friends and associates of Antipater after their defeat in the Lamian War. Kralli (2000, p. 121) observed that the Athenians 'resolved to honour as many 'friends' of the king and Antipatros as possible, in an effort to secure their benevolence'.

⁷⁴ See Tarn (1913, p. 43); Dinsmoor (1931, p. 14); Habicht (1997, p. 91); Oliver (2007, p. 250).

⁷⁵ Habicht (1997, p. 91 n. 89) suggested that Stratocles also proposed two 'very fragmentary decrees' that were passed on the same day as *IG* II² 649 (*IG* II² 389 and *Agora* 16.167). The evidence is by no means conclusive. But the hypothesis is plausible given Stratocles' penchant for proposing numerous motions on the same day.

⁷⁶ See for example Dinsmoor, 1931, p. 13; Davies, 1971, p. 164; Habicht, 1998, p. 91; Dreyer, 1999, p. 270.

⁷⁷ Tarn, 1913, p. 43; Dinsmoor, 1931, p. 14; Mossé, 1973, p. 123; Shear, 1978, p. 99.

⁷⁸ Dreyer (1999, p. 99) managed to find a connection between Philippides and Stratocles on the grounds that both were pro-Macedonians. He argued that the fact that Philippides was a pro-Macedonian is confirmed by the fact that he was honoured by Stratocles, whom he described as 'an absolute supporter of the Antigonid Demetrius'. Once again we have an example of the inconsistent and illogical use of the label 'pro-Macedonian'.

⁷⁹ A decree from 140/39 (*IG* II² 971, 20–1) refers to a grant of citizenship awarded by the Athenian *demos* [κατὰ τὸ] ψήφισμα, ὁ Στρατοκλῆς Εὐθυδήμου Διομεεὺς

εἰ[πεν]. Clearly, Stratocles' decrees could safely sit in the archives without causing pollution!

Chapter 7

- ¹ Habicht (1997, p. 116) observes that the Athenians commissioned such portraits 'when they wished to honor their fellow citizens for particularly notable achievements', and likens the portrait of Callippus in the council chamber with that of Leosthenes in the shrine of Zeus in the Piraeus (Pausanias 1.1.3). Given that Leosthenes was commander of a Panhellenic force against the Macedonians, and Callippus was reputedly the leader of a similar Panhellenic force, surely the greater prominence of Callippus' portrait within the democratic machinery should lead us to ponder whether his achievements were at least on a par with those of Leosthenes.
- ² Habicht (1998, p. 85) described the family as one that 'had been playing a significant role in Athenian public affairs for some time'.
- ³ Moerocles proposed a decree against those who injure merchants [Demosthenes] 58.53, 56. Around 330 he proposed a decree in honour of Pandius – concerned with grain storage – (*Agora* 16.82). In 318/7 he proposed an Eleusinian deme decree honouring Xenocles of Sphettus for his services as a priest (*IG* II² 1191).
- ⁴ Archander's name appears on another dedication (Petrakos, 1999b, no. 131).
- ⁵ Mossé (1973) even omits the Celtic invasion altogether. Some scholars have doubted Pausanias' claims about the number of Athenian *hippeis* sent to Thermopylae, or left the horsemen out altogether (e.g. Cary, 1952, p. 60). Bugh (1988, p. 188) argued persuasively in favour of the figure of 500 Athenian cavalrymen provided by Pausanias. Habicht (1997, p. 133) supported Bugh's arguments. Amongst recent scholars, only Rankin (1987, pp. 90–1), Ellis (1990, pp. 80–2; 1997, pp. 11–12), and Mitchell (2003, pp. 281–2) – all specialists on Celts – have demonstrated any real confidence in Pausanias' account. Waterfield (2004, p. 279) illustrates the trend in modern scholarship, arguing, 'the Athenians recovered their freedom enough to send a detachment of 500 horsemen to the north . . . to help turn back an invasion of Greece by Celtic tribesmen'. No ships, no picked hoplites, just cavalry. McNerney (1999, pp. 243–4) sanitizes Pausanias' account of its Athenian element, but unlike most modern accounts of the battle he does describe the encirclement of the Greek forces in order to rescue from oblivion Pausanias' description of the Phocians redeeming themselves for their failure in 480. Grainger (2007, p. 171) eliminates the Athenian contingent altogether. Not even the horsemen get a look in! Earlier Grainger (1999, pp. 100–4) mentions the involvement of Athenians only after Thermopylae had been turned. The unfortunate Megarans miss out in both of Grainger's accounts.
- ⁶ Shear (1978, pp. 28–9), Gauthier (1979, pp. 349–66, 371–4), Reger (1992, p. 372) all opted for a date ca. 280. Tarn (1913, p. 118) argued for a recovery in 285.
- ⁷ Bultrighini (1984, pp. 54–62) and Dreyer (1999, p. 261) have strongly criticized the translation of ἀνασώζω as 'rescue'.

- ⁸ The only secure evidence we have is that of a *thwarted* attempt to recover the Piraeus in the 280s (Polyaenus 5.17).
- ⁹ Cf. Habicht, 1979, p. 92; 1997, p. 132; Tarn, 1913, p. 442; Momigliano, 1975, p. 63; Nachtergaele, 1977, p. 142; Hutton, 2005, p. 192.
- ¹⁰ The image of Thermopylae as the place to defend Greece was so strong that there was an attempt to defend Thermopylae against the Turks in 1821. The failure of Athanasios Diakos, Panourgias Panourgias and Yiannis Dyovouniotis and their bands of *armatoloi* to defend a position at the river Alamana (Spercheios) near Thermopylae against Omer Vryonis, the commander of the Turkish army, along with Diakos' ensuing martyrdom were amongst the key moments of the early stages of the Greek War of Independence. Cf. Gordon, 1832, p. 272; Finlay, 1877, vol. 6, p. 161. There was even a doomed attempt by the British Expeditionary Force to repel invading German tank divisions at Thermopylae on 24–5 April 1941. A prominent British archaeologist once suggested to me that the commander of the British forces, the New Zealander Major General Freyberg, had clearly not read classics. Given that the soon-to-be Lord Freyberg attended Wellington College (1897–1904) where classics is still taught today, and served in A Company Hood Battalion at Gallipoli along with a group of junior officers known as the 'Argonauts' including Rupert Brooke, Denis Browne, Arthur Asquith and Patrick Shaw-Stewart, I would suggest that it is more than likely that Freyberg chose to make a stand at Thermopylae because he *had* studied classics!
- ¹¹ It is unfortunate for the modern reader that the more reliable Polybius provides no details of Thermopylae, but focuses on what he calls 'the invasion of Delphi'.
- ¹² For the most detailed discussion of the 'pro-Athenian' source see Habicht, 1979, p. 89 n. 9.
- ¹³ It is worth noting that Scholten (2000, p. 32) reconstructs the events in quite a similar manner. Both modern authors rely heavily upon Pausanias because of the prominence he gives to their subjects, but doubt particular elements of his story, particularly those involving Callippus and the Athenians.
- ¹⁴ For a recent critique of the notion that sources like Pausanias invented information see Bosworth, 2003.
- ¹⁵ Thus, Cary (1952, p. 60) rightly observes, 'As in 480, the Greeks made their first stand at Thermopylae, *but with a force far different in composition*' (italics added).
- ¹⁶ On the Phocians see McNerney, 1999, p. 244.
- ¹⁷ Cf. Nachtergaele, 1977, pp. 144–5; Strobel, 1996, p. 222; Habicht, 1997, p. 133; Scholten, 2000, p. 33.
- ¹⁸ Rankin (1987, pp. 90–1) accepts the story of Callippus' hegemony without question.
- ¹⁹ Pausanias actually reads: Εὐρύδαμον δὲ στρατηγόν τε Αἰτωλῶν καὶ στρατοῦ τοῦ Γαλατῶν ἐναντία ἡγησάμενον ἀνέθεσαν οἱ Αἰτωλοί.
- ²⁰ Hannestad (1993, p. 18) argues, 'the Aetolians had always been considered on the periphery of Greek civilization, and more or less semi-barbarous'. Rather than seeing the Aetolians as the natural leaders of the Greek world in 280, Hannestad sees the Aetolians as seizing the opportunity their unexpected success against the Celts offered 'to establish themselves as just as Greek as the other Greeks'.

- ²¹ Grote would no doubt have been shocked! For the reference see Scholten, 2000, p. 4.
- ²² For the sacred wars against the Aetolians see Scholten, 2000, pp. 19–20.
- ²³ Grainger (1999, p. 103) argues that the Aetolians were not particularly interested in defending the rest of Greece. He argues that their policy was the same as they adopted regarding the Lamian War and Demetrius Poliorcetes: ‘they defended their own territory, but scarcely stepped out of it on any pretext’.
- ²⁴ Grainger (1999, p. 104) argues, ‘the message was: the Aitolians are the new Athenians, the new saviours of Greece’.
- ²⁵ It is also worth pointing out that the fact that the invaders had no supporting fleet – a crucial difference between Pausanias’ account and the Herodotean story – has been seen as the cause of the Peloponnesian absence. Thus Niebuhr (1852, vol. 3, p. 240) argues, ‘the Peloponnesians, on the other hand, withdrew from the common cause, because they relied on the fact that the Gauls had no ships; they, accordingly, confined themselves to defending the isthmus of Corinth’. The other Greeks were able to convince the Spartans that Xerxes could circumnavigate the Peloponnese; Brennus clearly could not.
- ²⁶ Callippus is known to have served as an ambassador to Arcadian Orchomenus, where he was awarded *proxenia* along with Glaucon of Aethalidae and Aristides of Lamptrae (Moretti, *ISEI* 53). In the lead up to the Chremonidean War he was elected *synedros* to consult with King Areus and the Spartans, and their allies regarding the conduct of the war (*Syll.*³ 434/5, 70).
- ²⁷ Habicht (1998, p. 92) observed, ‘it is generally agreed that his source must have been a decree in honor of Olympiodorus standing alongside the statue on the Acropolis’.
- ²⁸ Like Habicht, Strobel (1996, p. 222 n. 291) uses the term ‘Fiktion’. Gullath (1982, p. 142) argues that it is ‘unhistorisch’. Tarn (1913, p. 442) opted for ‘rubbish’.
- ²⁹ See also Habicht, 1979, p. 92.
- ³⁰ See Nachtergaele, 1977; Elwyn, 1990; Champion, 1995, 1996.
- ³¹ Thus Polybius, Diodorus, Justin, Strabo and Dio Cassius focus on Delphi and overlook Thermopylae. Only the Suda appears to parallel Pausanias in emphasizing the attack on Thermopylae. Suda Γ.21 notes that Brennus attacked the ‘gates of Greece’, which clearly derives from an account of the attack on the so-called Hot Gates.
- ³² For Vouliagmeni as a site for maritime activity see Oliver, 2007, pp. 147, 156–7. Oliver, however, denies that the Athenians could have managed to berth and maintain warships without the Piraeus. That the Athenians did so before the Piraeus was used is not considered by any modern scholars discussing this question.
- ³³ For a recent discussion of the rubble camps see Oliver, 2007, pp. 153–8.
- ³⁴ Meiggs (1982, p. 122) speculates that the original 200 Athenian triremes built ca. 482 were constructed at ports around Attica.
- ³⁵ Presumably this is the same term that is mentioned in a third century document (225 BC) from Rhamnous honouring a trierarch (*SEG* 15.112, 26).
- ³⁶ Lund (1992, p. 204) speculated that Seleucus returned Lemnos to the Athenians because he had ‘hopes of naval support from Athens’. She observed that this hypothesis had ‘already been mentioned’ by Heinen (1972, p. 44). Unfortunately

Heinen did not explicitly make this connection. Rather, he speculated that Seleucus returned Lemnos to Athens 'in connection with' his plans to invade Europe.

- ³⁷ Salomon (1997, p. 217) discusses the possibility that Comeas commanded a cavalry force consisting only of cleruchs, but ultimately decides that Comeas must have arrived with some military force from Athens. Even if Comeas was being sent out on his own, surely a single warship could have been rustled up to do the job?
- ³⁸ In the *editio princeps*, Meritt (*Hesperia* 3, 1934, p. 8) suggests the decree 'may belong to the years of the Chremonidean War, shortly after the alliance between Athens and Sparta'.
- ³⁹ The date of this letter is not certain. Gauthier (1979, pp. 374–8) argued for between 285/4 and 277. Reger (1992, p. 373) hoped to push the date earlier than 281. Habicht (1997, p. 125) argued for a date around 280. Byrne's date is certainly in the same window set by other scholars.
- ⁴⁰ As a frame of reference it is worth considering that when Xerxes invaded, even the landlubber Spartans managed to scrape together ten triremes for the Battle of Artemisium and sixteen for the Battle of Salamis (Herodotus 8.1; 8.43).
- ⁴¹ Cartledge and Spawforth (1989, p. 35) suggest that the silver tetradrachms Areus minted with his name on the obverse, and the image of Alexander on the reverse were designed 'to sell an image of Areus on the open market of Hellenistic conceptual and dynastic exchange. More precisely, it was at Ptolemy II of Egypt that the message was aimed, with a view to convincing him that Areus was a suitable partner in his anti-Macedonian foreign policy'. The campaign was successful if the honours Areus received from Ptolemy Philadelphus, and the hoard of Ptolemaic coins found at Sparta are anything to go by.
- ⁴² Oliver (2007, p. 163) describes that Thermopylae expedition as the city's 'exceptional overseas campaign'.
- ⁴³ For the most recent detailed accounts of the Chremonidean War see Oliver, 2007, pp. 127–31, and O'Neil, 2009.
- ⁴⁴ For recent discussions of the immediate aftermaths of the Chremonidean War see Habicht, 2003, and Oetjen, 2000.

Select Bibliography

- Adams, C. D. (1927), *Demosthenes and His Influence*. London: Harrap and Co.
- Aikin, J. (1799–1815), *General Biography; or Lives, Critical and Historical, of the Most Eminent Persons of All Ages, Countries, Conditions, and Professions*. London: John Stockdale.
- Ajootian, A. (1998), 'A Day at the Races: The Tyrannicides in the Fifth-Century Agora', in K. J. Hartswick and M. C. Sturgeon (eds), *ΣΤΕΦΑΝΟΣ: Studies in Honor of Brunilde Sismundo Ridgway*. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania, pp. 1–13.
- Alcock, S. E. (1994), 'Breaking up the Hellenistic World: Survey and Society', in I. Morris (ed.), *Classical Greece: Ancient Histories and Modern Archaeologies*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 171–90.
- Ampolo, C. (1979), 'Un politico "evergete" del IV secolo a.C.: Xenokles figlio di Xeinis del demo di Sphettos', *PdEP* 34, 167–78.
- Arnold, M. (1960), *On the Classical Tradition*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Arnold, T. (1834), 'Rugby School', *Quarterly Journal of Education* 7, 234–49.
- Ashton, N. G. (1977), 'The Naumachia near Amorgos in 322 BC', *ABSA* 72, 1–11.
- Badian, E. (1961), 'Harpalus', *JHS* 81, 16–43.
- Bauman, R. A. (1990), *Political Trials in Ancient Greece*. London: Routledge.
- Bayer, E. (1942), *Demetrios Phalereus der Athener*. Berlin: W. Kohlhammer.
- Bayle, P. (1734–38), *The Dictionary Historical and Critical of Mr Peter Bayle* (second edition). London: G. Strahan.
- Bayliss, A. J. (2002), 'A Decree Honouring Medeios of Larissa', *ZPE* 140, 89–92.
- (2003), 'Curse-tablets as Evidence: Identifying the Elusive "Peiraikoi soldiers"', *ZPE* 144, 125–40.
- (2006), 'Antigonos the One-Eyed's Return to Asia in 322: A New Restoration for a Rasura in *IG II² 682*', *ZPE* 155, 108–26.
- (2008), 'Greek, but not Grecian? Macedonians in Enlightenment Histories', in J. Moore, I. Macgregor Morris and A. J. Bayliss (eds), *History Remade: The Enlightenment Origins of Ancient History*. London: University of London, pp. 219–46.
- Baynham, E. (2003), 'Antipater and Athens', in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 23–9.
- Bearzot, C. (1985), *Focione tra storia e trasfigurazione ideale*. Milan: Vita e Pensiero.
- Belardinelli, A. (1994) *Menandro Sicioni*. Bari: Adriatica Editrice.
- Beloch, K. J. (1904), *Griechische Geschichte* (second edition). Berlin: Trübner.
- Berve, H. (1926), *Das Alexanderreich auf prosopographischer Grundlage*. Munich: Beck.

- Billows, R. A. (1990), *Antigonos the One-Eyed and the Creation of the Hellenistic State*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Blackwell, C. W. (1999), *In the Absence of Alexander: Harpalus and the Failure of Macedonian Authority*. New York: Lang.
- Boegehold, A. L. (1995), *The Lawcourts at Athens, Sites, Buildings, Equipment, Procedure, and Testimonia*. The Athenian Agora XXVIII. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
- Bosworth, A. B. (1993), 'Perdiccas and the Kings', *CQ* 43, 420–7.
- (2003), 'Plus ça change . . . Ancient Historians and Their Sources', *Classical Antiquity* 22, 167–97.
- Bouras, C. (1990), 'Hellenistic Athens', in *Akten des XIII. Internationalen Kongresses für Klassische Archäologie, Berlin 1988*. Mainz: Zabern, pp. 267–74.
- Braund, D. (2003), 'After Alexander: The Emergence of the Hellenistic World, 323–281 bc', in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Oxford: Routledge, pp. 19–34.
- Briant, P. (2005), 'Alexander the Great and the Enlightenment: William Robertson (1721–93), the Empire and the Road to India', *Chromohs* 10, 1–9.
- Briscoe, J. (1978), 'The Antigonids and the Greek States, 276–196 bc', in P. D. A. Garnsey and C. R. Whittaker (eds), *Imperialism in the Ancient World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 145–57.
- Brock, R. (1989), 'Athenian Oligarchs: The Numbers Game', *JHS* 109, 160–4.
- Brogan, T. M. (2003), 'Liberation Honours: Athenian Monuments from Antigonid Victories in Their Immediate and Broader Contexts', in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 194–205.
- Bugh, G. R. (1988), *The Horsemen of Athens*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (2006), 'Introduction', in G. R. Bugh (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–8.
- Bultrighini, U. (1984), 'Pausania 1, 26, 3 e la liberazione del Pireo', *Rivista Filologica e d'Istruzione Classica* 112, 54–62.
- Buraselis, K. (2003), 'Political Gods and Heroes or the Hierarchization of Political Divinity in the Hellenistic World', in A. Barzano, C. Bearzot, F. Landucci and G. Zecchini (eds), *Modelli Eroi dall'Antichità alla Cultura Europea*. Rome: Brietschneider, pp. 185–97.
- (2004) *Kos Between Hellenism and Rome: Studies on the Political, Institutional, and Social History of Kos from ca. the Middle Second Century BC until Late Antiquity*. Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society.
- Burstein, S. M. (1985), *The Hellenistic Age from the Battle of Ipsos to the Death of Kleopatra VII*. Translated Documents of Greece and Rome, 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (2003), 'New Ways of Being Greek in the Hellenistic Period', in W. Heckel and L. A. Tritle (eds), *Crossroads of History: The Age of Alexander*. Claremont, CA: Regina, pp. 217–42.
- Butler, S. (1793), *Hudibras by Samuel Butler*. London: Benjamin and John White.
- Byrne, S. G. (2004), 'Proposers of Athenian State Decrees 286–261 bc', in D. Jordan and J. Traill (eds), *Lettered Attica. A Day of Attic Epigraphy*. Toronto: Canadian Archaeological Institute at Athens, pp. 313–25.

- (2006/7), 'Four Athenian Archons of the Third Century', *Mediterranean Archaeology* 19/20, 169–79.
- Camp, J. (1986), *The Athenian Agora*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- Campbell, J. K. (1964), *Honour, Family and Patronage: A Study of Institutions and Moral Values in a Greek Mountain Community*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Cargill, J. (1995), *Athenian Settlements of the Fourth Century BC*. Leiden: Brill.
- Carlsson, C. (2004) 'Koan Democracy in Context', in K. Höghammer (ed.), *The Hellenistic Polis of Kos State, Economy and Culture : Proceedings of an International Seminar Organized by the Department of Archaeology and Ancient History, Uppsala University, 11–13 May, 2000*. Uppsala: Uppsala University, pp. 109–18.
- Cartledge, P. A. and A. Spawforth (1989), *Hellenistic and Roman Sparta: A Tale of Two Cities*. London: Routledge.
- Cary, M. (1952) *A History of the Greek World from 323 to 146 BC*. London: Methuen.
- Casson, L. (1976), 'The Athenian Upper Class and New Comedy', *TAPA* 106, 29–59.
- Cawkwell, G. L. (1988), 'Nomophylakia and the Areopagus', *JHS* 108, 1–12.
- (1996), 'The End of Greek Liberty', in R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History 360–146 BC, in Honor of E. Badian*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 98–121.
- Ceserani, G. (2005), 'Narrative, Interpretation, and Plagiarism in Mr. Robertson's 1778 *History of Ancient Greece*', *Journal of the History of Ideas* 66, 413–36.
- Champion, C. (1995), 'The Soteria at Delphi: Aetolian Propaganda in the Epigraphical Record', *AJPh* 116, 213–20.
- (1996), 'Aetolia and the Gallic Attack on Delphi', *Historia* 45, 315–28.
- Clarke, M. L. (1945), *Greek Studies in England, 1700–1830*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- (1959), *Classical Education in Britain, 1500–1900*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clinton, K. (1974), *Sacred Officials of the Eleusinian Mysteries*. Transactions, vol. 64, part 3. Philadelphia, PA: American Philosophical Society.
- (2008–10) *Eleusis: The Inscriptions on Stone: Documents of the Sanctuary of the Two Goddesses and Public Documents of the Deme*. Athens: Archaeological Society at Athens.
- Connor, W. R. (1989), 'City Dionysia and Athenian democracy', *Classica et Mediaevalia* 40, 7–32.
- Constant, B. (1988), *Political Writings*, translated by B. Fontana. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Conwell, D. H. (2008), *Connecting a City to the Sea: The History of the Athenian Long Walls*. Leiden: Brill.
- Davies, J. K. (1971), *Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 BC*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Demetriou, K. N. (1996), 'In Defence of the British Constitution: The Theoretical Implications of the Debate over Athenian Democracy in Britain, 1770–1850', *History of Political Thought* 17, 280–97.
- Dinsmoor, W. B. (1931), *The Archons of Athens in the Hellenistic Age*. Cambridge, MA: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
- Disraeli, I. (1859), *Curiosities of Literature*. London: Routledge.
- Dow, S. (1934), 'The Lists of Athenian Archontes', *Hesperia* 3, 140–90.
- (1963), 'The Athenian Anagrapheis' *Harvard Studies in Classical Philology* 67, 38–54.

- Dow, S. and A. H. Travis (1943), 'Demetrios of Phaleron and His Lawgiving', *Hesperia* 12, 144–65.
- Downey, G. (1963), *Ancient Antioch*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Drake, J. (1702), *The History of the Last Parliament*. London: Coggan.
- Dreyer, B. (1998), 'The Hierens of the Soteris: Plut. *Dem.* 10.4, 46.2', *GRBS* 39, 23–38.
- (1999), *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte des spätklassischen Athen (322–ca.260 v.Chr.)*. Historia Einzelschriften 137. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- (2000), 'Athen und Demetrios Poliorketes nach der Schlacht von Ipsos (301 v. Chr.): Bemerkungen zum Marmor Parium, FG_{RI}Hist 239 B 27 und zur Offensive des Demetrios im Jahre 299/8 v.Chr.', *Historia* 49, 54–66.
- (2001), 'War endet die Klassische Demokratie Athens?', *AncSoc* 31, 27–66.
- Droysen, J. G. (1833) *Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen*. Hamburg: F. Perthes.
- (1878), *Geschichte des Hellenismus*. Gotha: Perthes.
- Duff, T. (1999), *Plutarch's Lives: Exploring Virtue and Vice*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Dunn, F. M. (1999), 'Tampering with the Calendar', *ZPE* 123, 213–31.
- Durrill, W. K. (1999), 'The Power of Ancient Words: Classical Teaching and Social Change at South Carolina College, 1804–60', *The Journal of Southern History* 65, 469–98.
- Duruy, J. V. (1856) *Histoire Grecque*. Paris.
- (1892) *History of the Greeks*. London: Trübner.
- Earle, E. M. (1927) 'Early American Policy Concerning Ottoman Minorities', *Political Science Quarterly* 42, 337–67.
- Ellis, P. B. (1990), *The Celtic Empire: The First Millennium of Celtic History c. 1000 BC–51 AD*. London: Constable.
- Elwyn, S. (1990), 'The Recognition Decrees for the Delphian Soteria and the Date of Smyrna's Inviolability', *JHS* 110, 177–80.
- Erasmus, D. (1753), *The Apophthegms of the Ancients*. London: A. Millar.
- Errington, R. M. (1990) *A History of Macedonia*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Erskine, A. (1990), *The Hellenistic Stoa: Political Thought and Action*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Ferguson, W. S. (1905), 'Athenian Politics in the Early Third Century', *Klio* 5, 155–79.
- (1911a), *Hellenistic Athens: An Historical Essay*. London: Macmillan.
- (1911b), 'The Laws of Demetrius of Phalerum and Their Guardians', *Klio* 11, 265–76.
- (1932), *Athenian Tribal Cycles in the Hellenistic Age*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1948), 'Demetrius Poliorketes and the Hellenic League', *Hesperia* 17, 112–36.
- Filmer, R. (1680), *Patriarcha; or The Natural Power of Kings*. London: Chiswell.
- Finkel, W. L. (1950), 'Walt Whitman's Manuscript Notes on Oratory', *American Literature* 22, 29–53.
- Finlay, G. (1877), *A History of Greece from Its Conquest by the Romans to the Present Day, BC 146 to AD 1864*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Finley, M. I. (1982), *Authority and Legitimacy in the Classical City-State*. Copenhagen: Munksgaard.

- (1983), *Politics in the Ancient World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Fisher, N. R. E. (1994), 'Sparta Re(de)valued: Some Athenian Public Attitudes to Sparta between Leuctra and the Lamian War', in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds), *The Shadow of Sparta*. London: Classical Press of Wales, pp. 347–400.
- Flacélière, R. (1937), *Les Aetoliens à Delphes*. Paris: E. de Boccard.
- Fossey, J. M. (2003), 'Phokion on a Funerary Lekythos?', *AncW* 34, 91–2.
- Freeman, E. A. (1857), 'Alexander the Great', *Edinburgh Review* 105, April 1857, 305–41.
- (1863), *History of Federal Government from the Foundation of the Achaian League to the Disruption of the United States*. London: Macmillan.
- Frösén, J. (ed.), *Early Hellenistic Athens, Symptoms of Change*. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens.
- Gabbert, J. J. (1983), 'The Grand Strategy of Antigonos II Gonatas and the Chremonidean War', *AncW* 8, 129–36.
- (1986), 'Pragmatic Democracy in Hellenistic Athens', *AncW* 13, 29–33.
- (1996), 'The Career of Olympiodoros of Athens (ca. 340–270 BC)', *AncW* 27, 59–66.
- (1997), *Antigonos II Gonatas: A Political Biography*. London: Routledge.
- Gagarin, M. (2000), 'The Legislation of Demetrius of Phalerum and the Transformation of Athenian Law', in W. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schütrumpf (eds), *Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation and Discussion*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 347–65.
- Garland, R. S. J. (1987), *The Piraeus from the Fifth to the First Century BC*. Ithaca, NY: Duckworth.
- Gast, J. (1782), *History of Greece from the Accession of Alexander of Macedon till Its Final Subjection to the Roman Power*. London: J. Murray.
- (1793), *History of Greece: Properly So Called*. Dublin: John Exshaw.
- Gauthier, P. (1979), 'La réunification d'Athènes en 281 et les deux archontes Nicias', *Revue des Études Grecques* 92, 348–99.
- (1985), *Les Cités Grecques et leur bienfaiteurs (IV—I^{er} siècles avant J.-C.)*, *Contributions à l'institutions*. BCH Suppl. 12. Paris: École française d'Athènes.
- Gehrke, H. J. (1976), *Phokion. Studien zur Erfassung seiner historischen Gestalt*. Munich: Beck.
- (1978), 'Das Verhältnis von Politik und Philosophie im Wirken des Demetrios von Phaleron', *Chiron* 8, 149–93.
- Gillies, J. (1786), *The History of Ancient Greece*. London: Strahan and Cadell.
- (1789), *View of the Reign of Frederick the Great with a Parallel between That Prince and Philip II of Macedon*. London: Strahan and Cadell.
- (1807), *History of the World: Comprehending the Latter Ages of European Greece, and the History of the Greek Kingdoms in Asia and Africa, from Their Foundation to Their Destruction*. London: Strahan and Cadell.
- Goldsmith, O. (1796), *The Grecian History, from the Earliest State to the Death of Alexander the Great, to Which is Appended a Summary Account of the Affairs of Greece, from That Period to the Sacking of Constantinople by the Othomans*. London: T. Longman.
- (1798), *Dr Goldsmith's History of Greece, Abridged for the Use of Schools*. London: G.G. and S. Robinson.

- Gordon, T. (1832), *History of the Greek Revolution*. Edinburgh: William Blackwood.
- Gottschalk, H. B. (2000), 'Demetrius of Phalerum: A Politician among Philosophers and a Philosopher among Politicians', in W. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schütrumpf (eds), *Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation and Discussion*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 367–80.
- Grainger, J. D. (1990), *The Cities of Seleukid Syria*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- (1999), *The League of the Aitolians*. Leiden: Brill.
- (2007), *Alexander the Great Failure: The Collapse of the Macedonian Empire*. London: Hambledon Continuum.
- Green, P. (1990), *Alexander to Actium: The Historical Evolution of the Hellenistic Age*. London: Thames and Hudson.
- (2003a), 'Occupation and Co-existence: The Impact of Macedon on Athens, 323–307', in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 1–7.
- (2003b), 'Delivering the Go(o)ds: Demetrius Poliorcetes and Hellenistic Divine Kingship', in G. W. Bakewell and J. P. Sickinger (eds), *Gestures: Essays in Ancient History, Literature, and Philosophy Presented to Alan L. Boegehold*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 258–77.
- (2006), *Diodorus Siculus, Books 11–12.37.1: Greek History 480–431 BC, the Alternative Version*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- (2007), *Alexander the Great and the Hellenistic Age*. London: Orion.
- Grieb, V. (2008), *Hellenistische Demokratie: Politische Organisation und Struktur in freien griechischen Poleis nach Alexander dem Großen*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Grote, G. (1862), *History of Greece*. London: J. Murray.
- Grotius, H. (1715), *Of the Rights of War and Peace*. London: D. Brown.
- Gullath, B. (1982), *Untersuchungen zur Geschichte Boiotiens in der Zeit Alexanders und der Diadochen*. Frankfurt: Peter Lang.
- Habicht, C. (1970), *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte* (second edition). Munich: Beck.
- (1979), *Untersuchungen zur politischen Geschichte Athens im 3. Jahrhundert v. Chr.* Munich: Beck.
- (1982), *Studien zur Geschichte Athens in hellenistischer Zeit*. Göttingen: Vandenhöck & Ruprecht.
- (1988), 'Die Beiden Xenokles von Sphettos', *Hesperia* 57, 323–27.
- (1993), 'The Comic Poet Archedikos', *Hesperia* 62, 253–6.
- (1997), *Athens from Alexander to Antony*, translated by D. L. Schneider. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- (1998), *Pausanias' Guide to Ancient Greece*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- (2000–3), 'A List of Magistrates from the Chremonidean War', *Horos* 14–16, 89–93.
- (2003), 'Athens after the Chremonidean War: Some Second Thoughts', in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 52–5.
- (2006), 'Athens and the Seleucids', in *The Hellenistic Monarchies: Selected Papers*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, pp. 155–73.
- Hakkarainen, M. (1997), 'Private Wealth in the Athenian Public Sphere during the Late Classical and the Early Hellenistic Period', in J. Frösén (ed.), *Early Hellenistic*

- Athens, Symptoms of Change*. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens, pp. 1–32.
- Hamilton, A. (1788), *The Federalist: A Collection of Essays, Written in Favour of the New Constitution, as Agreed upon by the Federal Convention, September 17, 1787*. New York: J. and A. McLean.
- Hammond, N. G. L. and F. W. Walbank (1988), *A History of Macedonia, Vol 3: 336–167 BC*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Hannestad, L. (1993), 'Greeks and Celts: The Creation of a Myth', in P. Bilde, T. Engberg-Pederson, L. Hannestad and J. Zahle (eds), *Centre and Periphery in the Hellenistic World*. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, pp. 15–38.
- Hansen, M. H. (1974), *The Sovereignty of the People's Court in Athens in the Fourth Century*. Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag.
- (1984), 'The Number of Rhetores in the Athenian Ekklesia 355–322 BC', *GRBS* 25, 123–55.
- (1985), *Demography and Democracy: The Number of Athenian Citizens in the Fourth Century BC*. Herning: Forlaget Systime.
- (1987), *The Athenian Assembly in the Age of Demosthenes*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1991), *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes: Structure, Principles and Ideology*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1994), 'The Number of Athenian Citizens Secundum Sekunda', *Echos du Monde Classique* 38, n.s. 13, 299–310.
- Harding, P. (2008), *The Story of Athens: The Fragments of the Local Chronicles of Attika*. London: Routledge.
- Harris, E. M. (2006), *Democracy and the Rule of Law in Classical Athens: Essays on Law, Society and Politics*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hauben, H. (1974), 'A Royal Toast in 302 BC', *AncSoc* 5, 105–17.
- Hazel, J. (2004), *Who's Who in the Greek World*. London: Routledge.
- Heckel, W. (1992), *The Marshals of Alexander's Empire*. London: Routledge.
- Hedrick Jr, C. W. (1999), 'Democracy and the Athenian Epigraphic Habit', *Hesperia* 68, 387–439.
- (2000a), 'Epigraphic Writing and the Democratic Restoration of 307', in P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Nielsen and L. Rubinstein (eds), *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, August 20, 2000*. University of Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, pp. 327–35.
- (2000b), 'For Anyone Who Wishes to See', *AncW* 31, 127–35.
- Heinen, H. (1972), *Untersuchungen zur hellenistischen Geschichte des 3. Jahrhunderts v. Chr. Zur Geschichte der Zeit Ptolemaios Keraunos und zum Chremonideischen Krieg*. Historia Einzelschriften 20. Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Helvétius (1759), *De l'esprit: Or, Essays on the Mind and Its Several Faculties*. London: Dodley and Co.
- Henry, A. S. (1988), 'The One and the Many: Athenian Financial Officials in the Hellenistic Period', *ZPE* 72, 129–36.
- Herman, G. (1981), 'The Friends of the Early Hellenistic Rulers: Servants or Officials?', *Talanta* 13, 103–27.
- (1987), *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

- Hill, G. C. (1869), *Benjamin Franklin, a Biography*. Philadelphia, PA: Claxton, Remsen, and Haffelfinger.
- Holm, A. (1894–1911), *The History of Greece*, translated by F. Clarke. London: Macmillan.
- Hornblower, S. (1992), 'Creation and Development of Democratic Institutions in Ancient Greece', in J. Dunn (ed.), *Democracy: The Unfinished Journey*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–16.
- Hume, D. (1751), *An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. London: A. Millar.
- Humphreys, S. (2007), 'Notes on Attic Prosopography', *ZPE* 160, 65–75.
- Hunter, R. (2001) 'Review', *Classical World* 94, 300–1.
- Hurwit, J. M. (1999), *The Athenian Acropolis: History, Mythology, and Archaeology from the Neolithic Era to the Present*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Hutton, W. (2005), *Describing Greece: Landscape and Literature in the Periegesis of Pausanias*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Jamot, P. (1922), 'Poussin's Two Pictures of the Story of Phocion', *The Burlington Magazine for Connoisseurs* 40, 156–8 and 159–63.
- Jenkyns, R. (1980), *The Victorians and Ancient Greece*. Oxford: Blackwell.
- (1997), 'The Beginnings of Greats, 1800–1872, I: Classical Studies', in M. G. Brock and M. C. Curthoys (eds), *The History of the University of Oxford*, vol. 6: *Nineteenth-Century Oxford, Part 1*. Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 513–20.
- Jones, A. H. M. (1957), *Athenian Democracy*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Jordan, D. (1980), 'Two Inscribed Lead Tablets from a Well in the Athenian Kerameikos', *AM* 95, 225–39.
- Kerenyi, K. (1967), *Eleusis: Archetypal Image of Mother and Daughter*. London: Routledge.
- Knipfing, J. R. (1921), 'German Historians and Macedonian Imperialism', *The American Historical Review* 26, 657–71.
- Korhonen, T. (1997), 'Self-Concept and Public Image of Philosophers and Philosophical Schools at the Beginning of the Hellenistic Period', in J. Frösén (ed.), *Early Hellenistic Athens, Symptoms of Change*. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens, pp. 33–102.
- Koumanoudes, S. N. and S. G. Miller, (1971), 'I.G., II², 1477 and 3046 Rediscovered', *Hesperia* 40, 448–58.
- Kralli, I. (1999–2000), 'Athens and Her Leading Citizens in the Early Hellenistic Period (338–261 bc): The Evidence of the Decrees Awarding the Highest Honours', *Αρχαιογνωσία* 10, 133–62.
- (2000), 'Athens and the Hellenistic Kings (338–261 bc): The Language of the Decrees', *CQ* 50, 113–32.
- Laix, R.A. de (1973), *Probouleusis at Athens: A Study of Political Decision-Making*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Lambert, S. D. (2000), 'The Greek Inscriptions on Stone in the British School at Athens', *ABSA* 95, 485–516.
- (2000–3), 'The First Athenian Agonothetai', *Horos* 14–16, 99–105.
- Lamberton, R. (2003), 'Plutarch's Phocion: Melodrama of Mob and Elite in Occupied Athens', in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 8–13.
- Lanciers, E. (1987) 'Het Eredecree voor Kallias van Sphettos en de Grieks-Egyptische relaties in devroege Ptolemaeëntijd', *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire* 65, 52–86.

- Landucci Gattinoni, F. (2003), *L'arte del potere: vita e opere di Cassandro di Macedonia*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag.
- Lange, C. H. (2008), 'The Battle of Actium and the Slave of Passion', in J. Moore, I. Macgregor Morris and A. J. Bayliss (eds), *Reinventing History: The Enlightenment Origins of Ancient History*. London: University of London, pp. 115–36.
- Lape, S. (2004), *Reproducing Athens: Menander's Comedy, Democratic Culture and the Hellenistic City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Lattey, C. (1917), 'The Diadochoi and the Rise of King-worship', *The English Historical Review* 32/127, 321–34.
- Lawton, C. L. (1995), *Attic Document Reliefs: Art and Politics in Ancient Athens*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- (2003), 'Athenian anti-Macedonian Sentiment and Democratic Ideology in Attic Document Reliefs in the Second Half of the Fourth Century' in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 117–27.
- Lehmann, G. A. (1995), 'Überlegungen zu den oligarchischen Machtergreifungen im Athen des 4. Jahrhunderts v.Chr', in W. Eder (ed.), *Die athenische Demokratie im 4. Jahrhundert v.Chr*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, pp. 139–50.
- Leiwo, M. (1997), 'Religion or Other Reasons? Private Associations in Athens', in J. Frösén (ed.), *Early Hellenistic Athens, Symptoms of Change*. Helsinki: Foundation of the Finnish Institute at Athens, pp. 103–18.
- Lewis, D. M. (1988), 'The Last Inventories of the Treasurers of Athena', in D. Knoepfler, (ed.), *Comptes et Inventaires dans la Cité Grecque: Actes du colloque international d'épigraphie tenu a Neuchâtel du 23 au 26 Septembre 1986 en l'honneur de Jacques Tréheux*. Neuchâtel and Geneva: Université de Neuchâtel and Droz, pp. 297–308.
- Liddel, P. (2007), *Civic Obligation and Individual Liberty*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Lund, H. (1992), *Lysimachus: A Study in Early Hellenistic Kingship*. London: Routledge.
- Lyttelton, G. (1768), *Dialogues of the Dead*. London: J. Murray.
- Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de (1763), *Entretiens de Phocion*. Amsterdam.
- (1769), *Phocion's Conversations: Or, the Relation between Morality and Politics* (Eng. Translation by William MacBean). London: Dodsley.
- (1770), *Observations on the Greeks* (Eng. Translation). London.
- Macaulay, T. B. (1824), 'On Mitford's History of Greece', *Knight's Quarterly Magazine* 3, November 1824, 285–304.
- (1827), 'Machiavelli', *Edinburgh Review* 45, March 1827, 259–95.
- (1828), 'On History', *Edinburgh Review* 47, May 1828, 331–67.
- MacDowell, D. M. (1990), *Demosthenes: Against Meidias*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Macgregor Morris, I. (2004), 'The Paradigm of Democracy: Sparta in Enlightenment Thought', in T. J. Figueira (ed.), *Spartan Society*. Swansea: Classical Press of Wales, pp. 339–62.
- (2007), 'The Refutation of Democracy? Socrates in the Enlightenment', in M. B. Trapp (ed.), *Socrates from Antiquity to the Enlightenment*. Hampshire: Ashgate, pp. 209–27.
- (2008), 'Navigating the Grotesque; Or, Rethinking Greek Historiography', in J. Moore, I. Macgregor Morris and A. J. Bayliss (eds), *Reinventing History: The*

- Enlightenment Origins of Ancient History*. London: University of London, pp. 247–90.
- McInerney, J. (1999), *The Folds of Parnassos: Land and Ethnicity in Ancient Phokis*. Austin, TX: University of Texas.
- MacKendrick, P. (1969), *The Athenian Aristocracy, 399–31 BC*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Mahaffy, J. P. (1877), *Social Life in Greece: From Homer to Menander*. London: Macmillan.
- (1890), *Greek Pictures: Drawn with Pen and Pencil*. London: The Religious Tract Society.
- (1896), *Greek Life and Thought: From the Death of Alexander to the Roman Conquest*. London: Macmillan.
- Major, W. (1997), ‘Menander in a Macedonian World’, *GRBS* 38, 41–74.
- Marasco, G. (1984), *Democare di Leuconoe: politica e cultura in Atene fra IV e III sec. a.C.* Florence: Università degli Studi di Firenze.
- Mari, M. (2003), ‘Macedonians and Anti-Macedonians in Early Hellenistic Athens: Reflections on ἀσέβεια’, in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 82–92.
- Martin, T. R. (1996), ‘Adeimantos of Lampsakos and Demetrios Poliorketes’ Fraudulent Peace of 302 BC’, in R. W. Wallace and E. M. Harris (eds), *Transitions to Empire: Essays in Greco-Roman History 360–146 BC, in Honor of E. Badian*. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, pp. 179–90.
- Meiggs, R. (1982), *Trees and Timber in the Ancient Mediterranean World*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Meritt, B. D. (1961), *The Athenian Year*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Merker, I. L. (1986), ‘Habron the Son of Lykourgos of Boutadai’, *AncW* 14, 41–50.
- Mertens, N. (2002), ‘οὐκ ὁμοιοί, ἀγαθοὶ δὲ: The *Perioikoi* in the Classical Lakadaimonian Polis’, in A. Powell and S. Hodkinson (eds), *Sparta: Beyond the Mirage*. London: Classical Press of Wales, pp. 285–304.
- Mikalson, J. D. (1998), *Religion in Hellenistic Athens*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- (2006), ‘Greek Religion: Continuity and Change in the Hellenistic Period’, in G. R. Bugh (ed.), *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 208–22.
- Millett, P. C. (2000), ‘Mogens Hansen and the Labelling of Athenian Democracy’, in P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Nielsen and L. Rubinstein (eds), *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, August 20, 2000*. University of Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, pp. 337–62.
- Millot, C. (1779), *Elements of the General History* (Eng. Translation). Dublin: Price.
- Mitchel, F. W. (1964), ‘Derkylos of Hagnous and the Date of IG II² 1187’, *Hesperia* 33, 337–51.
- Mitchell, S. (2003), ‘The Galatians: Representation and Reality’, in A. Erskine (ed.), *A Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 280–93.
- Mitford, William (1784–1818), *The History of Greece*. London: Cadell and Davies.
- Moggi, M. (1973), ‘I furti di statue attribuiti a Serse e le relative restituzioni’, *ASNP* 3, 1–42. (

- Momigliano, A. (1966), *Studies in Historiography*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
- (1970), 'J. G. Droysen between Greeks and Jews', *History and Theory* 9, 139–53.
- (1975), *Alien Wisdom: The Limits of Hellenization*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Montagu, E. W. (1759), *Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Antient Republicks, Adapted to the Present State of Great Britain*. London: A. Millar.
- Morgan, J. D. (2002), 'A Badly Restored Sculptor's Name in the Erechtheion Accounts', *American Journal of Archaeology* 106, 296.
- Morrison, J. S. (1996), *Greek and Roman Oared Warships*. Oxford: Oxbow.
- Mossé, C. (1973), *Athens in Decline, 404–86 BC*. London: Routledge.
- Muccioli (2008), 'Stratocle di Diomeia e la redazione Trezenia del 'Decreto di Temistocle'', *Studia Ellenistica* 20, 109–36.
- Nachtergaele, G. (1977), *Les Galates en Grèce et les Sôtéria de Delphes: Recherches d'histoire et d'épigraphie hellénistiques*. Brussels: Pallas des académies.
- Niebuhr, B. G. (1852), *Lectures on Ancient History, From the Earliest Times to the Taking of Alexandria, Comprising the History of the Asiatic Nations, the Egyptians, Greeks, Macedonians and Carthaginians*, L. Schmitz (ed.), translated by Dr Marcus Niebuhr. London: Taylor, Walton and Maberly.
- Ober, J. (1989), *Mass and Elite in Democratic Athens: Rhetoric, Ideology and the Power of the People*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1996), *The Athenian Revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- (1998) *Political Dissent in Democratic Athens: Intellectual Critics of Popular Rule*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Ober, J. and C. Hedrick (eds) (1996), *Demokratia: A Conversation on Democracies, Ancient and Modern*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Oetjen, R. (2000), 'War Demetrios von Phaleron, der Jüngere, Kommissar des Königs Antigonos II. Gonatas in Athen?', *ZPE* 131, 111–17.
- Oliver, G. J. (2003a), 'Oligarchy at Athens after the Lamian War: Epigraphic Evidence for the Boule and Ekklesia', in O. Palagia and S. V. Tracy (eds), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 40–51.
- (2003b), '(Re-)locating Athenian Decrees in the Agora: IG II² 448', in D. Jordan and J. Traill (eds), *Lettered Attica. A Day of Attic Epigraphy*. Toronto: Canadian Archaeological Institute at Athens, pp. 94–110.
- (2006), 'Polis Economies and the Cost of the Cavalry in Early Hellenistic Athens', in P. van Alfen (ed.), *Agoranomoi: Studies in Money and Exchange Presented to J. H. Kroll*. New York: American Numismatic Society, pp. 109–24.
- (2007), *War, Food, and Politics in Early Hellenistic Athens*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ollier, F. (1933), *Le mirage spartiate: étude sur l'idéalisation de Sparte dans l'antiquité grecque de l'origine jusqu'aux cyniques*. Paris: E. de Boccard.
- Olson, S. D. and A. Sens (1999), *Matro of Pitane and the Tradition of Epic Parody in the Fourth Century BC*. Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press.
- O'Neil, J. L. (1995), *The Origins and Development of Ancient Greek Democracy*. Lantham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- (2000), 'Royal Authority and City Law under Alexander and His Hellenistic Successors', *CQ* 50, 424–31.

- (2009), 'A Re-examination of the Chremonidean War', in P. McKechnie and P. Guillaume (eds), *Ptolemy II Philadelphus and his World*. Leiden: Brill, pp. 65–90.
- Osborne, M. J. (1979), 'Kallias, Phaidros and the Revolt of Athens in 287 BC', *ZPE* 35, 181–94.
- (1981–3) *Naturalization in Athens*. 4 vols. Brussels: Paleis der Academiën.
- (1985), 'The Archonship of Nikias Hysteros and the Secretary Cycles in the Third Century BC', *ZPE* 58, 275–95.
- (2004), 'The Archons of IG II² 1273', in D. Jordan and J. Traill (eds), *Lettered Attica. A Day of Attic Epigraphy*. Toronto: Canadian Archaeological Institute at Athens, pp. 199–211.
- (2006), 'The Eponymous Archons of Athens from 300/299 to 286/5', *AncSoc* 36, 69–80.
- (2009), 'The Archons of Athens 300/299–228/7', *ZPE* 171, 83–99.
- Osborne, R. (2010), *Athens and Athenian Democracy*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Sullivan, L. (1997), 'Athenian Impiety Trials in the Late Fourth Century BC', *CQ* 47, 136–52.
- (1997), 'Asander, Athens and IG ii² 450: A New Interpretation', *ZPE* 119, 107–16.
- (2001), 'The Nomophulakes of Demetrius of Phalerum', *JHS* 121, 51–62.
- (2002), 'The Law of Sophocles and the Beginnings of Permanent Philosophical Schools in Athens', *Rheinisches Museum* 145, 252–62.
- (2009a), 'History from Comic Hypotheses: Stratocles, Lachares, and *P.Oxy.* 1235', *GRBS* 49, 53–79.
- (2009b), *The Regime of Demetrius of Phalerum in Athens, 317–307 BCE*. Leiden: Brill.
- Palagia, O. (1982), 'A Colossal Statue of a Personification from the Agora of Athens', *Hesperia* 51, 99–113.
- (1998), 'The Enemy Within: A Macedonian in Piraeus', in O. Palagia and W. Coulson, (eds), *Regional Schools in Hellenistic Sculpture: Proceedings of an International Conference held at the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, March 15–17, 1996*. Oxford: Oxbow, pp. 15–26.
- Palagia, O. and S. V. Tracy (eds) (2003), *The Macedonians in Athens*. Oxford: Oxbow.
- Parke, H. W. (1977), *Festivals of the Athenians*. London: Thames & Hudson.
- Parker, H. (1937). *The Cult of Antiquity and the French Revolutionaries: A Study in the Development of the Revolutionary Spirit*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Parker, R. (1996), *Athenian Religion: A History*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Patterson, C. B. (1998), *The Family in Greek History*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Pauw, Cornelius de (1794), *Philosophical Dissertations on the Greeks*. London.
- Petrakos, B. Ch. (1999a), 'Ο δῆμος τοῦ Ραμνούντος: Τοπογραφία. Athens: Greek Archaeological Society.
- (1999b), 'Ο δῆμος τοῦ Ραμνούντος: Οἱ ἐπιγραφές. Athens: Greek Archaeological Society.
- Philipp, G. B. (1973), 'Philippides, ein politischer Komiker in hellenistischer Zeit', *Gymnasium* 80, 493–509.

- Poddighe, E. (2002), *Ne Segno di Antipatro: l'eclisse della democrazia ateniese dal 323/2 al 319/8 a.C.* Rome: Carocci.
- (2004), 'Atene e le lotte tra i diadoci nell'anno dell'archonte Archippo II: (318/7 a.C.)', *Ancient History Bulletin* 18, 1–24.
- Pomeroy, S. (1996), 'Family Values: The Uses of the Past', in P. Bilde, T. Engberg-Pederson, L. Hannestad and J. Zahle (eds), *Conventional Values of the Hellenistic Greeks*. Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, pp. 204–19.
- Pope, A. (1715), *Temple of Fame: A Vision*. London: Bernard Lintott.
- Pounder, R. L. (1983), 'A Hellenistic Arsenal in Athens', *Hesperia* 52, 233–56.
- Price, S. R. F. (1984), *Rituals and Power: The Roman Imperial Cult in Asia Minor*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Pritchett, W. K. (1972), 'Lucubrations Epigraphicae', *California Studies in Classical Antiquity* 5, 169–74.
- (1994), 'Circumventions of the Thermopylae Pass', in *Essays in Greek History*. Amsterdam: J. C. Gieben, pp. 243–93.
- Raaflaub, K. A. (2000), 'Zeus Eleutherios, Dionysos the Liberator, and the Athenian Tyrannicides. Anachronistic Uses of Fifth-Century Political Concepts', in P. Flensted-Jensen, T. H. Nielsen and L. Rubinstein (eds), *Polis and Politics: Studies in Ancient Greek History Presented to Mogens Herman Hansen on his Sixtieth Birthday, August 20, 2000*. University of Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, pp. 249–75.
- Raleigh, Sir Walter (1736), *The History of the World, in Five Books*. By Sir Walter Raleigh, Kt. The Eleventh Edition, Printed from a Copy Revis'd by Himself. To Which Is Prefix'd, The Life of the Author. London: G. Conyers.
- Rankin, D. I. (1988), 'The Mining Lobby at Athens', *AncSoc* 19, 189–205.
- Rankin, H. D. (1987), *Celts and the Classical World*. Portland, OR: Croom Helm.
- Raubitschek, A. E. (1962), 'Demokratia', *Hesperia* 31, 238–43.
- Rawlinson, G. (1869), *Manual of Ancient History, From the Earliest Times to the Fall of the Sassanian Empire* (second edition). Oxford: Clarendon.
- Rawson, E. (1969), *The Spartan Tradition in European Thought*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Reger, G. (1992), 'Athens and Tenos in the Early Hellenistic Age', *CQ* 42, 365–83.
- Rhodes, P. J. (1972), *The Athenian Boule*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- (1993), 'One Treasurer Oligarchic, Many Treasurers Democratic?', in H. D. Jocelyn (ed.), *Tria Lustra: Essays and Notes Presented to John Pinsent*, Liverpool Classical Papers, no. 3. Liverpool: Liverpool Classical Monthly, pp. 1–3.
- Rhodes, P. J. with D. M. Lewis (1997), *The Decrees of the Greek States*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Robbins, C. (1950), 'The Strenuous Whig: Thomas Hollis of Linedin's Inn', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 7, 1950, 406–53.
- Roberts, J. T. (1994), *Athens on Trial: The Antidemocratic Tradition in Western Thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Robertson, William (1793), *History of Ancient Greece*. Edinburgh: William Creech.
- Robinson, C. E. (1948) *Hellas: A Short History of Greece*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press.
- Robson, D. W. (1983), 'College Founding in the New Republic, 1776–1800', *History of Education Quarterly* 23, 323–41.
- Roland, Mme. (1795), *An Appeal to Impartial Posterity by Citizeness Roland*. London: J. Johnson.

- Rollin, Charles (1738), *The Ancient History of the Egyptians, Carthaginians, Assyrians, Babylonians, Medes and Persians, Macedonians, and Grecians* (Eng. Translation). London: John and Paul Knapton.
- Roos, A. G. (1968), *Flavii Arriani quae exstant omnia, Vol II: Scripta Minora et Fragmenta*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Rosivach, V. J. (1987), 'The Cult of Zeus Eleutherios at Athens', *PdP* 42, 262–85.
- (2001), 'Class Matters in the *Dyskolos* of Menander', *CQ* 51, 127–34.
- Ruschenbusch, E. (1994), 'Europe and Democracy', in R. Osborne and S. Hornblower (eds), *Ritual, Finance, Politics: Athenian Democratic Accounts Presented to David Lewis*. Oxford: Clarendon, pp. 189–97.
- (1999), 'La Démographie d'Athènes au IV^e siècle av. J.C.', in M. Bellancourt-Valdher and J.-N. Corvisier (eds), *La Démographie historique antique*. Arras: Artois Presse Université, pp. 91–5.
- Ruskin, J. (1886–7), *Praeterita: Outlines of Scenes and Thoughts Perhaps Worthy of Memory in My Past Life*. Orpington: G. Allen.
- Sabbathier, F. (1776), *The Institutions, Manners, and Customs of the Ancient Nations. Translated from the Original French of Mr. Sabbathier*. London: T. Becket.
- Ste. Croix, G. E. M. de (1983), *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World from the Archaic Age to the Arab Conquests*. London: Duckworth.
- Salomon, N. (1997), *Le cleruchie di Atene*. Pisa: ETS.
- Sanctis, G. de (1936), 'Atene dopo Ipso e un papiro fiorentino', *RFIC* 64, 134–52 and 253–73.
- Sarikakis, T. C. (1951), *The Hoplite General in Athens*. Chicago: Ares.
- Savalli-Lestrade, I. (1998), *Les Philoi royaux dans L'Asie Hellénistique*. Geneva: Droz.
- Schäfer, A. (1854) 'Des jüngeren Meidias ehrendecret für Phokion', *Philologus* 9, 163–67.
- (1885–7), *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*. Leipzig: Teubner.
- Scholten, J. B. (2000), *The Politics of Plunder: Aitolians and Their Koinon in the Early Hellenistic Era, 279–217 BC*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Schwenk, C. J. (1985), *Athens in the Age of Alexander: The Dated Laws and Decrees of the 'Lykourgan Era' 338–322 BC*. Chicago: Ares.
- Scott, K. (1928), 'The Deification of Demetrius Poliorcetes', *AJPh* 49, 137–66 and 217–39.
- Scott, M. (2010), *From Kings to Democrats: The Downfall of Athens to the Epic Rise of Alexander the Great*. London: Icon Books.
- Sealey, R. (1987), *The Athenian Republic: Democracy or the Rule of Law?*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- (1993), *Demosthenes and his Time: A Study in Defeat*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Sekunda, N. V. (1992), 'Athenian Demography and Military Strength 338–322 BC', *ABSA* 87, 311–55.
- Shalev, E. (2003), 'Ancient Masks, American Fathers: Classical Pseudonyms during the American Revolution and Early Republic', *Journal of the Early Republic* 23, 151–72.
- Shear, T. L. (1970), 'The Monument of the Eponymous Heroes in the Athenian Agora', *Hesperia* 39, 145–222.
- (1978), *Kallias of Sphettos and the Revolt of Athens in 286 BC*. *Hesperia Supplement* 17. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

- (1984), 'The Athenian Agora: Excavations of 1980–82', *Hesperia* 53, pp. 19–24.
- Shilleto, R. (1851), *Thucydides or Grote?* Cambridge and London: Deighton.
- Shipley, Graham (1987), *A History of Samos 800–188 BC*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- (2000), *The Greek World After Alexander: 323–30 BC*. London: Routledge.
- (2006), 'Recent Trends and New Directions', in G. R. Bugh (ed.) *The Cambridge Companion to the Hellenistic World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 315–26.
- Simpson, R. H. (1955), 'Polemaios' invasion of Attica in 313', *Mnemosyne* (fourth series), 8, 34–7.
- Sinclair, R. K. (1988), *Democracy and Participation in Athens*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, A. (1790), *The Theory of Moral Sentiments*. London: Strahan.
- Smith, L. C. (1962), 'Demochares of Leuconoe and the Dates of His Exile', *Historia* 11, 114–8.
- Smith, P. (1864), *History of the World*. London: Walton and Maberly.
- Smith, W. G. (1849), *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Mythology*. London: Taylor and Watson.
- Sommerstein, A. H. (2009), *Talking about Laughter and Other Studies in Greek Comedy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Spence, I. G. (1993), *The Cavalry of Classical Greece*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Stanyan, Temple (1707–39), *The Grecian History*. London: J. and R. Tonson.
- Stears, K. (2000), 'Losing the Picture: Change and Continuity in Athenian Grave Monuments in the Fourth and Third Centuries BC', in N. K. Rutter and B. A. Sparkes (eds), *Word and Image in Ancient Greece*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 206–27.
- Stork, P., J. M. van Ophuijsen and T. Dorandi (2000), 'Demetrius of Phalerum: The Sources, Text and Translation', in W. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schütrumpf (eds), *Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation and Discussion*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 1–310.
- Strauss, B. S. (1986), *Athens After the Peloponnesian War: Class, Faction and Policy 403–386 BC*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Strauss, B. S., and J. Ober, (1990), *The Anatomy of Error: Ancient Military Disasters and their Lessons for Modern Strategists*. New York: St Martin's Press.
- Strobel, K. (1996), *Die Galater*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag.
- Sundwall, J. (1906), 'De Institutiis reipublicae Athenensium post Aristotelis aetatem commutatis', *Acta Societatis Scientiarum Fennicae* 34, 1–26.
- Swift, J. (1701), *A Discourse of the Contests and Dissensions between the Nobles and the Commons in Athens and Rome*. London: John Nutt.
- Symonds, J. (1893), *Studies of the Greek Poets*. London: Adam & Charles Black.
- Takács, S. A. (2000), 'Pagan Cults at Antioch', in C. Kondoleon (ed.), *Antioch: The Lost Ancient City*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 198–216.
- Tarn, W. W. (1913), *Antigonos Gonatas*. Oxford: Clarendon.
- Taylor, C. (2001), 'Bribery in Athenian Politics Part 1: Accusations, Allegations, and Slander', *Greece and Rome* 48, 53–66.
- Thirlwall, Connop (1835–44), *The History of Greece*. London: Longman.
- Thompson, H. A. and R. E. Whycherley (1972), *The Agora of Athens: The History, Shape, and Uses of an Ancient City Center*. Athenian Agora XIV. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.

- Thonemann, P. (2005), 'The Tragic King: Demetrios Poliorketes and the City of Athens', in O. Helster and K. Fowler (eds), *Imaginary Kings: The Royal Image in the Near East, Greece and Rome*. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, pp. 63–86.
- Tourreil, Jacques de (1702), *'Historical Preface' to Several Orations of Demosthenes*, (Eng. Translation). London: Jacob Tonson.
- Tracy, S. V. (1988), 'Two Letter Cutters of the Third Century: 286/5–235/4 BC', *Hesperia* 57, 303–22.
- (1993), 'De Antipatro et Archedico Lamptrensi IG II² 402 + Agora I 4990', *Hesperia* 62, 249–51.
- (1994a), 'Hands in Greek Epigraphy – Demetrios of Phaleron', in J. M. Fossey (ed.), *Boeotia Antiqua IV, Proceedings of the 7th International Congress on Boiotian Antiquities, and Boiotian (and Other), Epigraphy*. Amsterdam: Gieben, pp. 151–161.
- (1995), *Athenian Democracy in Transition: Attic Letter Cutters of 340 to 290 BC*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- (2000a), 'Athenian Politicians and Inscriptions of the Years 307 to 302', *Hesperia* 69, 227–33.
- (2000b), 'Demetrius of Phalerum: Who Was He and Who Was He Not?', in W. W. Fortenbaugh and E. Schütrumpf (eds), *Demetrius of Phalerum: Text, Translation and Discussion*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 331–45.
- (2003), *Athens and Macedon: Attic Letter-Cutters of 300 to 229 BC*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Traill, J. S. (1966), 'The Bouleutic List of 304/3 BC', *Hesperia* 35, 205–40.
- (1975), *The Political Organization of Attica*. *Hesperia* Supplement 14. Princeton, NJ: American School of Classical Studies at Athens.
- Tritle, L. A. (1988), *Phocion the Good*. London: Croom Helm.
- (1997) 'Introduction', in L. A. Tritle (ed.), *The Greek World in the Fourth Century*. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1–8.
- (2009), 'Alexander and the Greeks: Artists, Soldiers, Friends, and Enemies', in W. Heckel and L. A. Tritle (eds), *Alexander the Great: A New History*. Malden and Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 121–40.
- Turner, F. (1981), *The Greek Heritage in Victorian Britain*. Newhaven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Vatai, F. L. (1984), *Intellectuals in Politics in the Greek World: From Early Times to the Hellenistic Age*. London: Croom Helm.
- Vlassopoulos, K. (2007), *Unthinking the Greek Polis: Ancient Greek History beyond Eurocentrism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wallace, R. W. (1989), *The Areopagus Council to 307 BC*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Waterfield, R. (2004), *Athens: A History, from Ancient Ideal to Modern City*. London: Macmillan.
- Whitehead, D. (1986), *The Demes of Attica, 508/7–ca. 250 BC: A Political and Social Study*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Wiles, D. (1984), 'Menander's *Dyskolos* and Demetrios of Phaleron's Dilemma: A Study of the Play in Its Historical Context – the Trial of Phokion, the Ideals of a Moderate Oligarch, and the Rancour of the Disfranchized', *Historia* 36, 170–80.

- Williams, J. M. (1985), 'Athens Without Democracy: The Oligarchy of Phocion and the Tyranny of Demetrius of Phalerum, 322–307 BC'. Unpublished PhD diss., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 1982.
- (1989), 'Demades' Last Years 323/2–319/8 BC. A 'Revisionist' Interpretation', *AncW* 19, 19–30.
- (1997), 'Ideology and the Constitution of Demetrius of Phalerum', in C. D. Hamilton and P. Krentz (eds), *Polis and Polemos: Essays on Politics, War, and History in Ancient Greece in Honor of Donald Kagan*. Claremont, CA: Regina Books, pp. 327–46.
- Wilson, P. (2000), *The Athenian Institution of the Khoregia: The Chorus, the City and the Stage*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Wiseman, P. (1979), *Clio's Cosmetics: Three Studies in Greco-Roman Literature*. Leicester: Leicester University Press.
- Woodhead, A. G. (1981), 'Athens and Demetrius Poliorketes at the End of the Fourth Century BC', in H. J. Dell (ed.), *Ancient Macedonian Studies in Honour of Charles F. Edson*. Thessaloniki: Institute for Balkan Studies, pp. 357–67.
- (1989), 'The Calendar of the Year 304/3 BC in Athens', *Hesperia* 58, 297–301.
- Worthington, I. (1992), *A Historical Commentary on Dinarchus: Rhetoric and Conspiracy in Later Fourth Century Athens*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- (1999), *Dinarchus and Hyperides*. Warminster: Aris and Phillips.
- Wright, J. K. (1992), 'Conversations with Phocion: The Political Thought of Mably', *History of Political Thought* 13, 391–415.
- (1996), *A Classical Republican in Eighteenth-Century France*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Young, Sir William (1804), *The History of Athens Politically and Philosophically Considered*. London: W. Bulmer and Co.

Index

- acropolis 7, 64, 65, 66, 101, 106, 124, 181, 252n. 34
- Aeschines 42–3, 52, 55, 112, 131, 216n. 11, 232n. 76, 240n. 6
- Aetolia, Aetolians 4, 9, 26, 105, 169, 193, 194–202, 205–6, 213, 239n. 64, 242n. 22, 251nn. 19, 20, 252nn. 22, 23
- agōnothesia* 103, 105, 117, 118, 235nn. 22, 23
- agora 61, 101, 121–4, 224n. 16, 234n. 14, 236n. 28, 238n. 57, 239n. 63
- agoranomoi* 224–5n. 16, 232n. 82
- Agyrrhius of Collytus 107, 108, 117, 127, 187, 208
- Alcibiades 112, 133, 214, 241n. 8
- Alexander the Great 1, 11, 12, 21, 30, 34, 40–2, 44, 102, 105, 113, 127, 130, 134, 135–6, 140, 155, 156, 160, 162, 163, 165, 170, 178, 189, 208, 215n. 6, 216n. 2, 220n. 50, 228n. 46, 235n. 15, 238n. 51, 240n. 3, 241n. 13, 244n. 9, 245nn. 23–5, 253n. 11.
- Alexander IV (King of Macedon) 142, 170
- Alexander, son of Polyperchon 84, 144–5
- Amorgos, Battle of 152, 153, 157, 158–9, 244n. 17
- anagrapheus* 65, 70, 76, 81–2, 85–6, 89, 100, 111, 114, 150, 229n. 51, 230nn. 67–8, 231nn. 69–70, 232n. 77, 233n. 83, 246n. 33
- Androcles of Sphettus 102–3
- Antigonus Gonatas 4, 9, 92, 109, 111–12, 128, 162, 194, 203, 209, 229nn. 46, 51, 239n. 64
- Antigonus the One-Eyed 7, 22, 55, 83–4, 92, 106, 116, 119, 141, 166–7, 169, 180, 238nn. 52, 56, 246nn. 32, 39
- charis* relationship with Athens 163–5
- deified as Saviour-god at Athens 37, 38, 40, 120–4, 157, 160–2
- eponymous hero of Athenian tribe 44, 157, 239n. 63, 246n. 38
- proclaims Greek freedom 119, 237n. 49
- Antioch-on-the-Orontes 95, 122, 239n. 61
- Antiochus (I) Sôtēr 7, 122, 165, 194, 238n. 51
- Antiochus (III) the Great 7, 193
- Antipater ‘Etesias’ 128, 239n. 65
- Antipater (Macedonian regent) 4, 10, 22, 31, 41, 80, 89, 91, 92, 99, 100, 102, 109, 120, 134, 136, 140, 141, 144, 146, 159, 164, 193, 218n. 26, 224n. 12, 227nn. 35, 38, 41, 229n. 50, 241nn. 16, 20, 242nn. 22, 24, 249n. 73
- Athenian *philoi* of 74, 75–7, 81, 114, 137–8, 142, 146, 226n. 32
- imposes oligarchy on Athens 35, 59–60, 62, 63–4, 65–6, 67, 68–70, 73, 79, 88, 90, 96, 97, 118, 130, 133, 137–40, 145–50, 225n. 25, 228nn. 42, 46, 233n. 90, 241n. 18
- Archedicus of Lamptrae 76, 81–2, 85, 89–90, 114, 150, 232n. 87
- archons 69, 85, 86, 140, 165–6, 179, 190, 233n. 1
- Anaxicrates (307/6) 235n. 18
- Apollodorus (319/8) 85
- Archippus (321/0) 85, 99
- Archippus (318/7) 99
- Caerimus (308/7) 235n. 18
- Demetrius (309/8) 90–1, 232n. 86, 235n. 18
- Democleides (316/5) 90, 233n. 87
- Diomedon (248/7) 190
- Ecphantus (235/4) 239n. 64
- Euxenippus (305/4) 115
- Hieromnemon (310/9) 235n. 18
- Lysias (238/7) 239n. 64
- Neaechmus (320/19) 85
- Nicias of Otryne (266/5) 118
- Olympiodorus (294/3 and 293/2) 55, 65, 184
- Polemon (312/11) 90, 233n. 87
- Telocles (280/79) 187–8, 230n. 58
- Areopagus council 87, 91, 233n. 88, 243n. 5

- Areus (King of Sparta) 189, 208–9, 252n. 88, 243n. 5
- Arginusae trial 13, 18, 27, 34, 50, 64, 148, 212, 219nn. 38, 40, 242n. 34
- Argos, Argives 46, 170, 178, 239n. 61
- Aristides 'the Just' 13, 29–31, 36, 50, 68, 219n. 37
- Aristides of Lamptrae 103, 108, 117, 118, 187, 208, 209, 230n. 58
- Asander (Satrap of Caria) 82, 89, 121, 238n. 56
- assembly (*ekklēsia*) 49, 53, 61, 64, 66, 69, 74, 80–4, 86–7, 94, 96, 102, 105, 107, 111, 120, 121, 132, 166, 168, 171, 177, 179, 212, 213, 227n. 38, 230n. 61, 231nn. 73–4, 233n. 3, 237nn. 36, 39, 242nn. 32, 36, 246n. 41, 244n. 17
- decrees of 52, 65, 99, 101, 104, 206, 223n. 8, 230n. 62
- essential feature of democracy 57, 96, 132, 222n. 6, 233n. 2
- orators in 67, 75, 103, 108, 115, 117, 136, 148, 183–4, 226n. 34, 229n. 52, 234nn. 9, 14, 240n. 67, 247n. 43
- astynomoi* 224–5n. 16, 232n. 82
- Athena 37, 64, 69, 86, 101, 120, 122, 125, 157, 161, 162, 167, 170, 227n. 36, 233nn. 90, 1, 246nn. 39, 40, 247n. 51
- Athenophiles 12–13, 28, 34, 45, 50, 212
- atimia* 70, 163, 168, 224n. 14, 232n. 76
- Audoleon (King of Paonia) 11, 127
- Boeotia, Boeotians 106, 159, 169, 195, 197, 199, 205–6 *see also* Thebes, Thebans
- Brennus 193–6, 198, 202, 206, 252nn. 25, 31 *see also* Celtic invasion
- Callias of Hermus 103, 104, 107, 108, 117
- Callias of Sphettus 44, 95, 109, 118, 127, 174–5, 200–1n. 51
- Callimedon 'the Crayfish' 44, 56, 62–3, 76, 91, 107, 114, 132, 138–9, 145, 149, 161, 222nn. 1, 2, 24nn. 16, 17
- Callippus of Eleusis 5–6, 53, 107–8, 117, 118, 127, 128, 187–210, 214, 250n. 1, 251nn. 13, 18, 252n. 26
- Cassander 4, 9, 31, 59–60, 62, 64, 65, 67, 73, 76, 82, 83, 97, 105, 106, 141–6, 172, 180, 183, 227nn. 35, 39, 40, 41, 229nn. 47, 50, 238n. 56, 249n. 67
- and Demetrius of Phalerum 77–80, 84, 91–2, 118–20, 125, 140, 161, 169, 226n. 27, 227n. 42, 228n. 46, 233n. 89, 241n. 20
- equated with slavery in Athenian inscriptions 119–20
- and Lachares 64, 78
- cavalry (Athenian) 106, 112, 134, 149, 198, 200–1, 202–5, 206, 236n. 35, 250n. 5, 236–7nn. 36–7
- Celtic invasion 5, 110–11, 188, 189, 190–203, 205–7, 236n. 35, 250n. 5
- Chaeronea, Battle of 10, 11, 36, 45, 62, 99, 134, 220n. 51
- Charicles 76, 145, 149, 155
- Chremonidean War 10, 21, 110, 117, 189, 191, 203, 204, 208–9, 252n. 26, 253nn. 38, 43, 44
- Chremonides of Aethalidae 109–11, 117, 127, 187, 196, 199, 208, 215n. 1
- census *see* Demetrius of Phalerum
- Cleaeetus of Cydathenaeum 103, 116, 168–70, 172, 175–6
- Clearchus of Aegilia 142, 144
- Cleomedon of Cydathenaeum 103, 116, 124, 168
- Cleon 39, 49, 50, 52, 103, 112, 136, 152, 154–5, 163, 212, 214, 244n. 17
- Comeas of Lamptrae 117, 118, 127, 203–4, 236n. 36, 239n. 62, 253n. 37
- Conon 52, 121, 159
- Conon (III) of Anaphlystus 114, 142, 144, 242n. 27
- Constant de Rebecque, Henri-Benjamin 13–14, 15, 218n. 35
- council (*boulē*) 66, 69, 80–1, 85, 86–7, 89, 98, 100, 111, 114–15, 123, 124, 132, 142, 144, 171, 213, 231n. 75, 234n. 9, 237n. 36, 241n. 19, 247n. 43
- chamber (*bouleuterion*) 115, 123, 187, 188, 189, 199–200, 207–9, 250n. 1
- councillors 89, 100, 111, 114–15, 166, 179, 229n. 57, 246n. 37, 232n. 81
- essential feature of democracy 57, 96–7, 222n. 6, 233n. 2
- probouleusis* 100, 111, 117
- Critias 149, 224n. 16, 243n. 37
- Deinarchus of Corinth (orator) 154, 243n. 5
- Deinarchus of Corinth (friend of Antipater) 78, 140, 145–6, 226n. 35, 227n. 39, 229n. 50, 241n. 20, 244n. 12
- Delos 161, 167, 180

- Delphi 132, 178, 193–6, 198–9, 201–2, 206, 251n. 11, 252n. 31
- Demades 39, 44, 56, 67, 75, 77, 80, 81, 108, 132, 133, 135–6, 138, 139–40, 155, 163, 164, 224nn. 11, 16, 226nn. 31–2, 227nn. 38–41, 229n. 52, 232n. 76, 241n. 13, 245n. 24
- Demeas, son of Demades 108, 227nn. 39, 41
- Demetrius of Phalerum 19, 37–8, 43, 48, 50, 59, 63–4, 65, 67–8, 72, 76, 92, 93, 114, 130, 137, 138, 145, 149, 150, 154, 185, 188, 216n. 2, 221n. 51, 222n. 4, 223nn. 5, 9, 225n. 25, 226nn. 26–7, 31, 227–8n. 42, 228nn. 43, 46, 229nn. 51, 54, 57, 229–30n. 58, 230n. 64, 232n. 78, 240n. 4
- archonship of 90–1, 232n. 86, 233n. 87, 235n. 18
- constrains assembly 80–4
- manager/tyrant of Athens 73, 77–80, 115, 140, 212, 224n. 15, 228n. 44, 229n. 56, 230n. 60
- nomothetēs* 79
- reforms of 53, 73–4, 86–8, 90–1, 104–5, 147, 233n. 88, 231nn. 72–4, 230n. 59, 235nn. 18, 22
- Demetrius Poliorcetes 4, 9, 16, 19, 45, 53, 55–6, 59, 64–5, 66, 93, 106, 107, 127, 158, 164–7, 172, 173–4, 175, 182–5, 186, 187, 198, 208, 214, 220n. 51, 223n. 5, 236n. 28, 237n. 43, 238n. 52, 244nn. 13–14, 16, 247n. 48, 248n. 57, 59, 249n. 78, 252n. 23
- and Athenian democracy 95, 97, 114, 116, 119–26, 128, 239n. 64
- autocratic behaviour of 168–72
- deified as Saviour-god at Athens 13, 17–18, 27, 37–9, 40–4, 46, 50, 51, 97, 102, 120, 153, 157, 160–3, 169, 183, 212, 218n. 24, 219n. 44, 244n. 21, 245n. 31, 247nn. 44–5
- eponymous hero of Athenian tribe 44, 157, 163, 165, 239n. 63, 247n. 49
- initiated into the Eleusinian Mysteries 125, 157, 166, 176–8
- Ithyphallic hymn to 162, 167, 198
- letters from to the Athenian council 124–5, 168–71, 234n. 9, 247n. 43
- liberates Athens 59, 65, 92, 102, 119, 230n. 65
- philoī* of and Athens 157, 160, 167, 176, 179–82, 185, 238n. 56, 248–9n. 67
- Demochares of Leuconoe 4, 39, 53, 76, 89, 90, 111, 114, 115, 116–17, 154, 155, 167, 183, 188, 194, 215n. 1, 232n. 87, 234n. 14, 240nn. 66–7, 244n. 13, 246n. 41, 248nn. 54–5
- and Demosthenes 43, 102, 108–9, 111, 126
- exile 59, 107, 116, 124, 126, 157, 172–6, 185, 237n. 47, 247–8n. 52, 248n. 57
- honours for 94, 109, 234n. 14
- opposed to Macedon 43–4, 127–8, 220n. 51
- orator 103–6, 107–8, 118
- democracy
- 319/8–318/7 bc regime 73, 81, 94–5, 98–101, 113–14, 145–50, 234nn. 7–12, 237nn. 40–1
- 307/6–301/0 bc regime 63, 65, 95, 102–6, 114–16, 119–26, 235nn. 15–23, 236nn. 24–8, 237nn. 42–7, 238nn. 50–8, 239n. 63
- 288/7–262/1 bc regime 5, 94–5, 106–12, 116–17, 126–8, 236nn. 29–36, 237nn. 36–8, 239n. 62, 240n. 67
- continuity of in Hellenistic period 1, 8–9, 11, 53, 59–60, 213–14
- definition of democratic ideology 56–8
- diversity of opinion in 112–17
- eighteenth-century reaction to 13–14, 22, 28–9, 33, 34–5, 37, 43, 45–6, 50
- Hellenistic democracy seen as
- plutocratic 5, 52–3, 117
- negative comparison of Hellenistic democracy to Classical democracy 1, 4–5, 8, 16, 45–6, 47, 50–3, 54–6, 211–13
- Demokratia (cult of) 54, 95, 96, 121, 123–4
- Demophilus of Acharnae 67, 99, 100, 114, 145, 220n. 51
- Demos (personification) 101, 187
- Demosthenes 1, 2, 6, 11, 13, 16, 31, 33, 35, 36, 38–9, 49, 52, 55, 63, 67, 76, 81, 87, 95, 102, 103, 107, 108–9, 111, 112–13, 115, 121, 124, 126, 127, 131, 132, 134, 135–6, 138–40, 154–5, 184, 211–14, 217n. 11, 218nn. 24, 26, 30, 220n. 48, 222n. 4, 224n. 16, 232n. 76, 236n. 31, 241n. 7, 243n. 4, 242n. 13
- death of equated with death of Greece 17, 19, 21–7, 35–6, 44–6, 49–50,

- Demosthenes (*Cont'd*)
 opposition to Macedon 8–9, 21–2, 42–4,
 44–5, 107–8, 155, 220nn. 46, 57
 posthumous honours for 21–2, 107–9,
 111, 126, 155
- Dercyllus of Hagnous 142–3, 237n. 40
- Diotimus (III) of Euonymon (Athenian
 general) 113, 135, 241n. 9
- Diotimus (IV) of Euonymon (Athenian
 orator) 102, 103, 104
- Dromocleides of Sphettus 167, 176,
 248n. 56
- Droysen, Johann Gustav 41, 47, 129, 201,
 219n. 40, 220n. 48
- Duruy, Jean Victor 14, 16, 21, 42, 45
- Eleven, the 84, 86, 224n. 16, 231n. 73, 240n. 4
- Erasmus, Desiderius 27–8, 33
- Eucadmus of Anacaea 77, 82, 85–6, 100,
 150, 232n. 83
- Euchares of Conthyle 95, 103, 104, 108
- Euphron (Tyrant of Sicyon) 86, 98, 100–1,
 102–3, 149
- Finlay, George 41, 47–8, 251n. 19
- Four Years War 106, 169, 182, 191, 239n. 64,
 240n. 67, 244n. 20
- Freeman, Edward Augustus 14, 26, 48,
 218n. 28, 220n. 50
- garrison(s), Macedonian 4, 125, 203
 Mounychia 3, 24, 33, 62, 65–6, 70, 77, 80,
 84, 91, 92, 111, 118–19, 119–20, 125,
 137–9, 141–5, 161, 169, 172–3, 200,
 209, 212–13, 223n. 6, 224n. 12,
 241n. 15, 242nn. 25–6
 Museum 43, 55–6, 65–6, 107, 125, 209,
 223n. 6, 238n. 56
- Gast, John 16, 19, 21, 31, 37, 38, 40, 188,
 219nn. 41–2
- Gillies, John 11–13, 15, 16, 21, 22, 28–9, 37,
 38, 40–1, 45, 188, 216nn. 3, 9, 218n.
 30, 219n. 42
- Glaukippos of Collytus 103, 115, 237n. 44
- Glaucon of Aethalidae 49, 53, 117, 118, 127,
 187, 189, 208, 209, 237n. 36, 252n. 26
- Goldsmith, Oliver 18, 23, 31, 188, 216n. 6,
 217nn. 20, 23, 218n. 26
- graphē paranomōn* 87, 105, 115, 116, 232n.
 76, 234n. 6, 237n. 44
- Grote, George 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 18–19, 21,
 24, 33, 35, 39, 40–3, 45–6, 47–8, 49,
 50, 129, 153, 157, 188, 215n. 1,
 217nn. 12, 15, 219nn. 39, 42, 45,
 220nn. 48, 50, 51, 221n. 58, 230n. 64,
 241n. 17, 244n. 20, 252n. 21
gynaikonomoi 87–8, 231nn. 73–4, 232n. 77
- Habron of Boutadae 102, 103, 114, 156
- Hagnonides of Pergase 32, 67, 94–5,
 98–101, 113, 145–6, 148,
 220n. 51, 233n. 90, 237nn. 40–1,
 249n. 72
- Hamilton, Alexander 2, 33, 131, 219n. 38,
 240n. 1
- Harmodius and Aristogeiton *see Tyrannicides*
- Harpalus trials 26–7, 39, 99, 113, 154, 193,
 218n. 26, 243n. 4
- Hegemon 76, 141, 145–6, 148, 226nn. 34–5,
 242n. 23
- honours (civic) granted by Athens
 awarded to citizens 31, 104, 203–4,
 236–7n. 36
 for foreigners 82, 89, 98, 100–1, 105, 111,
 121, 124, 127, 136, 149, 157, 161,
 179–82, 204, 223n. 8, 249n. 68
 so-called 'highest honours' 94, 95, 105,
 107, 109, 116, 126, 127, 136, 155–6,
 174–5, 184, 236n. 29
- Hyperbolus 39, 49, 66, 112
- Hypereides 27, 55, 67, 81, 103, 113, 115,
 135–6, 138–40, 155, 241nn. 7, 11,
 243n. 7, 245n. 24
- infantry (Athenian) 10, 56, 106, 120–1, 135,
 161, 192, 205–6, 240n. 2
- Ipsus, Battle of 54, 78, 106, 122, 163, 175,
 182–3
- kaloi k'agathoi* 116, 158, 171–2, 175
- Lachares 64–5, 66, 67, 78, 102, 104, 106,
 175, 179, 183, 223nn. 7–8
- Laches of Leuconoe 94–5, 108, 109, 111,
 116–17, 126, 127, 172, 174–5,
 234n. 14
- Laconophiles 12–13, 17, 18, 27–8, 34, 50,
 97, 130, 133, 211–12
- Lamian War 4, 10, 19, 21, 23, 24, 59, 68, 76,
 99, 100, 102, 103, 108, 111, 120,
 136–8, 193, 199, 215n. 1, 225n. 21,
 241n. 16, 249n. 73, 252n. 23
- law courts (*dikasteria*) 24, 57, 62, 69, 96, 97,
 99, 100, 103, 105, 111, 148, 213,

- 222n. 6, 224n. 11, 232n. 76, 233n. 2, 235n. 19
- Lemnos 122, 127, 167, 203–4, 213, 238n. 60, 239n. 62, 252–3n. 36
- Leonidas 2, 5, 193, 195, 205
- Leosthenes 132, 136–7, 159, 193, 199, 250n. 1
- limited franchises 55, 66, 68–74, 88, 91, 118, 125
- 1,000 drachmas 53, 73–4, 225nn. 25–6, 226n. 27
- 2,000 drachmas 24, 68–73, 133, 141–2, 148, 150, 172, 223–4n. 10, 224n. 14, 225nn. 17–18, 21, 241nn. 15, 18, 242n. 32
- liturgies 61, 105
- chorēgia* 105, 154, 235n. 22
- see also agōnothesia*
- trierarchy 154, 243n. 2, 252n. 35
- Lycurgus of Boutadae 52, 95, 102, 103, 105–6, 131, 132, 135–6, 156, 189, 235nn. 15, 17, 236n. 31
- Lysimachus 44, 106, 107, 111, 122, 126–9, 163, 170, 174–5, 245nn. 28–9
- Lyttelton, George 23, 33, 36, 219n. 37
- Mably, Gabriel Bonnot de 2, 12, 13, 15, 16, 19, 23, 32–3, 36, 38, 45, 129, 130, 131, 217n. 15, 218nn. 35–6, 240n. 1
- Macaulay, Thomas Babbington 14–15, 19–20, 21, 25, 26, 40, 45, 46, 50, 216n. 11
- Macedon, Macedonians 3, 4, 34, 49–50, 55, 77, 78, 80, 99, 100, 104, 105, 107, 109, 119, 127–8, 134–7, 138, 139, 141, 145–6, 147, 155, 156, 159, 189, 194, 199, 208, 216n. 3, 218n. 29, 219n. 40, 220nn. 50–1, 221n. 52, 227n. 40, 228n. 46, 229nn. 47, 50, 233–4n. 5, 240n. 6, 242n. 22, 245n. 22, 250n. 1
- ethnicity 40–4, 198, 219–20n. 46
- imperialism of 6, 10, 21, 29, 32, 36, 38, 42–3, 44–5, 54, 57, 79, 129–30, 212–13, 229n. 56, 236n. 31
- see also* garrison, Macedonian
- Medius of Larissa 180, 249n. 68
- Meidias 113, 115, 184
- Meidias (II) of Anagyrous 103, 115
- Menander 3–4, 10, 25, 72–3, 74, 87, 97, 218n. 27, 232n. 78
- Millot, Claude-François-Xavier 12, 18, 19, 29, 37, 38, 217n. 21
- Miltiades 2, 29–30, 36, 38, 50, 239n. 63
- Mitford, William 12, 14, 15, 40–1, 42, 45, 216nn. 4, 6, 10, 11, 216–17n. 11, 217n. 15
- Moerocles of Eleusis 99, 107, 108, 113, 114, 135, 189–90, 191, 206, 250n. 3
- navy (Athenian) 106, 107, 111, 134, 141, 143, 157, 159, 164, 180, 191–2, 195, 200–7, 213, 221n. 51, 225n. 21, 236n. 24, 243n. 3, 246n. 32, 250n. 5, 252nn. 32, 34, 253n. 37
- Nicanor 76, 78, 141–5, 147, 150, 228n. 42, 242n. 25
- Nicias 34, 52, 112, 133, 212, 214
- Nicocles (friend of Phocion) 32, 136, 148–9
- Niebuhr, Barthold Georg 10, 16, 19, 20, 21, 26, 39, 40–2, 45, 50, 153, 155, 165, 188, 218n. 30, 247n. 51, 252n. 25
- nomophylakes* 86–7, 105, 231nn. 72–5
- oaths 35, 74, 110, 236n. 31
- office-holders (regular)
- ambassadors (*presbeis*) 67, 75, 76, 77, 80, 99, 103, 107, 108, 116–17, 118, 127–8, 138–9, 142, 146, 162, 169, 209, 214, 227nn. 39, 41, 228nn. 42, 46, 241n. 16, 252n. 26
- generals (*stratēgoi*) 1, 5, 13, 18, 30, 33, 34, 50, 64, 88, 91, 103, 107, 108, 117, 118, 125, 132, 135, 136, 140, 143, 148, 150, 179, 187–8, 189, 190, 191, 197–200, 204, 206–7, 208–9, 212, 214, 219nn. 38, 40, 223nn. 7, 8, 240n. 6, 241nn. 19, 21, 242nn. 29, 34,
- hipparchs 107, 117, 118, 203–4, 236n. 35, 236–7n. 36, 239n. 62
- nomothetae* 93, 103, 104
- phylarchs 118, 236n. 35, 237n. 36
- secretaries 65, 81–2, 85–6, 99–100, 104, 111, 181, 229n. 54, 231n. 70, 234n. 8
- see also anagrapheus*
- treasurers 69, 103, 117, 118, 227n. 36, 233n. 1
- oligarchy, oligarchs 5, 47, 49, 52–5, 56, 57–60, 61–93, 94, 97–8, 105, 111, 126, 128, 160, 174, 184, 211, 213, 221–33, 241nn. 7, 11, 242nn. 24, 32
- Antipatrid oligarchy 56, 59, 62, 63–4, 66–7, 68–73, 75–7, 80–2, 85–6, 88–90, 91–3, 95, 98–101, 103, 108–9, 114, 115, 118–19, 132–3, 137–51, 224n. 16,

- oligarchy, oligarchs (*Cont'd*)
 226n. 31, 227n. 38, 228n. 42, 229n.
 55, 231n. 70, 232n. 77, 234n. 7,
 241n. 15, 242n. 27
- Demetrius of Phalerum 33, 59, 62, 63–4,
 66, 73–4, 77–80, 82–4, 86–8, 89–91,
 93, 115, 118–19, 156, 222n. 4,
 224n. 15, 225n. 25, 226n. 27,
 227–8n. 42, 229nn. 56–7,
 231nn. 72–4, 233nn. 89–90, 234n. 7
- Four Hundred 59, 62, 66, 67, 70, 74–5,
 91, 93, 111
- Pro-Demetrian regime 59, 64–6, 95, 107,
 175, 185, 187–8, 223nn. 7–8,
 230n. 68, 238n. 56, 246n. 36
- purges 66–8
- ruling cliques 74–80
- Thirty 35, 59, 62, 66, 67, 68, 70, 74–5, 77,
 82, 84, 91, 111, 228n. 46
- tyranny 62, 74, 77, 179, 226n. 30
- Olympiodorus of Euonymon 15, 102, 117,
 127, 184–5, 188, 200, 208, 236n. 24,
 252n. 27
- double archonship 64, 184
- general 103, 108, 118, 204
- ousts Demetrius Poliorcetes' garrison
 from the Museum 43, 107
- recovers/rescues the Piraeus 191
- seen as a collaborator 43, 55–6
- Orchomenus, Orchomenians 170, 189,
 208–9, 252n. 26
- Pauw, Cornelius de 12, 23, 38, 45, 218n. 29
- Perdiccas 136, 164, 229n. 50, 242n. 22
- Pericles 2, 6–7, 8–9, 30, 45, 46, 49, 52, 68,
 79–80, 112, 154–5, 212–13, 222n. 4
- Phaedrus of Sphettus 15, 43, 49, 55–6, 91,
 107, 117, 118, 127, 174, 208, 220–1n.
 51, 223nn. 7–8
- Philip II (King of Macedon) 9, 10, 11, 12,
 21, 23–4, 26, 27, 30, 36, 40–2, 99, 111,
 130, 134–5, 136, 142, 154, 160, 193,
 216n. 3, 218n. 29, 219–20n. 46,
 220nn. 48–50, 236n. 31, 245n. 22
- Philip (III) Arrhidaeus 142, 145–6, 228n. 46
- Philip V (King of Macedon) 17, 40, 193, 198
- Philippides of Cephale 4, 43–4, 97, 109, 118,
 125–7, 158, 163, 166, 167, 172, 174–5,
 177, 183, 239n. 64, 245nn. 28–9,
 248n. 58
- Philippides of Paeania 184, 241nn. 9, 11,
 245n. 29, 248n. 58
- Philochorus 3–4, 21, 65, 86–7, 92, 188,
 231n. 72
- Phocion 1–3, 16, 19, 38, 67, 78, 99, 115, 128,
 129–51, 155, 185, 188, 211, 214,
 215nn. 1–3, 218nn. 31, 34, 226n. 35,
 237n. 44, 240n. 1–2, 5–6, 241nn.
 12–13, 14, 17, 19, 242nn. 22–3, 25–6,
 243nn. 35–7
- leader of Antipatrid oligarchy 63–4, 68,
 71, 75–6, 80, 84, 92–3, 137–46, 150,
 224n. 12, 226nn. 31, 33, 228n. 42,
 232n. 78, 233n. 90, 241nn. 7, 15, 18,
 20, 21
- and Macedon 42–3, 134–7, 150, 219n. 40,
 220n. 5
- and Socrates 17–18, 27–36, 131, 215n. 1,
 218n. 32, 240n. 4, 242n. 33
- trial and death 13, 17–18, 27–36, 50, 54,
 64, 70, 86, 92–3, 97, 98, 99, 100,
 113–14, 129, 146–50, 216n. 10, 217n.
 23, 218n. 24, 219nn. 37–41, 237n. 48,
 242nn. 28–9, 242–3n. 34, 249n. 72
- Phocis, Phocians 145, 196, 207, 250n. 5,
 251n. 16
- Phocus 67, 130, 240n. 5
- Phytius of Thoricus 107, 108, 117, 208
- Piraeus 64, 70, 78, 84, 93, 106, 107, 111,
 125, 142, 147, 150, 175, 191, 200, 203,
 204–5, 223n. 5, 224–5n. 16, 228n. 42,
 230n. 65, 231n. 73, 242n. 25, 250n. 1,
 251n. 8, 252n. 32
- Pleistarchus 106, 169
- Polemaeus (nephew of Antigonus the
 One-Eyed) 84, 164
- Polyeuctus of Sphettus 99, 113, 114, 132,
 135, 145, 155, 229n. 56, 223–4n. 5,
 234n. 6, 237n. 40
- Polyperchon 22, 30–1, 76, 78, 84, 100, 119,
 124, 141–2, 144–6, 147–8, 150, 160,
 168, 219n. 37, 226n. 35, 229n. 50,
 234n. 9, 237nn. 46, 48, 240n. 1,
 242nn. 22–3
- πρόσοδον γράφεσθαι 124, 171, 234n. 9,
 237n. 46
- Ptolemy (I) Sôtēr 40, 44, 106, 107, 119, 141,
 165, 169, 170, 237–8n. 49
- Ptolemy (II) Philadelphus 7, 109, 111–12,
 127, 194, 204, 208–9, 253n. 41
- Ptolemy (III) Euergetēs 7, 44, 209
- Pyrrhus (King of Epirus) 106–7, 170
- Pythocles of Cedoe 76, 148, 227n. 36
- Rhamnous 137, 190, 203, 205, 239n. 64,
 241n. 14, 252n. 35
- Robertson, William 16, 18, 19, 21, 22–3, 29,
 37, 38, 40–1, 45, 217n. 22, 219n. 42

- Robespierre, Maximilien 2, 13, 31–2, 33, 131, 240n. 1
- Rollin, Charles 11, 12, 16, 18, 19, 21, 28–9, 37–8, 66, 158, 217n. 20, 225n. 17, 244nn. 17–18
- Rome, Romans 5, 8, 12, 15, 17, 23, 25, 165, 193, 218n. 31, 228n. 46
- Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 12–13, 15, 218n. 35
- Salamis, Battle of (480) 6, 8, 17, 212, 236n. 31, 253n. 40
- Salamis, Battle of (306) 106, 164, 180
- Samos 46, 66, 142, 160–1, 164, 180
- Scepsis 160–1, 164–5
- Seleucus (I) Nicator 7, 106, 111, 122, 127, 165, 167, 170, 238nn. 51, 59, 60, 239n. 61, 252–3n. 36
- Simonides of Hagnous 117, 127
- Solon 26, 68, 72, 75
- Solon of Plataea 78, 145, 241n. 20
- sortition 57, 65, 88–91, 96, 111, 222n. 6, 233n. 2
- Sōtēria games 200–1, 206
- Sparta, Spartans 4, 6, 8, 11–16, 16–17, 21, 26, 27, 28–9, 30, 34, 36, 45, 46, 50, 55, 62, 66, 74, 91, 121, 130, 132, 133–4, 135, 158–9, 160, 178, 189, 199, 206, 211, 213, 217n. 23, 221n. 52, 222n. 8, 228n. 46, 236n. 30, 252n. 25, 253nn. 40–1
- alliance with Athens in the Chremonidean War 109–10, 111–12, 196, 204, 208–9, 252n. 26, 253n. 38
- provides Thirty with a garrison 62, 66, 91
- Spartocus (King of Bosphorus) 111, 127
- Stanyan, Temple 11, 12, 45, 216n. 6
- Stereia 203, 205
- Stratocles of Diomeia 15, 46, 49, 50, 53, 63, 102–6, 114–16, 128, 136, 152–86, 188, 214, 215n. 1, 237nn. 42, 44, 243–50
- and Demochares 43–4, 116, 155, 157, 172–6, 220n. 51, 237n. 47, 244n. 13, 247–8n. 52
- false announcement of victory in Battle of Amorgos 152, 157, 158–9, 244nn. 17, 19
- enemy of Philippides of Cephale 43, 97, 125, 163, 172, 174–5, 177, 248n. 58
- honours Lycurgus 95, 105–6, 155–6
- latter career 182–5
- manipulates the Attic calendar 125, 157, 176–9
- proposes decree deifying Demetrius Poliorcetes and Antigonus the One-Eyed 38–40, 42–3, 50, 120–1, 157, 159–67, 219nn. 42, 44, 244n. 21
- proposes decree that whatsoever Demetrius wishes is to be ‘just and pious’ 124–5, 157, 167–72
- prosecutes Demosthenes 27, 39, 50, 154–5, 243n. 5, 244n. 12
- relationship with Demetrius Poliorcetes’ *philoi* 157, 162–3, 167, 179–82
- Telocles of Alopece 81–2, 114–15, 229n. 56–7
- Thebes, Thebans 26, 36, 46, 134, 154, 156, 213, 218n. 31
- Themistocles 2, 29–30, 36, 154, 196
- Theophrastus 7, 10, 61–2, 68, 74, 88, 100, 113–14, 222nn. 1–2, 226n. 28
- Theramenes 34, 77, 228n. 46
- Thermopylae 5, 110, 187–8, 189, 190, 192, 193–9, 200–4, 205–7, 208, 209, 250n. 5, 251nn. 10, 11, 15, 252n. 31, 253n. 41
- Thirlwall, Connop 16, 34–5, 39, 40, 42–3, 70–1, 129, 153, 158, 171, 188, 216n. 8, 225n. 18, 230n. 64
- Thrace 70, 133, 163
- Thrasycles of Thria 81–2, 85, 89–90
- Thudippus of Araphen 76, 148–9, 227n. 36
- Thymochares (I) of Sphettus 91, 221n. 51
- Thymochares (II) of Sphettus 117, 118
- tigers 7
- Tourreil, Jacques de 21, 23, 36, 45
- tribal cycles 65, 80–1, 99–100, 104, 111, 234n. 8, 235n. 18
- Tyrannicides 7, 120–4, 238nn. 51–6
- Voltaire 12–13, 15, 216nn. 3, 10, 217n. 15
- Vouliagmeni 203, 252n. 32
- Xenocles of Sphettus 99, 102, 103, 156, 190, 234n. 7, 235n. 17, 250n. 3
- Xenocrates 138, 141, 240n. 66
- Xerxes 5, 7, 41, 110–11, 192–6, 198, 205, 207, 236n. 31, 238n. 51, 252n. 25, 253n. 40
- Zeno 7, 10, 128
- Zeus 7, 32, 97, 101, 149, 160, 162, 178, 187, 201, 234n. 13, 245nn. 22, 23, 250n. 1

